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This doctoral thesis analyses the process of state construction in the early 
modern period from a joint perspective that amalgamates the agencies of state officials, 
lending communities, and local elites in the Hispanic Monarchy during the four initial 
years of Philip II’s reign. The project examines the convergence of private agendas inside 
and outside the royal administration, which were channelled by the Genoese lending 
community to overcome the consolidation of royal short-term debt in 1557 and its 
consequences. The application of an institutional approach, based on the works of Avner 
Greif, to the analysis of the social organisations that prevented a failure of coordination 
in the Hispanic Monarchy offers a fresh perspective on a topic normally assessed under 
predatory models. The specific study of two Genoese lenders who contributed to the 
establishment of a more viable and efficient financial system in the monarchy, Costantin 
Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo, provides details about how interregional transactions 
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Notes on currencies: 
This work aims to be reader friendly, which means that all sums of money have 
been converted into Castilian ducats of 375 maravedis each where possible. In the 
period studied in this thesis, ducats and maravedis were accounting currencies, which 
means that they were mostly used in the accountants’ books to handle large figures. 
From 1537, the golden escudo was minted and gradually replaced the ducat in Castile, 
which used to be a hard currency. The silver coin was the real, which had different values 
depending on the weight and quality of the metal. One ducat was worth 11 reales, while 
the Castilian escudo was worth 10 reales or 340 maravedis. From Chapter 3 onwards, 
the reader will also encounter the Genoese golden escudos, the value of which 
depended on the money market.1 
  
 
1 Further information of the currencies in Castile see Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict, 
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‘Gli Assenti di Spagna sono le maggior Negotiatione de 
Cambii, che segua nella Cristianità, facendosi di partite 
grandissime, e de millioni de scuti più, ò meno, secondo i 
bisogni, c’ha quella Corona di far provisioni de danari’2 
Financial services and the Hispanic Monarchy: a short review 
The opening quote of this thesis was written in 1638 by the Genoese economist 
Giovanni Domenico Peri in Il negotiante. The paragraph, which was part of an early 
modern textbook on the basic knowledge that prospective financiers and merchants 
should have learned by the time they were introduced to actual business, stressed two 
points. First, Spain was an immense marketplace where businessmen could benefit from 
the large operations of cambii called assenti, which Peri defined as the traffico de denari 
(circulation of money) and accordi (agreements) respectively.3 Second, the importance 
of those transactions could vary since they depended on the need of the monarch for 
money.4 In this sense, the Genoese economist referred to a huge and dynamic credit 
market in which the sovereign was the main contracting party of these financial services, 
which involved the transfer of money from one place to another and the exchange of 
currency. 
When Peri wrote this text, he also analysed the ongoing financial situation at that 
time. The economist emphasised that Genoese businessmen, who used to reside at the 
royal court in Madrid, had always been the financial service providers of the Spanish 
monarchs. Their theoretical monopoly of asientos, which is the Castilian word employed 
in this thesis, was being contested by Portuguese financiers when the work was 
published. Peri argued, however, that the newcomers had little chance of displacing the 
Genoese community since the former did not have enough adherenze (influence) in the 
 
2 Giovanni Domenico Peri, Il Negotiante, vol. 1 (Genova: Stampa di Pier Giovanni Calenzano, 1638), chap. 
XVII, p. 134. 
3 On the definition of ‘cambio’ see ibid., vol. 1, chap. XVIII, p. 145. 
4 Peri made a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary asientos in which the former were arranged 
each January to fund the military operations of the year, while the latter responded to unexpected needs. 
Although the royal administration arranged asientos for all the territories of the monarchy, Flanders 
consumed four million escudos at least, which was far more than the operations issued for other 
territories. See ibid., 1:135; the French invasion of the Habsburg Low Countries in 1635, during the Thirty 
Years’ War, explains the need for huge financial services. See Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years War, 
2nd ed. (Routledge, 1997), 133–34. 
2 
 
main financial markets of Europe. The Genoese thinker was not mistaken, as the 
Portuguese lending community had gained ground on Genoese financiers since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, especially after the consolidation of royal debt 
and the royal pardon of their community in January and June of 1627 respectively.  5 
The might of the Genoese lending community in the finances of the Hispanic 
sovereigns that Peri claimed in 1638 was the result of combining the Genoese strategy 
of diversifying risks and the enhancement of the bills of exchange in circulation, which 
eliminated the need to transport physical currency throughout Europe.6 In this sense, 
the Genoese improved the interconnections within a territorially dispersed Hispanic 
Monarchy by servicing liquidity in distant spaces at short notice thanks to their system 
of mutual trust. This shift in financial practices also coincided with the progressive 
retirement of the heads of the main South German lending houses. 7 This process is 
reflected in the classic debate about the substitution of one lending community for 
another, from Ehrenberg’s ‘century of the Fugger’ to Ruiz Martín’s ‘century of the 
Genoese’. 8 However, our knowledge about the lending communities that funded the 
Hispanic Monarchy in the early modern period has evolved since that debate started.9 
The last decade the literature has mostly focused on the evolution of lending 
communities in the seventeenth century, especially in relation to the financial decline 
of the monarchy in the seventeenth century. Some of the conclusions extracted from 
 
5 On the expansion of Portuguese lending houses see Carmen Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros y la crisis de la 
Monarquía Hispánica de 1640 (Ediciones de Historia, 2013), 122–24; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, El crédito de la 
monarquía hispánica en el reinado de Felipe IV (Junta de Castilla y León, 1997), 181–84; James C. Boyajian, 
Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650 (Rutgers University Press, 1983); Felipe Ruiz Martín, 
La Banca En España Hasta 1782: Una Historia Económica (Banco de España, 1970), 119–22. 
6 Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce, (1st English translation of ‘Les Jeux de l’Échange’, first 
published in 1979), vol. 2, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century (University of California Press, 
1992), 390–95. 
7 More details on these differences in Hermann Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en España y Portugal hasta 1560, 
Estudios de historia (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2000), 615. 
8 Richard Ehrenberg, Capital & Finance in the Age of the Renaissance; a Study of the Fuggers and Their 
Connections (first published in German in 1896 as Das Zeitalter Der Fugger) (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1963). 
Although Frank C. Spooner coined the expression of ‘the century of the Genoese’, it was Felipe Ruiz Martín 
who established chronological boundaries to the Genoese financial predominance between 1528 and 
1680. See Frank Clyffurde Spooner, L’économie mondiale et les frappes monétaires en France, 1493-1680 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1956); Felipe Ruiz Martín, La Banca En España Hasta 1782: Una Historia Económica 
(Banco de España, 1970). 
9 An excellent historiographical review, which inspired the following brief analysis of the literature, in José 
Miguel Escribano Páez and Alejandro García Montón, ‘De gobernantes y deudas. Una década de 




those studies are also applicable to the previous century.10 Information was always an 
asset, especially for the Genoese lending community, in reducing transaction costs.11 
Notwithstanding sharing information, lenders also competed and cooperated with one 
another through bonds of kindship or matrimonial alliances.12 Nevertheless, there is still 
little detailed information about how those lenders managed to fulfil their asientos with 
the royal administration.13 The fact that they were appointed to high-ranking positions 
at the royal court in the seventeenth century reflects the peak of their apogee, but 
further research in this field is still necessary.14 
The reimbursement of the financial services of private lenders has also drawn 
the attention of scholars, especially regarding the issuance of bonds of long-term royal 
debt called juros.15 The study of this financial instrument has received renewed interest 
in recent years through the analysis of how its attractiveness to prospective bondholders 
during periods of financial changes diminished its value.16 This literature, nonetheless, 
 
10 Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros y la crisis de la Monarquía Hispánica de 1640; Alberto Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda 
pública, mercado crediticio y actividad económica en la Castilla del siglo XVII’, Hispania: Revista española 
de historia 73, no. 243 (2013): 133–60; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Los genoveses y la incautación del interés 
de los juros de Castilla en 1634’, ed. Manuel Herrero Sánchez et al. (Génova y la monarquía hispánica 
(1528-1713), Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 775–800. 
11 The importance of information was already stressed by Doria in Giorgio Doria, ‘Conoscenza del mercato 
e sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti finanzieri genovesi nei secoli XVI e XVII.’, ed. Aldo De 
Maddalena and Hermann Kellenbenz, La repubblica internazionale del denaro tra 15. e 17. secolo, 1986; 
Yasmina Ben Yessef Garfia, ‘A Genoese Merchant and Banker in the Kingdom of Naples: Ottavio Serra and 
His Business Network in the Spanish Polycentric System, c.1590–1620’, European Review of History: Revue 
Européenne d’histoire, Abril 2016, 1–33; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, Claudio Marsilio, and Luca Lo Basso, ‘La rete 
finanzaria della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere dei cambi (1610-1656)’, Quaderni storici 42, 
no. 124 (2007): 97–110. 
12 Ana Sofía Vieira Ribeiro, Early Modern Trading Networks in Europe: Cooperation and the Case of Simon 
Ruiz, Perspectives in Economic and Social History 39 (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2016); Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘Los Cortizos. Un Clan Financiero de Origen Judeoconverso’, in 
Estado, Monarquía y Finanzas. Estudios de Historia Financiera En Tiempos de Los Austrias (Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2004), 185–210. 
13 A couple of exceptions in Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Banqueros Alemanes de Felipe IV: Los Fugger Jóvenes 
y Julio César Scazuola (1618-1641)’, Studia Historica. Historia Moderna 39, no. 1 (2017): 265–99; Mauricio 
Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, Taxes, and Default in the 
Age of Philip II, The Princeton Economic History of the Western World (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
14 Carmen Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro: Octavio Centurión, el financiero de los Austrias 
(Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2015). 
15  For a classic introduction see Álvaro Castillo Pintado, ‘Los Juros de Castilla. Apogeo y Fin de Un 
Instrumento de Crédito’, Hispania: Revista Española de Historia, no. 89 (1963): 43–70. 
16 Alberto Marcos Martín, ‘“Crecimientos, reducciones y no cabimientos de juros”. Tres episodios de 
gestión irresponsable de la deuda pública consolidada en la España del siglo XVII’, Cuadernos de Historia 
Moderna 42, no. 2 (2017): 553–84; Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Los juros y el endeudamiento de la 
Real Hacienda de Castilla,1557-1627’ (Historia de la deuda pública en España: (siglos XVI-XXI), Madrid: 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2015), 37–66; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘La rentabilidad de los juros de Castilla 
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tends to apply a quantitative long-term approach, leaving an important qualitative field 
barely explored and which this thesis intends to rectify.17 
Apart from the issuance of long-term debt, financial services were backed by 
royal incomes guaranteed by representative institutions. 18 This historiographical field 
has provided important works on the continuous negotiation between the central 
authority of the monarchy and the effective power of cities to mobilise resources.19 The 
fiscal system, which was largely in the hands of local elites, also posed an income ceiling 
on the monarchs that limited their ability to keep borrowing.20 When representative 
institutions did not agree with the sovereign to increase the limits on the fiscal burden 
and thus raise more debt, financial shocks in the form of debt consolidation took place.21 
New studies are delving into the multiple causes for this outcome, while scholars 
simultaneously emphasise the flexibility of the royal administration and private 
financiers to adapt to the new scenario.22 In this sense, there are still unresolved issues 
 
en el siglo XVII’, in Historia de la deuda pública en España: (siglos XVI-XXI), 2015, 85–110; Domínguez Ortiz, 
Antonio, ‘Juros y Censos En Castilla Del Seiscientos: Una Sociedad de Rentistas’, in Dinero, Moneda y 
Crédito En La Monarquía Hispánica (Marcial Pons : Fundación ICO, 2000), 789–806. 
17 An exception in Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y Demanda de Deuda Pública En Castilla: Juros de Alcabalas 
(1540-1740)’, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2009. 
18 Although the volume of literature on this issue is large, it is worth mentioning the main classic studies. 
See Ramón Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros., vol. 2: La Hacienda Real de Castilla, 3 vols 
(Barcelona: Crítica, 1987, first published in 1949); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda de Felipe 
IV. (Madrid: Editorial de Derecho Financiero, 1960); Modesto Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El 
Reinado de Felipe II, 3rd edition (first published in 1963) (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 
Seminario Cisneros, 1986). 
19 Manuel Herrero Sánchez, ‘El Modelo Republicano En Una Monarquía de Ciudades’, in Soulèvements, 
Révoltes, Révolutions: Dans l’empire Des Habsbourg d’Espagne, XVIe-XVIIe Siècle, ed. Alain Hugon and 
Alexandra Merle, Collection de La Casa de Velázquez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2017), 245–66; Regina 
Grafe, Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 243; José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, Las Cortes de Castilla y León bajo los Asturias: una 
interpretción (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2008); David Alonso García, El erario del reino: fiscalidad 
en Castilla a principios de la Edad Moderna, 1504-1525, Estudios de historia (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla 
y León, Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 2007); Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora, Cortes, monarquía, 
ciudades: las Cortes de Castilla a comienzos de la época moderna (1475-1515), 1988. 
20 José Ignacio Andrés Ucendo, ‘Una Hacienda permanentemente endeudada: Impuestos y deuda pública 
en la Castilla del siglo XVII’, 2015, 67–84; Carlos Álvarez Nogal and Christophe Chamley, ‘Debt Policy under 
Constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese Bankers’, Economic History Review 67, no. 1 (February 
2014): 192–213; Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora, ‘Liquidez, deuda y obtención de recursos extraordinarios 
(en torno a los servicios de Cortes en época de Carlos V)’, in Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político 
en Europa (1530-1558) (Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos 
V, 2001), 443–62. 
21  A historiographical review in Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Endeudamiento dinástico y crisis 
financieras en tiempo de los Austrias: las suspensiones de pagos de 1557-1627’, Libros de la Corte.es, no. 
7 (2013): 59–128. 
22  Escribano Páez and García Montón, ‘De gobernantes y deudas. Una década de producción 
historiográfica sobre la Castilla de los Austrias’, 373; Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero 
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that need elucidating regarding certain aspects of the financial system of the Hispanic 
Monarchy that involve all the above-mentioned topics. 
Research questions: 
The first research question that this thesis addresses is the problem of trust after 
financial shocks. Although episodes of debt consolidation in the Hispanic Monarchy 
were repetitive, even cyclical, the royal administration and its financial intermediaries 
kept attempting to draw the attention of prospective investors to invest in bonds of 
royal long-term debt. In this sense, trust was a transversal element present at every 
bilateral level of the pyramidal system of lending: sovereign-brokers, brokers-savers, 
and sovereign-savers. However, trust could also involve more than one level. An investor, 
for example, knew that their savings were being forwarded to fund royal debt through 
the intermediation of a broker. In that case, the investor had to rely on the royal 
administration to pay off the interest, on the one hand, and the broker to find a reliable 
debt bond in the long term, on the other. Some scholars have already addressed this 
question, but they used to employ an economics-based approach rather than an 
institutional one and focused mostly on the relationship between borrower and lender 
than on the entire system as a whole.23 This thesis intends to fill that void and answer 
the questions of how trust was developed in formal and informal institutions, and what 
the results of that relationship were. 
The second research question of this thesis deals with is the behaviour of the 
clients of the lending communities in the early modern period. Were they passive or 
active actors in the debt market? Did bondholders change their behaviour when 
financial conditions changed? The literature about early modern bondholders is scarce 
and not able to cover important scenarios such as financial shocks.24 This thesis aims at 
providing some insights on this topic to discover if clients were something more than 
 
Dinástico: Endeudamiento y Crisis Financieras En La España de Los Austrias, 1557-1647. Vol. 1 (Banco de 
España, 2016); Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell; Carlos Álvarez Nogal and 
Christophe Chamley, ‘La Crisis Financiera de Castilla En 1575-1577: Fiscalidad y Estrategia’, Revista de 
Historia de La Economía y de La Empresa 7 (2013): 187–215; Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, Felipe II: El 
Imperio En Bancarrota: La Hacienda Real de Castilla y Los Negocios Financieros Del Rey Prudente (Madrid: 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2008). 
23 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell. 
24 Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y Demanda de Deuda Pública En Castilla’. 
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that. In effect, those investors could be brokers at a local level who helped lending 
houses to permeate spaces that the latter could not reach alone. This relation is decisive 
for our understanding of risk sharing strategies, since they are usually associated with 
high-ranking intermediaries rather than small brokers. The following pages analyse, 
therefore, the behaviour and tactics of local actors. 
The final research question that this thesis poses is if it is possible to measure the 
importance of those local financial investors and brokers in the process of state 
consolidation. These individuals were not necessarily royal subjects or servants, though 
they could eventually become such during their lifetime. Instead, the main appeal of this 
individual, or group of individuals, lies in their indirect relationship to the royal 
administration, which was mediated by financiers. These brokers facilitated access to 
credit at a regional and local level to the Genoese (upstream flow) and provided 
profitable returns to their own clientele (downstream flow). By doing so, those people 
indirectly participated in the state articulation while helping to develop local economies 
and social institutions of economic assistance such as convents. In this sense, this thesis 
seeks to complement the literature that analyses the role of big financiers in the central 
administrations through an analysis of the clients who made that institutional 
integration possible.25 
Methodology and sources: 
Institutional historiography inspires the analysis employed in this thesis to 
understand the mechanisms of credit flow and the role of brokers and investors in the 
consolidation of the early modern state. In this thesis, institutions are considered as “a 
system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a (social) 
behaviour”.26 According to the institutional literature, institutions can be informal and 
formal. Informal institutions are “norms of conduct, historical traditions, religious 
precepts… often enforced by business and social groups, the church, family or private 
entities established explicitly to enforce codes of conduct”. Formal institutions, by 
 
25 Anne Dubet and Jean-Philippe Luis, eds., Les financiers et la construction de l’Etat: France, Espagne 
(XVIIe-XIXe siècle), Histoire (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2011). 
26 The definition of institution is taken from Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: 
Lessons from Medieval Trade, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 30. 
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contrast, “are embodied in constitutions, laws, the structure of state decision making 
and regulations enforced by judges, courts, police, bureaucracy”.27 
Scholars have often pointed to organisations as main enforcers of this set of 
values. The American economist Douglass C. North defined organisations as “groups of 
individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives” and classified them 
as political, economic, social, or educational bodies. 28  In this sense, organisations 
constitute institutions because they establish a set of values among its members and 
also determine the behaviour of individuals exogenous to their internal structure.29 
Since the organisations studied in this thesis were man-made, nonphysical, and enforced 
a certain pattern of behaviour through formal and informal mechanisms inside and 
outside their structure, they are considered institutions. 
As a result of this conceptual clarification, some of the organisations analysed in 
this thesis are classified as formal and informal institutions. For example, the Factoría 
General examined in the second chapter is considered a formal institution because the 
behaviour of its members responded to their instructions, legal documents that 
regulated their jobs and were issued by the highest authority in the Hispanic Monarchy. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, however, two Genoese lending groups are examined. 
These business organisations are considered informal institutions because their 
behaviour obeyed patterns of conduct based on reputation and self-coercion. In this 
case, no state regulated the behaviour of these lenders, which reflects their private 
character. 
This division between formal and informal institutions is essential to 
understanding the purpose of this work because the Genoese lending community is the 
main subject of study. This informal institution used to offer financial services to the 
Hispanic Monarchy through a system of syndicated lending based on trust and solvency 
before fellow financiers and creditors. Solvency, understood as the ability to create new 
sources of income, is an idea still barely explored in the micro level relationship between 
 
27 Philip Keefer and Mary M. Shirley, ‘Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development’, in 
Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude 
Mènard (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000), 96. 
28 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 5. 
29 Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, 31. 
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lender and broker-client. 30 In order to fill this void in the literature, this thesis focuses 
on the tactics that Genoese lenders used to liquidate their debts with the sovereign after 
the debt consolidation of 1557 through the distribution of juros al quitar among private 
investors.  
This sort of early modern financial leverage that Genoese lenders employed was 
possible thanks to their social capital, which are norms and mutual interests resulting 
from the creation of bonds of trust and processes of cooperation among the members 
of multiple social groups.31 This concept stress the Genoese ability to generate individual 
and collective benefits in the Genoese lending community, such as the reimbursement 
of royal debts through the sale of juros when the sovereign had no liquidity to service 
the former. A bidimensional approach to these debt transactions offers a clear vision of 
the many bonds of trust that were necessary for the success of the operation. 
First, the examination of over a hundred sales of juros linked to the old royal 
debts represents a vertical perspective because it considers the relationship between 
the king, the Genoese financier, and the investor. Although every juro was part of a 
larger sale of debt titles, each one was an independent operation with a new investor 
every time and, therefore, a new social connection for the Genoese financiers. 
Nevertheless, the identification of those investors is not a straightforward process. The 
research needs to resort specifically to the process of reimbursement associated with 
the concept of deudas viejas (old debts), which was the money that Philip II consolidated 
in 1557 and intended to reimburse to his lenders through the funds raised from the sale 
of long-term debt. When the monarch sold juros to the clients of the Genoese financiers, 
those small capitalists were registered in official lists held by the royal administration. 
The examination of these registers transcends the macro scale offered by the Genoese 
 
30 Some important examples that fit in the literature on the long-term development of royal debt are 
Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016; Álvarez Nogal, ‘La rentabilidad de los juros de Castilla 
en el siglo XVII’; Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda pública, mercado crediticio y actividad económica en la Castilla 
del siglo XVII’; David Alonso García, ‘Ducados Entre Dos Dinastias. La Circulacion de Capital Entre Castilla 
y Flandes a Comienzos Del Siglo XVI’, in Banca, Crédito y Capital. La Monarquia Hispanica y Los Antiguos 
Paises Bajos (1505-1700) (Fundación Carlos Amberes, 2006), 85–104; Carlos Morales, Felipe II; Carmen 
Sanz Ayán, Estado, monarquía y finanzas: estudios de historia financiera en tiempos de los Austrias (Centro 
de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2004); Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros y la crisis de la Monarquía 
Hispánica de 1640; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Los banqueros de Felipe IV y los metales preciosos americanos 
(1621-1665)’, Estudios de historia económica, no. 36 (1997): 9–195. 
31 Sebouh Aslanian, ‘Social Capital, “Trust” and the Role of Networks in Julfan Trade: Informal and Semi-
Formal Institutions at Work’, Journal of Global History 1, no. 03 (November 2006): 385. 
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financier and creates a micro level where hundreds of investors have been recorded in 
a database. 
Second, the horizontal dimension of the analysis observes the different profiles 
of each investor and how they raised enough capital to acquire juros. This approach, 
inspired by the literature about merchant companies, uses notarial protocols and 
private accounting records as its main source of information.32 The outcomes of this 
investigation establish that those investors were not low-income people. Instead, they 
were a wide array of wealthy civil and religious institutions, high- and low-ranking 
nobility, officeholders, courtiers, merchants, and other financiers. The accumulation of 
capital that those investors achieved to purchase the debt titles could also be the result 
of a lower level of the diversification of risks. These bondholders were the guardians of 
local liquidity, which they invested either upwards in the acquisition of royal debt or 
downwards to finance the economic development of their local spaces. Their 
participation in the Genoese upstream and downstream credit flows becomes a 
methodological challenge in order to establish a general profile of what kind of 
relationship existed between them and the Genoese financiers. 
As some juros were acquired by the mediation of broker-investors who paid on 
behalf of the rightful owner, there is another methodological problem: the linkage 
between the Genoese, the broker-investor, and the final debt holder. This research 
distinguishes between two levels of case studies regarding bondholders. The first one 
analyses only the clients of the Genoese who directly acquired the royal debt titles. The 
records kept in the royal premises contain the history of each debt title and they are a 
rich source of personal information too. Nevertheless, this material is insufficient and 
quite often it is necessary to look at secondary literature to complete the identification 
of individuals.  
This investigation has followed a top-down approach in which the institutional 
apparatus of the monarchy is the starting point. The main sources are held at the Archivo 
General de Simancas, which has provided two types of sources. First, the accounts of 
 
32  An example of this approach in Catia Brilli, ‘La importancia de hacerse español: la élite mercantil 
genovesa de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII’, in El sistema comercial español en la económia mundial (siglos XVII-
XVIII): Homenaje a Jesús Aguado de los Reyes (Servicio de Publicaciones, 2013), 225–55. 
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the royal treasurers, which have shown how the distribution of the juros granted to the 
Genoese financiers worked. Bundles of letters between the lenders and the royal 
accountants complement the gaps in these sources, which are indeed very dispersed. 
Second, the archive also holds copies of the juros as well as the original copies of those 
titles of debt. Those duplicates are bound to additional documents that relate part of 
the history of that title, such as later sales of shares, renunciations, or modifications in 
the interest by royal decree. 
This extra information is quite useful for further investigation as it also contains 
powers of attorney, which were sanctioned by public notaries. The name of the notary 
redirects the research to local notarial archives, which allows us to focus on specific case 
studies of investors and their private and public life. This project has required the use of 
notarial protocols from the Archivo Histórico Provincial of Valladolid and Burgos, which 
have produced interesting case studies. Nevertheless, these sources are only successful 
for the Castilian cases, while foreign investors had to be checked in foreign archives. 
Some cases have led the investigation to the Archivi di Stato of Florence and Genoa, or 
the Archivio Doria of Genoa. The variety of investors is so large that specific case studies 
have also driven the research to the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid, in addition to 
private archives such as the Archivio Naldini (Florence) or the Archivo de los Condes de 
Cedillo (Madrid). 
There are, moreover, other kinds of sources that have been important for the 
completion of this thesis. Most of the administrative reports, either financial or political, 
that have been analysed were found in the Archivo General de Simancas in Spain. Among 
these documents it is worth mentioning the presence of important correspondence 
between the multiple royal servants that are referred to in this thesis, either high- or 
medium-ranking officials. The Calendar of State Papers, another source of 
administrative correspondence, has provided a privileged perspective from the point of 
view of Venetian ambassadors present at the courts of the Hispanic Monarchy, England, 
France, and the Papal States. Just for this part of the study, more than 1,100 letters have 
been read, analysed, and categorised in the timeframe of this thesis. The outcomes of 
this task are to be found all over this study, especially in the third chapter, because they 
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provide a view of the alternative projects to raise funds for Philip II that coincided over 
time with foreign experiments along the same lines. 
Case studies: a brief introduction 
This project deals with two initial subjects of study to address the three research 
questions: Costantin Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo. These two Genoese financiers 
shared a long-term career in the Hispanic Monarchy before the consolidation of debt in 
1557. Although there were other lenders who financed Philip II in this period, Gentil and 
Grimaldo were particularly successful in liquidating a large part of the royal debts 
resulting from the first consolidation of Philip II’s short-term debt. Gentil was the 
representative of the Centurione consortium and he represents the type of financier 
that continuously pursued the authority of Philip II to formally sanction the recognition 
of old debts after the decree. Grimaldo, by contrast, officially worked alone and followed 
the effective power to also obtain the reimbursement of old debts. The comparative 
analysis of the asientos and subsequent distribution of juros that the two financiers 
organised offers new insights into the integration of formal and informal institutions. 
Thesis structure: 
All the compiled information has shaped this doctoral thesis into three parts that 
cover seven chapters plus conclusions. The first part contains three chapters. The first 
chapter offers a historiographical review of the symbiotic relationship between the 
Hispanic Monarchy and the Republic of Genoa in the early modern period to 
contextualise the work. The second chapter analyses the origins and purpose of the 
Factoría General in the context of the debt consolidation to show the importance of 
medium-ranking officials in formal institutions. The third chapter examines the 
convergence of the fiscal strategies that high-ranking officials of different polities 
developed to provide alternative solutions to debt consolidation, thus emphasising the 
similarities between European polities in their financial strategies. 
The second part contains two chapters and shows the perspectives of the two 
case studies in this project, Costantin Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo, throughout the 
phases of the development and stabilisation of the financial reform that the debt 
consolidation of 1557 triggered. More specifically, the fourth chapter analyses the 
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struggles of Gentil and the Centurione consortium to secure the trustworthy 
reimbursement of their old debts, which highlights the combination of informal and 
formal strategies for the enforcement of contracts. The fifth chapter examines the case 
study of Grimaldo and the difficulties he also faced in achieving a trustworthy repayment. 
In this chapter, the focus is on the intertwining of the private agendas of the royal factor 
López del Campo and Grimaldo, who were members of a formal and informal institution 
respectively despite both being private entrepreneurs. 
The third part of the thesis contains two chapters and provides the perspective 
of those investors who acquired juros al quitar that had been issued to reimburse old 
debts. The sixth chapter analyses the distribution of those bonds of debt among private 
savers to highlight their heterogeneous profiles. Some specific examples are provided 
to illustrate the process of brokering and resale to third parties, besides focusing on the 
private agendas that moved those investors to participate. The seventh chapter, by 
contrast, focuses on the importance of allocating royal debt to a specific royal income 
to be distributed among Castilian and foreigner investors with intermediated access to 
the credit market. More specifically, the chapter deals with the reliability of the nuevo 
derecho de lanas to back new debt, based on the ability of Genoese financiers to support 
taxpayers and the private agendas of investors to enlarge their influence in urban areas. 
The conclusions of this thesis offer some final remarks on the entire financial and 
social process analysed from the perspective of institutional integration. The goal of this 
final section is to emphasise that formal and informal institutions were indistinguishable 
in practice, and that informal institutions were essential for the economic development 
of large polities in the early modern period, since the central administration found the 























Chapter 1. The symbiosis of the Hispanic Monarchy and the 
Genoese: a matter of finances, social ascendance, and state 
construction 
The literature on the relation between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Republic 
of Genoa in the early modern centuries discusses their political and economic alliance 
against common enemies such as France in mainland Europe or the Ottoman Empire.33 
This partnership did not only imply a shared front in the military field but also a 
cooperative symbiosis based on reciprocal services and socio-economic integration. This 
chapter explores the historiography of this collaboration to propose an alternative 
theory of state-building based on the agency of non-state actors and their long-term 
agendas. The first part places this thesis in the historiographical debates on the 
emergence of the early modern state through an institutional approach. The main topics 
include the role of coercion and negotiation with urban elites, the contribution and 
efficiency of formal and informal institutions in the economic growth, and the agency of 
non-state actors in the formation of early modern states. The following analysis of the 
fiscal and financial structures of the early modern Hispanic Monarchy to explain the 
problems that led this huge polity to find its way together with the Republic of Genoa. 
The second part develops these points further in relation to the independent 
evolution of the Republic of Genoa to show how this polity became an essential although 
not integral part of the Hispanic Monarchy. In this sense, the emphasis moves towards 
the role of the Genoese diaspora in the state construction through this symbiotic 
relationship from inside and outside the territories of the monarchy thanks to its social 
integration with local elites. The chapter closes by reconsidering the alleged symbiosis 
between these two polities in high politics to evince the existence of intermittent 
disagreements and emphasize the importance of values such as trust and reputation at 
the local level. 
 
33 Arturo Pacini, ‘“Poiché Gli Stati Non Sono Portatili...”: Geopolitica e Strategia Nei Rapporti Tra Genova 
e Spagna Nel Cinquecento’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713), 2011, 413–58; Thomas 
Allison Kirk, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), chap. 4; Manuel Herrero Sánchez, ‘Sección 




1.1. Financing the Hispanic Monarchy: a conceptual roadmap 
The Hispanic Monarchy in the early modern centuries: a state in the making 
The main goal of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights into the 
historiographical debate about how early modern states like the Hispanic Monarchy 
clearly emerged from the sixteenth century. Scholars have approached this process in 
Europe focusing on the political organisation, economic development, or cultural 
exchanges of monarchies and republics.34 In general terms, the concept of state can be 
understood as the result of human efforts to organise themselves in community. 
However, the characteristics to define that concept have always caused problems to 
academics. Political sociologists, for example, keep using the definition of state given by 
the German sociologist and historian Max Weber, who considered the state as the form 
of human community (Gemeinschaft) in which a specific authority exerted the monopoly 
of the legitimated use of physical force in a limited geographical area.35 In other words, 
the rule of law and violence characterizes what a state should be. 
The correct enforcement of law and legitimate violence to control the Weberian 
limited territory required the development of institutions, either informal or formal 
ones. The traditional institutional literature considers that informal institutions are 
norms of conduct, historical traditions or religious concepts usually enforced by private 
groups such as family, business, and the church. Formal institutions, by contrast, are 
legal texts like constitutions and laws and enforced by judicial and administrative 
officials of the state. As it has already been stated in the introduction of this doctoral 
thesis, the methodology employed seeks to provide empirical evidence to the 
 
34  Some of the main works, which are properly contextualised in the following pages, include Perry 
Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Verso World History Series (NLB, 1974); Richard Bonney, The 
European Dynastic States, 1494-1660 (Oxford University Press, 1991); Wolfgang Reinhard, Power Elites 
and State Building, ed. European Science Foundation, The Origins of the Modern State in Europe (New 
York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1996); Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building 
States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 
(Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Stephan R. Epstein, Freedom and 
Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-1750., 2002; David Stasavage, States of Credit: 
Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities, Princeton Economic History of the Western World 
(Princeton, NJ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
35 Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, eds., Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on 
Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 136. 
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historiographical branch of this field that consider social organisations as institutions.36 
In this sense, early modern states were defined in territorial contestation with other 
communities also organised in institutions. 
The development of formal and informal institutions has traditionally been 
linked to the state capacity to generate economic growth for a society through the 
reduction of transaction costs.37 Transaction costs are the economic costs of arranging 
and enforcing contracts over time and space, which includes information resources and 
involves the collaboration of formal and informal institutions. 38  Therefore, the 
development of economic growth emerges when the collaboration between formal and 
informal institutions results in the protection of property rights from predatory practices 
and external threats together with the enforcement of contracts through laws and the 
use of legitimate coercion in the long-run. 
However, early modern states were a blurred reality in which formal and 
informal institutions intermingled through their practices. This doctoral thesis seeks to 
complement recent research on the impossibility of distinguishing formal and informal 
institutions.39 The following chapters provide some important examples for which this 
discussion has a particular importance, especially in the section that analyses the 
Factoría General. In this sense, this thesis is specifically framed in the historiographical 
current of New Institutional Economics, in which institutions are analysed in relation to 
their positive and negative effects on economic growth through the analysis of the 
behaviour of actors, especially regarding their role in transaction costs, property rights, 
and contract enforcement.40 
 
36  Keefer and Shirley, ‘Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development’, 96; Greif, 
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, 37. 
37 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
38 This concept was first studied by Richard Coase in the 1937 when he questioned about the existence of 
firms. After his work, more recent scholars have pursued a clear definition. See R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature 
of the Firm’, Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 386–405; Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions, Transaction Costs, and 
the Rise of Merchant Empires’, in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World 
Trade, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 24; Carl J. Dahlman, 
‘The Problem of Externality’, The Journal of Law & Economics 22, no. 1 (1979): 148. 
39 Grafe, Distant Tyranny. 
40 Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, ‘The Future of New Institutional Economics: From Early Intuitions 
to a New Paradigm?’, Journal of Institutional Economics 10, no. 4 (2014): 544. 
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The formation of early modern states was, therefore, a consequence of the 
enforcement of law and coercion in a territory through the development of formal and 
informal institutions that motivated political, social, and economic exchanges. 41 
Nevertheless, the dimension of those states or economic systems has also been object 
of study by sociologists regarding the effectiveness of informal and formal institutions 
to generate economic growth. The debate was born in the 1990s and stressed that 
informal institutions were less effective in big markets to provide protection to property 
rights and reduce transaction costs than formal institutions. 
Whereas scholars like North argued that informal institutions were only effective 
at the initial stages of development at local level because transactions were made face 
to face and reputation was easier to check, other academics like Greif proved the 
efficiency of informal institutions in larger markets through the analysis of the Maghribi 
community in the Middle Ages, which employed enforcing elements such as religious 
institutions. 42  More recently, scholars criticize the poor protection that informal 
institutions provided before expropriation against private and public actors, besides of 
the limited access to those institutions for the participants in the market. 43 The final 
chapters of this thesis demonstrate that formal and informal institutions could work 
conjointly to generate a regularity of behaviours that contributed to the stability and 
development of the economic system in large markets, such as the early modern 
Hispanic Monarchy. 
The protection that formal and informal institutions could provide was directly 
linked to their ability to exert coercion. For example, trade consists in the exchange of 
goods and services among people. However, people do not exchange the good itself but 
 
41 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 54. 
42  North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; Avner Greif, ‘Contract 
Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’, The American 
Economic Review 83, no. 3 (1993): 525–48; Greif is one of the growing number of academics who focus 
simultaneously on the two schools of thought in the New Institutional Economics through the study of 
property rights and contracts at the firm level together with a broader institutional perspective and the 
role of the state. See Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, ‘The Contribution of Douglass North to New 
Institutional Economics’, in Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass 
North, ed. Itai Sened and Sebastian Galiani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 11–29. 
43 Keefer and Shirley, ‘Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development’, 97. 
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the right to own it in property.44 The defence of property rights has always been costly, 
especially in wartime. This cost is the main cause to delegate that protection to 
organisations able to mobilise resources more effectively and at lower cost, such as 
states. The early modern state, therefore, emerged as guarantor of regularities of 
behaviour among participants of an economic and political system that protected 
property rights and set the transaction costs into a reasonable level cost-efficiency. 
Notwithstanding the consolidation of states could be the best solution in early 
modern Europe for the commonwealth, the highest authority in a political system was 
always negotiated at multiple levels whether monarchies or republics. The formation of 
the early modern Hispanic Monarchy as a state, central subject of this thesis, has been 
object of study among scholars from multiple perspectives. The Weberian territorial 
limitation abovementioned plays a central role in the definition of the Hispanic 
Monarchy. Traditional literature on this heterogeneous polity defined this state as a 
‘composite monarchy’ in comparison with other European, more centralistic, models. 45 
Each realm was organised through their own institutions, thus legitimizing the 
management of resources, the distribution of justice, and the use of coercion. 
The formation of the Hispanic Monarchy mostly obeyed the principle of aeque 
principaliter, in which a state that pursued diplomatic or military expansion retained 
native institutions to ease the governmental transition in the new territory. 46  The 
paradigmatic example of this type of union was that of the kingdoms of Castile and 
Aragon. Both kingdoms kept their own parliaments, though they presented substantial 
differences regarding their autonomy. In contraposition to this expansionism there 
exists the concept of accessory union, in which the annexed territory loses its 
institutions and laws, to be replaced by those of the new holder. The conquest of 
Hispanic America is the most representative example of this policy as the Hispanic 
 
44 Ronald Coase was the first academic to highlight this difference in his classic work Ronald Coase, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’, The Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1 October 1960): 1–44; Ménard and Shirley, 
‘The Future of New Institutional Economics’, 545. 
45  H. G. Koenigsberger, ‘Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe Dominium Regale or 
Dominium Politicum et Regale’, Theory and Society 5, no. 2 (1978): 191–217; J. H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of 
Composite Monarchies’, Past & Present, no. 137 (1992): 48–71. 
46 Elliott took this concept from the Política Indiana (1647), written by the Spanish jurist Juan de Solórzano 
Pereira, who used this concept to describe the process of political aggregations that resulted in the 
Hispanic Monarchy. See Elliott, ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, 52. 
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Monarchy created a new political system inspired by the Castilian example.47 These 
diverse strategies of expansionism reflected the domestic differences in the monarchy 
in a continuous process of political aggregation rather than integration that symbolised 
the existing polycentric division of effective power.48. 
In this sense, the Hispanic Monarchy consisted of jurisdictional fragmented 
territories in each realm that were interconnected with one another and converged in 
the authority of the sovereign. Jurisdictional fragmentation is here considered as the 
contestation of sovereignty by local and regional powers, such as cities, corporations, or 
feudal lords.49 These multiple social organisations were greatly interconnected through 
networks of relationships that integrated every part of the Hispanic Monarchy. 50 
However, the close link between the institutional separation of the Hispanic realms and 
the jurisdictional fragmentation in each of them has been considered an element that 
prevented its economic growth.51 The main explanation for this outcome is linked to the 
lack of centralism and absolutist practices from central authorities. 
The existence of jurisdictional fragmentation in the early modern Hispanic 
Monarchy thus contradicts the argument of North and Weingast regarding the cause of 
its 'retarded long-run economic growth', which they based on absolutist practices.52 
Indeed, recent literature challenges the concept of absolutist state, which had been 
traditionally considered as a political choice that tended to centralisation, military 
professionalisation, bureaucratisation, and a nobility progressively more 
domesticated.53 In this sense, this doctoral thesis is also framed by this literature of 
 
47 Manuel Lucena Salmoral, ed., Historia de Iberoamérica, 4th ed., vol. 2 (Madrid: Cátedra, 2008), 219; an 
exception must be made with the Tlaxcala people, which preserved its rights and properties because of 
their alliance with Cortés. See Kenneth R. Mills, William B. Taylor, and Sandra Lauderdale Graham, eds., 
Colonial Latin America: A Documentary History (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 113. 
48 Óscar Mazín Gómez, ‘Architect of the New World. Juan de Solórzano Pereyra and the Status of the 
Americas’, in Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a 
Global Hegemony?, ed. Pedro Cardim (Brighton ; Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 27. 
49 Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 14. 
50 J. B. Owens, ‘By My Absolute Royal Authority’: Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning 
of the First Global Age, Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 2005), 246. 
51 Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 169. 
52 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 
(1989): 808. 
53 One of the first works to highlight this point was Nicholas Henshall, The Myth of Absolutism: Change 
and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (London: Longman, 1992), chap. 6; Sommerville 
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political thought and stresses that the early modern Hispanic Monarchy was deeply 
dependant on the collaboration of actors and corporations to enforce royal authority.54 
Therefore, rulers and subjects played a decisive role in the process of state 
formation. The recent concept of ‘empowering interactions’, which refers to the 
communicative situation that results from the convergence of the interests of state 
representatives and local elites, illustrates this process.55 This collaboration aimed to 
generate mutual benefits was clearer during exogeneous and endogenous threats, 
when there was a need for mobilising resources at local level.56 The multiple wars and 
domestic conflicts in which early modern states like the Hispanic Monarchy got involved 
have drawn the attention of scholars in that sense.57 Notwithstanding the evident role 
of warfare in the development of states, its overuse shadow other ‘state shapers’.58 
As a result of this historiographical void, the study of the relationship between 
conflict and states has recently produced promising works on the model of ‘contractor 
state’, which have moved the focus to the analysis of private military entrepreneurs 
together with their networks, thus incorporating those non-state actors into the state 
apparatus.59 The importance of that people and their role as state-builders, nonetheless, 
 
provides an insightful historiographical review of the main works on early modern absolutism and how 
this concept has evolved to stress that there was no process of authority concentration, but a better 
convergence of private interests. See Johann P Sommerville, ‘Early Modern Absolutism in Practice and 
Theory’, in Monarchism and Absolutism in Early Modern Europe, ed. Cesare Cuttica and Glenn Burgess 
(Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 117–18. 
54 Anne Dubet, for instance, coordinated a book about the administration of royal finances in which their 
authors concluded that the members of institutions were always more important in terms of enforcing 
decisions than the institutions in which they worked. See Anne Dubet, ed., Les finances royales dans la 
monarchie espagnole: XVIe-XIXe siècles, Histoire (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2008). 
55 Willem Pieter Blockmans, André Holenstein, and Jon Mathieu, eds., Empowering Interactions: Political 
Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe, 1300-1900 (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), 25–27. 
56 Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, ‘The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and 
Politics’, American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (September 2009): 1240; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 
and European States, AD 990-1990, Studies in Social Discontinuity (Cambridge, Mass, USA: Blackwell, 
1990). 
57 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-
Military States, 1500-1660, Warfare and History (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), chapter 3 
(especially, page 121); Rafael Torres Sánchez, War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the 
Eighteenth Century (Ediciones Universidad de Navarra. EUNSA, 2007). 
58 Deborah A. Boucoyannis, ‘War: The Tyranny of a Concept’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 2010). 
59 Until very recently, the academic attention was focused elsewhere. The 2010s has been a decade of 
important and challenging works on this topic. See Jose Miguel Escribano-Páez, ‘Juan Rena and the 
Construction of the Hispanic Monarchy (1500-1540)’ (European University Institute, 2016), 216; Benoît 
Maréchaux, ‘Instituciones Navales y Finanzas Internacionales En El Mediterraneo de La Época Moderna: 
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has drawn less attention from scholars. Economic historians use to dilute the agency of 
financiers in macro-economic analysis, which results in few individual studies of the way 
the relationship of these individuals with state administrations and military providers 
worked.60 This thesis aims at contributing to this historiographical debate about actors 
who helped to form early modern states providing an analysis of the conditions in which 
financial entrepreneurs performed as state-builders in relation with their clientele, 
especially regarding their mutual collaboration with the royal administration to preserve 
the state apparatus. 
The analysis of the participation of non-state actors is, therefore, a crucial 
milestone in the historiography about the emergence of early modern states. Their 
ability to mobilise resources thanks to the negotiation among central authorities, minor 
administrations, individuals, and corporations opens new questions in an old branch of 
the debate about the formation of early modern states: political representation. Exactly, 
early modern sovereigns were never omnipotent nor absolutist to mobilise resources 
entirely on their own ability to impose their authority without negotiating first with local 
and regional elites. In this sense, gone is the time when the French, English, and Hispanic 
monarchies were considered 'absolutist states'.61  
From the 1980s onwards, multiple works have demonstrated that the age of 
absolutism (not equivalent to despotism) was an aspiration rather than a reality. 62 This 
historiographical current also had an impact on the studies of the Hispanic Monarchy, 
which is no longer classified as an absolutist state nowadays. 63  Even American 
 
Los Asentistas de Galeras Genoveses al Servicio de La Monarquia Hispanica (1500-1650)’ (Carlos III de 
Madrid, 2017); Rafael Torres Sánchez, Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 2016); David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise 
and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
60 Few studies have shown this pattern, especially regarding the Hispanic Monarchy. An example of this 
in Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro. 
61 The classic study by Perry Anderson offers a view of Hispanic absolutism linked to the preservation of 
the privileges of nobility until the end of the Ancient Regime. However, Anderson stressed that such 
absolutism was ‘in fact notably modest and limited in its domestic development’. See Anderson, Lineages 
of the Absolutist State, chap. 62. 
62  John Miller, Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Macmillan International Higher Education, 
1990); Peter Hamish Wilson, Absolutism in Central Europe (Psychology Press, 2000). 
63 Charles Jago, ‘Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile’, The American Historical Review 86, no. 2 
(1981): 326; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism, and Liberty’, in Fiscal Crises, 
Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450-1789, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, The 
Making of Modern Freedom (Stanford University Press, 2002), 181–225; Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 9. 
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territories, legally bounded to Castilian jurisdiction, were self-administered. In this 
regard, the absence of representative institutions like Castilian cortes has been 
considered as 'a dilution, not a devolution of power'.64 In other words, central royal 
institutions did not embody the authority overseas to mobilise resources, but their 
colonial dependent institutions. A similar proposal is applicable to the European 
territories of the Hispanic Monarchy. 
While sovereigns had legislative prerogatives to modify the fiscal system to meet 
the demand of resources resulted from conflicts of progressively larger scale, local elites 
held the effective means of collection and administration. In the case of the early 
modern Hispanic Monarchy, both the emperor Charles V and his son Philip II confronted 
these limitations to their demands, each of them in key turning points of their reigns 
(1536 and 1575 respectively).65 The question of absolutism was not a matter of authority 
but effective power. The institutional sociologist Thomas Ertman already emphasised 
this necessary collaboration in his work about the role of local governments, 
representative assemblies, and the rulers’ access to resources in the shaping of modern 
states.66 In this sense, Ertman remarked the viability of decentralised states, since local 
elites were the actual administrators of territorial resources. As a result of his approach, 
the definition of ‘state’ widened to include urban elites and their institutions. Going a 
step further, Braddick considered the ‘state’ as a coordinated network of territorially 
bounded offices exercising political power, thus stressing the role of local elites in its 
development. 67 
In this context of continuous negotiation with local elites, the thesis of the 
predatory absolutist state, which instinctively sought to extract the maximum resources 
exerting its authority, is simply unsustainable.68 Recent research has underpinned that 
the early modern Hispanic Monarchy did not fit in this model since its levels of coercion 
 
64  John Lynch, ‘The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America’, Journal of Latin American 
Studies 24 (1992): 73. 
65 Willem Pieter Blockmans, Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558 (London: Arnold, 2002), 29; José Ignacio Fortea 
Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes En La Corona de Castilla: Las Ciudades Ante La Política Fiscal de Felipe II  
(Valladolid: Cortes de Castilla y León, 1990), 221. 
66 Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, 317–19. 
67 Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700, 19. 
68 Glete stresses the predatory practices of state armed forces to find supply in the markets of the Hispanic 
Monarchy. However, as the scholar also emphasises, the monarchy was in a period of transition to the 
contractor model. See Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe, 135. 
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were low compared to other early modern states of the region, such as France or 
England. The protection of property from private theft and public predation was 
relatively respected, whereas coercive means such as forced loans, depreciations, and 
monopolies were exceptional. 69  This doctoral thesis comes to support this point 
because when Philip II consolidated his short-term debt seizing the incomes allocated 
for it and changing its interest rate, the monarch sought to provide solutions to create a 
credible commitment with his financiers and subjects to thus making the financial 
system viable in the long run. 
Economic historians have tended to link credible commitments to economic 
growth, which turns this concept into another tool of the state formation. A credible 
commitment comprehends two elements to occur: a precedent of 'responsible 
behaviour' from the rulers and constraining tools to make them obey the rules.70 The 
most representative restrictive means that could oblige sovereigns to comply the rules 
of the game were institutions, traditionally formal institutions like parliaments.71 From 
the fiscal point of view for example, the existence of representative institutions, which 
defended the interests of urban elites rather than those of commoners, was way of 
preventing predatory practices from the sovereign derived from his authority. No 
central parliament represented the interests of other territorial elites in the Hispanic 
Monarchy, though their decisions might have an impact in the rest of the territories. 
In the specific case of the Hispanic Monarchy, its composite division encouraged 
the sovereign to negotiate with the parliaments of each territory separately the 
mobilisation of resources, the protection of rights, and better ways to reduce 
transaction costs.72 Representative institutions had individual traditions and privileges 
 
69 Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, ‘Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal Constraints and Financial Development 
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Financial Capitalism, ed. D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, and Larry Neal (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 202–13. 
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71 Koenigsberger, ‘Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe Dominium Regale or Dominium 
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72 Both the Emperor Charles V and his son Philip II confronted these limitations to their demands, which 
marked key turning points in each of their reigns. See Blockmans, Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558, 29; 
Carlos Álvarez Nogal and Christophe Chamley, ‘Philip II against the Cortes and the Credit Freeze of 1575-
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that obliged the Hispanic rulers to plan a different strategy for each assembly to ensure 
their authority was obeyed. The main characteristic of these parliaments was their 
composition, which varied from one kingdom to another. 
For example, while there was a strong presence of noblemen and clergy in 
Aragon at the time studied in this thesis, these two groups had lost interest in 
participating at the meetings held in Castile. 73  In the Habsburg Low Countries, by 
contrast, the population was concentrated in urban centres and this resulted in a 
powerful bourgeoisie with influence in the provincial and regional parliaments, which 
resulted in interesting outcomes explained in further detail throughout the third 
chapter. 74  The heterogeneity and apparent disconnection among representative 
institutions illustrates how diverse political spaces became a forum of negotiation where 
every participant needed the collaboration of elites from other territories to satisfy their 
own goals. 
Whereas the king sought to gather new resources with which to pursue his 
dynastic duties, the local elites represented at these meetings demanded new mercies 
and changes that could reinforce their influence in their home cities and confirm their 
traditional privileges. The bargaining tool of this political game was the fiscal apparatus 
of the territories, which had an impact in the distribution of fiscal burden in urban and 
rural spaces besides of establishing a debt ceiling to the monarch. While the sovereign 
had the legislative prerogative to enact new taxes and either raise or abolish the existing 
ones at certain parliaments, local elites held the effective means of collection and 
distribution of wealth at the local and regional levels. Therefore, the Hispanic sovereigns 
were obliged to grant some concessions and mercies in exchange for collaboration. 75 In 
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this sense, the Hispanic Monarchy has been recently considered as a monarchy of urban 
republics to highlight the importance of those urban microcosmos.76 
The differences among the parliaments that represented urban polities in the 
Hispanic Monarchy resulted in and unbalanced political weight in the conglomerate of 
the monarchy. Although the monarchy embraced large parts of Europe and America by 
the 1550s, the cortes of Castile were the most important representative institution of 
the ensemble. The reason of this ‘privileged position’ lay with the number of generous 
subsidies that these estates granted to the monarch and the certainty of their collection 
to back new debt.77 After the comunero revolt of 1520-1521, Charles V preserved the 
representative institution to support his foreign policy since the Castilian parliament 
began to pass extraordinary pecuniary subsidies to the monarch regularly. 78 
Nevertheless, any increase in the ordinary fiscal pressure, even a simple renewal, 
required the approval of the cortes. This continuous negotiation among ruler and a 
representative institution reflects that authority and effective power in the political and 
fiscal means of the monarchy cannot be placed solely on the monarch.79 This outcome 
confirms that representation was a necessary concession for the good functioning of the 
state.80 
Understanding how the royal and local agendas converged is a question that still 
has much to offer. In the specific case of the Castilian cortes, urban oligarchies managed 
the local tax collection of royal revenues, which granted them an important bargaining 
power. The role of these elites, who channelled funding to the monarch and assured his 
future incomes, provided him with the certainty of steady cash and solvency to keep 
borrowing from independent lenders in case of necessity. In this regard, solvency must 
be understood as the possibility of the sovereign to create new sources of incomes and 
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79 An idea already defended in Stasavage, States of Credit. 
80 Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, 112. 
25 
 
expenditure to make his finances sustainable.81 The collaboration of local elites to pass, 
raise taxes, and channel them to royal treasuries timely was not an easy task, unless 
those groups of power had a private interest on that mechanic. 
In effect, recent historiographical contributions emphasise the convergence of 
private and public interests, which has resulted in a new historiographical model: the 
stakeholder state. 82 The model that Grafe and Irigoin propose is applied to the colonial 
space and based on the fact that local elites benefited from the correct functioning of 
the state administration, which gave them incentives to the state development. In other 
words, local powerholders were part of the state administration thanks to their private 
rather than public interests. This doctoral thesis supports this historiographical model 
to understand the Hispanic Monarchy through the analysis of the Factoría General, 
whose members had a private interest in the viability of the monarchy. 
The financial system of the Hispanic Monarchy: taxes and debt 
The sovereigns of the Hispanic Monarchy, starting with Charles V in 1519 as 
common monarch of the Iberian realms with effective authority, were always in need of 
private funding. Their extensive patrimonial inheritance included territories in the 
Iberian and Italian peninsulas, Central Europe, the Low Countries, the northern African 
coast, and an overseas colonial empire in America and the south eastern Asian 
archipelagos. Notwithstanding the impressive territorial patrimony of the Hispanic 
sovereigns, their main concern regarding the preservation of those territories remained 
in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. The increasing hostilities between the Habsburg 
and Valois dynasties throughout the sixteenth century created new external foes like 
the French-Ottoman alliance that threatened the integrity of the dynastical 
inheritance.83 
Together with the military conflicts with rival early modern states, the 
amalgamation of so different territories and subjects under the authority of a single 
sovereign soon revealed the inevitable emergence of domestic problems. Urban revolts 
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and outbreaks of religious discontent took form throughout all the composite monarchy 
as a result of failed means of negotiation and representation, both key concepts for the 
formation of early modern states already explained in the previous section. The well-
known revolts of comuneros and germanias in the Iberian Peninsula, the religious wars 
against the Schmalkaldic League in Central Europe, or the War of the Eighty Years were 
the outcomes of the lack of consensus among interregional and local powerholders.84 
The numerous commitments of international scale demanded extensive funding 
that was always difficult to collect on time and harder to disburse in the appropriate 
spaces. The Hispanic sovereigns obtained their pecuniary resources from a cumulative 
tradition of ordinary and extraordinary taxes agreed with the representative institutions 
of the multiple territories of the monarchy. 85 Whereas the ordinary taxes were regular 
incomes approved in perpetuity, the extraordinary taxes were all those exceptional 
subsidies that either the parliaments or religious institutions conceded to the monarchs 
in times of need. Since the Hispanic Monarchy was constantly participating in 
international and domestic conflicts, the extraordinary incomes tended to be considered 
a granted and regular stream of funding by the sovereigns. The second chapter of this 
thesis highlights this point when referring to an ecclesiastical subsidy that was already 
allocated to pay debt before it was officially agreed, which resulted in tense negotiations 
between the royal administrators and the high clergy of Castile. 
The extraordinary subsidies agreed with the multiple lay and ecclesiastical 
parliaments were subjected to problematic and continuous negotiations, which resulted 
in the fact that the fiscal burden of the ordinary taxes that funded most of the military 
enterprises of the monarchy were part of the indirect taxation, especially trade 
customs.86 In the case of Castile, fiscal heart of the composite monarchy, the sovereigns 
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V in Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, secs 2–3; for an overview of Philip II’s challenges see 
Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), sec. 4. 
85 This division of revenues was historiographically clear already in the 1990s. See David Alonso García, ‘La 
configuración de lo ordinario en el sistema fiscal de la monarquía (1505-1536): Una o dos ideas’, Studia 
historica. Historia moderna, no. 21 (1999): 117–52; Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora, ‘Fiscalidad 
extraordinaria y deuda: El destino del servicio de las Cortes de Castilla: 1535-1537’, Espacio, tiempo y 
forma. Serie IV, Historia moderna, no. 8 (1995): 11–48. 
86 The growing importance of indirect taxation was common in Europe in the early modern times. See 
Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, The Rise of Fiscal States; for the specific case of the Hispanic Monarchy see Luis 
Antonio Ribot García, ed., Las Finanzas Estatales En España e Italia En La Época Moderna, El Río Heráclito 
6 (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2009), 19. 
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preferred to agree with the cities summoned to the parliament a contract called 
encabezamiento by which they promised to provide a fixed amount of money in 
exchange for the right to manage the collection of those taxes.  
This strategy solved three problems for the Hispanic monarchs. First, the 
agreement avoided the obligation of arranging funds to pay for the services of tax 
collectors, especially in wartime when the available resources were scarce. Second, the 
king provided a means of self-government to local elites and minimised his interference 
in urban affairs. Finally, the amounts were more predictable and reliable, which 
improved the credit reputation of the monarch when he borrowed. This fiscal system 
was highly appropriate for a composite monarchy in terms of cost-efficiency because 
the coercive burden was diluted among urban institutions and important issues like 
authority and representation were respected. In this sense, the major problem to deal 
with was the amount of money to be raised rather than a change of fiscal collection. 
Notwithstanding the preferable reliability of ordinary incomes, the numerous 
commitments with which the Hispanic Monarchy had become involved by the mid-
sixteenth century compelled a substantial enlargement of the royal budget through the 
increase of extraordinary subsidies. Whereas the main Castilian fiscal duties (alcabalas 
and tercias) that were circumscribed to the system of encabezamiento barely rose by 
14% during the whole of Charles V’s reign, the subsidies granted by the Castilian cortes, 
called servicios (ordinario and extraordinario), practically doubled.87 This means that 
urban elites, who controlled their representatives in the cortes, preferred to discuss and 
pass extraordinary concessions of capital rather than change the traditional agreements 
on ordinary taxes. The reason for this political behaviour was that cities preferred to 
keep the fiscal burden as low as possible to retain their bargaining tool with the monarch. 
If they accepted a continuous increase in the royal duties, these new taxes would 
enlarge the royal power to levels that could create an unbalance in the social pact of 
authority diminishing the local influence of urban elites and institutions. 
The policy of permanent negotiation during the reign of Charles V in Castile was 
a continuation of the strategies that the Catholic monarchs had already initiated by the 
 
87 Blockmans, Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558, 156. 
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end of the previous century.88 If their main goals had been to reinforce royal authority 
and restore the estates lost during the last war of succession in Castile (1474-1479), 
Charles V sought continue their policy and enlarge his own resources to respond the 
new challenges of his reign. The large dimension of the commitments of the Hispanic 
sovereigns demanded an equivalent mobilisation of resources, which has drawn the 
attention of scholars since the second half of the previous century. The initial approach 
followed a structural and isolating perspective because it examined how taxes were 
created, organised, and developed, namely in the kingdom of Castile.89 
The interest in the mobilisation of resources through fiscal means as part of the 
emergence of early modern states consolidated with comparative studies in the 1990s.90 
From those years onwards, scholars have focused on the relation between the fiscal 
system and the process of state formation. Works on the military revolution, a 
traditional field that considers the advances in military technology as a crucial element 
in the emergence of early modern states, were then linked to the study of the 
development of more sophisticated and efficient fiscal systems able to mobilise more 
resources.91 This historiographical shift resulted in a tendency known as ‘New Fiscal 
History’, which puts the focus on the impact that warfare and new fiscal means 
contributed to generate economic growth under the conceptual umbrella of the fiscal-
military state.92  
 
88 This continuous negotiation had proved successful during the political and financial struggles of the 
fifteenth century, when it was necessary to keep local tax collectors as part of the royal administration 
even though they failed in their duties. The loyalty of urban elites, who belonged to the body of tax 
collectors, emerged as a central piece in the restoration of royal power in Castile. Once the Catholic 
Monarchs restored royal power, they enacted fiscal reforms at the cortes of Toledo (1480) following the 
previous tradition of negotiation. See Pablo Ortego Rico, ‘“Sy algunas quiebras en ellas oviese...”: crisis de 
liquidez y quiebras financieras en Castilla a fines de la Edad Media’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 42, 
no. 2 (2017): 438. 
89 The following examples, though framed in a larger economic narrative, approached royal incomes 
according to what they taxed, a common pattern generally assumed in the historiography. See Ulloa, La 
Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II; Ramón Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros 
(Barcelona: Crítica, 1987), vol. I; Juan Eloy Gelabert González, La bolsa del Rey: rey, reino y fisco en Castilla 
(1598-1648) (Barcelona: Crítica, Grijalbo Mondadori, 1997). 
90 Richard Bonney, The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815 (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
91 The second edition of Parker’s monograph on what he called ‘military revolution’ generated a large 
debate, especially regarding the chronology of a revolution that took around three centuries to complete. 
See Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 
2nd ed (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 6. 
92 I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Money, Money, and yet More Money! Finance, the Fiscal-State, and the Military 
Revolution’, The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern 
Europe, 1995; Michael J. Braddick, ‘The Fiscal-Military State’, in State Formation in Early Modern England, 
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The role of institutions in the process of creation a fiscal-military state is evident, 
which has encouraged recent studies to delve into the impact that the development of 
specific institutions had for the rise and decline of fiscal regimes.93 This approach is still 
necessary because there are many differences and similarities to discover among the 
Western European states. Throughout the third chapter of this thesis, for example, there 
is discussion of an entire proposal about the convergence of fiscal policies during the 
1550s in the English, French, Hispanic, and Italian territories that would have been 
overlooked without this comparative method. 
Nevertheless, the interterritorial comparison of fiscal systems with special 
interest in the institutions that shaped those early modern states is not the only inspiring 
methodology in the field. In effect, the emergence of GIS (Geographical Information 
System) procedures is helping to create EU-funded projects that seek to spatialise the 
early modern fiscal reality. In other words, scholars are attempting to link fiscal spaces 
with their social agendas to thus obtain a better approach to their historical 
developments.94 The outcomes of these new investigations are enlarging our knowledge 
about the mutability of fiscal demarcations. This conclusion implies that a larger or 
smaller amount of royal taxes were not collected because of royal decisions or civic 
agreements, but because their fiscal districts were subject to eventual changes.95 
The sales of jurisdictions, a common practice when the monarchs ran out of 
money, or special royal demands of liquidity are among the main causes that can explain 
why these fiscal territories expanded and contracted throughout their history.96 As a 
 
c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Glete, War and the State in Early Modern 
Europe. 
93  Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, The Rise of Fiscal States; Irigoin and Grafe, ‘Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal 
Constraints and Financial Development in the Early Modern Hispanic World’; Ildefonso Sánchez González, 
Historia General Aduanera de España: Edad Moderna, Estudios Históricos (Madrid: Ministerio de 
Hacienda, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2014). 
94 A volume on this aspect with important contributions by international scholars such as A. Crespo Solana, 
D. Alonso García, M. Lex, S.T. Perrone, A. Picazo, and Antonio Crespo in David Alonso García, ed., ‘Historia 
Moderna y Sistemas de Información Geográfica (SIG)’, Revista electrónica de Historia Moderna 7, no. 26 
(2 July 2013). 
95 David Alonso García, ‘Crear Espacios, Cobrar Impuestos. Los Partidos Fiscales de Castilla a Principios de 
La Edad Moderna’, in Los Ámbitos de La Fiscalidad: Fronteras, Territorio y Percepción de Tributos En Los 
Imperios Ibéricos (Siglos XV-XVIII) (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2011), 41–56. 
96 A classic overview in Miller, Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe, 91; see also two classic chapters 
on the relationship between the sale of jurisdictions and absolutist practices within a framework of fiscal 
crises in I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis’, in Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and 
Representative Government, 1450-1789, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, 2 (first published in 
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result of these investigations, future scholars will be able to deal with this dynamic 
geographical dimension of the fiscal apparatus in the Hispanic Monarchy. In the 
meantime, this thesis aims at contributing to this literature focusing on the role of 
institutions and the strategies of urban elites through their participation in the fiscal 
system of a state in the making during a time of warfare and uncertainty. 
Notwithstanding the several historiographical branches that study the fiscal 
system in the Hispanic Monarchy abovementioned, scholars agree about its inability to 
service the increasing demand of resources on time and quantity. 97 Recurrent crisis of 
liquidity and unforeseeable events as result of continuous conflicts obliged the Hispanic 
rulers to seek credit among private financiers. However, the system allowed the 
monarch to avoid the use of credit by leasing some royal incomes to the private sector, 
which also provided a way to find steady liquidity. 
The system of tax farming was in strict concomitance with the royal financiers as 
they benefited from an efficient tax collection system. Clientelism emerged from this 
indirect alliance of tax farmer-independent financier, an issue that simply tightened the 
cohesion of local elites with international businessmen.98 The literature of this topic, 
though consistent, does not offer great novelties for the study of this alternative to large 
borrowing.99 There is still much to know about the networks that connected these actors, 
especially in terms of brokerage and information. This thesis also seeks to contribute in 
this field through the analysis of strategies of intermediation between financiers and 
local elites, especially in long-term and long-distance contractual relationships of 
financial services. More specifically, the seventh chapter reveals the how a businessman 
 
1994), The Making of Modern Freedom (Stanford University Press, 2002), 140–80; Thompson, ‘Castile: 
Absolutism, Constitutionalism, and Liberty’. 
97 Alonso García, ‘La configuración de lo ordinario en el sistema fiscal de la monarquía (1505-1536)’. 
98 David Alonso García, ‘Poder financiero y arrendadores de rentas reales en Castilla a principios de la Edad 
Moderna’, Cuadernos de historia moderna, no. 31 (2006): 117–38; Juan Manuel Carretero Zamora, ‘Los 
arrendadores de la Hacienda de Castilla a comienzos del siglo XVI (1517-1525)’, Studia historica. Historia 
moderna, no. 21 (1999): 153–90. 
99  A recent collective work which offers heterogeneous case studies of different geographies of the 
Hispanic Monarchy, but with few novelties in the field, is Ernesto García Fernández, Tesoreros, 
‘arrendadores’ y financieros en los reinos hispánicos: la Corona de Castilla y el Reino de Navarra (siglos 
XIV-XVII) (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2012); Carretero Zamora, ‘Los arrendadores de la Hacienda de 
Castilla a comienzos del siglo XVI (1517-1525)’. 
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from Burgos (Castile) intermediated financial services to the duchess of Florence (Italy) 
for several years. 
The research of international financiers able to provide funds in every corner of 
the monarchy faster than carrying bullion by any means of transport, by contrast, has 
been much more prolific. The collaboration of international financiers to disburse 
money anywhere and in ways that were around the monarchy became a standard 
procedure that was not exempt from expensive fees charged by the service providers. 
The system that moneylenders used to transfer money between distant places was 
based on the consolidation of an effective system of bills of exchange across Europe. 
The bill of exchange was a written obligation that consisted of cashless payments 
between actors at a future moment. It was originally designed for long-distance trade in 
the Mediterranean Middle Ages to improve mobility in the international capital market 
since there was no central mint.100 The political fragmentation of the Mediterranean 
area necessitated the exchange of currencies, which was problematic in terms of 
security and quantity when carrying bullion from one place to another over long-
distance journeys. Beyond the expansion of these bills of exchange in commercial 
transactions, their use in financial deals was possible thanks to five elements. 101 
First, usury laws that formerly prevented Christians from applying interest rates 
on private credits started to become less restrictive and intrusive during the transition 
to the early modern centuries, especially since credit operations became transactions 
for regular incomes that often lasted a lifetime. 102  Only Jewish communities were 
exempt from this religious ban, which was a triggering element for them to become the 
majority lending community in medieval times. Once they were expelled from a 
territory, they took their accounting knowledge with them, thus spreading the concept 
of credit to the rest of the Mediterranean area and beyond. 
 
100 This financial device was first created by Italian merchants, who later spread it to the Atlantic coasts. 
Northern Europe, which was dominated by the Hanseatic League in commercial and financial matters, 
learnt later about the use of bills of exchange. See Karl Gunnar Persson, An Economic History of Europe: 
Knowledge, Institutions and Growth, 600 to the Present, New Approaches to Economic and Social History 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133. 
101  This conceptual framework is based on North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, 125–26. 
102 Kenneth H. F. Dyson, States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in European History and Integration 
(Oxford University Press, 2014), 118–19. 
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Christians progressively became more aware of the benefits of credit 
transactions and the use of bills of exchange. In order to circumvent the religious 
prohibition, they created the second element that characterises the expansion of bills 
of exchange in the financial market: discount houses. 103  These business structures 
acquired bills of exchange before they matured at a discounted price. This means that 
people sold bills to buyers at a lower price than their face value because they wanted to 
have liquidity before the bill of exchange matured. In this way, those who bought these 
financial devices at a discounted price could earn the full price of the bill of exchange 
once the date for its payment was reached, as initially indicated in the document. The 
existence of discount houses was, therefore, a determining factor in improving the 
mobility of this product across Europe. 
As usury laws became more flexible and discount houses improved the 
circulation of bills of exchange, a third element must be considered: transferability. The 
concept of the transferability or negotiability of a bill of exchange refers to its ability to 
be handed to another person or financial society, ensuring its final payment. In other 
words, whoever became the debtor responsible for the reimbursement was legally 
liable to fulfil their promise. In this sense, bills of exchange also became a liquid asset 
since the reputation of the debtor backed the payment. These legal changes and 
innovations enabled financiers to apply higher interest rates in their transactions, while 
diminishing the costs of writing financial contracts.  
The fourth element is the enforceability of these financial deals, which finds its 
parallel in the techniques that merchants used to avoid being cheated. The use of kinship 
and family ties was the most common strategy to maintain trust among one another 
and enforce penalties if necessary.104 However, there were other ways in which shared 
identity could be as important as blood, such as religious and regional ties. 105  This 
reciprocal identification was a self-enforcing tool since the community to which a 
cheater belonged would definitely expel that individual from business as his or her 
dishonest action damaged the reputation of the group. 
 
103 Victoria N. Bateman, Markets and Growth in Early Modern Europe, Perspectives in Economic and Social 
History, no. 20 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 119–20. 
104 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 126. 
105 Bateman, Markets and Growth in Early Modern Europe, 120. 
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Besides this group pressure, a fifth element ensured the use of bills of exchange 
in financial contracts: legal institutions. The existence of a legal framework and 
institutions able to enforce penalties if a cheater deceived was an additional security 
means by which people could trust one another. In addition to the informal enforcement 
relating to the community reputation, legal institutions also provided a formal 
enforcement tool that ensured and legislated for punishment and confiscation. 
These five elements helped international merchant-lenders to consolidate a 
financial system based on bills of exchange and thus to provide the Hispanic rulers with 
goods and a reasonable cost-efficiency financial mechanism. When the sovereigns 
struggled to find resources with which to reimburse those services, there was an urge 
to improve the system of payments to reduce costs and keep credit flowing. Since most 
of the royal incomes were of a fiscal nature, any increase in them certainly required the 
collaboration of the estates in each domain to make the new resources reliable so as to 
service the reimbursements. 
This financial agreement was efficient and possible thanks to the relation 
between financial sustainability and the solvency of the monarchs. 106  Whereas the 
former concept means that individuals or institutions already have the fiscal means to 
reimburse their debts, solvency refers to the ability of these borrowers to facilitate that 
reimbursement by creating or obtaining new ways of payment, such as the enactment 
of new taxes or increasing the existing ones. If royal incomes were irregular, their 
collection untrustworthy, and they were constantly drained away by military conflict, 
international lenders hesitated to provide their services to the monarch because his 
finances were unsustainable. If the king had the effective collaboration of those 
institutions that collected royal incomes, by contrast, credit would flow more easily as 
the ability to pay back debts was sustainable. 
However, sometimes the causes for a credit shortage were not related to the 
backing of local institutions to collect the taxes.107 Notwithstanding the large incomes 
of the sovereign, he also incurred huge expenses for the maintenance of the realms, 
 
106 A recent reference to these two concepts in Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 
106. 
107 David Alonso García, ‘Deuda, crédito y Hacienda Real en tiempos de Carlos V’, in Historia de la deuda 
pública en España: (siglos XVI-XXI), 2015, 30. 
34 
 
especially in wartime like in the chronology studied in this thesis. When the financial 
system was sustainable but unable to provide additional funding to reimburse more 
debt, it was time for the king to demonstrate that he was solvent by increasing his fiscal 
budget. In order to achieve this goal, he had to increase his income ceiling, which 
required negotiations with the fiscal collectors of the monarchy, either lay or 
religious.108 In most cases, however, the highest fiscal burden lay on the cities of all the 
realms. 
Therefore, it was more common to see a negotiation with cities rather than with 
the religious and noble estates. Even that bargaining process, which used to take place 
in the estate meetings or cortes, was not necessarily a bilateral dialogue between an 
urban collective and the monarch. The third chapter of this dissertation relates an 
example from the Habsburg Low Countries about how it was sometimes necessary to 
deal with each city individually in order to increase the royal income ceiling. Therefore, 
an efficient body of tax collectors and the ability to enlarge the fiscal budget meant 
better access to credit. 
These two concepts of sustainability and solvency are useful tools to explain why 
the Castilian estates became so important for the Hispanic Monarchy, since they 
contributed to triggering the decision to establish new royal income ceilings so as to 
service royal debt. When the level of these liabilities surpassed the expected incomes of 
the monarch or the collection failed for whatever reason, there was a mechanism to 
avoid the financial collapse of lenders and borrower. This system consisted in the 
issuance of titles of long-term debt called juros to compensate for the inability of the 
monarch to pay on time.109 
 
108 The importance of representation for the access to credit has recently been tackled by David Stasavage, 
who stressed the importance of geographical distance for representative institutions and their 
relationship with the income ceiling together with their aim at offering a better access to credit. See 
Stasavage, States of Credit. 
109 The financial concept of ‘juros’ was not exceptional of the Castilian case. Other early modern territories 
developed their own devices with large similarities among them, which highlights the financial 
convergence of institutional strategies. The case of ‘renten’ in the Habsburg Low Countries is a central 
issue in the third chapter that can illustrate this point. See also James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution in 
the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515-1565 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
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During the reign of Charles V, these juros became a common means of 
reimbursement of loan contracts (asientos) and also an important collateral that 
reassured lenders about the sustainability of royal finances. The use of this financial 
device increased notoriously in the 1520s until the end of the period under study in this 
thesis.110 Its associated payments were assigned to royal incomes, either already agreed 
with the cortes or estimated if they had not been collected yet. 
The definition of these two financial concepts, asientos and juros, has many 
variables, though their essential characteristics are generally accepted. This thesis 
employs the versions of these concepts described by Henri Lapeyre and Felipe Ruiz 
Martín.111 First, an asiento was a complex short-term financial operation that was often 
reimbursed in cash and involved up to three different services: the delivery of money, 
goods or military support; transport of the borrowed capital whenever this was needed; 
and the conversion of currency. The arrangement of an asiento consisted in a tortuous 
bureaucratic process and negotiation with the service provider that could last weeks or 
even months. 
The Council of Finances and its dependant organisms first issued some reports 
to define the needs of the monarch and how he could repay the service with the 
available funds.112 Once a sum was agreed, it was offered to businessmen who resided 
at the royal court. These lenders arranged the deal with the royal officers and they 
together wrote down all the details about how the services would be delivered and 
reimbursed. Although many asientos were arranged at the royal court, they were also 
offered at payments fairs held in Castile, specifically in Medina del Campo, Villalón, and 
 
110 Carlos Morales estimates that the share of ordinary royal incomes used to pay the interest that the 
juros generated rose from 30% to 70% between 1519 and 1556, thus showing the growing use of these 
titles of debt in the financial system. See Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 29. 
111 Henri Lapeyre, ‘La Participation Des Genois Aux <<asientos>> de Charles Quint et de Philippe II’, in Atti 
Del Congreso Internazionale Di Studi Storici. Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlántico Nell’Etá Moderna 
(Genova: Istituto di scienze storiche, 1983), 147–61; Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘Un Expediente Financiero Entre 
1560 y 1575’, Moneda y Crédito, no. 92 (1965): 3–58. 
112 The Council of Finances was established in 1523 in order to speed up the flows of funds in the entire 
monarchy. Alongside other royal institutions of financial control such as the Contaduria Mayor de 
Hacienda, the Council managed all the royal incomes and also the financial negotiations of the monarch. 
See the excellent monograph on the Council of Finances by Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Consejo de 
Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602: Patronazgo y Clientelismo En El Gobierno de Las Finanzas Reales Durante 




Medina de Rioseco, and other realms of the sovereign. In this sense, it is possible to 
pinpoint in the following map some of the financial centres used for this primary market 
of royal debt within the borders and the area of influence of the Hispanic Monarchy. 
Second, whereas the asientos generated short-term debt, the financial product 
called juro represented long-term debt. Juros could be either a reward or mercy for 
someone’s services (juro de merced), or a credit instrument in the form of a leasing 
contract because the king had temporarily ceded part of his royal incomes to the title 
holder (juro al quitar). This variety can be dated back to the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries in Castile, though most probably it was not created in this kingdom. Giuseppe 
Felloni believes that Genoese financiers introduced this credit innovation in Castile by 
emulating a similar title of debt called compere that they had created around the middle 
Map 1. Main financial centres accessible to the Hispanic Monarchy in the mid-sixteenth century organised by ‘state’. 
Triangle (Franche-Comté), squares (Republic of Genoa and Duchy of Parma, outside the Hispanic Monarchy), 
rhombuses (Kingdom of Castile), and pentagons (Habsburg Low Countries). Sources: Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of 
Commerce (1st English translation of ‘Les Jeux de l’Échange’, first published in 1979), vol. 2, Civilization and Capitalism, 
15th-18th Century (University of California Press, 1992), 90, 394, 524; Cristóbal Espejo and Julián Paz, Las antiguas 
ferias de Medina del Campo: investigacion historica acerca de ellas (Valladolid: Editorial Maxtor, 2003). 
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of the twelfth century.113 This thesis seems correct because of the great evidence for 
the arrival and settlement of the Genoese diaspora in the Iberian Peninsula at around 
that century, after losing their entrepots in the Black Sea. 114 
The juro as a credit instrument consisted of two parts: principal and interest. The 
first concept is still used today when referring to the price that the buyer had to pay for 
the title of debt. In exchange for their investment, debt holders periodically received an 
interest (rendimiento) based on the price of juros in the secondary market when these 
debt titles were transferable. The amount of this return depended upon the rate of 
interest established in the written document of the juro. The interest rate was 
established by the price of borrowing in the credit market, which was the result of many 
variables, such as the reputation of the lender, the sustainability and solvency of the 
borrower, the liquidity available in the market, the means of reimbursement, and the 
instalments agreed. 
The royal suspensions of payments clearly made it difficult for the monarch to 
access private credit because of the loss of reputation. Although the question as to how 
the Hispanic sovereign managed to overcome this reputational factor during the crisis 
of 1557 is explored in depth in the following chapters, it is sufficient to say here that the 
actors working in financial system simply sought to find ways to generate liquidity for 
borrower and lenders. As long as the interests of the monarchy and the international 
lending community were aligned, the resulting liquidity of their deals served to keep 
servicing the debts with the lenders’ creditors. In this sense, the difficulties the monarch 
had in paying back his debts were relatively easily overcome through a bargaining 
process that often resulted in modifications of asientos to facilitate the final 
reimbursement. In principle, nobody wanted the financial system to fail so they put all 
their efforts into keeping it healthy. 
This shared interest of borrowers and lenders encouraged political bargaining 
between the king and the estates, which usually resulted in the enlargement of the royal 
 
113 Giuseppe Felloni, ed., La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito: atti del convegno, Genova, 11 e 12 
novembre 2004, Atti della Società ligure di storia patria (1947), nuovaser., v. 46, fasc. 2 (Genova: Società 
ligure di storia patria, 2006). 
114 On the settlement in the Iberian Peninsula of the Genoese diaspora and its early modern development 
see Enrique Otte, ‘Il Ruolo Dei Genovesi Nella Spagna Del XV e XVI Secolo’, A. de Maddalena y H. 
Kellenbenz, La Repubblica Internazionale Del Denaro Tra XV e XVII Secolo, Bolonia, 1986, 17–56. 
38 
 
revenues. Both ordinary and extraordinary fiscal incomes were divided into two 
different budgets: situado and consignado. The situado was the part used to pay the 
interest on juros, which constituted the consolidated part of the debt. The consignación, 
however, was the part of a royal rent that was agreed in order to pay new debts, such 
as those arranged in the service contracts called asientos. These new credits were 
expected to be paid in the short-term, thus being called floating debt to distinguish it 
from long-term or consolidated debt. 
Apart from their different timing, these two types of credit differed in the quality 
of the royal incomes assigned for their repayment. Since the royal earnings assigned to 
service the situado were more reliable both in collection and quantity, especially 
because they had been agreed with the cities, the other incomes intended to reimburse 
the floating debt were considered less reliable. The traditional example of the money 
coming in from the American fleet to the Peninsula is a clear instance of the importance 
of a debt backed by reliable taxes. 
Since the fleet could be delayed or carry less capital than expected, it was risky 
for lenders to accept giving a credit backed by the American fleet. However, the 
possibility of rearranging the payments of the floating debt to include other royal 
incomes eased the process of negotiation needed to reach an agreement. In other words, 
the consolidated debt was safer than the floating one, though the flexibility of the royal 
administration to preserve its financial reputation made the latter debt a relatively safe 
investment. The biggest problem with floating debt for lenders was the timing, because 
the unreliability of the incomes assigned to its service could also delay the payment to 
their own creditors. 
This system presented a serious difficulty for debt holders. The budget of the 
situado was untouchable because it backed the consolidated debt, which had to be 
serviced in time to preserve the reputation of this debt.115 If local treasurers failed to 
pay the interests of juros, it was necessary to amend the royal income in their service, 
just as happened with the floating debt.116 Notwithstanding the flexibility of the financial 
 
115 Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’, 
Estudios de Historia Económica, no. 55 (2009): 45. 
116 Recent research states that the transference of a royal liability from one income to another to satisfy 
the lender was down to the monarch’s good will. See Marcos Martín, ‘“Crecimientos, reducciones y no 
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system of payments, the price and reputation of this financial product could lead to a 
decrease in primary and secondary markets of royal debt.117 This situation could hinder 
the monarch from accessing new loans because the reputation of his sustainable system 
of payments had fallen. Therefore, the correct liquidation of the interests of the juros’ 
holders was paramount. In order to service them, the Council of Finances and the 
multiple central accounting offices managed the information about the identity of these 
people, which was used to deliver the orders of payment (libranzas) to the local 
treasurers. 118  In this sense, the high-ranking institutions of the royal administration 
sought to preserve the royal reputation through the establishment of strong control 
over who should be paid and when. 
The mathematical formula to obtain the interest (rendimiento) that these debt 
holders received is not often explained in the historiography. 119  Instead of the 
percentages that we are used to working with nowadays, the rendimiento was 
calculated in Castilian maravedis and expressed in thousands per thousand (miles al 
millar). This interest ranged from 5,000 to 40,000 per thousand. For example, a juro at 
10,000 al millar meant that for every 10,000 maravedis invested as principal, the juro’s 
holder earned 1,000 maravedis periodically. However, sometimes the monarch decided 
to revalorise upward the principal necessary to treat the initial amount of money as 
interest in a process called crecimiento. 
We can observe multiple examples of this practice in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. On 31st October 1563, for example, Philip II decreed a limit on 
the maximum interest rate of any juro sold of 7.14%. In order to apply this novelty, debt 
holders were requested to increase their investment in the principal of the juro to 
compensate the percental difference. Another important example took place on 26th 
January 1608, when Philip III decided that new debt titles could not generate more than 
 
cabimientos de juros”. Tres episodios de gestión irresponsable de la deuda pública consolidada en la 
España del siglo XVII’, 555. 
117 Primary market is here understood as the deals made between the monarch and the lenders, whereas 
the secondary market refers to the sale of royal debt intermediated by a lender to a third party. 
118 Depending on the royal treasury, the payment of these interests was annual, biannual or quarterly. 
See Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’, 46. 
119 An exception in Irigoin and Grafe, ‘Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal Constraints and Financial Development 
in the Early Modern Hispanic World’, 10–12. 
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5% in interest.120 In this sense, the aim of this practice was to keep interest rates of 
consolidated debt as low as possible so as to be able to pay them while keeping them 
attractive to investors and raising more money to refill royal liquidity.121 Nonetheless, 
there were only two choices left for the title holders when the monarch decreed a 
crecimiento. 
The first option of the debt holder was to accept the new deal and increase the 
amount of money invested in their juros to match the necessary capital so as to keep 
receiving the same interest in terms of cash. A visual representation of this process can 
be found in figure 1, where a random juro purchased for 100,000 maravedis at an annual 
interest rate of 10% generated 1,000 maravedis per year. Once again, the process for 
understanding the mathematical operation used by Hispanic officials to calculate that 
percentage is expressed in maravedis per thousand, as already explained. 
Therefore, when the monarch decreed that no juro could have an interest rate 
higher than 7.14% (or 14,000 maravedis per thousand), this meant that the sovereign 
was lowering the maximum percental rate. Following his instructions, the initial juro in 
this example had to be adjusted to a legal level. Since investors preferred to keep 
earning the regular stream of 10,000 maravedis per year thanks to the interest rate, an 
additional capital injection of 40,000 maravedis on the principal was necessary. As a 
result of this operation, the monarch earned an extra sum of money for the same 




120 On 8th October 1621 a new decree requested that not only were new juros affected by the interest 
limit but so were those already sold. See Alberto Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda Pública, Fiscalidad y Arbitrios En 
La Corona de Castilla En Los Siglos XVI y XVII’, in Banca, Crédito y Capital. La Monarquia Hispanica y Los 
Antiguos Paises Bajos (1505-1700), ed. Carmen Sanz Ayán and Bernardo José García García (Fundación 
Carlos Amberes, 2006), 373. 
121 Marcos Martín, ‘“Crecimientos, reducciones y no cabimientos de juros”. Tres episodios de gestión 
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× 1,000 = 10,000 𝑚𝑟𝑣𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Figure 1. Example of a juro initially purchased for 100,000 maravedis (mrvs) at an interest rate of 10% (10,000 
mrvs/1000) on which a crecimiento process was applied, thus lowering the interest rate to 7.14% (14,000 
mrvs/1000), forcing an increase in the capital invested up to 140,000 maravedis to keep receiving a regular interest 
of 10,000 maravedis per year. 
The investor had another option, which consisted in asking the monarch for the 
reimbursement of their investment and the return of the debt title to the sovereign in a 
process called desempeñar. In this process, the debt holder was permitted to recover 
his capital while keeping the interests earned until that moment. There was no third 
option in which the investor could retain the juro at the initial terms unless the decree 
only affected those juros issued after its enactment, such as those between 1608 and 
1621. In other words, the process of desempeño depended on the availability of funds 
in the royal treasury. Considering that a revalorisation of the titles of consolidated debt 
was a sign of scarce liquidity in the coffers of the monarchy, the process of 
reimbursement regarding the principal could be extremely lengthy. Therefore, it was 
very often more convenient to accept the price increase than return the investment of 
the juro to the monarch. 
The lifetime of a juro was established in its letter of sale. A juro could be 
perpetual (perpetuo) and remain in the hands of its beneficiary without the possibility 
for the king to recover it unless the holder had committed serious offenses such as 
heresy or high treason (lesa majestad). Otherwise, if the title of debt was temporary and 
redeemable, it was called juro al quitar. In that case, the monarch could re-purchase 
them whenever he desired. These juros did not necessarily have a fixed term of duration. 
Indeed, they could last for the duration of a lifetime (vitalicios) or inheritable (de 
heredad). Moreover, a juro could also serve as collateral in financial transactions, the so-
called juros de caución. This variant of the debt title was used to offer a guarantee on 
the short-term debt contract, which meant that they could not be enforced until the 
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king had failed in his obligations agreed in the asiento. In the second half of the sixteenth 
century, a new modality of juros was born: juros de resguardo and juros de 
comodidad.122 Both debt titles could be sold even before the monarch defaulted as they 
were transferable to third parties. The juros de caución were active until the first 
suspension of payments in April-June 1557, yet according to Ruiz Martín and Carlos 
Morales the juros de resguardo did not begin to be commercialised until 1561, just after 
the Medio General of 1560.123 
Between 1556 and 1559, the period under study in this thesis, the type of juros 
that the monarch issued were juros al quitar, which resulted from the old debts that he 
had contracted with the financiers since June 1557. These were issued to repay royal 
creditors and they also functioned as collateral. Those juros had the same finality as the 
juros de resguardo, but they were a different concept because while the juros al quitar 
were a mercy to repay old debts, the juros de resguardo reimbursed the financier in 
advance for the same asiento to which they were linked. It is worth mentioning another 
tool that was different from the juros de resguardo and al quitar, which Drelichman and 
Voth have recently proposed: the working capital.124 This capital was a sum of money 
that the sovereign gave in advance to the businessman, who was tasked with searching 
for potential investors and discovering whether it was possible or not to raise enough 
funds from the sale of juros. As we can see, the Council of Finances always sought to 




122 The difference between these two debt titles, issued in the early 1560s, lays in the fact that the ‘juros 
de comodidad’ were a sort of loan from the monarchy to help the lender accommodate his operations, 
whereas those ‘of resguardo’ were debt titles that could be sold immediately. See more details in Carlos 
Morales, Felipe II, 93–94. 
123  Although Romano Canosa concluded that those juros were created in 1555, his observation was 
erroneous as these involved a different and extraordinary kind of contract. See Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘Las 
finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II (alternancias de participación que se ofrecieron para 
Francia)’, Hispania: Revista española de historia, no. 2 (1968): 109–74; Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 91; 
Romano Canosa, Banchieri genovesi e sovrani spagnoli tra Cinquecento e Seicento (Roma: Sapere 2000, 
1998). 
124 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 203. 
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The secondary market of debt: upstream and downstream flows of credit 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the royal administration and private financiers, 
there was a chronic scarcity of liquidity in many parts of the Hispanic Monarchy. This 
lack of cash generated upstream and downstream flows of credit to compensate for it. 
Fernand Braudel already noted in 1979 these processes of collecting private capital and 
forwarding it to meet the royal needs (upstream), while redirecting the returns to the 
investor in exchange for their investments (downstream).125 The evidence that Braudel 
found was located within the context of the birth of capitalism. The eminent scholar 
claimed that when Genoese bankers agreed short-term loans with Philip II, they 
obtained liquidity by distributing shares of the royal reimbursements among Italian and 
Hispanic investors. The French historian thus realised the complex structure of money 
flows that fed the enterprises of the Hispanic monarchs. 
Braudel mentioned having found lists of subscribers who had participated in the 
sales of juros in the Archivo General de Simancas, but he lamented not having noted 
their reference. 126 The capital that those subscribers provided to the king was then 
forwarded to Genoese financiers as their reimbursements, a repayment that sometimes 
was effected even before the financier had to fulfil his obligations elsewhere. The 
Genoese lending community, a pivotal element of this dissertation, managed these 
financial operations by placing juros in the secondary debt market thanks to 
intermediaries. Braudel, however, did not clarify whether these juros were part of the 
reimbursement of the principal or a collateral clause that guaranteed the repayment. 
Perhaps these variants encouraged him to compare these processes with the sale of 
public debt in the nineteenth century, though the Hispanic Monarchy cannot be 
identified as a modern state yet in the sixteenth century. Notwithstanding this 
important controversy, he opened an entire field of research into understanding the 
upstream and downstream flows of credit that still demands further investigation. 
In this regard, the preference given to debt holders rather than to the 
intermediaries who facilitated the collection of the returns that the juros generated is 
still surprising.127 Recently, Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth reviewed the 
 
125 Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce, 2:386–88. 
126 Ibid., 2:388. 
127 Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’, 13. 
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flows of credit in their study on the royal renegotiation of 1596 and incorporated an 
important novelty worth mentioning.128 Although they acknowledged the existence of 
the Braudelian lists of subscribers, they found consistent evidence about how the 
Genoese financiers diversified risks in their obligations as lenders through the sale of 
shares in the instalments in exchange for a fee. This strategy reduced the amount of 
capital that high-ranking financiers had to invest on their own behalf. Since Genoese 
financiers parcelled the investment out, they also diversified the risks of not being 
properly reimbursed, which were now shared with other investors. 
In this sense, Drelichman and Voth realised how much detail the Genoese 
accounting books (libri maestri) could offer in future investigations. This excellent and 
complementary source of information recorded and organised all the operations of 
small capitalists. Finally, the two scholars also claim that the upstream flow was a private 
negotiation between the Genoese financier and a third party with whom they agreed 
the principal and the conditions of the royal reimbursement. However, the scarcity of 
accounting books and correspondence among financiers makes it difficult to generalise 
this aspect. This project, indeed, reflects how difficult it is to find and understand the 
social engagement between Genoese financiers and their creditors. In order to analyse 
this type of sources, it is necessary first to identify who invested in the secondary debt 
market, an aspect that has barely been dealt with in the relevant historiography and 
which demands an urgent shared database. 
In this auxiliary market, the Genoese found the liquidity that they needed to fulfil 
their obligations. The literature of this field has revealed interesting aspects, 
investigated principally by Álvarez Nogal, that shed light on how the upstream and 
downstream flows of credit worked.129 The first step consisted in the commercialisation 
of these juros, which determined how profitable they could be for a Genoese financier 
due to the premium obtained. The study of this process is complicated because the long-
term bonds could be transferable in part or fully to third parties. In addition, the holder 
 
128 Their ideas were first published in a working paper before the publication of a more extensive book. 
See Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Funding Empire: Risk, Diversification, and the 
Underwriting of Early Modern Sovereign Loans’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network, 6 July 2011); Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell. 
129 Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’. 
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of the debt title could ask for a change to the royal income that supported the juro if it 
stopped being profitable. Transferability and mobility, therefore, were crucial for 
achieving the commercialisation of this financial product and, thus, activated the 
machinery that funded the Hispanic Monarchy. 
The sale of juros was a negotiation that could be direct or indirect.130 In the 
former case, royal officials sold these debt titles when they attended commercial fairs 
or travelled around cities where they knew of the presence of potential buyers. The 
second option involved financiers, like the Genoese community, signing asientos with 
the monarch and having contacts with small investors. The following chapters of this 
thesis deal with this alternative method in order to analyse the Genoese upstream and 
downstream connections. Nevertheless, it can be observed that both Nicolao de 
Grimaldo and Costantin Gentil, the main subjects of this study, only contacted the 
investors and agreed price and instalments with them, but they did not necessarily 
collect the interest. This fact emphasises the multiplicity of services involved in a sale of 
juros and hampers the establishment of a unique model. 
The work of Álvarez Nogal has also demonstrated that the sources of this 
secondary debt market present a two-faced profile. On the one hand, they can be 
practically endless at local level because they are mostly private contracts recorded in 
notarial deeds. Álvarez Nogal used this source, for example, to analyse juros earmarked 
on alcabalas and tercias (custom duties) of Burgos, Cádiz, and Murcia. His study is, 
therefore, based on a perspective from below and limited to two incomes already 
farmed within a specific geography at local level. In this sense, his investigation does not 
analyse this secondary debt market from the perspective of a Genoese financier who 
intermediated for its correct functioning, which is the methodology used in this thesis. 
On the other hand, the royal accounts on the sales of juros represent a methodological 
challenge because of the registration system. As a juro was a transferable privilege, the 
royal officials were only interested in the person who bought the share of the juro and 
nothing else. 
 
130 Although there were women among the people who acquired a juros, the presence of businessmen 
was much more common. See ibid., 17–18. 
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The new holder had no obligation to be present in the correspondent treasury to 
collect the money generated from the interest of his income. As a result of this 
procedure, the person who collected the money through powers of attorney remains 
normally unknown in the royal sources. Unless a specific process of digging around in 
the sources is done, which is extremely time consuming and has unpredictable results 
because of the way the documents are organised, these collectors will always be 
overlooked. Throughout this thesis, there are examples of reports that show who 
collected the interest, which will let historians to start linking people in a sort of clientele. 
Although this information is quite valuable for a complete historical narrative, many 
additional sources such as the powers of attorney used in the collection are not normally 
preserved. The solution to this difficulty lies in the contrast between the royal sources 
and the local archives where notarial protocols are held. In other words, local archives 
allow for an in-depth investigation, which can reveal if those who visited the small 
treasuries were agents, relatives, or the holders who had acquired a share of the title of 
debt. 
A final remark, also present in the work of Álvarez Nogal, refers to the limitations 
that the sources present regarding the place where those investors lived. This 
information does not always appear in the sources, but it is an essential requisite. In 
general terms, investors usually acquired juros that were taken out on their own city’s 
taxes to avoid transport costs, travelling to distant treasuries, and also to have a better 
chance of influencing the treasurer. In other words, there was a need for reducing 
transaction costs. If the residence of the investor is missing, it is harder to know if the 
investor chose a nearby income or not. This relationship of ‘closer treasury-higher 
benefit’ has its exception to the rule in the existence of foreign holders of juros or 
holders living overseas. 
The presence of the Genoese diaspora in Castile and Genoese investors in Genoa 
transforms that distant reality into something more complex.131 Alberto Tenenti and 
Francesco Poggi are the only scholars to have listed the royal incomes that the Genoese 
community held in the Hispanic Monarchy, though their analysis did not include how 
 
131 Genoa was a territory outside of the royal fiscal system and, therefore, it was not possible for someone 
settled there to obtain a juro. Any operation from the Ligurian city, either to purchase the debt title or to 
collect its interest, required a larger pecuniary and social capital than if the holder lived in Castile. 
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those foreign investors received their rendimientos.132 In this sense, the existence of 
intermediaries is an option already accepted in the works of Drelichman and Voth.133 
Nonetheless, following their argument it is also possible that those investors in Genoa 
subdivided their juros even more by splitting their share among more people. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no theory to explain how those investors, so distant 
from each other in geographical terms, contacted one another. 
Whilst the process of commercialisation and the sources of this secondary debt 
market are a field of study in their own right, the identity of those who purchased juros, 
or at least a share of them, is another. According to the traditional literature based on 
the works of Ruiz Martín and Conklin, the investors were predominantly Castilian.134 
Their profile was heterogeneous, but most of them were clergymen and civil servants, 
though there were also institutions such as councils or monasteries, as the following 
chapters illustrate. Although Ruiz Martín was right when he pointed out several years 
ago the wealth of those investors, recent studies prove that there were also people with 
much less economic capacity.135 However, a new problem arises that the historiography 
has not yet resolved: how did these small investors obtain enough liquidity to participate 
in the great financing of the Hispanic Monarchy? A preliminary answer to this issue is 
addressed in this study, which presents examples of Genoese financiers, who lived at 
the royal court and advanced money on behalf of those small investors. A further 
analysis of the capacity of these people to obtain liquidity unveils where the money 
really came from. 
Sometimes the old Genoese nobility used the liquidity of the new Genoese 
families (nobili nuovi).136  This assumption contradicts the argument put forward by 
Pacini about endless factionalist confrontation in Genoese society. The proposal of 
 
132 Francesco Poggi, ‘Le Guerre Civili Di Genova, in Relazione Con Un Documento Economico-Finanziario 
Dell’anno 1576.’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 54, fasc. 3 (1926): 1–173; Alberto Tenenti, ‘Las 
Rentas de Los Genoveses En España a Comienzos Del Siglo XVII’, in Dinero y Crédito, 1977, 207–48. 
133 According to these scholars, the traditional fee for intermediation services was 1% of the investment. 
See Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 193. 
134 Ruiz Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II (alternancias de participación que 
se ofrecieron para Francia)’, 124; James Conklin, ‘The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II’, 
Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 3 (1 June 1998): 491. 
135 Drelichman and Voth, ‘Funding Empire’, 21. 
136 This collaboration can also be observed in the galley providers. See Maréchaux, ‘Instituciones Navales 
y Finanzas Internacionales’, 173. 
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Álvarez Nogal, for example, offers a profile of wealthy buyers rather than small 
investors.137 Unfortunately, there is not yet enough in-depth analysis available to discern 
whether those rich men and women were also financed by their own creditors, such as 
merchants or local artisans, or if they were the holders of liquidity in their local space. 
This historiographical void opens an innovative approach to the literature that deals with 
the scrutiny of local elites, independently of whether they were located within the 
territories of the Hispanic Monarchy or not. This thesis seeks to examine the financial 
participation of wealthy people and institutions as a key mechanism of the state 
construction through the correct working of the upstream and downstream flows of 
credit. 
Suspension of payments: 
Although the system allowed the monarch to drain as much liquidity as he could 
from his subjects through any means at his disposal, this process was not free of charge. 
The king, as it happens with any other borrower, had to reimburse his financial 
commitments. If the monarch failed to fulfil his obligations, the financial system 
collapsed. This is what the historiography has commonly described as a financial crisis.138 
The study of this concept within the Hispanic Monarchy has been dominated by its 
causes and effects in Castile, the economic heart of the monarchy. Still immersed in 
national studies, in the 1960s the classic literature was revisited to obtain a better 
understanding of the basic principles of these crises.139 The main topic that scholars 
dealt with during that decade was the effect military constraints had on the royal 
capabilities, such as the chronic deficits that obliged it to increase the fiscal burden and 
borrow extensively. When the monarch suspended payments, the main objective was 
 
137 Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’, 19. 
138 An extensive historiographical review of this concept as applied to the Hispanic Monarchy in Escribano 
Páez and García Montón, ‘De gobernantes y deudas. Una década de producción historiográfica sobre la 
Castilla de los Austrias’. 
139 Domínguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda de Felipe IV.; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de 
Felipe II; Castillo Pintado, ‘Los Juros de Castilla. Apogeo y Fin de Un Instrumento de Crédito’; Álvaro Castillo 
Pintado, ‘Dette Flottante et Dette Consolidée En Espagne, de 1557 à 1600’, Annales. Histoire, Sciences 
Sociales 18, no. 4 (1 July 1963): 745–59; Martín, ‘Un Expediente Financiero Entre 1560 y 1575’; Ruiz 
Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II (alternancias de participación que se 
ofrecieron para Francia)’; Ramón Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, vol. 3: Los caminos del oro y 
de la plata, 3 vols (Barcelona: Crítica, 1987). 
49 
 
to obtain liquidity by recovering allocations (consignaciones) given to financiers as 
reimbursement for their services. 
The 1970s followed the path opened in the previous decade with works more 
focused on understanding what the medios generales (general agreements) were.140 The 
basic knowledge was already established, but the first signs of change began to appear 
when the interest shifted to the causes for the suspension of payments to royal lenders. 
To this decade belongs one of the first references to these crises as an expression of 
royal power rather than the result of an imbalance between incomes and expenses.141 
According to this approach, the royal household sought to avoid financial oligopolies 
that could jeopardise the sustainability of the monarchy. 
In the 1980s, the attention of Italian historians began to be drawn to the Castilian 
financial shocks. They were interested in discovering the effects of medios generales in 
Italy, when Hispanic territories in that peninsula were called to contribute.142 In addition, 
the concept of a royal anti-monopoly strategy developed in the 1970s was refined in this 
decade to analyse the bargaining capabilities of the financiers. This change in the 
literature revealed that the monarchy was not all powerful.143 Some works, by contrast, 
put the focus on locating the agency of the military conflicts in the financial crises that 
affected all levels of Hispanic society.144 
During the following decade, the conflict remained at the centre of the picture, 
yet it was not only military. One classic author emphasised the social dimension of 
financial crises, in which the monarchy often played an active role to weaken strong 
 
140 Álvaro Castillo Pintado, ‘“Decretos” et “Medios Generales” Dans Le Système Financier de La Castille. 
La Crise de 1596’, Historie Économique Du Monde Méditerranéen, 1450-1650, Mélanges En L’honneur Du 
Fernand Braudel, 1973, 137–44; Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: 
The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars., First edition, Cambridge Studies 
in Early Modern History (Cambridge Eng: University Press, 1972), 150–51. 
141 Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘La Banca En España Hasta 1782’, in El Banco de España. Una Historia Económica 
(Madrid, 1970), 18–19. 
142 Giovanni Muto, ‘Decretos e Medios Generales. La Gestione Delle Crisi Finanziarie Nell’Italia Spagnola’, 
in La Repubblica Internazionale Del Denaro Tra XV e XVII Secolo, ed. Aldo De Maddalena and Hermann 
Kellenbenz (Bologna, 1986). 
143  Enrica Neri, Uomini d’affari e di governo tra Genova e Madrid: (secoli XVI e XVII) (Milano: Vita e 
pensiero, 1989). 
144 Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘El crédito de la corona y los hombres de negocios en los últimos años del reinado 
de Felipe IV’, Cuadernos de historia moderna, no. 9 (1988): 63–94; María José Rodríguez-Salgado, The 




groups of financiers.145 If the monarch and his circle developed an aversion to the royal 
lenders, it was also true that the conflict affected the relationships between the 
sovereign and the estates (cortes). 146  As the royal debt was backed by negotiable 
incomes that Castilian cities forwarded to the king, the monarch sought to increase the 
ceiling of those subsidies. However, sometimes the causes of financial crises had to do 
with factional disputes at the royal court.147  
The works published in the 2000s and the 2010s have proposed new approaches 
to the suspensions of payments, especially due to the 2008-2013 global financial crisis. 
For example, one line of investigation argues that these episodes had a serial pattern as 
a result of economic policies framed by courtly struggles, though their goal was to keep 
spending.148 Recently, some scholars have been paying more attention to the socio-
political costs of the financial crises in the early modern Hispanic Monarchy, which are 
reflected in the municipal indebtedness of the Castilian cities. 149  Other studies, 
nonetheless, have developed more in-depth research lines already sketched in the 
previous decades, especially those that focused on the conflict between the monarch 
and the cortes.150 
Although the suspension of payments is a broad concept and it involves many 
aspects, all of them converge in that the excessive indebtedness of the monarch resulted 
from an imbalance between incomes and expenses.151 By reason of this inequity, the 
royal fiscal leverage was what determined the viability of the debts.152 The monarchy 
backed its liabilities with fiscal resources, ordinary and extraordinary, that were 
 
145 Felipe Ruiz Martín, Pequeño Capitalismo, Gran Capitalismo: Simón Ruiz y Sus Negocios En Florencia, 
Historia Del Mundo Moderno (Barcelona: Crítica, 1990); along the same lines Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘La 
estrategia de la monarquía en la suspensión de pagos del 96 y su “medio general”’, in Las sociedades 
ibéricas y el mar a finales del siglo XVI: Congreso Internacional, vol. 2, 1998, 81–95. 
146 Gelabert González, La bolsa del Rey; Thompson, ‘Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis’. 
147 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Política y Finanzas En El Siglo XVI El Gobierno Del Erario Real y El 
Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602’ (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1994); Carlos Morales, 
El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602. 
148 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Crisis financieras y deuda dinástica, 1557-1627’, Cuadernos de Historia 
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scattered around the monarchy. If they diminished or stagnated, a crisis followed. Of 
course, political negotiations to increase the fiscal capability of the monarch played an 
important role throughout the whole reign of the Habsburg dynasty, but more 
interesting was the use of the suspension of payments as a means to subjugate the fiscal 
resistance of Castilian cities.153 
After briefly describing the main lines of investigation into the suspensions of 
payments and their consequential financial crises, a lengthier explanation of the subject 
is necessary. Although the monarchy might be considered as a predator state that 
always sought liquidity to fund its enterprises, it was also obliged to give something in 
return. When the reimbursement did not take place, the financial upstream and 
downstream credit flows collapsed, and a crisis occurred. This event is known in the 
historiography as a royal default or bankruptcy, because the ruler was the agent that 
had borrowed more than he could support.154 
Philip II is generally considered as the first Habsburg monarch of the Hispanic 
Monarchy to default in April-June 1557.155 The suspension of payments -or supensión de 
consignaciones in contemporary jargon- was the process through which the monarch 
stopped payments of his short-term debt. It happened when the royal estate had no 
available incomes to allocate the reimbursements of these asientos. What followed this 
royal default was a conversion of the failed assets into long-term debt titles with a lower 
interest rate. This thesis follows the traditional understanding of these processes as 
Castillo Pintado had already explained them in 1963.156 He claimed that royal defaults 
were nothing but forced consolidations of floating debt. 
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Although the plan for debt conversion is a clear and undisputed concept, there 
is a marked discrepancy about its meaning in the historiography. This debate has 
provided three different perspectives. Giovanni Muto defended a first model in 1986 
that focused on the causes of royal defaults. He asserted that the monarch borrowed 
more than he could afford, which provoked structural deficiencies in the royal estate to 
fulfil its debt commitments.157 In other words, Muto talked about a crisis of solvency. 
Years later, in 2000, Álvarez Nogal proposed that the suspension of payments was a tool 
rather than a consequence.158 The suspension of payments as an instrument served, 
thus, to reduce the creation of oligopolies of financiers who could penalise the king by 
settling together. However, only the expendable royal creditors were included in those 
suspensions since the others had important ongoing business with the monarch. 
Drelichman and Voth offered a third perspective in 2014. They state that the suspension 
of payments was a financial plan to restructure royal debt and make it more manageable, 
though the king could keep borrowing without declaring the default. In short, their 
proposal points to temporary crises of liquidity rather than crises of solvency or 
strategies of banishment.159 
In this thesis, the concept of suspension of payments is simply a tool, an 
opportunity to introduce the reader to a post-crisis period that, nonetheless, had long-
term consequences for the state building process of the Hispanic Monarchy. However, 
this thesis follows the argument of Drelichman and Voth about the temporary royal crisis 
of liquidity because there were asientos signed just after the default and debt 
conversion, which obtained their reimbursement in recently freed royal incomes. Philip 
II’s needs in the war against France and the Papacy did not permit him to stop borrowing, 
so the only solution was to free already earmarked incomes. In addition, the argument 
of Álvarez Nogal is also applicable because, given that the South German financiers such 
as the Fugger and Welser were the only excluded group, the royal default and debt 
consolidation can be understood as a tool to avoid the emergence of the Genoese 
oligopoly. 
 
157 Muto, ‘Decretos e Medios Generales. La Gestione Delle Crisi Finanziarie Nell’Italia Spagnola’, 278–79. 
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Genoese strategies of financing 
Drelichman and Voth have contributed to establishing the organisational 
concepts and strategies of negotiation that enabled Genoese lenders to establish 
themselves as the predominant royal financiers in the Hispanic Monarchy from 1557 
onwards. They have proposed that the Genoese businessmen worked in ‘coalition’, a 
concept adapted from the classic study by Avner Greif about a group of Jewish 
merchants from the Maghreb in the eleventh century.160 In Greif’s words, a coalition is 
‘an economic institution in which expectations, implicit contractual relations, and a 
specific information-transmission mechanism supported the operation of a reputation 
mechanism’. In this sense, the literature about the Genoese financial diaspora 
intermingles with institutional historiography. More specifically, the Genoese lending 
community can be considered as an informal institution in which norms, traditions, and 
especially reputational elements had a coercive effect among its members to avoid 
anyone cheating on the others.161 
The Genoese coalition was first characterised by its tendency towards syndicated 
lending through the cooperation of different companies to offer big financial services.162 
This strategy helped to reduce risks, which otherwise could lead to the bankruptcy of 
single lenders. Co-lending, however, was not necessarily related to capacity constraints 
but to intermarriage strategies since there were also large operations. 163 In terms of 
organisation, Genoese lending companies used to be formed by relatives, though not 
necessarily. This created a tacit alliance from which groups of overlapping financiers 
emerged.  
The second element is represented in the collateral conditions that Genoese 
financiers demanded when they lent money to the monarch. These clauses backed the 
liquidity of the businessman, in case the monarch could not fulfil his obligations of 
reimbursement. These conditions of security were also accompanied by clear 
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descriptions about how and when they could be executed. Most of these collateral 
clauses involved the issuance of juros de caución and, after 1561, juros de resguardo.164 
Apart from being a protective means, these conditions provided a trustworthy source of 
liquidity even before the sovereign was unable to meet the payments in the contract. 
The third and final feature is the ‘cheat-the-cheater enforcement’ or internal 
discipline. It was applied to expel from the community any discordant or untrustworthy 
member who did not follow the rules. This method, already mentioned regarding the 
expansion of bills of exchange in the capital market, punished the cheaters and 
motivated the others to be loyal members of the community. Decades ago, Giorgio Doria 
established that the correspondence between businessmen was the key factor that 
made possible the existence of this discipline, though he found it in the merchant 
communities.165 Although Drelichman and Voth affirm that the Genoese financiers were 
a close-knit group, this does not mean that these businessmen always collaborated 
conjointly. Indeed, the study by Ruth Pike contains a number of examples in which the 
Genoese merchants of Seville did not fully trust every member of their community.166 
There is, therefore, no contradiction in extending this argument to consider that this 
heterogeneous behaviour also occurred among financiers. 
These three elements together meant that Genoese financiers were a close-knit 
group. Specifically, these businessmen worked by seeking reciprocal benefits when they 
lent money to the monarch and prevented internal difficulties with mechanisms of 
reputation and self-enforcement. The best advantage to syndicated lending was that 
they could act as a single lender. This characteristic was their best defence against any 
external threat, such as unexpected royal defaults. The Genoese financiers of Philip II 
were, indeed, able to establish a penalty against the king if he did not service his debts. 
The economist James Conklin studied this concept in his 1998 article on the ‘bankruptcy 
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of 1575’.167 This penalty had, in turn, two coercive tools that the financiers could use 
against the king. 
The first tool consisted of the threat posed by the Genoese royal financiers due 
to their traditional involvement in the commercial flows between Castile and the 
Habsburg Low Countries. The second was their capacity to paralyse, or at least obstruct, 
the credit supply to the monarch, even from non-Genoese providers. Through the 
analysis of these two coercive tools, Conklin concluded that Philip II was always forced 
to repay his debts. If he refused, he was likely to suffer cuts to his financial supply and 
commercial boycotts in wartime. 
This approach seems to be fully applicable only in the context of conflict, when 
those penalties became a real problem due to the constant need for resources. Because 
of this specific condition, this thesis partially accepts the premise of Conklin. During the 
timeframe studied in this work, the war with France and the Papal States put Philip II in 
a weak position at the negotiating table with his lenders. However, the commercial 
threat is a rather naïve hypothesis to be taken seriously as the Genoese had other 
commercial businesses that were not necessarily connected with high finance. 
In his analysis, Conklin also applied the theory of sovereign debt, which focuses 
on the role that reputation played for both lender and borrower. Drelichman and Voth 
have recently reviewed some of the main studies on this topic from the 1990s and early 
2000s along these lines, thus providing a field of discussion about the relationship 
between reputation and the lending equilibrium. 168  They emphasise the different 
results for the lending stability if the reputations of borrowers, lenders, and 
reimbursement processes fall apart in three different scenarios. Although a bad 
borrower’s reputation is typically considered as the main cause of a financial collapse 
due to unsustainable debt, it is perhaps more beneficial to look at the reputation of the 
lender instead for the case studies contained in this thesis. Rather than reflecting on the 
lenders’ reputation as regards their capability to service their financial commitments, it 
 
167  Conklin, ‘The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II’, 495–96; Drelichman and Voth 
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is more effective to check their ability to punish defaulting borrowers in order to retain 
the trust of their own creditors. 
In this sense, these three scholars agree on the fact that if borrowers and lenders 
maintained a good reputation, their lending contracts would become self-enforcing, 
which means that there was no need to apply any penalty or coercion from any side. 
More specifically, according to Conklin the royal capability to sustain its debt was the 
principal element in determining whether to declare a suspension of payments or 
continue borrowing when reputation was asymmetrical. Conklin based his argument on 
the predictions and models developed by Bulow and Rogoff in the late 1980s, a work 
that has become a classic in this field of Economic History.169 
Bulow and Rogoff claimed that if the only threatening tool held by lenders was 
to stop lending, then they could anticipate a royal suspension of payments by cutting off 
the credit supply early, thus reducing losses.170 Nevertheless, Conklin did not consider in 
his study that the royal capacity to keep healthy levels of sustainable debt also depended 
on the ability of lenders to finance the monarchy through the acquisition of juros. In 
other words, the preventive financial penalty that the Genoese could voluntarily exert 
by stopping lending is one thing. It is quite another thing for the lenders to be unable to 
continue lending because their capacities for collecting capital through the upstream 
and downstream flows had diminished. 
To conclude this first part of the chapter, the main concepts concerning the 
Genoese upstream and downstream flows of credit in relation to the state-building 
process have been described. They explain how the secondary credit market was a 
privileged space where these processes took place within the Hispanic Monarchy, 
besides their interrelation with the structure and importance of royal incomes. All 
together established a debt ceiling for the king who, nonetheless, continued borrowing 
even after declaring a suspension of payments in the royal incomes earmarked to service 
his short-term debts. This decision and the following financial scenario tested the 
abilities of the Genoese to diversify risks, while increasing their collateral clauses to 
 
169 Cf. Jeremy I. Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget?’, Working Paper 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1988). 
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by A. W. Lovett, ‘The Castilian Bankruptcy of 1575’, The Historical Journal 23, no. 4 (1980): 899–911. 
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obtain the maximum profit. Their syndicated lending and their connections with the 
principal economic nodes of the monarchy posed a serious threat to the monarchy, 
which facilitated the rapid recovery of the borrowing process after the royal financial 
restructuring. In sum, the Genoese lending strategy was well protected through an 
efficient organisation and an aggressive policy, which was widely backed by the Republic 
of Genoa. 
1.2. The Republic of Genoa, its diaspora, and the Hispanic Monarchy: 
historiographical analysis of a perfect symbiosis 
The Hispanic-Genoese encounter 
The historiography of the association between the Hispanic Monarchy and the 
Republic of Genoa is clearly marked by the paradigm of ‘the Genoese century’, which 
was characterised by a generalised and predominant financial Genoese presence in the 
Hispanic Monarchy. Frank Spooner coined this concept in 1956, though it was originally 
inspired by the first edition of Braudel’s La Méditerranée published in 1949. Braudel 
established a chronological boundary that had an impact on later works, enclosing them 
in the financial operations of those businessmen.171 In this sense, the French historian 
pointed to the first royal suspension of payments in 1557 as the initial year of this 
historiographical period, while Spooner noted that the Genoese financial predominance 
in Europe lasted until the last quarter of the seventeenth century based on the inflow of 
precious metals to Genoa.172 
These boundary dates fluctuated, especially the year when this ‘Genoese century’ 
began.173 Ruiz Martín, a disciple of Fernand Braudel, established the initial point in 1528 
and its end in 1627. 174  The first year corresponds to the agreement for an alliance 
between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Republic of Genoa, whilst the second date 
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refers to a royal suspension of payments that marked an impasse in Genoese financial 
predominance. Nowadays, historians still take these years as fundamental references, 
though it is generally agreed that the end of this period broadly exceeded 1627, as 
Spooner suggested.175  
It is clear, nonetheless, that the Genoese century is a cornerstone in the origins 
of modern capitalism. Braudel proclaimed this idea in his The Wheels of Commerce, 
where he pointed out that these initial steps were based on the mobilisation of 
accumulated capital from commercial enterprises.176 In this sense, Braudel argued that 
the Genoese shift to royal finances was not a political decision resulting from alliances, 
but a private initiative that could choose between investing or hoarding liquidity. This 
historiographical line that emphasises the economic aspect of the Genoese society 
continued in the 1990s, with the study by Giovanni Arrighi.177 His comparative analysis 
of cycles of capital accumulation reveals that the Genoese system of reinvestment was 
funded with the profits that the Ligurian merchant class had accumulated while the 
trade routes to the Black Sea were still open. 
Enrique Otte had already discussed this commercial tradition and the Genoese 
retreat from the Black Sea due to Ottoman and Venetian competition, which had 
reoriented investments to North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula from the thirteenth 
century. 178  Arrighi affirms that this movement also produced a shift in the political 
exchange that the merchant strata had with the Genoese aristocracy. The latter 
provided military protection to the merchants as long as they benefited from the long-
distance trade with the Mediterranean Levant. When this trade finished and the profits 
were reduced, the guarantors of protection retreated to their fiefs. Consequently, the 
Genoese merchants had to rely on Iberian lords for protection abroad. This new 
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agreement between Genoese merchants and the Iberian nobility for military support 
reduced the protection expenses and, thus, transaction costs.179 
The strategy of these proto-capitalists resulted in a golden age for the 
multilateral relationship between the Republic of Genoa, its diaspora, and the Christian 
kingdoms that later formed the core of the Hispanic Monarchy and were participating 
in an expansionist process of conquest over Andalusia and the Kingdom of Murcia. The 
historiography on these enterprising people identifies them with the ruling oligarchy of 
Genoa, a group of families that also led the Genoese diaspora in the different territories 
of the Hispanic Monarchy.180 The study by Edoardo Grendi in 1975 on the origins of the 
kinship relations reveals this reality, which also explains that the political ennoblement 
of certain families in the Republic was due to the capital and cultural heritage that they 
achieved thanks to the shared effort of the whole family.181 
The importance of the social structure of the Genoese republic for its relationship 
with the Hispanic Monarchy resulted in an innovative approach that mixed that 
structure with politics. In 1990, Arturo Pacini provided the first specialised account of 
the birth of this relationship through that new perspective.182 His argument claimed that 
the roots of this bond lay in 1528, when Charles V formed an alliance with the Republic 
of Genoa. Pacini detected a systematic factionalism within Genoese society, which led 
to chronic civil struggles and the intermittent tutelage of foreign powers even after the 
agreement with the Hispanic Monarchy was signed. 
Genoa: the imperial aggregate 
The political alliance of 1528 simply reinforced those pre-existing bonds with the 
territorial elites in Castile who, in return, also helped the Genoese merchant class to 
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overcome the military power of the landed aristocracy of Genoa. 183 In addition, the 
moneyed groups of the Republic were able to control politics with the political reform 
that followed the deal with the Hispanic Monarchy. This urban oligarchy embodied a 
social group composed of 28 families (alberghi) known as the old nobility (nobili vecchi), 
in contrast to other families (nobili nuovi) who rose against them in 1575 for control of 
the Republic. There is a tendency in some works to assert that the Genoese oligarchies 
and the Genoese diaspora were not two separate groups of people, but a consortium of 
business families. 184  However, there has been little discussion about the internal 
differences between these two groups.185 
This rivalry between the parties was quite interrelated with the economic 
development of Genoese society. Despite the damaging effects of this factionalism, 
which pursued the independence of the merchant Republic, Pacini also noted the 
reciprocal benefits that this political alliance offered to the Genoese polity and its 
diaspora. 186  While the former obtained military and diplomatic support, the latter 
gained a privileged position within the Hispanic markets. In exchange, the Republic and 
its diaspora supplied the Hispanic Monarchy with naval and financial backing.  187  In fact, 
the Genoese private navy was a crucial element in bridging the Iberian Peninsula and 
the Hispanic territories in Italy, thus ensuring the transport of bullion to the Duchy of 
Milan and the Kingdom of Naples.188 This strategy also increased tensions in the already 
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polarised Mediterranean Sea between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Ottoman 
Empire.189 
The Republic also acted as buffer state between France and Italy and as a 
geostrategic gateway to Milan, an inland territory and, therefore, isolated from the rest 
of the monarchy. Altogether, this allowed the Republic of Genoa to restructure its 
internal organisation to stabilise the chronic social unrest, at least for roughly fifty years. 
This conglomerate of mutual benefits and obligations transformed the Republic of 
Genoa and its businessmen into what Herrero Sánchez defined in 2001 as an imperial 
aggregate of the Hispanic system.190 In other words, the Republic of Genoa became a 
kind of protectorate with special rights for its citizens, even though it officially continued 
as an independent state. 
Apart from the political and economic aspects of the Genoese oligarchy, the 
diaspora has also been an object of study in its own right. According to Recio Morales, 
the noble nature and the Catholic affiliation of the Genoese diaspora eased its insertion 
into the Hispanic territories.191 The former was an exclusive aspect of Genoese citizens, 
whilst the latter complemented a social profile that was very attractive and easy to 
adopt by the wealthy actors who controlled the local power in the Iberian Peninsula. 
The Genoese alliance with these local elites is a fundamental part of the upstream and 
downstream flows of credit, as will be shown in the second and third chapters. The elites, 
namely the nobility and religious institutions, held the local liquidity in the Hispanic 
Monarchy and, therefore, were of interest for the Genoese lenders. 
In this sense, the Genoese knew very well what kind of people they should 
engage with, though sometimes there was resistance.192 Genoese marriage strategies 
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were a key element in ensuring the relation with those local elites.193 Nevertheless, it is 
possible to distinguish two different behaviours of the Genoese diaspora, which 
highlights its model of informal institution. The richest and most powerful individuals of 
the diaspora tended to marry members of other prominent Genoese families, hopefully 
of higher rank and influence, while those who were less fortunate or had less to offer 
simply married with local native families. The latter would have to await until the next 
generation to arrange more favourable marriages and increase their social prestige 
within the community.194 
Herrero Sánchez has described these social strategies as a policy of integration 
within the territories of the Hispanic Monarchy where the Genoese diaspora had 
economic interests, primarily in the Kingdoms of Castile, Naples, and Sicily, and the 
Duchy of Milan.195 His argument claims a dynamic relationship between the Genoese 
and their local hosts in which the former sought to transfer their cultural values and 
economic strategies whilst adapting to the native ones. In addition, the Genoese 
businessmen offered transnational capital based on extensive social networks through 
kinship and friendship bonds.196 
The presence of this concept of transnational capital in the literature for almost 
forty years and the lack of in-depth analyses about it simply illustrates how complicated 
 
193 Two recent examples of this literature in Enrique Soria Mesa, ‘Poder Local y estrategias matrimoniales. 
Los genoveses en el reino de Granada (ss. XVI y XVII)’, in Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528-1713), 
2011, 21–46; Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘Octavio Centurión, I marqués de Monesterio. Un “híbrido” necesario en 
la monarquía hispánica de Felipe III y Felipe IV’, in Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528-1713), vol. 2 
(Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 860. 
194 A few examples of the former group in Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro; Álvarez Nogal, 
Marsilio, and Basso, ‘La rete finanzaria della famiglia Spinola’; Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, La familia genovesa 
Centurión: (mercaderes diplomáticos y hombres de armas), al servicio de España, 1.380-1.680: una 
contribución a la defensa de la civilización occidental (Huelva, 2004); the latter group is discussed in David 
Alonso García, ‘Los Fornari y las rentas de Orán a comienzos del siglo XVI. Financiación del rey y negocio 
familiar’, in Los extranjeros en la España moderna: actas del I Coloquio Internacional, celebrado en Málaga 
del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002 (Ministerio de Ciencia e innovación, 2003), 101–12; José-Enrique López 
De Coca Castañer, ‘Mercaderes genoveses en Málaga (1487-1516). Los hermanos Centurión e Ytalian’, 
Historia, Instituciones, Documentos 7 (1980): 95. 
195 Manuel Herrero Sánchez, ‘Génova y El Sistema Imperial Hispánico’, in La Monarquía de Las Naciones. 
Patria, Nación y Naturaleza En La Monarquía de España, ed. A. Álvarez-Ossorio and B. García (Madrid, 
2004), 542. 
196 Manuel Herrero Sánchez, ‘La Red Genovesa Spínola y El Entramado Transnacional de Los Marqueses 
de Los Balbases al Servicio de La Monarquía Hispánica’, in Las Redes Del Imperio. Élites Sociales En La 




is its investigation.197  The Genoese diaspora would not have invested simply in the 
acquisition of lands and offices, knightly habits or marriages to facilitate their integration 
into the local elites of the Hispanic territories. Instead, the Hispanic nobility adopted 
these Genoese businessmen in exchange for their material and social capital, which 
injected a renewed source of liquidity and investment for this social group. Thanks to 
these reciprocal strategies, the Ligurian merchant-financiers came to control, or at least 
participated in, key economic sectors such as the wool trade and fiscal operations like 
tax farming.198 
The Genoese diaspora and their integration into the local elites of the Hispanic 
Monarchy 
These activities were complemented by the biggest Genoese business of all: 
financing the activities of the Hispanic royal agenda. The number of works on this topic 
is extensive and the main characteristics of the Genoese financial community were 
already described in the first part of this chapter (syndicated lending and internal 
discipline based on reputation). It is possible, nonetheless, to establish two levels of 
financing as observed by the historiography. The first is characterised by a small-medium 
scale that puts the focus on operations at the local level.199 Although this local dimension 
is an indispensable part of the Genoese upstream and downstream flows of credit, the 
historiographical research on this aspect is clearly insufficient. However, it is generally 
agreed that these local financial transactions generated a surplus of capital that allowed 
some businessmen to become local bankers and, therefore, provide credit to native 
commercial enterprises, local institutions, and pious foundations. Among these 
activities, the Genoese financing of the American trade with sea loans has been an 
 
197 Although Trasselli does not call it as ‘transnational capital’, the concept was already present in Carmelo 
Trasselli, ‘Los Genoveses En Sicilia y En Calabria Desde El Reinado de Carlos V Hasta La Guerra de Los 
Treinta Años’, in Actas Del I Coloquio Internacional de Historia Económica. Dinero y Crédito (Siglos XVI al 
XIX), ed. Alfonso Otazu y Llana (Madrid, 1978), 199. 
198 Some recent examples are Rafael María Girón Pascual, ‘Los lavaderos de lana de Huéscar (Granada) y 
el comercio genovés en la edad moderna’, in Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528-1713), 2011, 191–
202; Rafael María Girón Pascual, ‘“Cruzando aceros”. El comercio de espadas entre España e Italia en los 
siglos XVI y XVII’, Gladius: estudios sobre armas antiguas, armamento, arte militar y vida cultural en 
Oriente y Occidente, no. 36 (2016): 161–79; Ben Yessef Garfia, ‘A Genoese Merchant and Banker in the 
Kingdom of Naples’; Catia Brilli, Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700-1830, 2016. 
199 López De Coca Castañer, ‘Mercaderes genoveses en Málaga (1487-1516). Los hermanos Centurión e 
Ytalian’; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘Las compañías bancarias genovesas en Madrid a comienzos del siglo XVII’, 
Hispania: Revista española de historia 65, no. 219 (2005): 67–90. 
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important topic in the literature since they were micro-credits for Castilian sailors who 
traded with Hispanic America in the sixteenth century.200 
This kind of activities allowed the Genoese moneylenders to accumulate liquidity 
to participate in larger financial operations. A clarifying instance of these larger financial 
operations was the financing of local councils, which needed credit to undertake major 
investments. Tinoco Rubiales, for instance, provides an excellent example of the 
interrelation between the micro-loans and the financial operations with juros in 
Seville.201 Another aspect that the low-profile Genoese moneylenders developed was 
their commitment to the larger policies of the Hispanic Monarchy. The financing of 
charitable works (hospitals, churches, orphanages, religious festivities) in Southern Italy 
to promote cultural unity before the Islamic threat has also been observed.202 These 
activities at a local level reveal the reinforcement of symbiotic relations with local elites 
and the achievement of a good reputation among the Genoese lenders, who was often 
decried as usurers in the religious pulpits, nonetheless. 
On the macro scale, the Genoese financing of the Hispanic Monarchy covers the 
largest part of the literature.203 Its historiography focuses on aspects such as the internal 
organisation of the Genoese financiers or the liquidity available to the monarch in 
relation to the royal suspensions of payments. It must be remembered that the king 
financed himself through short-term loans (asientos) that were often partially 
 
200 Antonio-Miguel Bernal and Isabel Martínez Ruiz, La Financiación de La Carrera de Indias (1492-1824): 
Dinero y Crédito En El Comercio Colonial Español Con América (Sevilla: Fundación El Monte, 1992), 166–
69. 
201 The council of Seville received credit from its local bankers to acquire royal long-term debt (juros). See 
Santiago Tinoco Rubiales, ‘Rey, Ciudad, Crédito: Iniciativas y Restablecimiento de Los Bancos Públicos En 
Sevilla (1578-1582)’, in Dinero, Moneda y Crédito En La Monarquía Hispánica (Marcial Pons : Fundación 
ICO, 2000), 698. 
202 Dauverd, Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean. 
203 A recent historiographical analysis of this issue in David Alonso García, ‘Genoveses En La Corte, Poder 
Financiero y Administracion En Tiempos de Carlos V’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713), 
vol. 1, 2 vols (Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 251–78. Some classic examples for every reign 
organised in chronological order in Ramón Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 3 (1947-1967) vols 
(Barcelona: Crítica, 1987); Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Felipe II y Sus Banqueros’, in Banca, Crédito y 
Capital. La Monarquia Hispanica y Los Antiguos Paises Bajos (1505-1700) (Fundación Carlos Amberes, 
2006), 329–44; Carmen Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro: Octavio Centurión, el financiero de los 
Austrias (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2015); Nunziatella Alessandrini, ‘La Presenza Genovese a Lisbona 
Negli Anni Dell’unione Delle Corone (1580-1640)’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713), vol. 
1, 2 vols (Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 73–98; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘El poder de los banqueros 
genoveses en la corte de Felipe IV’, in Centros de poder italianos en la monarquía hispánica (siglos XV-
XVIII), vol. 2 (Polifemo, 2010), 1095–1124; Carmen Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros de Carlos II (Valladolid, 
España: Universidad de Valladolid, Secretariado de Publicaciones, 1988). 
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reimbursed by issuing royal long-term debt (juros). A plan for debt conversion emerged 
when the monarch declared a suspension of payments on his asientos and the 
instalments scheduled to repay the lenders, most of them Genoese, were transformed 
into juros. All royal debts, either short-term or long-term, were earmarked to royal 
incomes. 
As the Genoese financiers based their enterprises on royal incomes, their control 
over the territory gave them greater knowledge of how profitable a royal earning could 
be. In this sense, the vertical economic integration covered the control of the productive 
means, their taxation, and their capitalisation, which helps to broaden Giorgio Doria’s 
argument about Genoese flows of information.204 Although Doria’s early work applied 
to commercial strategies, it revealed the constant communication within the Genoese 
community based on an uninterrupted correspondence as key to their success. His 
argument works for merchants as well as financiers, notwithstanding the scarcity of 
many of the letter books (copialettere) of these businessmen in the modern archives.205 
Doria offered a perspective from below about how the Genoese were successfully 
integrated into the Hispanic territories. These information flows allowed the Genoese 
diaspora to establish networks of reporters in different spaces, which helped them to 
calculate the risk of lending money to the monarch and the real condition of royal rents. 
Sometimes the Genoese lenders were told that there were no more royal 
incomes available for the allocation of new debt, which warned them of an impending 
royal suspension of payments with the consequent implementation of debt conversion. 
This consolidation of debt generated losses to bankers in general, and to the Genoese 
lenders in particular, who saw their symbiotic relation with the Hispanic Monarchy 
threatened. 206  Drelichman and Voth believe that the monarchy simply suffered 
temporary crises of liquidity, which means that the monarch could still pay his debts.207 
In other words, their argument suggests a royal strategy to restructure the royal estate 
 
204 Doria, ‘Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo’, 107–8. 
205 The examples of businessmen whose archives have survived offer interesting results of a depth rarely 
applicable to the Genoese diaspora. See for example Vieira Ribeiro, Early Modern Trading Networks in 
Europe. 
206 Pacini, ‘Grandes Estrategias y Pequeñas Intrigas’. 
207 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell. 
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so as to improve the royal sustainability and conditions of royal financing before 
creditors such as the Genoese bankers. 
Lenders would absorb the consequences of the debt consolidation and, even 
though they lost money, they continued lending capital to the king because it was 
profitable. The main opposition to this argument came from Nogal and Chamley, who 
criticised Drelichman and Voth for underestimating the profitability of short-term 
contracts for bankers.208 Indeed, that profitability was higher than initially calculated 
because of the diversification of risks that the Genoese financiers undertook. This 
debate led to a revival of the historiography on upstream and downstream flows of 
credit in recent years. 
Profitability was a decisive element for the continuation of the Hispanic-Genoese 
symbiosis. The Genoese diaspora benefited from lending to the Spanish monarch, while 
the Republic of Genoa backed the political efforts of the monarchy in Europe. The 
Genoese bankers differed from other moneylenders because they diversified risks 
through the sale of shares in their obligations, which provided them with liquidity once 
they allocated juros to private investors after the reform of 1557. These novelties in the 
financial system encouraged the traditional idea that Genoese financiers used the 
capital of someone else to fund royal enterprises. 209  Their social capital not only 
extended to prospective investors and colleagues, but also to royal officers at a local 
level that could help the lenders ensure the profitability of the juros that they placed in 
the secondary debt market. This collaboration, however, resulted in illegal alliances that 
were prosecuted, and hence new laws and institutions were enforced to prevent public 
fraud. 
Fraud and trust through the business of juros 
The Genoese integration into the Hispanic markets through their collaboration 
with local elites affected both the upstream and downstream financing processes.210 As 
has already been stressed in the first section, the correct functioning of the secondary 
 
208 A description of the critique can be found in Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Duplication 
without Constraints: Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley’s Analysis of Debt Policy under Philip II’, The Economic 
History Review 69, no. 3 (2016): 999–1006. 
209 Ruiz Martín, Pequeño Capitalismo, Gran Capitalismo, 13. 
210 On the integrative function developed by local elites and institutions within a regime of ‘jurisdictional 
fragmentation’, see Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 72. 
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credit market was dependent on the collaboration of the treasurer responsible for 
paying, a field scarcely studied in the literature.211 The collaboration of the treasurers 
was not always easy to secure because treasurers or tax farmers of the royal income 
were often somehow interconnected with local elites and had private interests around 
that specific source of income. Nonetheless, the treasurers were supervised by the 
Castilian Council of Finances in terms of information and the two accounting offices 
(Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda and Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas) regarding the 
disbursement of funds. In this regard, treasurers did not know how much they had to 
pay until the moment the rendimientos had to be disbursed. 
This system aimed at eradicating internal corruption among the treasuries, as 
they were also in charge of the fiscal collection. Extra information on their side could 
have led to fraud and a deviation of funds towards their private interests. Disobedience 
was also an alternative to fraud. Alonso García supports this idea since treasurers, tax 
collectors, and tax farmers were responsible for making the payments, even if they had 
not received the funds yet.212 This means that if a treasurer did not have enough money, 
for whatever reason, he was still legally responsible for making the payment when 
required. 
In addition, those treasurers had to issue letters of payment to the juro’s holder in 
order to justify and confirm the correct payment before the royal council. As a 
consequence, the Council of Finances had the faculty to decide the moment when and 
the person who would receive the rendimiento, besides knowing when and how much 
would be paid. That system of control was vertical and not devoid of corruption and 
fraud.213 The privileged position of some officials of finances with respect to other local 
treasurers encouraged the abuse of the latter by the former as to when and who would 
be paid first. These problems discouraged potential credit investors, as these practices 
increased the variabilities for knowing when one could receive the interest. To 
 
211 Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y demanda de deuda pública en Castilla. Juros de alcabalas (1540-1740)’, 45. 
212 Alonso García, El erario del reino, 90. 
213 An excellent approach to this topic and the problem associated with the concept of ‘corruption’ in 
Francisco Andújar Castillo, Antonio Feros, and Pilar Ponce Leiva, ‘Corrupción y Mecanismos de Control En 
La Monarquía Hispánica: Una Revisión Crítica’, Tiempos Modernos: Revista Electrónica de Historia 
Moderna 35, no. 2017/2 (2017): 284–311. 
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counteract the effects of this uncertainty, Genoese integration into the territory was 
essential for the correct functioning of the secondary debt market. 
Studies on the relationship between the Genoese diaspora and local elites from a 
local perspective have demonstrated that there was neither an immediate collaboration 
nor a strong resistance that could result in uncontested trust. In this sense, Céline 
Dauverd concludes that only the merchant element of the diaspora enjoyed royal favour, 
which was always the best incentive for improving the relations between them and local 
elites. 214  Notwithstanding this argument, the work by Girón Pascual on Genoese 
merchants in the Kingdom of Granada demonstrates that there is no unitary model for 
understanding the diaspora-local elites relationship. 215  Indeed, his study proposes a 
form of collaboration with local elites supported in patronage systems and mutual debts 
rather than royal favour. This relationship was marked by the mutual benefits that both 
Genoese businessmen and local oligarchs could obtain. However, they were legally 
linked through their mutual liabilities, which was a form of coercion to sustain the 
relationship. 
The Genoese participation in the distribution of juros through the secondary debt 
market reveals that this relationship system was indispensable. Genoese brokers 
created a bond of trust with local investors and intermediaries who sought a regular 
extra income in the form of this credit means, which enhanced their own finances to act 
as financial intermediaries to third parties. They collected these earnings until the 
monarch decided to repay his debt to the investors, which meant the reimbursement of 
the principal to the bondholder. Therefore, a juro was a trustworthy asset if the monarch 
serviced it. The literature on this secondary debt market is clear in this respect. 
The loss of trust in these juros marked the end of the Genoese apogee, which 
had taken place by the middle of the seventeenth century.216 The monarchy had started 
 
214  Céline Dauverd, ‘The Genoese in the Kingdom of Naples: Between Viceroys’ Buon Governo and 
Habsburg Expansion’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713), vol. 1, 2 vols (Società Ligure di 
Storia Patria, 2011), 279–302. 
215 Rafael María Girón Pascual, ‘Las Indias de Génova: Mercaderes Genoveses En El Reino de Granada 
Durante La Edad Moderna (Ss. XVI-XVIII)’ (Universidad de Granada, 2013), 227–29. 
216 Marcos Martín, ‘“Crecimientos, reducciones y no cabimientos de juros”. Tres episodios de gestión 
irresponsable de la deuda pública consolidada en la España del siglo XVII’; Álvarez Nogal, ‘La rentabilidad 
de los juros de Castilla en el siglo XVII’; Álvarez Nogal, ‘Los genoveses y la incautación del interés de los 
juros de Castilla en 1634’. 
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to introduce new taxes on the rendimientos through measures such as the crecimientos 
or the media anata, which reduced interest rates and forced investors to compensate 
for the principal on this unbalanced instrument to keep receiving their usual interest.217 
Accordingly, scholars have observed that the military effort was a formidable variable 
that affected the value of investing in long-term bonds because it lay behind most of the 
fiscal innovations. 218  The succession of royal suspensions of payments and the 
consequent plans for debt consolidation simply culminated in the erosion of trust while 
also diminishing the royal capacity to issue new debt, as its allocation progressively led 
to uncertain revenues.219 Because of these changes to the conditions of the juros, the 
private demand for this financial product sharply contracted and the circulation of 
capital slowed from the first quarter of the seventeenth century because they could not 
be sold. 
The Genoese became progressively less able to provide new loans given the lack 
of interest among investors, while a new group of financiers began to shine: the 
Sephardic community.220 These bankers moved to Portugal at the end of the fifteenth 
century and later to the Habsburg Low Countries in search of religious toleration. They 
started to replace the Genoese lenders around 1627 thanks to the support of the Count-
Duke of Olivares, favourite minister of the Hispanic ruler Philip IV. The shift between 
lending communities and the financial underscoring of the Hispanic Monarchy went 
together with the end of the great fairs of exchange and the growing political tension 
between the monarchy and the Genoese republic.221 
The seventeenth century also witnessed the demise of the Hispanic armies in 
Europe and the resulting disappearance of the protection that the Hispanic monarchs 
 
217 Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio, ‘Juros y Censos En Castilla Del Seiscientos: Una Sociedad de Rentistas’, 792–
94; Álvarez Nogal, ‘La rentabilidad de los juros de Castilla en el siglo XVII’, 106. 
218 Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda pública, mercado crediticio y actividad económica en la Castilla del siglo XVII’, 
141. 
219 An example of this fear of uncertain incomes can already be seen in the sixteenth century with the 
juros earmarked for the Casa de la Contratación of Seville. See Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘Un expediente 
financiero entre 1560 y 1575’, Moneda y crédito, no. 92 (1965): 3–58. 
220 An analysis of this community around 1640 in Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros y la crisis de la Monarquía 
Hispánica de 1640, 41. 
221 An early analysis of the volume of business in the exchange fairs and its decline in the first half of the 
seventeenth century can be observed in the work of Giusepe Felloni, who also noted the reorientation of 
the Genoese capital to other states. See Giuseppe Felloni, ‘Asientos, Juros y Ferias de Cambio Desde El 
Observatorio Genovés’, in Dinero y Crédito (Siglos XVI al XIX), 1978, 335–59. 
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had offered to the merchant republic in the past. The historiography has also followed 
this dismantling of the Hispanic-Genoese relationship, emphasising the role that a 
succession of political disagreements and the wars against Louis XIV of France played.222 
The French bombardment of the port of Genoa in 1684 may be seen as the decisive 
point in the end of this symbiotic relationship that had lasted over a century.223 
Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the literature about the political and financial 
relationship between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Republic of Genoa in the early 
modern period in the context of the current historiographical debates on the formation 
of early modern states. The outcomes of this research show that the Hispanic-Genoese 
military alliance of 1528 between Charles V and Andrea Doria was not the trigger for 
their symbiotic association, but the result of a long-term process of social integration in 
which the Genoese diaspora, and not the other way around, invested its social and 
economic capital to gain access to key spaces of power in the Hispanic Monarchy. 
Although trade was the initial main economic field in which the Genoese prospered, the 
Ligurian community clearly stood out in terms of finances. 
The literature on the role of the Genoese community in the finances of the 
Hispanic Monarchy is prolific, especially when examining the ability of Genoese 
businessmen to fund the enterprises of Hispanic sovereigns through contracts called 
asientos. Scholars have often focused on the strategies these lenders employed to 
comply with their financial liabilities. A sense of homogeneity has emerged from that 
literature when it analyses patterns of syndicated lending based on mechanisms of 
reputation. The apparent Genoese unity, discussed in the second part of this 
dissertation to argue that competition and collaboration co-existed in the Genoese 
coalition, reflects the influence of institutional historiography on the internal 
organisation of informal institutions. 
 
222  Thomas Allison Kirk, ‘The Apogee of the Hispano-Genoese Bond, 1576-1627’, Hispania: Revista 
Española de Historia 65, no. 219 (2005): 57–61; Thomas Allison Kirk, ‘La Crisi Del 1654 Come Indicatore 
Del Nuovo Equilibrio Mediteraneo’, Atti Della Società Ligure Di Storia Patria, Nuova Serie 51, no. 1 (2011): 
527–38. 
223 Herrero Sánchez, ‘Génova y El Sistema Imperial Hispánico’, 193. 
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In effect, the financial and commercial dealings of the Genoese lending 
community in the Hispanic Monarchy demonstrate the ability of informal institutions to 
reduce transaction costs and promote economic development in large polities. In this 
sense, this thesis challenges North’s classic assumption regarding the capacity 
constraints of informal institutions to operate beyond local markets. The findings of 
Greif and Hoffman on the organisation of informal institutions and the role of notaries 
in channelling private credit in the late-medieval and early modern periods have inspired 
the argument in the following chapters that the Genoese lending community 
contributed to the state consolidation through its financial strategies and social capital. 
The ability of the Genoese diaspora to permeate the multiple social and 
administrative layers that composed the Hispanic Monarchy, from humble merchants 
to the powerful royal ministers and local elites, helped to interconnect the dispersed 
territories of the Hispanic Monarchy. The apparent inability of the royal administration, 
which can be considered as a large organisation of formal institutions, to extract and 
forward resources from the multiple territories of the Hispanic Monarchy made the 
services of the Genoese community necessary in order to obtain the collaboration of the 
actual administrators of the fiscal means that funded royal credit – local elites. 
Thanks to the services of the Genoese community, therefore, it was possible to 
create efficient upstream and downstream flows of credit that fuelled both the needs 
of the Hispanic Monarchy and the aspirations of local elites and small capitalists through 
the distribution of bonds of long-term debt called juros. Genoese lenders turned into 
the financial intermediaries of this process, which channelled all those intertwined ‘state’ 
and local interests through a secondary debt market that experienced its apogee during 
second half of the sixteenth century. While the Hispanic sovereign borrowed large sums 
to finance his military and political commitments on the international scene, Genoese 
financiers benefited from distributing juros allocated on reliable royal incomes collected 
near bondholders. As a result of this collective achievement, the Republic of Genoa 
became an imperial aggregate thanks to its international role in the Habsburg-Valois 
conflict and the financial agency of its diaspora for the correct functioning of the 
Hispanic Monarchy. In other words, Genoa remained independent but was integrated 
into the Hispanic society, economy, and administration. This sort of political union is still 
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a historiographical field that requires further research, especially regarding the role of 
Genoese high-ranking administrators rather than private entrepreneurs in the Hispanic 
Monarchy. 
Notwithstanding the Genoese success in the sixteenth century, the following 
decades brought those flows of credit based on trust to an end. The Genoese diaspora 
had generously benefited from refinancing debt on the royal estate, a situation that 
ended when the levels of sustainable and solvent indebtedness were finally overcome. 
Genoese financiers, who enriched the elites of the monarchy and serviced the needs of 
the sovereign, had engaged in too many credits and every new loan now required extra 
collateral clauses from the borrower to ensure the reliability of the system. Throughout 
the seventeenth century, the monarch started to notice the weakness of the financial 
structure and his own inability to service his obligations with bondholders and their 
brokers. Therefore, the upstream and downstream flows of credit stopped, and new 
sources of capital were required to replace the old ones. The resulting financial shock 
progressively distanced the Genoese diaspora from its position of de facto monopoly in 
the finances of the monarchy, which raises questions about whether these financial 
intermediaries were an indispensable element in the process of state construction. 
However, while those Genoese flows of credit functioned, the monarchy 
deployed an international policy in which elites and small investors in the monarchy 
benefited through the convergence of their agendas, which made them participants in 
the consolidation of the early modern state. The concentration of royal debt in the 
hands of local elites made them the guarantors of liquidity in the long term. As long as 
the monarch paid the interest on the juros, local elites had a trustworthy source of 
regular income to re-invest at a local level, which contributed to the development of 
regional economies. In other words, thanks to the Genoese financiers, noble families 
and religious institutions became the bankers of their cities and urban spaces. Anybody 
willing to develop an economic activity or infrastructure that required a large injection 
of capital had to resort to these elites in search of funding. This chapter has stressed the 
need for further research regarding the relation between non-state actors and the 
process of state construction, whose agency was intermediated by the Genoese lending 
community. The last chapter of this thesis illustrates how these guardians of local 
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liquidity can be traced and how they interacted with Genoese financiers at the royal 
court and with the lowest social strata, thus complementing this approach to the state-







Chapter 2: Suspension of payments and the reactivation of credit 
 
‘being our treasure as it is now, we have 
determined and decided to make account with all 
the merchants on their repayments and interests, 
entirely until the end of the last year 1556, and 
whatever it amounted to must be provided to 
them in juros at 20,000 maravedis per thousand’ 
(Philip II, King of Spain, to his royal accountants. 
London, 17th April 1557; translated from old Castilian)224 
The above extract is part of the letter that the sovereign of the Hispanic 
Monarchy sent to his royal accountants in the kingdom of Castile on 17th April 1557 with 
instructions to consolidate his short-term debt with royal lenders and issue them long-
term debt bonds in exchange. Philip II was in England at that moment in an attempt to 
obtain financial, material, and diplomatic support from that kingdom in the war against 
the league of France and the Papal States. 225 The royal decision to consolidate Philip’s 
debts was the outcome of failed negotiations with numerous polities in his patrimonial 
domains to provide him with additional funding for the ongoing war. Whereas no money 
was expected from England, nobody in Castile wanted to buy jurisdictions in royal 
domain, and the Habsburg Low Countries were financially exhausted after conceding an 
extraordinary aid to Philip II in 1556.226 The Italian realms, on the other hand, had been 
financing the military response to the French expedition of the duke of Guise since 
January 1557, which consumed all the resources available.227 
Apart from the European states that threatened the Hispanic Monarchy, the 
Ottoman Empire and its allies in the northern coast of Africa would periodically raid the 
shores of the western Mediterranean Sea. Notwithstanding the Ottoman victories in the 
Danube region, the conquest of Tunisia by Charles V and the outbreak of war against 
 
224 Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 810, 85’ (Letter, London, 17 April 1557) [translated into English]; the full 
transcription of this letter can be found in Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico: 
Endeudamiento y Crisis Financieras En La España de Los Austrias, 1557-1647. Vol. 2 (Banco de España, 
2016), 14. 
225 Parker, Imprudent King, 52; Philip II managed to involve the English realm in the war through its 
declaration of war against France in early June. See Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, 
Venice, Vol. 6, 924’, Letter, (6 July 1557). 
226 Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments, 185. 
227 Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, 264–70. 
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Venice in the 1530s resulted in an alliance with France to stop Habsburg expansionism, 
which still endured in the late 1550s.228 Conflict is, therefore, a substantial element of 
this chapter.  
The territorial dispersal of the Hispanic Monarchy hindered the mobilisation of 
financial and material resources. The ability to upkeep armies and navies during the 
early modern centuries is a much-debated issue in the historiography, which has 
generated many publications on the rise of the fiscal-military state.229 War thus became 
the catalyst for state creation and the channel for the promotion of the people involved 
in the mobilisation of resources from institutions both inside and outside of it. While this 
chapter analyses the strategies and interests of medium-ranking officials inside the royal 
administration of the Hispanic Monarchy, the following chapter complements this 
approach to this type of early modern state-builder by focusing on high-ranking officials. 
The structure of this chapter is organised into three parts and two case studies. 
The first section sketches the long path until the king decided to create the Factoría 
General, stressing the importance of the conflict with the Castilian regency and the 
agency of the war with France and the Pope to channel the private agenda of the first 
medium-ranking official to be analysed: Juan Suárez de Carvajal, bishop of Lugo. The 
second part explains the role of the second subject of study, the factor general López 
del Campo, in the political and financial struggle of the monarchy. Finally, multiple 
elements are brought together in the third section of this chapter to analyse the earliest 
stages in the first suspension of payments of Philip II from the perspective of the royal 
administration. The goal of this structure is to demonstrate that medium-ranking state-
builders participated incidentally in the process of state construction. The first debt 
consolidation of Philip II is thus examined to shed light on the initiatives and personal 
interests of those officials who were central to the institutional, social, and economic 
cohesion of the Hispanic Monarchy. 
 
228 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 51. 
229 Some important examples for the Hispanic Monarchy, in particular, and Europe, in general, in Rafael 
Torres Sánchez and Patrick Karl O’Brien, Constructing a Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Spain 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe. 
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2.1. The Hispanic Monarchy and its medium-ranking officials: the role of Juan 
Súarez de Carvajal in the financial reform 
When the still prince Philip left the Iberian realms for England on 13th July 1554 
to marry its queen, Mary Tudor, he instructed his sister Joanna of Austria to act as regent 
of his kingdoms during his absence. 230  Within the following two years, emperor  
Charles V abdicated in favour of his son Philip, granting him rule over the Iberian titles, 
Naples, Sicily and the Netherlands.231 During this period, princess Joanna remained in 
Castile administrating a very unstable treasury, while the recently appointed king  
Philip II began to demand subsidies from her to fund his war against France. 232 The 
apparently endless war that emperor Charles V had been waging against Henry II of 
France for political prominence in western Europe had turned the Habsburg Low 
Countries, the Savoy-Milan corridor, and the kingdom of Naples into huge theatres of 
war. Philip II assumed his father’s commitments and conflicts with the rule of his new 
estates.233 This inheritance, notwithstanding its greatness, created problems for a royal 
treasury already unable to provide enough funds for the ongoing war.234 
Nevertheless, Philip II was not the only one in need of additional funding because 
of the excessive loans that his father had taken out. Henry II had also been contending 
with financial shortages since 1553 due to the outstanding debts of his father  
Francis I.235 Although France was one of the most unified monarchies in Europe and it 
had the largest share of taxpayers compared to other contemporary states, Henry II was 
unable to pay the accumulated interests of his debts with private financiers. 236 
Throughout the second half of 1555, the French monarch decreed the consolidation of 
his floating debt, a decision that Philip II followed just two years later. 237 The taxes that 
the French king collected from his subjects were not enough to keep borrowing to fund 
 
230 Joanna was returning from Portugal after marrying Prince João, who had died in January that year. She 
left their child, Sebastian, in Portugal when returned to Castile. See Parker, Imprudent King, 45. 
231 The Council of State acknowledged the transmission of powers in Castile by March 1556. See Council 
of State to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 112, 70’, Letter, (22 March 1556). 
232 Parker, Imprudent King, 50. 
233 An excellent monograph about the war on all its fronts in Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of 
Empire. 
234 Carlos Morales, ‘Felipe II y Sus Banqueros’, 331. 
235 Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, 95. 
236 Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, The Rise of Fiscal States, 93. 
237 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 149–50. 
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the ongoing war. With the two monarchs financially overwhelmed by their respective 
debts, a truce was agreed in Vaucelles on 5th February 1556 for five years.238 
The news of peace quickly reached the Italian territories, where officials from 
both parties were deployed. In Siena, for example, the delay between the original 
agreement and the proclamation of the truce enforced the restoration of any gains and 
losses during that period.239 More interestingly, the council of Genoa rapidly published 
the truce and warned that any offenders who broke it would be severely punished.240 
This announcement concerned two different aspects of the Genoese agenda at that 
moment. On the one hand, the council intentionally claimed the Republic of Genoa as 
part of that truce, which was a public recognition that Genoa was one of Philip II’s closest 
allies. On the other hand, the announcement notified the main lending houses of the 
Republic of the changing political conditions, which directly affected the interest rates 
that bankers imposed on the French and Hispanic monarchs and the reimbursements of 
their principal. War was good for lenders, but only if borrowers could afford their 
services. 
Notwithstanding this ceasefire, the truce was indeed an armed peace, the goal 
of which was to reorganise finances and forces so as to resume hostilities when in a 
better shape. In fact, the War Council in Castile decided not to send all the troops to the 
frontiers because there was a distrust of France, which had broken truces before 
without notice.241 Although a resolution was sought to reduce the financial burden on 
the royal treasuries, it was costly to upkeep the remaining garrisons. The Council 
dismissed first the German mercenaries in Naples, Siena, and Piedmont, causing a 
general unrest because the French armies in the Italian Peninsula had not withdrawn a 
single soldier.242 
 
238 Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, 263. 
239 A copy of the clauses signed between Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, bishop of Burgos, and his 
French counterpart in the truce between Spain and France in ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 79’ (Agreement, Siena, 
14 May 1556). 
240 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 53: Publication by the Signoria of Genoa about the Truce between Spain and 
France’ (Genoa, 23 March 1556). 
241 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 112, 111’, Letter, (28 May 1556). 
242 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 11’, Letter, (17 April 1556). 
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Despite this asymmetrical disarmament, the Hispanic royal finances were in a 
precarious state in the following months, with the deficit still at average levels. The 
relationship between incomes and expenses was the source of most of the problems. 
Figure 2 provides a glimpse of the evolution of the marginal funds the king managed in 
order to satisfy his floating debt (grey line), thus providing a measure of his liquidity to 
service it. The consolidated debt increased slowly until 1556, when it escalated in 
relation to the debt consolidation of 1557. The year 1556 marked the very beginning of 
what became a financial transformation that increased the monarch’s margins for 
borrowing, though his marginal funds to pay floating debt diminished substantially. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the balance of payments between 1552 and 1559 (in ducats). Sources: Ulloa, La Hacienda Real 
de Castilla En Tiempos de Felipe II, 130. 
In June, the regent Joanna warned Philip II that only his return to Castile could 
save the situation.243 Although Charles V had designated Philip II as his successor, he still 
had to swear on his will to protect the estates of each kingdom. However, the need for 
the oath hid other intentions. Regent Joanna wanted to summon the cortes of Castile to 
seek the best way to redeem the royal estate. Doubtlessly, she was hoping for a 
negotiation with the urban elites of Castile to apply a fiscal increase that could lighten 
the financial burden of the king, something that would have to wait until 1559, when 
Philip II returned to Castile and retook direct control of the royal finances. In the 
meantime, the Hispanic ambassador in Genoa reported on the penalty that Genoese 
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lending houses were enforcing against Philip II until he paid his debts. 244 No more loans 
or financial services would be offered until the monarch repaid his arrears. 
In addition to this restriction of credit, France broke the truce in Italy, which 
confirmed the suspicions of the Castilian ministers about an ongoing informal war. In 
July, the duke of Alva sent reports from Naples to the regent Joanna informing her that 
French troops were breaking the pact, though there was no formal resumption of 
hostilities yet.245 Indeed, the situation was more worrying than expected, as the duke 
alerted Joanna of three additional problems that required immediate liquidity boosts. 
First, the marquis of Pescara, who oversaw the Duchy of Milan until Alva returned, had 
no funds to pay his troops.246 Consequently, the military scattered around the territory 
were looting villages that were progressively abandoned. Fearing a civil revolt that could 
cause a breach in a key stronghold of the monarchy, the duke urged that funds be sent. 
Second, the Republic of Siena, administered by the cardinal of Burgos, also 
needed money to pay the troops stationed there. 247  The cardinal of Burgos was 
desperately seeking private financial means in Genoa because the soldiers were 
demanding that their salaries be paid.248 Nevertheless, the accumulated debts of the 
monarch were too large and it was impossible to repay them, in total or partially, in 
Castile. This lack of royal liquidity to repay debts generated discontent among Genoese 
financiers, who did not hesitate again to penalise Philip II by refusing to lend even a 
single ‘real’ until they were paid. Therefore, they did not wish to lend any money or issue 
 
244 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, 1385, 82’, Letter, (27 May 1556). 
245 ‘They will observe the truce when they cannot find an opportunity to break it to their advantage’. See 
Duke of Alva to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 242-244’, Letter, (17 July 1556). 
246 Two regiments mutinied in January and February of that year. Francisco Fernando de Ávalos, Marquis 
of Pescara, was barely able to take control of the situation. In the previous year he had to lend 20,000 
escudos from his wife’s dowry (worth 30,000 escudos) to pay the troops stationed in Lombardy. His 
endless efforts to keep the Duchy safe from the French army led by Brissac were ultimately fruitless. See 
Nicoletta Bazzano, ‘Diccionario Biográfico Español (RAH): Francisco Fernando de Dávalos de Aquino y de 
Aragona’, accessed 5 August 2019, http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/10497/francisco-fernando-de-davalos-
de-aquino-y-de-aragona. 
247 Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, Cardinal of Burgos, was an important ambassador of the Hispanic 
Monarchy. Before his appointment to Siena, he had represented the interests of Charles V in Rome as 
cardinal since 1550. See Arturo Llín Chafer, ‘Mendoza y Bobadilla, Francisco De’, in Diccionario Biográfico 
Español (Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/33103/francisco-de-mendoza-
y-bobadilla. 
248 The Hispanic ambassador in Genoa managed the delivery of funds to the Cardinal through asientos. An 




bills of exchange.249 This financial blockade affected the whole situation in the Italian 
domains, especially because of the recent problems in Siena. 
In an attempt to save the situation, the cardinal took private loans from Genoese 
lenders and backed them with his own estate. 250  This action, similar to that of the 
marquis of Pescara in 1555, must be understood as part of the royal service, even though 
the royal servant risked his or her own patrimony. The king’s officials linked their fates 
to the royal debt, making them an essential part of the state-building process.251 This 
pattern is confirmed in the repeated behaviour of other royal servants that will be 
introduced later in this thesis, such as the factor general López del Campo. This official 
backed loans to Philip II with his, and even his friends’ properties. In this sense, there 
was no separation between private and public property. 
Third, Paliano, a fortress that controlled the only valley along the route from 
Naples to Rome, was being fortified by Pope Paul IV.252 It was evident that the Holy See 
would ally with the French armies and the duke of Ferrara to conquer Naples, thus 
reducing Hispanic influence in Italy and recovering the traditional position that the 
family of Paul IV, the Carafa, had enjoyed in the southern kingdom.253 In this regard, the 
Papal strategy posed a double threat to the monarchy. The military force of a combined 
army represented a direct offensive, whereas indirectly, the Pope had requested that 
every potentate in Italy expel Hispanic subjects from their lands.254  
The duke of Alva quickly tried to counteract the Papal plot by sending his own 
delegates to convince the Italian sovereigns of the good intentions of Philip II and asking 
them to encourage the Pope to end his military plans.255 In addition, the duke departed 
from Naples to Genoa in July that year. The Hispanic ambassador in Genoa reported to 
 
249 The financial restraints were continuous, so the Cardinal of Burgos complained vehemently to the 
ambassador in Genoa, who reported that the clergyman would ‘kill him’ (sic) unless he obtained funds. 
See Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 75’, Letter, (6 November 1556). 
250 Duke of Alva to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 242-244’. 
251  A recent work on this topic in Escribano-Páez, ‘Juan Rena and the Construction of the Hispanic 
Monarchy (1500-1540)’. 
252 A more detailed narrative about the Italian war of 1547-1559, including the classic literature, in Shaw, 
The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, chap. 7. 
253 More details about this conflict in the third chapter. 
254 ‘He wrote and sent men to all the rulers of Italy to convince them against Your Majesty, persuading 
them to expel the Spaniards from Italy’, in Duke of Alva to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 242-
244’. 
255 Duke of Alva to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 144, 234’, Letter, (30 August 1556). 
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the king that Alva had little hope of obtaining peace and was ready to launch a campaign 
against Rome. In August, he had already recruited 10,500 men and was waiting for 8,500 
more from Tuscany and Genoa. In sum, the duke would invade Lazio with 19,000 soldiers 
plus artillery. The logistics that Alva needed to undertake this extremely expensive 
enterprise required the agency of multiple people, ranging from military staff to 
financiers, diplomats, and politicians. The military organisation of the campaign needed 
funding that Philip II was unable to provide fully, which obliged the royal officials to 
arrange asientos with Genoese lenders at almost any cost.256 
The problem was that the monarch could not fulfil all his obligations at the fairs 
of Castile, thus restraining his credit. It was time for the Hispanic ambassador in Genoa 
to intercede once again to try to convince the regency to accept and service the 
reimbursements. This political negotiation generated a parallel effort in his 
correspondence with Philip II, in which the diplomat urged the king to force the regency 
to fulfil its financial obligations. Once the regency passed these matters and satisfied the 
financial demands of the royal lenders, the Genoese lending houses were able to collect 
enough capital from independent investors who were expecting short-term earnings to 
offer new money exchanges. In short, the military campaign of the duke of Alva would 
not have been possible without the collaboration of high-ranking (e.g. the regent 
Joanna, cardinal of Burgos) and medium-ranking officials (e.g. ambassador Suárez de 
Figueroa), whose private agendas converged to serve the king. These multilateral 
relations were one of the essential elements that gave form to the Hispanic Monarchy 
as an early modern state. 
Leaving aside the role of high-ranking officials, whose participation and 
strategies in the state-building process are discussed in the third chapter, medium-
ranking officials can offer valuable examples of how influential they could be in shaping 
the state through their support or disapproval of the actions of other actors. The struggle 
for an ecclesiastical subsidy, the dos quartas, from the Castilian high clergy to the 
Hispanic monarch between mid-1555 and mid-1556 illustrates this theoretical proposal. 
 
256 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 17-18’, Letter, (2 May 1556); a 
detailed analysis about these lenders in chapters 3 and 4. 
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Castilian high clergy did not only organise the spiritual relief and social cohesion 
of the subjects of the monarchy in their dioceses, but they also collected taxes that were 
later partially forwarded to the king on Papal approval. Although the ecclesiastical estate 
had collaborated with Charles V since the beginning of his reign, the relationship 
between the monarchy and these ecclesiastical powerholders deteriorated significantly 
over the decades. The origins of their conflict lay mainly in the use of subsidies, which 
were intended to be spent in the war against the infidel lords in the northern coast of 
Africa and the Ottoman Empire. The financial constraints of the Hispanic Monarchy 
during the intermittent wars with France had made those subsidies a regular income 
rather than an extraordinary contribution.257 
In 1554, for example, prince Philip and the regent Joanna sent orders to the 
marquis of Sarria, the Hispanic ambassador in Rome, regarding the concession of the 
Papal approval for the collection of dos quartas in Castile.258  Philip and Joanna had 
already earmarked the reimbursements from some money exchanges to that subsidy, 
thus considering it an expectable and regular income as it had been in the past. 259  
Julius III, the pope at that time, made the concession in October 1554, which introduced 
an entire institutional mechanism of enforcement. However, the Papal bull did not 
arrive in Castile until January 1555. The bishop of Lugo, Juan Suárez de Carvajal, was 
appointed general administrator (Comisario General) for the collection. From his 
position as a medium-ranking official of the Hispanic administration, Suárez de Carvajal 
pursued his own personal goals through service to the monarchy.260 
Suárez de Carvajal owed the start of his career in the royal administration to the 
support of his patron and father-in-law García de Loaysa, general administrator of 
another Papal subsidy called the cruzada in the late 1530s. Once Loaysa died in 1546, 
 
257  Together with the extraordinary subsidies conceded by the Castilian estates, ecclesiastical 
contributions were used to pay the principal in asientos to fund military campaigns. Their use to service 
the interest of long-term debt, however, was exceptional. See Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero 
Dinástico, 2016, 37. 
258 Sean T. Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical 
Subsidy, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 199. 
259 News about this asiento signed by the Milanese lending house of Affetati with the royal administration 
in Joanna of Austria to Charles V, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 109, 292’, Letter, (10 February 1555). 
260 The following details about his career have been extracted from his biography. See Henar Pizarro 




Suárez de Carvajal was appointed his successor as general administrator of the Papal 
concessions thanks to the recommendation of his new patron: the powerful secretary 
Francisco de los Cobos. At that stage of his career, Suárez de Carvajal was already a 
member of the Council of Finances, having succeeded the former president of that 
institution, Jerónimo Suárez de Maldonado. 261  During his double tenure, Suárez de 
Carvajal sought alternative sources of income to protect the Papal concessions from 
misuse by Charles V and high-ranking officials. 
In 1554, the year in which prince Philip and the regent Joanna demanded a new 
Papal concession, Suárez de Carvajal was dismissed from the Council of Finances as the 
result of an ongoing factional struggle at court. After his dismissal, the Bishop of Lugo 
realised he had failed in his attempts to join either the incipient Ebolist (reformist) and 
imperialist (conservative) factions.262 The secretary Juan Vázquez de Molina, one of the 
heads of the imperialist group in Castile, was in conflict with Suárez de Carvajal regarding 
their role in the administration of royal finances. 263 The origins of their enmity lay in the 
protective policy of Suárez de Carvajal towards the ecclesiastical concessions, which 
hindered Vázquez de Molina in fulfilling his duties to the royal administration. 
Suárez de Carvajal’s resistance to providing any of the income at his disposal 
obliged Vázquez de Molina to seek alternative income to fund the ongoing conflicts of 
Charles V. This situation began when the secretary had returned to Castile in 1545 to 
help his relative, Francisco de los Cobos, in his final years. When Cobos died in 1547, 
Vázquez de Molina inherited his obligations and concerns regarding the precarious state 
of the royal finances together with his role as secretary in the Council of Finances.264 The 
struggle between Suárez de Carvajal and Vázquez de Molina was, therefore, personal as 
well as factional because of the political allegiance of the latter. In their struggle, it is 
possible to observe two medium-ranking officials who were in conflict because of their 
 
261 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Suárez de Maldonado, Jerónimo’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español 
(Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/17030/jeronimo-suarez-de-
maldonado. 
262 José Martínez Millán, ed., Instituciones y Elites de Poder En La Monarquía Hispana Durante El Siglo XVI, 
Colección de Bolsillo 19 (Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1992), 112, footnote 
20. 
263 Pizarro Llorente, ‘Suárez de Carvajal, Juan’. 
264 Adela Tarifa Fernández, ‘Vázquez de Molina, Juan’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real Academia 
de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/21382/juan-vazquez-de-molina. 
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personal agendas and who channelled their strategies through their actions in the royal 
administration. 
Suárez de Carvajal’s inflexibility towards the use of Papal concessions and the 
enmity between him and Vázquez de Molina resulted in his being removed from the 
Council of Finances in 1554.265 The Bishop of Lugo no longer had any support in the court 
of the regent and he still had the difficult task of administrating the new Papal subsidy. 
The actions of Suárez de Carvajal in the following months, which were the total opposite 
of his traditional policy of protecting the concessions from misuse in the European wars, 
demonstrate that the bishop wanted to recover his position and influence at the court. 
In other words, his personal agenda motivated the adaptation of his strategies, 
depending on the circumstances. 
In this sense, the election by the papacy of Suárez de Carvajal to administer the 
bull made him the target of the initial protests sent to him by the Castilian high clergy in 
February 1555. The objections of the chapters followed the traditional complaint against 
Suárez de Carvajal, namely that the subsidies be considered as regular income rather 
than an extraordinary contribution to the fight against the enemies of Christendom. 
Juan Martínez Silíceo, archbishop of Toledo and former preceptor of Prince Philip, led 
the resistance and called a meeting of the other chapters of Castile in Valladolid on 20th 
June with the aim of discussing their contribution.266 
Although Suárez de Carvajal acknowledged the resistance of the high clergy and 
their demands, he could not tolerate an unfavourable outcome from that meeting. The 
bishop of Lugo employed two different strategies that were also common to high-
ranking officials in the royal administration. First, Suárez de Carvajal sent orders to 
confiscate the accounting books of the chapters in order to apportion the contributions 
and arrest any clergyman who resisted. Second, the bishop bargained with the 
representatives of the chapters individually, offering them salaries and better 
advantages for their dioceses when they were already in Valladolid before the 
meeting.267 The strategy of Suárez de Carvajal, therefore, was based on early coercion 
 
265 Martínez Millán, Instituciones y Elites de Poder En La Monarquía Hispana Durante El Siglo XVI, 112. 
266 Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 
200. 
267 Ibid., 200–201. 
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and individual negotiation to compel the representatives attending the meeting to 
collaborate rather than resist. 
The representatives finally met on 25th June in Valladolid and initiated the 
procedures to discuss the Papal concession with the royal representatives. The regent’s 
government appointed Antonio de Fonseca (president of the Royal Council), Vázquez de 
Molina, and Suárez de Carvajal to oversee the negotiations with the ecclesiastical 
potentates. These three men represented the three groups of influence at the royal 
court: Ebolists or reformist (Fonseca); Imperial or conservative (Váquez de Molina); and 
non-aligned (Suárez de Carvajal).268 Apart from the factional differences, Vázquez de 
Molina and Suárez de Carvajal already had their own personal conflict. In this sense, the 
royal negotiating board was personally divided but institutionally united to achieve a 
positive answer from the ecclesiastical assembly regarding the Papal subsidy. 
The negotiations finished on 21st October, when the representatives returned to 
their chapters after four months of an expensive institutional struggle.269 During their 
time in Valladolid, the delegates agreed that the Bishop of Lugo should withdraw his 
policy and release some of the clergymen who had resisted the sequestration of the 
accounting books of the chapters in early July. However, news arrived in Valladolid on 
15th July regarding a brief from the Papal chancellery about the revocation of the 
concession that the former pope Julius III had granted to Charles V in 1554. This legal 
change turned the negotiation into a moral problem because the delegates were then 
legally unable to concede any subsidy. The immediate reaction of the potentates, 
therefore, was to report to their chapters on how they should proceed. Meanwhile as 
they waited for a response, the deputies of Toledo urged Suárez de Carvajal to abandon 
his duties because he had no legal right either to sequester the accounting books or 
arrest anyone who resisted. 
 
268 The alignment of Fonseca with Ruy Gómez before his departure with Prince Philip to England resulted 
in his appointment as president of the Royal Council on 2nd April 1553. See Ignacio J. Ezquerra Revilla, 
‘Fonseca, Antonio De’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), 
http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/16746/antonio-de-fonseca. 
269 The following chronological references have been taken from a detailed work about the meeting, 
which is based on the analysis of its minutes. See Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the 
Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 201–14. 
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Although the demand of the delegates found support among the jurists, the 
regent’s commissioners hurried to support Suárez de Carvajal. Fonseca and Vázquez de 
Molina argued that the new Papal directive was very general and did not affect the bulls 
with lead seal and concessions to the emperor. The royal position on this legal issue was 
logical bearing in mind the urgent need for funds. If they agreed with the assembly about 
the cancellation of Suárez de Cavajal’s powers, then the regency lost a valuable coercive 
tool against the chapters. The Bishop of Lugo, who foresaw that negotiations could reach 
an impasse in August, recommended that the regent secure confirmation from Pope 
Paul IV about Julius III’s concession.270 
The Hispanic intermediary in Rome was the ambassador Fernando Ruiz de Castro, 
marquis of Sarria. The diplomat had arrived in Rome in July 1555 with instructions to 
ease the political tensions with Pope Paul IV.271 Surprisingly, Sarria had already obtained 
the Papal confirmation of the bull on 31st July, two weeks before Suárez de Carvajal had 
suggested this to regent Joanna.272 The brief, however, did not arrive in Castile until 
December, two months after the assembly had disbanded.273 
The meeting of the ecclesiastical representatives had concluded a mixed policy 
of negotiation and coercion on behalf of the royal board.274 In September, for example, 
while Fonseca bargained with the delegates, Suárez de Carvajal had prepared the orders 
to enforce the collection of the Papal concession without the collaboration of the 
chapters. 275  This aim of the Bishop of Lugo, however, was not one shared by his 
colleagues and regent Joanna. The execution of a forced collection was not viable 
 
270 Ibid., 207. 
271 De Castro’s negative experience in Rome, however, proved that Paul IV was convinced that a war would 
be triggered against the Hispanic Monarchy. See Michael Jacob Levin, Agents of Empire: Spanish 
Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005), 64–66; Eduardo Pardo 
de Guevara y Valdés, ‘Ruiz de Castro y Portugal, Fernando’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real 
Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/43639/fernando-ruiz-de-castro-y-portugal. 
272 Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 
216. 
273 The assembly was finally dismissed on 21st October. See ibid., 214. 
274 Regent Joanna reported to Charles V about the tough negotiations with the clergy and the actions of 
the bishop of Lugo. See Joanna of Austria to Charles V, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 109, 306’, Letter, (18 August 1555). 
275 The bishop warned Charles V about his decision and also about having contacted the ambassador Sarria 
to oversee the delay in the Papal confirmation. Although the bull was enforced, the collection was 
restricted to bishoprics and other religious institutions. The male and female monasteries of Saint 
Augustine and the Dominican Orders, as well as the Military Orders, were temporarily excluded from the 




because of its costs and the foreseeable resistance from the clergy. Their concern 
reinforces the thesis about the role of medium-ranking officials in the process of state 
construction, especially at local level. Without the collaboration of regional and local 
powerholders, the royal administration was unable to extract any resources. 
Once the assembly was dismissed on 21st October and the Papal confirmation of 
the bull was still in Rome, Suárez de Carvajal dispatched the orders to begin the forced 
collection. At this stage it is possible to observe the conflict among royal commissioners. 
While Fonseca wanted the clergymen to enforce the collection to show that they were 
positively predisposed to negotiating a deal, Suárez de Carvajal preferred laymen 
instead so as to avoid resistance from within the Church. Finally, the Bishop of Lugo 
withdrew to please one of Charles V’s favourite statemen. In the end, the personal 
agenda of Suárez de Carvajal motivated him to recover his influence at the royal court. 
His coercive strategy with the representatives during their assembly, notwithstanding 
his prior vigorous protection of Papal concessions, was due to the need to confirm the 
importance of his appointment inside the royal administration. The bishop used the 
resistance of the clerics in 1555 to demonstrate that he was the only one able to compel 
the Castilian high clergy to contribute.276 
Suárez de Carvajal’s coercive approach, however, was suspended when the Papal 
confirmation arrived in December. The bishop sent missives to the chapters reporting 
on the Papal resolution and initiated a process of individual negotiation, a strategy that 
high-ranking officials also used to pursue their personal goals.277 The negotiations again 
failed because another letter from Rome arrived by Christmas. Paul IV had annulled the 
brief confirming the concession, though he did not clarify whether the subsidy was 
valid.278 The news gave renewed energy to an already resilient clergy, which countered 
 
276 Since his departure from the Council of Finances, Suárez de Carvajal had lost his influence from the use 
of Papal concessions, which were largely managed by the Council. See Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian 
Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 215. 
277 The Duke of Savoy had to negotiate individually with the provinces of the Habsburg Low Countries, 
whereas Cardinal Carafa negotiated a contribution with the Papal cities in the same way and the Cardinal 
of Lorrain followed suit in France. Further details in Chapter 3. 




the resumption of the forced collection by Suárez de Carvajal by suspending the religious 
services in many dioceses of Castile by February 1556.279 
The policy of coercion that Suárez de Carvajal employed to pursue his agenda 
resulted in a counterproductive outcome. There were already too many conflicts in 
Europe to add a new one at home. The regent Joanna ordered the suspension of the 
forced collection and the resumption of holy services on 27th February.280 The Bishop of 
Lugo had wasted his chance to regain royal favour by pursuing an abusive coercive 
strategy against a key institution in the kingdom that serviced most of the royal 
pecuniary demands. 281 The regency could hardly extinguish the fire in the following 
weeks. Only individual negotiation with the chapters, especially with the archbishopric 
of Toledo, could conclude a deal in which the clergy supported the king and began to 
collect the subsidy without Papal approval.282 Negotiation succeeded where coercion 
failed. 
This case study about Suárez de Carvajal, a medium-ranking official within the 
royal administration, demonstrates that these types of statesmen employed negotiation 
and coercion to achieve their personal goals. This strategy was a pattern also found in 
the higher ranks of central administrations, which stresses the similarities among the 
two groups. However, the divergence of personal agendas among these officials 
resulted in internal disputes inside the royal administration. The case of Fonseca or 
Vázquez de Molina illustrates this point, both from the perspectives of factional tension 
and personal quarrels. Conflict, in short, was the channelling element that medium-
ranking officials employed to accomplish their targets. 
However, coercion had proven to be an unviable option with the Castilian high 
clergy. For the subsequent ecclesiastical contributions, Philip II ordered a lavish 
ceremony in which all the funds would be carried to Valladolid and put into a chest in 
 
279 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 229. 
280 Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 
218. 
281 A thorough analysis of the role Castile played in the royal finances in Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 24–34. 
282 The regent Joanna warned her brother Philip II about the continued resistance of the Castilian high 
clergy. See Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 80’; Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face 
of Empire, 230. 
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the church of Saint Paul in Valladolid.283 Just three people would have access to the 
money: the rector of the community, a royal official, and a specially commissioned 
administrator to guarantee a degree of impartiality. The location chosen for the chest 
was the place where the meetings of the Castilian estates used to assemble, which 
highlights how public an issue like this was. These kinds of ceremonies were an 
important element for maintaining the cohesion among the multiple agents in the 
Hispanic Monarchy. The procession of the chest entering the church of Saint Paul can be 
interpreted in early modern times through the historiographical concept of ritual, 
meaning any public event that promoted monarchical cohesion and avoided coercion.284 
As the negotiations with the Castilian high clergy were underway, the Hispanic 
ambassador in Genoa sent news about French troop movements in Piedmont and 
reported everything his agents discovered in Provence. 285 It was obvious to all that 
Henry II was preparing to resume the war, though this time he counted on the support 
of the Pope and his allies. The duke of Alva warned in July 1556 that Papal officials had 
intercepted the correspondence to and from Naples, which compromised the security 
of secret communications such as military plans and financial statements. 286  He 
suggested two strategies to counteract this cold war with Rome. 
First, any letter from the Pope or his officials that passed through Barcelona, 
Fuenterrabía, and Vitoria to France was to be opened and checked. Second, the duke 
proposed a ban on any financial transaction from the territories of the monarchy to the 
eternal city, as anyone could use those funds to secretly finance the Papal armies.287 This 
aspect of the economic war that the nobleman recommended to Joanna reveals how 
controversial the administration of financial hubs was. An embargo on private 
operations, just because someone forwarded money to Rome, could result in other 
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284 This field is still poorly studied. See a critique in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill, eds., Monarchy 
Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
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285 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 75’; Gómez Suárez de Figueroa 
to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 27-28’, Letter, (25 July 1556); Stefano Doria to Gómez Suárez 
de Figueroa, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 29’, Letter, (25 July 1556). 
286 Duke of Alva to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 242-244’. 
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businessmen seeing the Hispanic Monarchy as an invasive intruder that exceeded its 
authority. 
Notwithstanding this problem, Philip II took up the suggestion of the duke of Alva 
regarding to impose a limit to the financial sources the Pope.288 For example, although 
the king acknowledged the right of a Papal nuncio to be in Castile without harm or 
subject to an embargo, Paul IV had sent another nuncio with powers of collecting 
ecclesiastical incomes to Castile. Philip II ordered the State Council to impede the office 
of the new nuncio immediately, as such a commission could not be tolerated and, hence, 
no ecclesiastical funds should leave the kingdom.289 
Although Philip II spent much effort to prevent any Papal meddling in the 
Castilian finances, the suspicions of Alva were finally confirmed when the Archbishop of 
Toledo came into contact with a merchant of Burgos called Miguel de Zamora to seek 
and forward 150,000 ducats to the pope.290 The businessman declined to assist Silíceo, 
alleging that this would be an act of disloyalty to the king. The prelate concealed his 
disappointment and sought the money through other people. Once he had apparently 
raised the funds, surprisingly, he communicated again with the merchant asking him to 
provide six healthy mules ‘for His Sanctity’. Presumably, Silíceo had obtained the money 
and needed a means of transport to the coast or to some fair, where he could arrange a 
bill of exchange against Rome. Once again, the merchant of Burgos refused to help, yet 
the archbishop’s compliance with the wishes of the Pope had been made clear. The 
news of this incident was sent in cipher, to avoid French officials intercepting and 




288 Philip II to Council of the Estate, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 117, No Page’, Letter, (29 December 1556); Carlos 
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Although the role of the archbishop was essential in this financial manoeuvre, his 
second appeal to the Burgos merchant after he had already refused to assist him simply 
stresses the close link that they shared and the potential of the businessman to 
complete the deal. Miguel de Zamora and Silíceo had surely met each other when the 
former became treasurer of the Crusade Bull between 1551 and 1554.291 In other words, 
Miguel de Zamora combined his position as a medium-ranking official in the royal 
administration with his traditional duties as merchant from 1552 until 1557. During this 
period, for example, Zamora ran a clothing company with some of the most important 
businessmen and royal financiers of Burgos, such as Diego de Bernuy, highlighting the 
social networks of this statesman with diverse activities. However, he was also a capable 
royal lender to Charles V, since he had granted the emperor 300,000 ducats in August 
1552.292 The social capital of Zamora and his experience with the administration of Papal 
concessions was decisive for Silíceo since Philip II had banned the circulation of all bills 
of exchange within Castile on 6th November 1551.293  
If the royal edicts and orders were logical responses in the context of war, far 
more revealing is the reason that prevented the merchant from lending money, 
although he knew it was for the pope. It is surprising that in the religious society of 
Castile, the businessman preferred to remain loyal to the king rather than to Paul IV. 
Although royal regulations could have impeded the credit supply, Zamora’s final 
decision may have mostly been due to his knowledge of the enmity between Philip II 
and Paul IV. The merchant preferred to be a good subject before a good Christian, even 
if he patronised the church of San Lesmes in Burgos.294 
His former experience in the royal administration, and probably the future of his 
family agenda, may have encouraged him to prefer loyalty to the monarchy. In this 
sense, medium-ranking officials who worked for the central administration had multiple 
loyalties, either to laymen like the heads of the political factions at the royal court 
 
291  Zamora also participated in the preaching of another bull in 1555. See Manuel Basas Fernández, 
‘Miguel de Zamora: la vocación religiosa de un viejo mercader’, 1953, 770; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de 
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(Suárez de Carvajal) or spiritual leaders like the pope (Miguel de Zamora). Their personal 
agenda was what mattered and defined those loyalties through their actions, an agenda 
that statesmen used to channel through major conflicts. 
The role of these individuals became paramount when ambassador Suárez de 
Figueroa reported on the progress on the Italian war in the last days of September 
1556.295 The diplomat wrote to the regent Joanna that the duke of Alva was entering the 
Papal States while the king demanded a new financial service against Castile to pay the 
captain of the galleys, Francisco de Mendoza. The financial roulette kept spinning and 
adding new liabilities to an already exhausted treasury that could barely find new 
sources of income to back more debt. It was time for Philip II to push for the 
professionalisation of the management of the royal finances through new medium-
ranking officials. The financial ineffectiveness and the political resistance of the regency 
to enforce most of the royal decisions encouraged the monarch to rely on these agents. 
A new formal institution that could operate from the Habsburg Low Countries, Genoa, 
and Castile was about to be created. 
2.2. A last-minute solution against financial collapse: the Factoría General 
The use of factores -royal representatives- to administer the royal finances was 
not new in Europe. Other monarchies, such as France, England, and Portugal, had 
already used them to reduce financial costs and ease credit negotiations.296 In the case 
of the Hispanic Monarchy, the system of financing by proxy became an important 
element during the reign of Philip IV and the government of his still-powerful favourite, 
the Count-Duke of Olivares.297 The many difficulties Philip II observed in 1555 to provide 
funds and additional sources of income to the royal treasury encouraged him to reform 
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the financial structure of the monarchy.298 As regards the origins of the Factoría General, 
scholars have proposed three approaches.299 
The first concerns political bargaining at the royal court in Brussels. Since 
Emperor Charles V declared Philip II the new king of the Hispanic realms on 16th January 
1556, those months were characterised by the persistent interference of the Emperor 
in financial issues, something that forced Philip to delay his plans for reform. 300 The 
departure of the Emperor from Zeeland in September 1556 allowed the new monarch 
greater room for manoeuvre. 301  The second approach suggests that the military 
constraints in Italy, rather than politics, forced Philip II to reform his economic 
institutions. 302  A third option stresses the intention of the monarchy to be more 
independent from merchant bankers, diminishing their influence in the royal finances.303 
All these proposals converge in the fact that the financial systems of administration and 
communication needed to be reorganised if Philip II wanted to avoid the general 
collapse of his recently inherited domains. 
As the military conflict developed and expanded to Italy by March 1555, when 
French troops entered into the Duchy of Milan, the need for financial mobility 
increased.304 The lack of additional funding from the regency government in Castile 
simply added a new spur to the creation of a system of factores reales in October 1555 
while the assembly of the clergy in Castile ended without a decision. 305  The new 
organisation was developed in three phases, each characterised by the diverging 
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interests of private agendas. The first phase involved entrusting the management of the 
finances of the whole monarchy to a single man. 
Although this task was apparently overwhelming, it was approved. Gaspar 
Schetz, Lord of Grobbendonk and loan broker of Mary of Hungary in Antwerp, was 
appointed to the post in November 1555.306 According to a letter that Philip II sent to 
the magistrates of Antwerp on 1st January 1556, the monarch wrote to the council of 
Antwerp regarding the appointment of Gaspar Schetz, with instructions to take care of 
the royal finances and help the local council to find funding whenever it was possible. 307 
In exchange for this financial service, the local officials of Antwerp were requested to 
grant the factor real all the honours and privileges that were customary for the royal 
household. In this sense, medium-ranking officials like Schetz were often socially 
promoted through recognition and rituality.308 
When the commission of Schetz was formalised, Philip II was still unable to 
reform the financial system due to the magnitude of the project. He still needed the 
power of the financial head of the monarchy, the Kingdom of Castile, to achieve his goal. 
This transfer of powers was not materialised until two months later, when Charles V 
bequeathed this realm to his son in January 1556.309 Once Philip II was in full control of 
the Castilian institutions, the second phase of the Factoría General began. At this stage, 
the royal secretary Francisco de Eraso and commander Bernardino de Mendoza 
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proposed a change to the system.310 Instead of just one factor, their recommendation 
was to add another of Castilian origin, their client actually, to administer the 
homonymous kingdom. This new distribution would reduce the power of Schetz 
considerably, but this was necessary because the situation in Brussels was continuously 
worsening. The estates of the Habsburg Low Countries, and more specifically the 
deputies of Brabant, had not approved the traditional subsidy to Philip II yet.311 
Without a reliable future income, Antwerpian lenders were reluctant to provide 
new loans. The factoría of Schetz in that city was, therefore, useless. Alternative sources 
of liquidity, intended to generate trust among financiers, came from England. Mary 
Tudor, wife of Philip II, offered her husband up to 200,000 crowns from private 
creditors.312 The Hispanic monarch, who needed more solvency than liquidity and was 
aware of the disastrous political consequences in England if he accepted this money, 
rejected the offer.313 Given these circumstances, Philip II decided to move forward and 
initiate the third phase of the new system in September 1556. This stage of the reform 
reflected another change to the original project with the addition of two more factores 
to the system, besides the appointment of a factor general to coordinate his institutional 
colleagues. 
The ultimate plan centralised the finances of the monarchy in the hands of four 
experienced businessmen. They were Fernán López del Campo, Juan López Gallo, Gaspar 
Schetz and Silvestre Cattaneo; two Castilians, a Brabantian, and a Genoese respectively. 
The literature on this financial milestone has apparently never taken notice of the fact 
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that these four men were not high-ranking lenders, but medium-ranking ones from the 
private sphere. López del Campo, for example, was a Burgos merchant who used to 
participate in multiple asientos with López Gallo during the 1550s.314 López Gallo was 
another financier from Salamanca who was appointed in Bruges to improve the initial 
system in the Habsburg Low Countries.315 Although Schetz arranged some deals with the 
monarchy, he and his family were mostly active at a local level in the money market of 
Antwerp. 316  Finally, Cattaneo used to collaborate with other Genoese financiers to 
arrange asientos with the emperor during that decade.317 
None of these financiers participated in large financial operations, as the well-
known Fugger, Centurione or, to cite a Castilian case, Diego de Bernuy did. The choice 
of these men for the role of factores reales, instead of high financiers, is definitively 
related to the financial policy of the monarchy that sought to prevent any oligopoly 
among its lenders. 318  The use of medium-ranking businessmen allowed Philip II to 
prevent the main royal lenders from benefiting from the control of and information 
about the royal finances. Notwithstanding this advantage, the new system for organising 
the borrowing activities of Philip II was mostly intended to prevent the failure of 
coordination within the royal administration. 
The appointment of López del Campo as factor general, however, symbolised a 
certain degree of centralisation and hierarchy, which reflects the formal character of the 
institution. The instructions given to each factor by the highest authority, the monarch, 
conditioned their behaviour in the institution and simultaneously had an impact on the 
behaviour of the people dealing with them.319 In this sense, the Factoría General was 
born to reduce transaction costs in financial operations, especially regarding the costs 
associated with searching for and information about financial instruments and lenders, 
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but also the lower decision costs inherent within a centralised institution. 320 
Furthermore, the Factoría General was especially intended to reduce the costs 
associated with financial deals. Examples of this successful strategy were the 
consolidation of short-term debt in 1557 and the lower interest rates applied to the 
asientos signed after the decree.321 
The nomination of López del Campo for the post, instead of someone else, points 
to a court rivalry.322 Francisco de Eraso and Ruy Gómez de Silva, courtiers of Prince Philip 
and the emperor, carried out a lengthy operation to take control of the Council of 
Finances and the accounting office known as the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda. They 
were the heads of the courtly group today referred to as the Ebolists, which sought to 
reform the royal administration through the appointment of a network of patrons and 
clients with common interests. Through their institutional monopoly, the group 
intended to have influence in the inner circle of the sovereign before other members of 
the royal court such as the Duke of Alva or the president of the Council of Finances, Juan 
Vázquez de Molina.323 Eraso became secretary of this institution and royal accountant 
on 13th April and 22nd May 1556 respectively.324 In this way, the royal secretary gained 
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access to all the communications of the Council and the real state of royal finances, 
mixing both influence and information. 
Although these offices granted Eraso a privileged position, he still needed 
someone in Castile to oversee the financial decisions taken there. Eraso put forward the 
name of López del Campo for the role of factor general in Castile. This strategy sought 
to undermine any opposition in the Council of Finances through the powers granted to 
López del Campo, who was sent to Castile with authority to manage all the royal incomes 
in that kingdom.325 It was clear that the establishment of the Factoría General was a 
statement of intentions to the main royal representatives of the monarchy. 
This new organisation, defended by Eraso and Gómez de Silva, appointed the 
factores to the three main financial locations under the political protection and influence 
of the Hispanic Monarchy: Valladolid, Antwerp and Genoa. The strategy left out key 
places such as Besançon and Lyon, where two of the main financial fairs of western 
Europe took place. Although factores such as López Gallo had agents in Besançon, it is 
still not known whether the factores had someone appointed at Lyon. The fact that Lyon 
was under the influence of the French monarch could have prevented the Hispanic 
officials from trying to find funding there, at least directly.326 This decision relegated the 
regency government in Castile and the ambassador Suárez de Figueroa in Genoa to a 
secondary role, to which they reacted immediately. 
In Genoa, after the arrival of Silvestre Cattaneo in the final days of January 1557, 
the ambassador Suárez de Figueroa wrote to Philip II restating that he was eager and 
ready to keep serving him. 327 The diplomat had just realised how dangerous Cattaneo 
could become for his own duties in the Ligurian city. Leaving the negotiation of asientos 
 
Biográfico Español (Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/21065/francisco-de-
eraso-y-hermosa. 
325 A list with the instructions given to López del Campo in ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 22’ (Summary, 1556). 
326 The Genoese lending houses were expelled from Lyon in 1551, which created a sort of ‘French area of 
influence’ in the city. See Enrique Otte, ‘Sevilla y Las Ferias Genovesas Lyon y Besançon, 1503-1560’, in 
Atti Del Congresso Internazionale Di Studi Storici Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico Nell’età 
Moderna (Genova: Istituto di scienze storiche, Università di Genova, 1983), 261. In Lyon there were, 
instead, Florentine and some German lending houses, which financed the enterprises of Henry II in 
collaboration with the city council. See the monograph on this relationship by Angela Orlandi, Le grand 
parti: fiorentini a Lione e il debito pubblico francese nel 16. secolo, Quaderni-Fondazione Carlo Marchi 14 
(Firenze: L. S. Olschki, 2002). 
327 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 4’, Letter, (19 February 1557). 
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and exchanges in the hands of the factor meant that he would have to step aside and, 
therefore, lose importance and prestige within the structure of the monarchy. The 
reaction of the ambassador was logical but ineffective because the correspondence that 
arrived from Genoa to Philip II was seen by Francisco de Eraso, who certainly cared more 
for pushing his own agenda than giving space to the complaints of the representatives 
of the old financial system. 
In Castile, López del Campo had arrived at the regent’s court in Valladolid by 
November 1556, after his official appointment as factor general on 22nd September.328 
The factor general brought with him royal instructions for the regent Joanna and the 
Council of Finances to issue letters ordering all royal incomes in Castile to be forwarded 
to him. Nevertheless, this transfer of powers did not take place as soon as the factor 
general arrived in Castile with the royal demands. Instead, it was a progressive 
process. 329  First, the Council of Finances issued the letters that qualified López del 
Campo to receive the incomes from the military orders, mines, and the Casa de la 
Contratación -a sort of Trading House - in Seville on 16th December. The second phase 
took place some days later, when the major royal accountants handed the ‘recudimiento 
general’ to López del Campo. That document entitled the factor general to receive all 
the remaining royal incomes from 1st January 1557 onwards.330 
Despite that accreditation, some revenues, such as the last third of the servicio, 
an extraordinary tax that the Castilian cities granted to the monarch, were excluded 
from the recudimiento. The Council of Finances excused itself from having to obey the 
orders of the monarch, claiming that when the news arrived, everything had already 
been dispatched to the multiple treasurers in the kingdom.331 Revoking the orders would 
only have caused rebellions and disturbances (‘revolución y alteración’). As can be 
observed, the Council of Finances considered itself independent enough to be able to 
disobey Philip II without prior negotiation if this was necessary. 
 
328 Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y Contabilidad En La Real Hacienda’, 244. 
329 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 19’, 30 December 1556. 
330 An early reference to the accounts of the factor general in Esteban Hernández Esteve, ‘Las Cuentas de 
Fernán López del Campo, primer factor general de Felipe II, para los reinos de España (1556-1560)’, 
Hacienda Pública Española 87 (1984): 85–105. 
331 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 26’, Letter, (13 December 1556); Council of 
Finances to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 5-7’, Letter, (1 April 1557). 
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Notwithstanding the practical limitations the Council of Finances imposed on 
López del Campo, the factor general knew his instructions very well and defended them 
from the beginning of his commission.332 Once in Castile, he was entitled to arrange 
asientos and exchanges in and out of the fairs on behalf of the king, receive all the royal 
incomes of the kingdom -including what came from America- and issue juros al quitar 
with a maximum interest rate of 10%. Apart from being a financial broker, the factor 
general also became a military supplier for the Council of War. In this sense, his 
commission also sought to minimise financial and transaction costs by foreseeing that 
open war with France was imminent. Apart from these duties, the main goal of López 
del Campo was to restore the king’s credit. 
All the powers that López del Campo received were intended to simulate an 
apparent cash flow that the monarch did not have at that moment due to the multiple 
delays in the reimbursement of his debts. The factor general had to secure the flow of 
new credit and exchanges, thus reassuring everyone that the king was still a trustworthy 
borrower. This motivation explains the appointment of López del Campo as factor 
general for Castile, which meant that the other two factores reales should adapt their 
actions to his strategies. López Gallo and Cattaneo would simply send and receive bills 
of exchange, besides administering funds in their designated regions. Reality showed 
that this subordination and concentration of power in López del Campo did not work 
because each appointee had his own agenda. In this sense, Lopez del Campo had to deal 
with royal institutions and other medium-ranking officials that did not want to be 
displaced or minimised. 
Despite the multiple agendas of those officials, all converged in the effort to 
improve the financial reputation of the king. This long-term process began when the 
factor general analysed the general situation of the royal finances in Castile when he 
arrived in the royal court on 4th November 1556.333 A month later, on 13th December 
1556, López del Campo had already written his verdict about the situation and 
 
332 Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y Contabilidad En La Real Hacienda’, 249–51. 
333 Since the general factor was appointed on 22nd September, it took him the whole month of October 
to arrive at the court of the regent. See Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 91’, Letter, (15 
January 1557); for the date of the factor’s commission see Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y 
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forwarded it to Philip II. 334  Castilian commerce was declining because of the royal 
decrees of November 1551 (prohibition on the issuance of bills of exchange to cover 
payments from fair-to-fair in Castile), December 1555 (setting of interest rates on 
external exchanges) and March 1556 (prohibition of money exchanges within the Iberian 
Peninsula, including Portugal).335 These three edicts were the result of protectionist 
policies that sought to keep liquidity within the economic Castilian circuit and reduce 
interest rates for new financial operations with the sovereign. The main motivation for 
the enactment of these laws was a recommendation from Philip II, who intended to stop 
the increasing interest rates that his father -still in charge for the two first edicts- was 
implementing with each new asiento.336 
This premium on the financial services to the king also affected the rest of the 
monarchy since the economic health of the royal finances rested on its fiscal power. The 
escalating demand for money exchanges increased the fiscal burden on taxpayers to 
repay them. This policy resulted in an economic downturn for local entrepreneurs, who 
observed how their benefits decreased due to the higher fiscal pressure imposed by the 
cities and increasing inflation.337 For example, the accounting books of one of the most 
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important Castilian merchants of the time, Simón Ruiz, show a temporary disruption to 
his economic activities because of a credit contraction in 1556.338 
All these elements help to explain the commercial decline in Castile mentioned 
by López del Campo in his report. 339 The October fair in Medina del Campo, which had 
been delayed until December of that year, was a good confirmation of this conclusion. 
Although the fair was arranged to close on 17th December, no money exchanges had 
taken place by the 12th. Surprisingly, financiers were waiting for the factor general to 
participate in the fair. Their behaviour reflects their awareness of the powers and 
instructions of the medium-ranking official López del Campo. They preferred to deal 
with him rather than with the regent’s representatives, which highlights the importance 
of medium-ranking officials to non-state actors in the process of state cohesion. 
The factor general noted in his report that the level of businesses arranged was 
not even a quarter of what it used to be. His understanding of this decline showed not 
only how damaged the credit market was but also how necessary his presence and role 
were for the correct working of the monarchy. López del Campo was thus creating the 
perfect image that assured his professional future, and that of his patron Eraso too, in 
the administration of the Castilian royal finances. In other words, this medium-ranking 
official was promoting the importance of his role in the royal administration as part of 
his personal agenda through his service to the king within conditions of political 
(international war), institutional (financial reform), and social (economic downturn) 
conflict. 
Given the situation in Castile, López del Campo promised to report to Philip II 
from Medina del Campo once the fair was over. On 30th December, the factor general 
sent his conclusions directly to Philip II, which were mixed but optimistic.340 He found 
that the credit market was still healthy enough to supply 300,000 or 400,000 ducats in 
case it was necessary. However, the decline of Castilian commerce was a worrying 
development that needed to be addressed as soon as possible to minimise any future 
harm. He recommended a commission be formed comprised of two or three theologians 
 
338 R. Rodríguez González, ‘La Negociación Cambiaria En La Banca de Simón Ruiz’, in Dinero, Moneda y 
Crédito En La Monarquía Hispánica (Marcial Pons : Fundación ICO, 2000), 691. 
339 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 26’. 
340 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 19’. 
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along with two or three magistrates to advise on the most effective actions for the 
service of the king and the wellbeing of the monarchy. 
If López del Campo had identified some of the key economic problems of Castile 
in December 1556, on 1st February 1557 he sent an exhaustive report to Philip II with 
suggestions on how to fix them.341 In that document, López del Campo explained point 
by point a masterplan to save the royal treasury from an ignominious end and 
simultaneously to launch an economic attack on the enemies of the monarchy. Campo’s 
proposals were implemented a few months later, which speaks to the trust that the king 
had in the businessman. In contrast to this fruitful relationship, Philip II had been having 
many disagreements with his sister Joanna in the previous months. This encouraged the 
factor general to address his report directly to the monarch since he made clear that the 
Council of Finances had no interest in seeing it.342 
The letters and reports from the factor general to Philip II were very emotional, 
a common pattern among missives from other royal servants. The exaggerated tone of 
this type of correspondence sought to promote a royal servant’s personal agenda 
through the simulation of a sincere loyalty and the desire to serve the sovereign and the 
monarchy. The main goal of the sender was to obtain royal grace and mercies.343 In this 
sense, López del Campo was straightforward in his letters to the king, in which he 
stressed the importance of his services and requested that he be compensated with 
honours (honra). 344  This desire for royal grace may explain why López del Campo 
provided a very visual image of the fair. In his long report, he lamented that the 
prosperity of the Castilian fairs that he had seen during his youth as an independent 
businessman, had already disappeared. He described, for example, how he had 
previously attended the same fairs at Medina del Campo and how full they had been 
with no less than two hundred rich businessmen just a few years earlier. In the fair of 
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October 1556 -actually held in December- there were now barely twenty wealthy 
businessmen, a decline in the participation rate of 90%. 
By the end of 1556, there was a clear primacy of Italian lenders as the leading 
royal financiers, who held 50.8% of the share of the debt (see table 1). These numbers 
have remained unchanged since the works of the 1980s -Ulloa and Carande- and modern 
scholars still use them in their analyses of the royal finances to illustrate the well-known 
rise of the Genoese.345 For this reason, it is very likely that the twenty lenders López del 
Campo mentioned in his report were Genoese, since they were already the best 
positioned lending nation. Nonetheless, the factor general avoided giving any names, 
something that would have been very useful for historians in gauging the state of 
Genoese lenders. Nevertheless, he may have exaggerated his statement to reinforce 
how essential a part of the financial machinery of the monarchy his office was, an issue 
that he emphasises in following letters to Philip II. 
It was evident that something was going extremely wrong in the way the royal 
finances had been managed until that moment. In his report of 1st February 1557, López 
del Campo again blamed the royal decrees issued six years before. He claimed that they 
had forced merchants to borrow from unlawful lenders at very high interest rates. The 
factor general does not specify how high those interest rates that ‘those mean men’ 
 





German Castilian Italian Flemish
Total debt 3.224.998 940.229 8.204.911 1.981.379
Principal borrowed 2.315.457 857.042 4.901.214 1.570.156
Table 1. Comparison of shares held by national group of lenders (1552-1556). In Castilian ducats. Source: 




(hombres de mala conciencia) imposed on the monarchy against the common wellbeing 
were. Clearly, there was a profound unease in the writings of López del Campo when he 
described the situation.346 
For instance, he narrated how honest merchants from Seville had been forced to 
engage in ‘moatras’ and ‘cambios fingidos’ because of their continuous need for liquidity 
from the lengthy commerce with America. Moatras were fraudulent contracts in which 
someone purchased a commodity at a high cost on credit and then sold it back to the 
merchant who sold the item in the first place, although at a lower price. This operation 
allowed borrowers to create a loan contract in which they obtained liquidity, which was 
the difference between the initial face value of the commodity and its resale price. The 
‘cambios fingidos’ were exchanges of money that concealed high interest rates, which 
were not declared explicitly in the contracts, in their reimbursements. With both tools, 
a borrower obtained liquidity and showed that he was solvent so as to keep doing 
business at a high cost. 
In addition, the limitation and royal regulation of interest rates had discouraged 
lenders from doing business in the Iberian territories of the monarchy, thus reducing the 
credit coming from abroad. The royal edicts were, nonetheless, well intentioned. As 
mentioned before, they were intended to reduce the interest rates of domestic and 
foreign credit, which had risen to levels of usury during the last years of the reign of 
Charles V. The usury is what especially worried the clergy and the sovereign, a common 
concern that helped to bring their positions closer during the dispute over the 
ecclesiastical support for the pope analysed in the first section of this chapter. There 
was a culture against these kinds of deals, which drove borrowers to bankruptcy 
(quebrar y romper). 347  If lenders and merchants were dropped from the economic 
framework that the monarch backed, then there would be a significant loss of the 
taxpayers who fuelled the royal treasury and the military machinery. In this sense, the 
 
346 ‘[...] lo que vi en esta feria de octubre no se puede escribir, ni creer [...]’ in Hernández Esteve, La Historia 
de La Contabilidad, 72–73. 
347 In 1556 five merchants and one banker were bankrupted at the fairs of Medina del Campo. See Falah 
Hassan Abed Al-Hussein, ‘Las quiebras de los hombres de negocios castellanos’, vol. II (Historia de Medina 
del Campo y su tierra, Ayuntamiento de Medina del Campo, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, Diputación 
Provincial de Valladolid, Caja de Ahorros Provincial de Valladolid, 1986), 261. 
107 
 
moral position against usury was mingled with the need to support the common wealth 
and protect the royal interests. 
Apart from the economic consequences of these political decisions, it is worth 
mentioning how the royal economic policies forced businessmen to flee towards less 
restrictive spaces. The traditional mechanism for issuing credit in Castile was focused on 
the fairs of Medina del Campo, Villalón de Campos and Medina de Rioseco. Although 
sometimes they could be delayed or prolonged due to the lack of businessmen or royal 
funds to service the payments due, they were key financial and commercial hubs for 
native and foreign businessmen.348 There, high financiers, merchants, and royal officials 
freely converged to arrange loans or make reimbursements. Nevertheless, the royal 
decrees imposed a more politically controlled market, something that López del Campo 
strongly criticised. 
The Council of Finances selected a judge to check whether the accounting books 
of the businessmen at the fairs fulfilled the requirements established in the decrees so 
as to enforce them more efficiently. This coercion on financiers and merchants became 
even greater with the appointment of a notary and a justice official (alguacil), who 
accompanied the judge in his inquiries. This harassment was doubtlessly perceived as 
the excessive intromission of the royal prerogative into private matters. The most 
prominent men who attended the fairs decided to start sending their servants on their 
behalf instead of having to deal with the royal officials. Their absence from those 
meetings thus made the fairs less attractive to attend for other businessmen. In sum, 
this coercive royal policy of inspecting every operation of these businessmen was 
counterproductive, a conclusion that can be reached for other case studies throughout 
this first part of the thesis. López del Campo insisted on ending this coercion and 
 
348 Álvarez Nogal and Chamley provide a list of the actual dates of the fairs, but it seems that according to 
the date of the report of López del Campo, the fair of October 1556 took place at an earlier date than that 
given by Álvarez Nogal and Chamley. Cf. Carlos Álvarez Nogal and Christophe Chamley, ‘Philip II against 
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Latin American Economic History 34, no. 3 (2016): 381. A recent overview with key bibliography about the 
topic in Hilario Casado Alonso, ‘Crédito y Comercio En Las Ferias de Medina Del Campo En La Primera 
Mitad Del Siglo XVI’, in Il Mercato Del Credito in Età Moderna: Reti e Operatori Finanziari Nello Spazio 
Europeo, 2010, 21–48. 
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reversing the resultant general loss of trust it caused as soon as possible, especially 
because of the war with France that broke out in January 1557.349 
The military constraints would require a large amount of the liquidity that the 
royal edicts were diverting to other kingdoms such as Aragon, Valencia, or Portugal. The 
high price of gold and the prohibition on issuing bills of exchange from fair-to-fair 
encouraged the businessmen to extract as much currency as they could.350 Flanders and 
Besançon were the only open places to where money exchanges could be addressed in 
the monarchy. However, the latter applied high interest rates on currency exchanges, 
which made Flanders a more viable destination. Concentrating all the exchanges in 
Flanders was, nonetheless, dangerous, as this could overwhelm its fairs. The factor 
general recommended, therefore, suspending the royal edicts until Philip II returned to 
Castile and there were new discussions about this issue. López del Campo in fact had 
already made some of his own suggestions.351 
First, the restoration of domestic money exchanges, at least between Valladolid 
-together with Medina del Campo - and Seville, because they constituted one of the 
main economic arteries of Castile. The jurists accepted this measure as long as it 
occurred with some moderation. Second, the resumption of the money exchanges 
charged with interest within Castile (‘fianza de feria a feria’) but with the imposition of 
an interest ceiling of 12% on the principal. This solution, however, was unlawful 
according to the ecclesiastical rules about usury. Making money out of money without 
any productive service was forbidden. Nevertheless, it was necessary to restore the 
commercial levels of the past. In addition, this recommendation drew the king’s 
attention to the fact that this type of exchange was already allowed in other territories 
of the monarchy, such as Flanders. Refusing this solution would mean favouring other 
kingdoms before Castile, although it was the financial heart of the monarchy. Third, 
 
349 The predictable outcome of the truce affected the whole monarchy. For some examples, see Federico 
Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 787’, Letter, (1 September 1557); Charles V to 
Juana of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 119, 2’, Letter, (31 January 1557). 
350 Especially since Philip II had instructed the regent Joanna to forbid any money exchange with Rome 
from January 1557 in the context of the conflict with Pope Paul IV, as discussed in the previous section. 
More details about this topic regarding the royal decrees in Carlos Morales, ‘Mercado Financiero y Crédito 
Del Soberano En El Tránsito de Carlos V a Felipe II. La Intervención En Los Tipos de Cambio Mediante Las 
Pragmáticas Del 1551-1557’, 287–98. 
351 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’; Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 43–44. 
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opening the money exchanges with the rest of Europe, including Aragon, Valencia, and 
Catalonia. Portugal was, nonetheless, excluded due to its monetary policy, which had 
increased the value of its money by royal order. 
López del Campo expected that this strategy would attract businessmen to 
Castile again and force Portugal to restore its previous monetary policy. The factor 
general was a proponent of an early version of an ideology based on the laissez faire 
concept because, as his correspondence suggests, he believed that the state should 
rarely intervene in the market. Apart from the abovementioned suggestions, the factor 
general also recommended less state coercion in the market and proposed two points 
for the consolidation of a new political and financial agenda. The first point was the 
cancellation of the royal decree that fixed the interest rates of money exchanges with 
foreign states. His second proposal recommended the prohibition of fair banks (‘bancos 
de feria’) in the Castilian fairs. The former point aimed to attract businessmen once 
again, despite their intrusive policies towards the interest on the exchanges. The latter 
signified a significant change in the way of doing business in the fairs of Castile. 
The bancos de feria were bankers who arrived in any Castilian city which was 
about to celebrate a fair, either commercial or purely financial. Once there, these 
businessmen presented themselves before the local council and made deposits to 
ensure their solvency in case they went to bankrupt during the fair. If the local 
authorities accepted them, including the royal representative (corregidor), they could 
open bank accounts for all the merchants who arrived in the fair. Their services consisted 
in providing a cashless system at the fairs based on guarantees that merchants and 
financiers deposited in their temporary banks. 
Once merchants and financiers finished their business, they checked their bank 
account and if they did not owe anything they could leave without any issue. However, 
if they had an overdraft, they had up to twenty days in which to clear it. Sometimes the 
fair bankers offered advances to those insolvent clients at an interest rate ranging 
between 14.2% and 33.3% on the principal.352 The bankers, in sum, benefited from 
solvent and insolvent businessmen alike, a situation that improved during economic and 
 




financial crises, such as the one generated by the royal decrees of the 1550s. The 
dangers inherent in the abusive services of these bankers encouraged López del Campo 
to recommend that transactions should take place with cash and without the agency of 
the fair banks, just as happened in the other territories of the monarchy. 
This proposal to reduce royal influence in the markets coincided with another big 
issue that worried the monarch: his debts. López del Campo estimated that the royal 
incomes in Castile could only generate 320,000 ducats in 1557, while the expected 
ordinary expenses for the same year amounted to 586,666 ducats.353 With the ongoing 
war against France and its allies, it was urgent to find a solution, especially regarding the 
increasing interest. 354  López del Campo discussed the issue with Luís Hurtado de 
Mendoza Pacheco, marquis of Mondéjar, and Gutierre López de Padilla to propose a 
way of overcoming this financial problem. The marquis was president of the Council of 
the Indies and member of the State and War Councils, while López de Padilla was 
member of the Council of Finances and major accountant since the 5th February of that 
year, just four days after López del Campo wrote the report.355 In sum, these two men 
had influence and information about almost anything important that happened 
throughout the monarchy. 
Their project consisted in stopping payments on the floating debt of the king, 
which was estimated at six million ducats plus 840,000 more in interest. The next step 
would be to undertake precise accounting surveys about what Philip II owed to his 
lenders until the 1st January 1557 and in the meanwhile consolidate all these debts -
including principal and interest - into juros al quitar at 5% of the annual interest.356 The 
factor general suggested ordering López Gallo, his colleague in Flanders, to redeem 
300,000 or 400,000 ducats of those juros each year, starting with the Fugger family, in 
order to show goodwill for repayments. With this financial tactic, the king would recover 
 
353 The original figures were given in maravedis, 120 and 220 million respectively. The amount has been 
converted to ducats, at 375 maravedis each, to ensure consistency throughout the text. 
354 ‘[...] es menester poner orden en lo de los intereses [...]’ in Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, 
EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
355 Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602, 60, 80. 
356 The royal lenders Rodrigo de Dueñas and Costantin Gentil (representative of the Centurione family) 
proposed in mid-1555 a similar project that consisted in granting packs of juros at 10% interest to be 
redistributed among investors for a limited period in exchange for a steady cash flow to the royal treasury. 
For more details, see Pulido Bueno, La familia genovesa Centurión, 143. 
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some earmarked revenues that he could use immediately, as well as continue 
progressively to reimburse his debts to the lenders. The royal reputation and solvency 
would recover and misinformation about the real state of the royal incomes would not 
spread among financiers, thus reducing the financial costs. 
López del Campo also proposed new taxes to ease the reimbursement of those 
debts, such as an imposition of 5% on the value of any exports by sea and another tax 
on wool exports. The latter tax had a double purpose: providing funds to a badly 
damaged treasury, on the one hand, and attacking the French economy and industry 
through the increase of prices in wool imports to that kingdom, on the other. The tariffs 
that the factor general proposed for this new tax were one ducat per sack of wool to 
Flanders and two if the goods travelled to France or Italy. López del Campo foresaw that 
such fiscal novelties would create unrest among the main groups of merchants and, 
thus, local elites with influence in the cortes. To counteract any resistance, the monarch 
should negotiate with the two leading poles affected: Burgos and Seville. The former 
would suffer the most damage because most of the commerce to the North passed 
through that city. 
In order to minimise the resistance in Burgos, López del Campo suggested the 
abolition of an old decree that obliged wool exporters to bring clothes and linens back 
to Castile after having concluded their wool business, a law that increased their 
expenses and interfered in their freedom as independent businessmen. This measure 
would satisfy the petitions the Castilian cities had made since the last cortes of 1555, a 
gesture that would calm not only the elites of Burgos but also other minor polities 
involved in the wool trade. In addition, the monarch could also promise the abolition of 
the new tax on exported wool after ten years from its official enactment. Convincing the 
Sevillian elites, on the other hand, would simply require the restoration of money 
exchanges, a first step to the recovery of the commercial dynamic. 
López del Campo thus concluded that the outcomes of this non-interventionist 
policy combined with a new fiscal policy could be used as a military weapon with which 
to weaken and influence other powers, such as France or Portugal. The factor general 
thus appealed for a less coercive approach and preferred negotiating with local 
powerholders, an uncommon pattern among medium- and high-ranking officials 
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working for central administrations. Nevertheless, these tactics could only work if the 
other administrative bodies of Castile collaborated, something that the Council of 
Finances was not likely to do because it would entail accepting reforms that endangered 
the personal agendas of its members. As result of their foreseeable reluctance, López 
del Campo preferred not to inform the Council about the plans for consolidation yet, 
especially the task of recovering juros already issued with an interest of 7.14% with the 
money coming from freed allocations.357 This resistance encouraged López del Campo 
to recommend the creation of an official committee formed by the Marquis of 
Mondéjar, López de Padilla, the Licentiate Vaca de Castro and himself. Their goal was to 
find additional options to complement those already proposed. Nonetheless, the fact 
that this select group of people was characterised by their allegiance to the Ebolist party 
was even more important than the motivations of the committee. 
Since Eraso had managed to have López del Campo appointed as factor general, 
other important members of this faction had risen to high ranks in the royal 
administration. For example, Ruy Gómez de Silva, co-founder of the Factoría General 
and head of the court party, also became major accountant on 20th January 1557. 
Bernardino de Mendoza, who had been captain general of the galleys in the 
Mediterranean Sea, also joined the group as major accountant on 2nd February, as López 
de Padilla did on 5th February.358 Vaca de Castro, finally, became temporary president of 
the Council of Castile.359 The introduction of members of the Ebolist party to the financial 
institutions of the monarchy undermined the resistance of the regency government to 
reforms. In this sense, the personal agenda of López del Campo as a medium-ranking 
official coincided with the interests of the other members of the royal administration, 
and they thus helped each other to progressively increase their influence in the main 
institutions of decision-making. 
 
357 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 65’ (Report, 1557). 
358 Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602, 80; before aligning with the Ebolist 
party, Mendoza had been a close friend of Alba, who was in the rival faction. However, this shift in 
friendships obliged Alva to impede Mendoza’s career in the royal administration with all means at his 
disposal. See Dionisio A. Perona Tomás, ‘Mendoza, Bernardino De’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real 
Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/12618/bernardino-de-mendoza. 
359 Martínez Millán, Instituciones y Elites de Poder En La Monarquía Hispana Durante El Siglo XVI, 164. 
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The Council of Finances was aware of the deterioration of its competences and 
power since the arrival of the factor general in Castile with his instructions. Its reaction 
focused on counteracting the rise of López del Campo, who was collecting too many 
incomes and positions in the royal administration.360 This was one of the main warnings 
the Council made to Philip II, emphasising that the factor general intended to become 
the only person, or someone of his choice, who could manage the royal finances. This 
concentration of power sought to transform the factor into a sort of general payer of 
the Castilian militias and navy, officials in the royal chancelleries, and members of the 
royal councils. In sum, López del Campo could become an all-powerful man in Castile 
with influence over the military, political, and financial spheres. 
This conclusion of the Council of Finances was not simply an artificial illusion 
created to defend its share of influence with the king, but an ongoing process. An 
anonymous summary report written in Valladolid in 1557 contained the main points of 
the report and a letter that López del Campo sent to Philip II on 1st February, where the 
factor general declared that royal accountants wanted to transfer powers over the tax 
collectors and general recipients of royal rents to him.361 In this way, he would be able 
to choose these royal servants and facilitate the management of the Castilian finances 
without harming the royal estate. The way the document described this episode and 
others stressed the good will of the factor general before his enemies at the regency 
court, which suggests that a collaborator of the Ebolist party wrote this list. The most 
probable candidate is Ruy Gómez de Silva, who docked near La Corunna (Galicia) on 10th 
March after being appointed major accountant of Castile and the Indies in February.362 
His first stop was Valladolid, where he introduced himself to the regency and 
shared his instructions. Philip II had ordered him to collect 2,450,000 ducats -1,650,000 
ducats from the Habsburg Low Countries and 800,000 ducats from Italy - to counteract 
the French military campaigns.363 On 20th March he departed from the regency court to 
 
360 Council of Finances to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 5-7’. 
361 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 65’. 
362 Ruy Gómez de Silva to Charles V, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 5’, Letter, (3 November 1557); Carlos Morales, El 
Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602, 80. 
363 The king reiterated his needs in two letters written on 13th and 15th February. See Fernán López del 
Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 230’, Letter, (24 April 1557); Council of Finances to Philip II, ‘AGS, 
EST, Leg. 121, 111’, Letter, (24 April 1557). 
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visit the emperor Charles in Yuste before meeting with Cardinal Silíceo in Toledo, the 
head of the Castilian clergy who had led the resistance against the ecclesiastical 
contribution the previous year as analysed in the previous section.364 De Silva gathered 
information about the real state of Castile and the best way to fulfil the instructions that 
Philip II had given to him. 365 His arrival was providential for the career of López del 
Campo, though he was unable to service the royal demands, because he was not allowed 
to arrange new money exchanges or asientos without a royal order specifically issued 
by the monarch.366 Therefore, the burden passed to the regent Joanna, who could mint 
as much bullion as she could find in the Casa de la Contratación.367 The amounts of 
American gold and silver held in Seville had diminished progressively since Philip II 
ordered them to be confiscated in September 1556, a directive that the regency 
government did not forward to the officials in the Casa de la Contratación.368 
The result of this disobedience was the disappearance of most of the precious 
metal. Emperor Charles V first informed Princess Joanna that the treasure was estimated 
at seven or eight million ducats; later it was five million, and finally 500,000 ducats.369 
Emperor Charles was outraged and from Yuste where he was at the time chided the 
Sevillian officials and the Princess Joanna’s councillors for tolerating this. Bearing in mind 
his advanced age of 57 years, the emperor expressed his intention of writing to Philip II 
to recommend that he mete out extraordinary justice to the people responsible for this 
calamity. Charles V, however, decided not to wait until the king had issued his proposed 
punishment and instead appointed Luís Quijada to see who was responsible in 
Valladolid.370 A thorough investigation ordered by the regency followed in Seville. While 
the inquiry was underway, the members of the Councils of Finances and the Indies 
blamed each other and declared themselves not guilty.371 
 
364 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 120, 241’, Letter, (20 March 1557). 
365 De Silva’s instructions in Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 515, 92’ (Instruction, Brussels, 2 February 1557) 
reference taken from Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda, 80; see also Royall Tayler, ed., Calendar of 
State Papers, Spain: 1554-1558, vol. 13 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), 285–87. 
366 Charles V to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 119, 2’. 
367 Charles V to Juan Vázquez de Molina, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 119, 16’, Letter, (27 February 1557). 
368 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 209. 
369 Charles V to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 119, 22’, Letter, (1 April 1557). 
370 Luís Quijada to Charles V, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 8’, Letter, (4 August 1557); Luís Quijada to Philip II, ‘AGS, 
EST, Leg. 121, 9’, Letter, (4 August 1557). 
371 Council of Finances to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 111’. 
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It was already April 1557 and the monarch needed the money he had requested 
instead of worrying about what happened in the Casa de la Contratación, though he 
would later impose a severe punishment.372 A double solution was adopted. First, López 
del Campo received 600,000 ducats held in Seville – 100,000 ducats more than had been 
estimated in February. Second, the factor general contracted a money exchange of 
180,000 ducats at the Lent fair in Villalón.373 While 30,000 ducats were paid to the Count 
of Feria, the remaining 150,000 would join the money that awaited in Laredo on the 
northern coast. Transporting the money to the Low Countries, however, would require 
the assistance of the merchant fleet because the royal navy that was docked in Laredo 
and captained by Luís de Carvajal was not ready.374 Nevertheless, the most interesting 
part of this supply of funds was the independence of López del Campo.375 If in February 
1557 he could not arrange money exchanges without a royal letter, by April he decided 
to risk his own position to serve the king.376 The difference between these two moments 
was the presence in Castile of Ruy Gómez de Silva, who doubtlessly supported the 
decision of López del Campo. 
Step by step, the king came to tolerate this type of improvised administration by 
medium-ranking officials like López del Campo. Indeed, the monarch followed the advice 
of the factor general and restored the money exchanges within Castile and with 
Valencia.377 Although the Council of Finances limited their use, some businessmen dared 
to trade with them. It was clear that the regency government was progressively 
relinquishing its opposition before the strategies of Gómez de Silva, Eraso and López del 
Campo. Indeed, the Council wrote to Philip II on 24th April recommending the application 
 
372 Emperor Charles V ordered the public arrest and imprisonment of the responsible people in the castle 
of Simancas, near Valladolid, until Philip II sent his final decision on what was to happen to them. See 
Charles V to Juan Vázquez de Molina, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 119, 34’, Letter, (5 December 1557). 
373 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 230’. 
374 The navy departed on 24th March, but it was stuck by bad weather and returned to be repaired. See 
Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 120, 241’; Luís de Carvajal to Juana of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 
122, 92’, Letter, (4 June 1557). 
375  The sales of regimientos and escribanías, the right to rule municipalities and be public scribe 
respectively, were estimated at another 150,000 ducats. Along with other incomes, the Factor general 
hoped to collect one million ducats for Flanders. 
376 His service to Philip II went beyond arranging money exchanges. The factor general always aimed to 
engage his friends to provide funds to the monarch, though sometimes it was necessary to use the agency 
of his brother, Lope del Campo. 
377 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 230’. 
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of the plan to consolidate the floating debt that the factor general conceived.378 On the 
same date, Gómez de Silva and the accountant López de Padilla wrote to Philip II advising 
him of the immediate implementation of the plan. 379  None of these royal officials, 
however, knew that the king had already initiated the financial reform. 
2.3. The consolidation of Fernán López del Campo in the administration and the 
difficult enforcement of his project 
On 17th April 1557, Philip II sent from London a letter to his Council of Finances 
in Castile.380 In this missive, the monarch ordered the cessation of payments on his 
floating debt and its immediate consolidation into juros al quitar with a 5% interest rate, 
in addition to issuing the new tax on wool exports that López del Campo had suggested 
in February. Just a day later, Philip II wrote another letter to his bishops, leading nobles, 
and high officials demanding a generous economic contribution to support his military 
defence against the Pope and the invasion of France with a new army.381 It was clear 
that Philip II had entered a new phase of the armed conflict, in which he needed all the 
liquidity and solvency he could derive from the monarchy. In effect, Hispanic troops had 
commenced a counteroffensive and were marching towards Saint Quintin, plundering 
everything they found in their way.382 
In the meantime, Ruy Gómez de Silva was in Castile collecting funds with the help 
of López del Campo to pay the troops on the French border and in Italy. The diminished 
treasure of the Indies was not enough to meet the royal expectations and the regency 
appeared to be responsible for this. There was no other option but to decree the 
suspension of payments, a decision that the regent Joanna and her ministers delayed 
until they reached an agreement with Philip II about the financial administration of the 
royal households. The monarch, foreseeing the resistance of the regency to enforcing 
 
378 Council of Finances to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 111’. 
379 Their letter included a detailed statement of the royal finances and the means taken to obtain liquidity, 
such as the sale of municipal lands or jurisdictions. See Ruy Gómez de Silva and Gutierre López de Padilla 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 112’, Letter, (24 April 1557). 
380 Philip II to Council of the Estate, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 32, 42’, Letter, (17 April 1557); a transcription of the 
decree into modern Spanish has recently been edited by Carlos Morales. See Carlos Morales, El Precio Del 
Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 14. 
381 Philip II to his bishops, leading nobles and high officers of state, ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 296’, Letter, (18 
April 1557); Philip II to Juana of Austria, ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 298’, Letter, (28 April 1557). 
382 On their way, Philip’s troops sacked the house of a wealthy lord who used to host Henry II, causing 
much grievance at the French court. See Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 
Vol. 6, 854’, Letter, (4 July 1557). 
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his orders, in April accepted that limits be placed on the powers of López del Campo.383 
This decision symbolised a truce between the king and the regency as it assured the 
independence of the latter before the increasing power of the factor general. In other 
words, a medium-ranking official had gone too far and negotiation among high-ranking 
officials was necessary to preserve the cohesion of the administrative structure of the 
Hispanic Monarchy. 
The fears of the regency were not unfounded. The role of López del Campo as 
factor general was a potential threat. He embodied a shift in the way of financing the 
monarchy that initially displaced the regency in financial issues. Subsequently, the 
influence and independence of López del Campo was consolidated also through the 
appointment of other Ebolist members to the Castilian institutions. The Lent fair of 
Villalón celebrated in April 1557 demonstrated the capabilities of the new team of 
officials, but it was in May when the faction exhibited its true potential. On 7th May, 
López del Campo and Gómez de Silva arrived in Toledo to negotiate new supplies for the 
monarch and collect ecclesiastical subsidies from Archbishop Silíceo, who was leading 
the resistance to the forced loan that Philip II had imposed.384 
They found the clergyman close to death and preparing his last will, which 
provides an interesting case study on the role of medium-ranking officials at local 
level. 385  In this will, according to López del Campo, Silício wanted to transfer the 
patronage of the School of the One Hundred Maidens in Toledo to Philip II, an 
opportunity that the factor general sought to enforce. López del Campo was motivated 
in this not only so as to increase the piety of the monarch but also to gain rights over the 
property and its goods. If Silíceo died under these conditions, the royal representative 
(corregidor) of Toledo would register that patrimony for liquidation. Pope Paul IV, still in 
conflict with Philip II, could claim that patronage for the Church. Bearing in mind the 
40,000 ducats that the archbishop owed the emperor, López del Campo advised the 
monarch to impose his right and thus recover the loan from Silíceo, charging it in kind. 
 
383 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 238. 
384 Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 217’, Letter, (13 May 1557) the 
money transfers of Silíceo trying to send to Paul IV the previous year, already noted, highlights the long-
term resistance of this cleric to the royal policies. 
385 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 218’, Letter, (13 May 1557). 
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Although Silíceo was finally able to keep this right in the hands of the next archbishop, 
the pro-active strategies of the factor general and Gómez de Silva to collect funds from 
any source were being employed at the local level.386 
Their intentions, nonetheless, went beyond gaining control of a small property 
and its income in exchange for some ducats. They sought the agency of Archbishop 
Silíceo to convince reluctant clergymen to send the remaining sum of the ecclesiastical 
subsidy (cuarta) to the king, something that the Primate of Castile eventually 
supported.387 The condition sine qua non that the high clergy imposed in exchange for 
their collaboration was to use the money in military campaigns against Algiers and Bugia, 
Hispanic objectives in the north of Africa. With the collection of this extraordinary 
contribution, López del Campo and Gómez de Silva sought to obtain liquidity and 
reinforce the reputation of the monarch by depicting him as a respectable Catholic 
sovereign. 
The synergies of the two royal servants yielded good results as their visit to 
Toledo was a complete success. The two medium-ranking officials had managed to 
negotiate the final instalments of the ecclesiastical contribution analysed in the first 
section of this chapter. In this sense, they succeeded where the regency government of 
Joanna and her officials, especially Suárez de Carvajal, had failed since 1555. Apart from 
this well-known achievement, which relegated the regency to a secondary role in terms 
of its ability to exercise royal authority, López del Campo and Gómez de Silva also closed 
a deal to rent the income from the maestrazgos -territories of the military Orders of 
Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara- for 400,000 ducats.388 Most of the money was to be 
 
386 Ángel Santos Vaquero, ‘La Vida En El Colegio de Doncellas Nobles de Toledo’, Hispania Sacra 69, no. 
139 (31 July 2017): 153. 
387 The historiography about this second phase in the relations with the Castilian Church is reduced to few 
lines, leaving the field wide open for further investigation. See Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El 
Reinado de Felipe II, 605; Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 230; about the support of 
Silíceo see Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 217’; Fernán López del 
Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 218’, 218. 
388 Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 217’, 217; the letter does not 
provide the names of the lease holders. However, Ulloa briefly pointed to this operation in his classic 
work, from which it seems that two well-known financiers from Burgos (Juan Curiel de la Torre and Juan 
Béjar de Lerma) took the rent until 1st January 1559. See Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado 
de Felipe II, 557–58. 
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provided through bills of exchange and silver, which reinforced the royal solvency thanks 
to the agency of these two medium-ranking officials. 
Their success was complete when they received letters from Philip II approving 
the plan to consolidate his floating debts. Once the situation seemed to favour López 
del Campo, the factor general hastened to explain to his patron Francisco de Eraso that 
the major accountant, Francisco de Almaguer, was preparing the total amount of debt 
owed to the royal financiers.389 Nevertheless, the factor general also suggested that 
Almaguer could have profited from managing the royal finances during his commission, 
thus making a direct accusation of fraud in order to discredit him. 
This was not the first time that Ebolist members had tried to discredit Almaguer. 
In 1556, the royal counsellor Doctor Velasco conducted an investigation against 
Almaguer.390 Obviously, there was a long-term plan by the Ebolist faction to take full 
control over the Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda, which managed all the information 
regarding financial issues and authorised payments and collections. Indeed, the final 
assault on the Castilian higher financial institutions was the petition of the contadores 
mayores Gómez de Silva and Gutierrez de Padilla, also president of the Council of 
Finances, for the appointment of López del Campo as member of the Council of 
Finances. However, López del Campo never achieved this position.391 
When López del Campo returned to Valladolid from Toledo, he tried to enforce 
the plan for consolidation that the king had approved in April. His efforts were fruitless 
until 10th June 1557, when Philip II imposed his decision to consolidate the floating debts 
despite the resistance and delay of the regency in Castile.392 The first shock among the 
financiers there was to be expected. The businessmen dispatched letters to Lyon, 
Germany, and Genoa to report the royal decision and receive new instructions as to how 
they should proceed. López del Campo warned Philip II that delegations of these 
financiers, especially from Genoa, would soon arrive at his court in the Habsburg Low 
 
389 Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 217’. 
390 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 236. 
391 Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602, 80–83. 




Countries.393 Many Genoese high financiers could become bankrupt at the following 
fairs if the monarch did not reverse his decision or reach individual agreements. 
One month after Philip II enforced his decision, López del Campo realised that 
there was no money to send to Italy. The royal officials there needed 800,000 ducats, 
but the suspension of payments hindered any chance of meeting that goal. However, 
the factor general again displayed his bargaining skills and agreed an asiento with Daniel 
Spinola for 530,000 golden escudos to Genoa in exchange for 170,000 ducats of old 
debts plus the principal and an interest rate at 9%. His bargaining strategies were 
surprising. In addition, he mortgaged his patrimony and a juro worth 4,500 ducats and 
asked his friends for money to provide 55,000 ducats in Florence. Once the currency 
exchange was calculated, López del Campo was able to send over 600,000 ducats to 
Italy, quite an achievement given the scepticism of the lending community.394 In sum, 
after proposing and successfully employing a coercive measure such as the 
consolidation of the royal debt, López del Campo was in a better position to negotiate 
with the lending houses. 
Yet, in just one month, López del Campo failed to fulfil three basic points of his 
initial instructions. First, he took an asiento without royal permission. Second, he 
undermined the plan to reschedule the royal debt that he had himself proposed to save 
the monarchy by promising the repayment of old debts. Third, he was not allowed to do 
business involving his own and the royal patrimony. Nonetheless, these decisions 
culminated in his progressive independence by adapting to the circumstances of Castile 
and the needs of Philip II. Notwithstanding these points, the services of the factor 
general were critical for the first phase of the financial and administrative reform, which 
Francisco de Eraso reminded the monarch of when he requested a mercy for López del 
Campo.395 Thus, the cycle of factional and financial struggles ended and the team was 
ready for the second stage of the great reform of the Hispanic Monarchy, which is 
analysed in the second part of this thesis. 
 
393 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’, Letter, (18 July 1557). 
394 [For Italy Your Majesty ordered to provide 800,000 ducats, and at the moment there was no money on 
hand for this. With this declaration executed on the merchants -the suspension of payments-, all thought 
that it could not be possible to find any remedy through money exchanges...], see Fernán López del Campo 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 209’, 7 May 1557. 




Many elements converged between 1556 and 1557 to trigger the second phase 
of the financial reform during the ongoing war, especially regarding the role of medium-
ranking officials in the royal administration. First, the political inability and reluctance of 
the regency to meet the expectations of the monarch forced the latter to create the 
Factoría General. This gave prominence to the Ebolist courtly party headed by Gómez 
de Silva and Francisco de Eraso, who deployed their protégés in the royal high councils 
and accounting institutions to gain control of the royal finances. The resulting dispute 
between the factor general and the regency illustrates the shift from the traditional to 
the new system of financing, a change that was marked by the private agendas of its 
protagonists. The regency tried to keep the social order in Castile by not interfering in 
the interests of its subjects and royal financiers, while López del Campo sought his own 
promotion by proposing a master plan for the king’s war. 
Second, the demands for money that Philip II sent to the regency and his factor 
general in January 1557 were simply overwhelming. The economic policy of royal edicts 
undertaken since the early 1550s resulted in a critical fiscal and, therefore, financial 
situation in Castile. The liquidity needed for asientos also worked for minor merchants. 
The pyramidal scheme of credit analysed in the first chapter of this thesis explains the 
problem. If local investors who used the services of Genoese brokers had no money, 
neither could the king have it. The Italian intermediaries would be unable to find savings 
to channel towards the royal needs, which froze the credit market. This system blurred 
the frontier between what could be called private and what public finances.396 
Third, the importance of conflict, both domestic and external, was an undeniable 
triggering element of the first phase of financial transformation. The increase in armed 
conflicts during this period stressed the importance of the space where these 
encounters took place because resources had to be mobilised accordingly. The political 
dispersal of the Hispanic Monarchy obliged a division between forces and funds. The 
Factoría General, a formal institution based on the instructions given to its members, 
became the inevitable solution to an ineffective response system that had been in use 
for half a century. As regards domestic security, the war with the Papal States meant the 
 
396  Alonso García, ‘Ducados Entre Dos Dinastias. La Circulacion de Capital Entre Castilla y Flandes a 
Comienzos Del Siglo XVI’, 99. 
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Castilian Church posed a serious threat to the king’s funding in 1556 and 1557, which 
was only resolved after lengthy and individual negotiations with the heads of the higher 
clergy. 
Fourth, Suárez de Carvajal and López del Campo embodied what serving the king 
meant. Their willingness to fulfil their duties embraced a sentiment of obligation 
towards the sovereign and responsibility towards the monarchy. However, it was their 
private agendas what encouraged the two medium-ranking officials to develop their 
careers alongside the monarch. The constant reminders of their great efforts, such as 
the help of family and friends, to serve the monarch were a symbol of commitment. In 
addition, their individual interests were not exempt from converging or coming into 
conflict with other agendas. Whereas Suárez de Carvajal found his foe in the secretary 
Vázquez de Molina, López del Campo had his own among the officials serving the 
regency.397 In this sense, conflict and collaboration among royal officials were constant 
patterns in their administrative relationship. In other words, medium-ranking officials 
played an important role in the consolidation of the early modern state by channelling 
their personal agendas through the royal authority, as framed in a context of 
institutional, political, and economic conflict. 
Finally, this thesis provides a new way of analysing the suspension of payments 
in April-June 1557. Instead of looking at the role of high institutions such as the regency 
and the Council of Finances, this chapter focuses on medium-ranking royal officials 
immersed in the factional conflict of an international court. The analysis of the case 
studies of Suárez de Carvajal and López del Campo shows a new perspective from which 
obedience to the highest authority left room for manoeuvre to take independent and 
informal decisions. This behavioural perspective on the members of formal institutions 
also refreshes the traditional literature referred to in this chapter, which looks at this 
financial and political episode through long-term narratives and which has broader goals 
that do not take account of details. In sum, this doctoral thesis aims to complement, and 
sometimes contest, the existing literature on state construction by investigating the 
people who were usually behind the first heads of the administration. 
 
397 The factor general also was in constant conflict with the other factores in the institution. The analysis 
of this competition for the primacy in the Factoría General and the role of that clash in the process of 
state-building has intentionally been left aside for a future journal article. 
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Chapter 3. Fiscal solutions to financial problems: a common 
strategy in the private agendas of high-ranking state-builders 
Introduction: 
The studies on the financial crises of the Hispanic Monarchy have often focused 
on either the relationship between financiers and the royal administration, or the 
bargaining process between the monarch and regional elites to increase the income 
ceiling of the sovereign.398 These two perspectives, therefore, tend to frame relations 
through the interest of the monarch. However, royal servants had a personal concern in 
the success of those operations too. These officers channelled their private agendas 
through the authority of higher authorities, namely their sovereigns. This chapter 
analyses the strategies of high-ranking state-builders through three case studies to 
demonstrate that the role of Genoese relational capital in the state-building process, 
the core subject of this dissertation, was complementary. 
The first section examines the interests of Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, 
when he was in the service of Philip II in 1556. More specifically, the study of this 
nobleman focuses on his actions to provide the Hispanic sovereign with funds during the 
war with France. The second part of this chapter examines the case of Cardinal Carlo 
Carafa and his strategies to finance the war of Pope Paul IV against the Hispanic 
Monarchy between 1555 and 1557. The third section, finally, examines the agency and 
agenda of another clergyman, the cardinal of Lorraine, also from the perspective of how 
the war against the Hispanic Monarchy between 1556 and 1559 was financed. 
The comparative analysis of these three case studies together reveals the 
common strategies they used to accomplish their personal goals. Each subject followed 
a systematic process of initial negotiation with regional and local elites to then follow 
this up with soft and hard coercion if necessary. The multiple levels of coercion illustrate 
how useful this strategy was for high-ranking state-builders and their patrons. 
Notwithstanding the logical differences between these three case studies, due to their 
individual social environments, it is possible to detect a common need for international 
warfare to pursue their personal goals. Therefore, this chapter argues that high-ranking 
 
398 Some recent examples in Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro, chap. IV and p. 108; Drelichman 
and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 78. 
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officers inside central administrations participated in the state-building process by using 
conflict as an excuse to accomplish their own agendas. 
3.1. The duke of Savoy and the States-General of 1556 in the Habsburg Low 
Countries: 
The duke of Savoy and his agenda: 
Few men exemplify better what a high-ranking state builder was in the early 
modern period than Emmanuel Philibert. His education was not originally intended to 
lead to a political career, but to supporting the family agenda from positions within the 
clergy.399 The death of his older brother Luigi in 1536, however, made Philibert the heir 
of the duchy of Savoy, which had been incorporated into the French monarchy that year. 
Philibert, exiled with his family from their patrimony, joined the service of Charles V in 
1545, when he was only seventeen, to assist the emperor in his campaign against the 
Schmalkaldic League (1546-1547). Philibert proved to be a capable military man and a 
cunning courtier. His services were rewarded with membership of the Order of the 
Golden Fleece in 1546. During his stay at the imperial court, Philibert managed to 
establish a durable friendship with the influential Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, whose 
role at the court increased with the retirement of his father in 1547.400 Two years later, 
Philibert met his cousin Prince Philip in Brussels, who was just a year younger than him. 
From that moment, Philibert and Philip strengthened their relationship through actions 
such as Philibert escorting the prince back to Castile in 1551 before joining the emperor 
for the siege of Metz in 1552. 
His father Charles died in August 1553, making Philibert the duke of Savoy the 
following year.401 Although the new duke had no patrimony, he was set on recovering it. 
Barely three weeks after Philibert became duke of Savoy, he wrote his last will. The duke 
named his cousin Giacomo as universal heir of all his domains if he defected from the 
 
399 The following details about the life of Emmanuel Philibert have been extracted from two biographies. 
See Miguel Ángel Echevarría Bacigalupe, ‘Saboya, Manuel Filiberto De’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español 
(Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/13388/manuel-filiberto; Enrico 
Stumpo, ‘Filiberto, Emanuele (Duca Di Savoia)’, in Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 1993, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/emanuele-filiberto-duca-di-savoia_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/. 
400  Ricardo Gómez River, ‘Perrenot de Granvela, Antonio’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real 
Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/11263/antonio-perrenot-de-granvela. 




service to the French monarch. If Giacomo refused or died without heirs, his other 
cousin Philip could inherit the duchy. In effect, the new duke of Savoy swore loyalty to 
the Habsburg cause against the monarchy of France in this document.402 The subsequent 
reward for the duke was King Philip’s promise to appoint him lieutenant and captain-
general of the imperial army when Charles V departed for Castile.403 
Nevertheless, an additional title was promised to the duke. King Philip also 
wanted the duke of Savoy to govern the provinces using the title of regent, which Queen 
Mary of Hungary had employed since 1531. 404  However, Mary kept control of the 
government longer than initially expected. 405  In mid-December, for example, the 
Venetian ambassador Badoer reported on the meetings of the State Council. Besides 
presiding over the chamber, Mary of Hungary always entered the room first and often 
had to call for the duke of Savoy as for any other councillor.406 Mary of Hungary was not 
happy with the duke as governor-general of the provinces, making it clear that she 
preferred him to be sent to govern Milan and marry the duchess of Lorraine. Details of 
this resistance to the duke in the highest institutions are common in the correspondence 
of the Venetian ambassador Federico Badoer.407 The general distrust of Mary and the 
resistance of the provinces against the title of regent for the duke, resulted in his 
appointment as governor-general instead with the abdication of Charles V on 25th 
October 1555.408 
His appointment as governor-general was ratified by all the provinces except 
Brabant, which firmly resisted recognising him as governor. Brabant preferred the duke 
to be just a representative of the monarch, rather than someone with institutionalised 
powers. This argument was not, of course, the only complaint. The duke was a foreigner 
in the highest position of the royal administration, just below the new sovereign. This 
 
402 Surprisingly, the executioners of this will were Queen Mary of Hungary, Granvelle, and Ruy Gómez de 
Silva. See ibid. 
403 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 243’, Letter, (10 October 1555). 
404 Ibid. 
405 The manifest resistance of the provinces to recognising the duke as governor hampered his career in 
the royal administration. Although the duke oversaw many issues in the provinces, including their military 
defence, it seems King Philip chose to not grant full powers to Savoy yet. See Federico Badoer to Doge 
and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 262’, Letter, (31 October 1555). 
406 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 318’, Letter, (18 December 1555). 
407 Ibid. 




privilege bothered the provincial elites, who were left out from key spaces of power and 
lost influence in the decision-making processes. 409 The counts of Lalaing, Egmont and 
Hoorn, although important native supporters of the royal government, supposedly 
followed the orders of the duke and not the other way around. 
From his new privileged position, the duke followed the policy of continuing the 
war at any cost, which worried the provincial elites. The duke of Savoy did not want to 
lose the war against France because it could mean the loss of his occupied duchy in 
northwest Italy. Therefore, it was in the duke’s personal interest to provide new sources 
to fund the ongoing conflict, which meant the impoverishment of the Habsburg Low 
Countries. Once again, as is underscored in every chapter of this dissertation, the service 
to the monarch was a reciprocal relationship based on mutual obligations.410 Whereas 
Savoy helped Philip II to defend his states, the king was expected to help the duke 
recover his duchy. This mutually self-enforcing relationship was a tacit recognition of 
bilateral rights, a sort of syndicated lending because none of the sovereigns could satisfy 
their needs on their own and hence created a military business in which both partners 
had liabilities.411 In this sense, private initiatives and public policies intermingled through 
individual state builders that were present at every level of the monarchy. The following 
chapters stress this point and offer a comparison between high statesmen and 
independent entrepreneurs who, participated in the state construction from different 
areas but with similar strategies and goals. 
When peace is a threat: the duke’s personal agenda at risk 
Since continuing the war was the duke of Savoy’s only option to accomplish his 
personal goals, the treaty of peace that Pope Paul IV was promoting between the 
Hispanic Monarchy and France posed a great threat to his plans. Paul IV had instructed 
Reginald Pole, cardinal of England, to negotiate a text that satisfied both monarchs by 
the end of 1555. Pole’s mission, nonetheless, was a deceit because Henry II and Paul IV 
 
409 The appointment of someone other than the emperor or the king to govern, especially if that person 
was a foreigner, was a main complaint of the provinces even before Charles V abdicated and 
notwithstanding their oath of loyalty. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 
Vol. 6, 252’, Letter, (23 October 1555). 
410 Esteban Estríngana, Servir al rey en la Monarquía de los Austrias, 11. 
411 The concept of syndicated lending is generally used in Economics, but it is also applicable to this case. 
See its definition in Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 142. 
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had already signed a military alliance on 13th October 1555 to expel the Hispanic 
Monarchy from Naples, Sicily and Milan. 412  Pole, unaware of the Franco-Papal 
intentions, sent his secretary Vincenzo Parpaglia, abbot of Saint Salutto, to the Hispanic 
and French courts. Parpaglia arrived in Brussels in late December, where he met with 
king Philip and Perrenot de Granvelle. The correspondence of the Venetian ambassador 
Federico Badoer in Brussels illustrates some details of the negotiation and the 
consequences it had for the duke of Savoy. 
Throughout the month of January 1556, king Philip and Charles V negotiated on 
behalf of the duke regarding his states in northwest Italy. A preliminary deal arranged 
for the restoriation of the duke of Savoy to his duchy while Henry II’s second surviving 
son, the duke of Orléans, governed Milan as governor until his first son was appointed 
duke. 413 However, the treaty also stipulated that the duke of Savoy could not hold the 
fortresses in his territory, which were left in French hands until the new duke of Milan 
was designated. The text was, therefore, unfavourable to the duke of Savoy, who would 
become just a powerless puppet rather than the ruler of his patrimony. The duke then 
requested from King Philip and Charles V the duchy of Milan and a marriage suitable to 
his status that would let him preserve his dignity. If the sovereigns were to reject his 
proposal, then the duke requested permission to negotiate on his own.414 When king 
Philip discussed this issue with the duke of Savoy again, the nobleman openly 
complained about the resulting situation for him and his states. 415 
Instead of a peace treaty, a truce with France was finally agreed in Vaucelles on 
3rd February. 416  No territorial restoration was agreed, which left the duke of Savoy 
without any compensation but with an annual pension of 25,000 francs from the French 
monarch until the end of the truce. The duke refused this annuity because he considered 
 
412 Kenneth Meyer Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571 (American Philosophical Society, 1984), 
640. 
413 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 335’, Letter, (1 January 1556); 
Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 346’, Letter, (1 October 1556). 
414 In cypher. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 346’. 
415 This part of the letter was in cypher, thus preventing anyone from discovering the disagreements 
between king Philip and the duke of Savoy. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, 
Venice, Vol. 6, 352’, Letter, (15 January 1556). 
416 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 379’, Letter, (2 June 1556); Giacomo 
Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 380’, Letter, (2 July 1556). 
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it an offense to his cause. 417 The nobleman had lost his state and the possibility of 
receiving another in exchange. Notwithstanding his public rage against the Hispanic 
sovereigns, who did not relieve him from defending their states, the duke did not 
consider renouncing their service because this could mean the end of his claim to the 
duchy of Savoy. 
As a result of this conflict, the duke of Savoy had to sharpen his cunning skills to 
accomplish his personal goals, which required a peace treaty with France that could be 
beneficial for the duke and King Philip. In this sense, the duke had to resume the war 
and achieve a decisive military victory. The means to fuel his warmongering strategy was 
the money he intended to provide Philip II through an agreement with the provincial 
representatives of the Habsburg Low Countries, which had initially been summoned to 
meet in Brussels on 1st March.418 However, the meeting did not start until 12th March.419 
The duke’s fiscal strategy in the States-General of 1556: 
Although the truce with Henry II had been signed, it may not have lasted long 
and the Papal remonstrances in Italy against the truce were a forewarning of the need 
to reorganise the military forces and obtain new sources of funding to keep borrowing 
if this proved necessary.420 It was general knowledge that Philip II expected a generous 
contribution from the provincial delegates to pay the courtiers as well as the Hispanic 
armies and German mercenaries on the borders with France. 421 As usual, the session 
opened with the monarch asking for subsidies (aides), which the provinces conceded 
graciously so as to demonstrate their loyalty.422 Philip II argued that he had incurred 
 
417 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 382’, Letter, (2 August 1556). 
418 Philip II had already dispatched the grand bailli of Hainaut, the count of Lalaing, on 8th February to 
summon the provincial deputies by the 1st March in Brussels. See Louis Prosper Gachard, Lettre à MM. 
les questeurs de la Chambre des représentants: sur le projet d’une collection de documents concernant les 
anciennes assemblées nationales de la Belgique (Société typographique belge, A. Whalen et Cie, 1841), 
87; therefore, the news reported by the Venetian ambassador suggesting that the monarch could require 
the presence of the provincial deputies in Antwerp at the end of February was out of date. See Federico 
Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 410’, Letter, (24 February 1556). 
419 Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments, 180; Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing 
Face of Empire, 189. 
420 The Venetian ambassador in Rome reported the Pope’s complaints and fears over the danger to the 
Papal territories. See Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 419’, Letter, (3 July 
1556). 
421 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 418’, Letter, (3 May 1556); Federico 
Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 421’, Letter, (3 September 1556). 
422 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 426’, Letter, (14 March 1556). 
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large debts to protect those provinces with his armies. He estimated his expenses were 
worth 1.5 million crowns, though additional charges had been made to cover 
extraordinary issues. 
Seeking a long-term solution to his financial problems, which mostly prevented 
the monarch from arranging new money exchanges at acceptable interest rates, the 
duke of Savoy suggested a new fiscal policy that Philip II proposed to the States-General 
on 12th March.423 The proposal consisted of the enactment of two new duties of 1% and 
2% on the value of real estate and moveable goods respectively.424 Notwithstanding this 
exceptional demand, the monarch promised to abolish those taxes after two years. Just 
a year later, Philip II promised a similar condition to the cities of Castile when he imposed 
a temporary new tax on wool exports – to be analysed in the last chapter of this 
dissertation – with a similar result. Therefore, the monarch gave his new fiscal policies 
a touch of temporality to facilitate their implementation before the representative 
institutions. However, the taxes not only remained, but they also increased in value 
progressively. 
Apart from the expected duration of the two new taxes, the conditions of their 
payment make clear the reasons for the subsequent resistance to them.425 The tax of 2% 
on moveable goods worried the provincial elites because it could reveal the wealth of 
individuals. The duty was based on a previous proposal made in 1543, though its 
collection mechanism was more sophisticated this time. Collectors should use local 
records to find commercial operations, although private properties (e.g. jewellery, 
clothing, furniture, etc.) remained unknown unless they were traded. The payment of 
the tax to the royal administration would take place in three instalments: Saint John’s 
Day (24 June 1556), Christmas 1556, and Saint John’s Day (24 June 1557). 
The 1% tax on real property, on the other hand, was calculated on the duty using 
the data from the previous six years in the regional records. In other words, the monarch 
intended to charge this duty by using the administrative tools already present in the 
provinces. Whoever had a mortgage for houses and industrial properties had to pay the 
 
423 Gachard, Lettre à MM. les questeurs de la Chambre des représentants, 87. 
424 Ibid. 
425 A detailed account of these conditions in Dutch can be found in K. Verhofstad S.J., ‘De Regering Der 
Nederlanden in de Jaren 1555-1559’ (Nijmegen: Berkhout, 1937), 84–86. 
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tax. If there was a leasing contract, the leaseholders were exempted from paying, thus 
charging the duty to the owner of the property. Sacred properties were also exempt, 
such as churches, graveyards, or chapels. The territories devastated by the war with 
France were to be specially considered but were not exempt from the beginning. Apart 
from real estate, this tax was also charged on financial investments. For example, 
whoever had a letter of debt from public bodies (e.g. local renten) had to pay the 1% 
tax. The mechanism to speed up its collection was based on the collaboration of debt 
issuers, who advanced payment of the tax to the monarch and then paid less interest to 
bondholders when the bond matured. In other words, debtholders had no choice 
whether to contribute or not, since public bodies like cities already enforced their 
collaboration. 
The characteristics of this new fiscal proposal made the duke of Savoy the target 
of criticism from deputies and native powerholders alike. This was not surprising since 
the proposal attacked the interests of landowners and merchants at local level, and 
provinces at regional scale.426 Apart from charging properties and transactions, as Tracy 
has already stated for the case of Holland, a higher royal taxation might endanger the 
chances of the provinces from obtaining credit due to the already constrained fiscal 
burden.427 In other words, the royal overtaxing of the provinces to obtain more funds 
and access to credit seriously reduced the provinces’ ability to also finance themselves. 
Apart from the pecuniary aspect of the ducal strategy, the duke also threatened 
the traditional privileges and exemptions of the local ruling elites. The provincial 
delegates had the customary month to consult with their home provinces to receive an 
answer regarding the royal petition. Whereas some representatives left for their 
provincial parliaments, others remained in Brussels to propose an alternative solution 
rather than accepting the abovementioned taxes. This bargaining process reveals the 
 
426 María José Rodríguez-Salgado, ‘Amor, menosprecio y motines: Felipe II y las ciudades de los Países 
Bajos antes de la revolución’, in Ciudades en conflicto: (siglos XVI-XVIII) (Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 
2008), 190. 
427 See, for example, when he referred to the unexpected results of a new fiscal policy in the provinces 
called ‘novel expedients’ of 1542-1544, in James D Tracy, A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg 
Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515-1565 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), 90. 
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lack of unity among the provinces to organise themselves as a single voice and how high-
ranking state-builders used this heterogeneity to their benefit. 
The bargaining process and its difficulties: 
The deputies who remained in Brussels offered one million livres to the monarch 
if he withdrew his new fiscal policy.428 Philip II’s response to the deputies was a cunning 
one, though quite disadvantageous for those absent from the chamber: the lowest 
social strata. According to the Venetian ambassador, the king’s answer was that he did 
not intend to abandon his petition. Instead, he reminded the representatives that those 
taxes would not be raised from the wealthiest patricians and lords of the provinces but 
from the poor.429 The good words expressed by Charles V during his abdication about 
the care he had shown for his subjects disintegrated in the real-world actions of his son. 
At this early stage of his reign, Philip II became king of his people, though ‘people’ was a 
word with many nuances.  
The negative royal response to the withdrawal of the taxes triggered new 
strategies among the provinces and their cities. For example, the four members from 
Flanders (Ghent, Ypres, Bruges and Franc of Bruges) wrote a letter to the sovereign on 
31st March in which they asked Philip II to demand a sum of money instead of 
implementing the taxes.430  It was not until 25th April, when the provincial deputies 
returned to Brussels with permission to promise a contribution of 1.5 million livres if the 
taxes were not imposed, that Philip II responded to the petition of the most 
representative Flemish cities. 431 The monarch wrote to the four members of Flanders 
that if their representatives could not convince the remaining elites of Flanders to accept 
the two taxes, they ought to offer a sum of money instead.432 
 
428 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 433’, Letter, (22 March 1556). 
429 ‘[...] and his Majesty has said that he does not purpose altering his proposal, as he knows that this sum 
of money would be taken from the poor, and that the rich would not pay in proportion to their wealth’. 
See ibid. 
430 Gachard, Lettre à MM. les questeurs de la Chambre des représentants, 88; on the importance of the 
four members of Flanders for the province and the central governments see Wim Blockmans and Walter 
Prevenier, The Promised Lands: the Low Countries Under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530, trans. Lizabeth 
Fackelmans and Edward Peters, 1999, 46. 
431 On the provincial counteroffer, see Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 464’, 
Letter, (26 April 1556). 
432 Gachard, Lettre à MM. les questeurs de la Chambre des représentants, 88. 
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This royal counteroffer initiated a process of bargaining with the provinces 
intended to extract from them an extraordinary contribution instead of enacting the 
unpopular new taxes. The duke of Savoy oversaw the negotiations with the provincial 
deputies, which continued without any progress during the first weeks of May. The duke 
and the bishop of Arras, with whom he had enjoyed a fruitful friendship since the 1540s, 
and the State Council departed for Tournai on 9th May to ask for advice regarding the 
royal pecuniary demand to queen Mary of Hungary.433 The advocate of the fiscal strategy 
needed additional guidance to accomplish his goals from the woman who had preceded 
him in the government of the provinces. However, the queen rejected an offer of help 
from the duke of Savoy and his companions, which obliged them to return to Brussels 
empty-handed by 17th May.434 
While the duke and his allies were pleading for Mary’s help, the provincial 
deputies stated upon their return that they were not permitted to approve the new 
taxes that the monarch proposed. Nonetheless, they confirmed the offer of raising a 
million crowns by other means, as had been suggested weeks before.435 It was clear that 
the provincial and local elites of the Habsburg Low Countries preferred to make an 
extraordinary contribution rather than pass new permanent duties. This pattern was 
also found, as is detailed in the following sections, in the Papal States and France. It was 
not, therefore, a unique behaviour but a general strategy of negotiation with central 
administrations. 
Savoy’s problem was that the States General of 1556 was his first important 
negotiation after being appointed governor-general of the Habsburg Low Countries. His 
failure obliged Philip II to insist on the necessary collaboration with Mary. The monarch 
then sent the marquis of Berghes, Jean de Glymes, to secure her help again on 19th 
May.436 Mary refused to assist her nephew once more. Her reasons not to collaborate 
were more public this time. Apart from being forced to travel to Castile, Mary 
complained that she had not been granted the lordship of the city of Mechelen. Mary’s 
 
433 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 479’, Letter, (5 October 1556). 
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436 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 490’, Letter, (21 May 1556). 
133 
 
reluctance, however, can also be due to her having been replaced as governess of the 
provinces. The fact that her replacement requested her help indicates how desperate 
the duke of Savoy was. Mary could not avoid embarrassing Philip II and Charles V with 
the first failure of their new appointee.437 The scandal reached such a point that even 
the Venetian ambassador Badoer realised that some royal ministers had advised Philip 
II not to withdraw the taxes, whereas it was evident that only Mary could make a deal 
with the provinces.438  
The situation for the duke of Savoy was desperate. The insurgent provincial elites 
and their deputies found an impressive ally in their previous governess. In short, the old 
system was rebelling against the new one. Nevertheless, the assistance of Mary of 
Hungary was not the only strategy the duke of Savoy employed to subdue the provincial 
elites. As stressed in the sections on the Papal States and France in this chapter, high-
ranking state-builders would follow certain steps to pursue their personal goals. When 
initial negotiations failed and there was resistance from local and regional elites to 
comply with the state-builder, coercion was imposed. However, it is possible to detect 
two levels of coercion in the case studies in this chapter: soft and hard coercion. The 
first usually implied individual negotiation with the members of the regional and local 
elites, whereas the second involved the use of violence to accomplish the goals of the 
state-builder. 
Soft coercion at regional and local level: 
Since the provincial representatives officially rejected the new fiscal policy when 
they returned to Brussels in late April, Philip II decided to change the terms of some of 
his demands. His reaction was an intrinsic part of the bargaining process included in a 
strategy of soft coercion at regional level. The duke of Savoy, author of the initial royal 
proposal, described the novelties in detail to the Venetian ambassador, Badoer.439 The 
sovereign, instead of insisting on enacting both taxes, restricted his demand to the 
approval of the 1% duty on real property only. This change was a cunning strategy 
because rather than an indirect tax of 2% on commercial and industrial goods, Philip II 
 
437 Philip II sent for her a third time without any results, which indicates the strenght of her resistance. 
See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 491’, Letter, (23 May 1556). 
438 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 486’. 
439 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 480’. 
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opted for a direct duty. Since the Habsburg Low Countries were a highly industrialised 
and urbanised area of western Europe, it was more logical to charge commercial 
transactions than ones on real estate since the former could generate a larger yield. In 
Castile, for example, Philip II gained more resources from indirect taxes, such as the 
excise duty called alcabala, than from a direct imposition.440 
The difference between the two different fiscal policies lay in the fact that Philip 
II did not need a new long-term income. The new royal proposal and similar strategies 
in the Papal States and France suggest that the Hispanic sovereign, or the duke of Savoy 
more specifically, chased a generous and pre-arranged contribution from the subjects. 
The choice of a direct tax was, therefore, a means to obtain a generous subsidy because 
the provincial elites would never accept a system of direct taxation that attacked their 
traditional privileges and exemptions. Besides dropping one of the two taxes, the royal 
counteroffer to the contribution of a million crowns also included a clause by which local 
priests and magistrates, but not royal officers, would inspect and evaluate the real 
property. This freedom to choose who would register properties was a generous 
concession because local elites could control these officers much better. In this sense, 
the direct tax was a double-edged sword for provincial elites. Whereas the duty attacked 
their privileges, their control of the registration process was tempting. 
Apart from the concession of control of the inspection and evaluation of real 
property, the royal counteroffer also included some important points regarding the use 
of these funds. First, the money raised through the new fiscal policy would remain in the 
provinces to pay the royal debts that cities like Antwerp incurred to serve the emperor 
and now the king. Second, these funds would also pay those lords who lacked a salary 
during the war and had to mortgage their properties to finance their service to the 
monarch. Finally, the remaining money would be used to construct new fortresses and 
repair the existing ones. These three points plus control of the registration process 
implied that the provincial elites obtained guarantees regarding the management of the 
tax and the expenditure of its yields. In exchange for his good will, Philip II received a 
 
440 A general overview of the ordinary and extraordinary incomes of Philip II during his reign in Ulloa, La 
Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II. 
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proportional daily payment up to the sum of 200,000 crowns, which was considered part 
of the ordinary service for the royal house and court. 
In short, the royal counteroffer seemed reasonable, although two points were 
questionable. The first problem was that the duty consisted of a direct tax that attacked 
the traditional exemptions of local and regional elites. The second issue refers to the use 
of the money collected to pay the urban debt. The debt for service was originally issued 
to pay for the military expenses of the endless Habsburg-Valois conflict, which had 
caused intermittent wars since the last decade of the fifteenth century. Bearing in mind 
this historical context and the high levels of municipal debt in the Habsburg Low 
Countries by the late 1550s, the resistance of the provincial elites is understandable. The 
approval of the tax meant that those elites agreed to contribute to the reimbursement 
of a debt that ultimately belonged to the monarch. In other words, elites would pay 
twice for a service they made to their sovereigns. However, the worst part lay just 
behind that double contribution. The tax was to be perpetual, which meant that the 
contribution of the privileged social strata would be permanent. 
These problems could make the provincial elites even more subject to the 
sovereign, which explains why they demanded something equally valuable: the 
withdrawal of imperial troops and their replacement with native soldiers. The presence 
of foreign troops was devastating for some regions, especially when they were not paid 
on time. Many arrears sparked mutinies and soldiers lived on the province. Besides the 
effects of public disorder, these troops were also a reminder of who wielded the real 
coercive power: the duke of Savoy. In effect, the royal advisor who proposed the initial 
royal demand of two taxes was also in control of the troops safeguarding the provinces. 
The problem was not that Savoy could withdraw some forces and let the French sack 
some lands, but the possibility of employing these forces against the provinces, as 
happened during the rebellion of Ghent in 1539-1540.441 
The deputies claimed that the Flemish garrisons could reduce military expenses 
and be as equally effective as a watching force during the truce. Although their 
 
441 After the rebellion failed, Charles V imposed an overwhelming fine on the city to fund the construction 
of a citadel intended to remind the city the perils of rebelling. See Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and 




reasoning was logical and initially acceptable, the duke of Savoy was opposed. According 
to what Savoy told the ambassador Badoer, the duke recommended that the monarch 
not accept this demand but instead force the provinces to regularly finance the presence 
of nearly 6500 Hispanic and German soldiers in case the truce was broken. The duke’s 
argument was not the only one based on the fear of the resumption of war. Another 
high-ranking royal advisor, the count of Lalaing, returned from the French court 
convinced that the truce would soon be terminated.442 
Nonetheless, it was also evident that the duke of Savoy did not want to lose his 
coercive tool against the provinces. In effect, the soldiers on the border were an 
additional bargaining tool during the negotiation with the provincial deputies. The 
distrust of the provinces was not unfounded, if we consider the negotiations for another 
subsidy once the war with France was over three years later. On that occasion, the 
deputies demanded the withdrawal of Hispanic troops in return for paying a subsidy to 
the monarch. After tough negotiations of two years, Philip II accepted the provincial 
demand.443 
While the duke of Savoy negotiated at a regional level with the provincial 
deputies, the count of Lalaing had been sent to the provinces with the mission of 
inspecting the territory and negotiating with the members of the provincial elites 
individually. His manoeuvre exemplifies the mixture of soft coercion and individual 
negotiations at provincial and local level, a very common practice in the Papal States, as 
analysed in the following section. On 20th May 1556, Lalaing reported to the duke of 
Savoy on the alarming conditions in the Habsburg Low Countries, while pointing to some 
of the main grievances.444 
Excessive debts in the provinces, the scarcity of available incomes to back new 
money loans, and high taxation were among the main complaints that Lalaing reported 
 
442 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 480’. 
443 Rodríguez-Salgado, ‘Amor, menosprecio y motines’, 195. 
444 [... quel estat les pays de pardecha se trouvent pour le présent, et non seulement par les grandes debts, 
selon l’estat quie avant hier fust lut, mais aussi pour les excessives et insuportables cerges en quoy lesdits 
pays sont de rentes vendues comme de maltostes imposts et samblables choes...], extracted from Armand 
Louant, ‘Charles de Lalaing et les remontrances d’Emmanuel-Philibert de Savoie (juillet et novembre 
1556). Documents pour servir à l’histoire du début du règne de Philippe II dans les anciens Pays-Bas’, 
Bulletin de la Commission royale d’Histoire 97, no. 1 (1933): 265–67; also referred in Koenigsberger, 
Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments, 173. 
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to Savoy. The count claimed that the inhabitants of the provinces were selling their 
properties to service their creditors, a trend that had increased with the war. This 
situation, argued Lalaing, had led to a point in which it was extremely difficult for the 
provinces to accept the new taxes that the monarch was demanding. If the king had to 
be served, Lalaing advised the duke of Savoy, then the monarch should be encouraged 
to seek funding from his mines, the gold coming from America, and larger contributions 
from his other subjects. Regarding this third point, Lalaing reminded the duke that the 
ongoing conflict affected the entire monarchy, and it was no longer an Italian war but a 
King’s war (guerre du roy). Therefore, there should no distinctions in the contributions 
of his subjects. 
When hard coercion turned into a personal necessity and a public problem: 
The duke of Savoy was in a risky situation. While he was failing in his attempt to 
close an agreement with the provinces for a higher contribution to fund the war, the 
provinces seemed to have scarce resources to service the royal demand. The 
negotiations were at a stalemate and the future of the duke of Savoy was uncertain. On 
7th June a meeting was held between Philip II and his advisors regarding the possibility 
of sending the duke of Savoy as governor of the duchy of Milan to face the Papal and 
upcoming French attacks and reappointing Mary of Hungary as regent of the Habsburg 
Low Countries for three years.445 It was clear that the problem in the negotiation with 
the provinces was the duke of Savoy. 
Regardless of the perils, the duke managed to get the provinces to send their 
contributions (aides) in exchange for not enacting the taxes. The first offer was accepted 
on 8th June from the four members of Flanders, for which negotiations had been ongoing 
since 31st March. After this donative, the nobility and cities of Hainaut followed (30th 
June), plus the city of Tournai (5th July), the province of Artois (5th July), the province 
composed of Lille, Douai, and the Orchies (5th July), the province of Tournaisis (9th July), 
the clergy of Hainaut (10th August), the province of Zeeland (10th November), the 
province of Utrecht (12th November), and the province of Holland (17th December).446 
These negotiations tested the duke of Savoy’s ability to handle difficult political 
 
445 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 509’, Letter, (6 August 1556). 
446 Gachard, Lettre à MM. les questeurs de la Chambre des représentants, 88–90. 
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situations. His success was reflected in the promise of contributions valued at circa 1.5 
million livres, from which Flanders was to supply more than half (see chart 1).447 
 
Chart 1. Contributions Philip II accepted from the provinces instead of enacting the taxes of 1% and 2% on movables 
and real property (June-November 1556). Source: Gachard, Lettre à MM. les questeurs de la Chambre des 
représentants, pp. 88-90. 
Notwithstanding the progressive successful negotiations of the duke of Savoy 
with the provinces and their cities, which ensured his position in the Habsburg Low 
Countries, there was one region that did not want to contribute: Brabant. Since the royal 
court moved to Ghent to accompany Charles V before his departure in August, the 
provincial deputies were advised to travel to that city to discuss their subsidies 
further. 448 The Brabant deputies refused to travel to Ghent because they found the 
celebration of a meeting of the States-General outside of Brussels, its traditional 
location, offensive. Their refusal obliged the duke of Savoy to return to Brussels in order 
to subdue the irreverent deputies on 29th August.449 
The situation quickly worsened as the Brabant potentates demanded that they 
publicly check the royal accounts to see how much Philip II had spent in his defence of 
the provinces. They also wanted to reform the civil courts, obliging Savoy to withdraw 
as he was not mandated to negotiate such terms. The foreseeable resumption of 
hostilities with France made it unadvisable to confront the local principals of Brabant, 
 
447 The contribution of Flanders was the first to be accepted on 8th June. The negotiations took until 
November 1556 with most of the remaining provinces. Brabant, however, resisted a contribution until 
August 1558, when it offered 660,000 livres. See ibid. 
448 Only the contributions of Utrecht, Holland, Zeeland, and Brabant were missing. See Federico Badoer 
to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 573’, Letter, (8 September 1556). 



















which could have created a new conflict at home. 450  The governor, warning of the 
possible use of hard coercive means, told the deputies that they should not force the 
monarch to return to Brussels to punish them for their insolence. 
The Brabant deputies eventually went to Ghent by mid-September, though they 
refused to grant a contribution in exchange for the taxes.451 Instead, they demanded the 
royal court and parliament move back to Brussels. The Flemish delegates, watching the 
negotiations of their colleagues, offered a monthly donative of 600 crowns to the duke 
of Savoy if the royal court remained in Ghent.452 The conflict between the king and the 
States-General had turned into a dispute among the delegates to host the provincial 
meetings. If we bear in mind that the presence of the monarch and his entourage could 
benefit some, these people were surely the patricians of Ghent at the local level and the 
potentates of Flanders more generally. 
In early October, the Brabant deputies returned to Brussels, promising to seek a 
conciliatory position from their homeland colleagues, although their response to the 
royal demand was foreseen as negative.453 The polycentric character of the Hispanic 
Monarchy thus resulted in greater self-management, with room for manoeuvre to resist 
a centralist agenda. Philip II then wrote to the duke of Savoy, letting him know that if 
the Brabant resistance continued, he would go first to Antwerp with a large guard and 
then to Brussels to punish the recalcitrant deputies.454 On 10th October, indeed, the 
Venetian ambassador reported that he believed Philip II had already sent some 
companies of soldiers to Brussels in disguise.455 
Clearly the monarch, probably following ducal advice, had already decided to use 
force if he felt obliged to. Philip II pursued two goals in sending troops to Brussels. First, 
he wanted to secure the city and the royal government there if there was any upheaval 
as result of the failed negotiations with the Brabant deputies. Second, the presence of 
 
450 Even Charles V, who was on his way out of the country, had to advise his son on how to deal with the 
Brabant delegates. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 610’, Letter, (13 
September 1556). 
451 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 623’, Letter, (19 September 1556). 
452 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 632’, Letter, (26 September 1556). 
453 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 643’, Letter, (10 March 1556). 
454 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 654’, Letter, (10 September 1556). 
455 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 656’, Letter, (10 October 1556). 
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soldiers in the city, or at least the rumour of their existence, was a tool to coerce the 
reluctant delegates. In other words, the political polycentrism not only relied on mutual 
negotiation and collaboration among the multiple centres of power but on coercion too. 
A clear example of this connection can be seen a few days after the rumoured entrance 
of soldiers in Brussels. The duke of Savoy incarcerated three Brabant deputies because 
of their opposition to granting the subsidy.456 Further investigation revealed the specific 
accusations that were made against these members. This forced the remaining 
delegates to leave Brussels and return to their hometowns, looking for a reconciliation 
with the sovereign, a strategy that was repeated in the Papal States that year, as 
analysed in the following section. 
The repression did not end with the imprisonment of these three deputies. 
Instead, the duke of Savoy embarked upon a strong royalist agenda of changes.457 First, 
he and the State Council agreed to appoint two leading members of each estate 
favourable to the king’s demands to let them decide whether to grant the subsidy or 
not. Second, the duke suggested the creation of three bishoprics in Brabant, arguing that 
religious order was almost out of control.458 Although there was a religious problem in 
the provinces, it was far from the levels of two decades later and it seems that the true 
goal of the duke was to divide Brabant society even further. The addition of three new 
bishops to the Brabant assembly would tip the decision on the subsidy in favour of Philip 
II, perhaps not by 1556 but most probably in the long term. 
The duke’s repressive methods did not achieve the anticipated results as the 
delegates were still reluctant to concede the subsidy by the end of October.459 Philip II’s 
presence seemed essential for obtaining money from Brabant, so he had to delay his 
departure for England. However, the monarch did not travel to Brussels immediately 
but in mid-November. The Venetian ambassador commented that the reason for this 
could have been to give the duke more time to resolve the issue with the delegates.460 
Indeed, the reluctance of the deputies to obey the duke could mutate into disobedience 
 
456 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 664’, Letter, (14 October 1556). 
457 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 667’, Letter, (18 October 1556). 
458 Koenigsberger detected a similar proposal for the States-General of 1557, also referring to the religious 
problem. See Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments, 188. 
459 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 680’, Letter, (24 October 1556). 
460 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 693’, Letter, (11 April 1556). 
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to the king if he turned up there, potentially encouraging other provinces to follow the 
Brabant example. The heated aims of some high-ranking officers such as the Prince of 
Orange, who suggested hanging those deputies who did not collaborate and erecting a 
fortress in Brussels, support this conclusion.461  
Finally, Philip went to Brussels on 9th November to oversee some of the cities 
swearing their loyalty to the duke of Savoy as governor-general of the provinces.462 This 
resolution was, apart from a necessary act of protocol, a way to regain control of the 
situation without conceding the satisfaction of a victory to the deputies. 
Notwithstanding the royal presence, the conflict remained unresolved, which induced 
the deputies to put forward new demands, such as the immediate abolition of three 
taxes on wine, beer and bread.463 The negotiations calmed down in the following days 
and members of the State Council called for a symbolic reconciliation with the deputies, 
whereby they would pay two tenths of the subsidy originally proposed.464 
Notwithstanding the preliminary agreement, the resistance to the 
abovementioned taxes continued and the citizens of Brabant proclaimed that they 
would not pay unless these taxes were abolished.465 Before the situation spiralled out of 
control, the duke of Savoy and the State Council wrote to Philip II explaining the general 
situation in the Habsburg Low Countries by December. 466  Meanwhile military and 
financial expenses accrued because the subsidies initially agreed in the meeting of the 
States-General in April 1556 had not been disbursed yet, as the high levels of poverty 
and municipal indebtedness prevented the provinces from contributing beyond their 
abilities.467 The duke of Savoy realised that it was possible that his strategy to achieve 
his personal goals by coercing the provinces to fund the resumption of the war was 
probably unfeasible. 
 
461 It must be remembered that Orange accompanied Savoy when they for Queen Mary to help with the 
duke’s fiscal project. See ibid. 
462 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 696’, Letter, (11 August 1556). 
463 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 703’, Letter, (18 November 1556). 
464 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 721’, Letter, (22 November 1556). 
465 Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 741’, Letter, (29 November 1556). 
466 Gachard, ‘III. Analectes historiques, 4e série’, 124–32. 
467  The royal councillors insisted on the necessity of considering the Hispanic Monarchy as a single 
patrimony with a single border: ‘aussy Vostre Majesté n’aura en moindre affection les pays de par deçà, 
son anchien patrimoine, qui, au respect d’Espaigne, se doibt bien compter pour frontière’, see ibid., 128. 
142 
 
Remarks to the case study: 
The aim of this section was to analyse the coercive means that high-ranking early 
modern state-builders employed in the Hispanic Monarchy to accomplish their personal 
goals. The duke of Savoy and his bargaining strategy represent an extraordinary example 
of how private agendas overlapped with public politics through the agency of the highest 
authority. Although the duke did not recover his duchy until the peace treaty of Cateau-
Cambresis in April 1559, three years after the events explored in this section, the States-
General of 1556 provide an excellent example of how the mechanics of coercion and 
resistance worked. 
The case study of Emmanuel Philibert reveals that negotiation was a means of 
coercion from the beginning. Savoy already knew when he drafted the project that the 
provinces would reject it. Once the project was presented, a strategy of soft coercion 
based on negotiation with regional and local elites followed. When this option failed, as 
in the case of Brabant, it was necessary to enforce his goals by means of hard coercion, 
such as the threat and use of violence against social elites. This case shows that hard 
coercion was not always an effective way of dealing with resistance. However, it was 
also a warning to other polities before they refused collaboration. The following section 
examines this same strategy in the Papal States, to demonstrate that its outcomes were 




3.2. Cardinal Carlo Carafa: a high-ranking state-builder in early modern Rome 
A long-term family affront and its fiscal solution: 
The case study of Cardinal Carlo Carafa and his strategies for pursuing his private 
agenda from his position as a high-ranking state-builder can only be understood if it is 
framed within the conflict between his uncle Gian Pietro Carafa and Emperor Charles V. 
This tension had its origins in the early 1500s, when the grandparents of Charles V 
expelled the French armies from the kingdom of Naples.468 The Carafa family, which had 
been a traditional supporter of the French cause, began to suffer from a lack of 
sympathy among the members of the new government.469  
The subsequent conflict between the Habsburg and Carafa dynasties increased 
in the following decades. For example, when a revolt in Hispanic Naples broke out in 
1547, Gian Pietro urged Pope Paul III to launch a military intervention in the 
neighbouring kingdom.470 The anti-Hispanic actions of Gian Pietro, already cardinal from 
1536, resulted in him being prohibited from visiting his see when he was appointed 
archbishop of Naples in 1549.471 Finally, Gian Pietro Carafa as Pope Paul IV in May 1555 
turned a dynastic dispute into an institutional conflict between the Holy See and the 
Hispanic Monarchy. 
Cardinal Carlo Carafa, nephew of Gian Pietro, also suffered from Charles V’s 
policy towards his family even before being nominated cardinal. For example, Pope Paul 
III appointed him knight of the Order of Saint John along with the priory of Naples in the 
1530s. Charles V, however, prevented the teenager from taking effective possession of 
the institution.472  Although Carlo Carafa joined the imperial army of Charles V as a 
mercenary, he remained averse to the plans of the Hispanic Monarchy. Therefore, when 
his uncle became Pope Paul IV, Carlo Carafa was appointed cardinal (7 June 1555). From 
 
468 Although there were dynastic claims, the Catholic Monarchs stressed the military intervention was 
made to defend the Church. See Barbara Fuchs and Emily Weissbourd, eds., Representing Imperial Rivalry 
in the Early Modern Mediterranean (University of Toronto Press, 2015), 107–9. 
469  Alberto Aubert, ‘Carafa, Gian Piero’, in Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 2014, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/papa-paolo-iv_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/. 
470 William S. Maltby, The Reign of Charles V (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 
2002), 91. 
471  The achbishopric became a traditional Carafa property, since a member of the family always 
administered it from 1484, except for the period 1544-1549. See Miles Pattenden, Pius IV and the Fall of 
The Carafa: Nepotism and Papal Authority in Counter-Reformation Rome (OUP Oxford, 2013), 10. 




that moment onwards, cardinal Carafa and Paul IV pursued a diplomatic initiative 
intended to achieve the military intervention of France in Italy to recover the family’s 
influence in the kingdom of Naples. 
This diplomatic strategy resulted in a treaty with France drafted on 13th October 
and finally signed on 15th December 1555, which secured the French military protection 
of the Papal States and the Carafa family besides war-related clauses.473 In exchange for 
this military assistance, Paul IV promised to invest one of the sons of Henry II of France 
as king of Naples, while another son would become duke of Milan. Since the position of 
the Carafa family in Naples had been largely neglected for half a century because of its 
traditional support for French interests, the need for the personal intervention of the 
Carafa to restore French rule in southern Italy is not surprising. In this sense, the truce 
of Vaucelles (February 1556) between France and the Hispanic Monarchy was a serious 
setback for the agenda of the Carafa. Without the support of the French army to the 
south of the Papal States, Paul IV would be defenceless before the duke of Alva and his 
army. 
In the spring of 1557, the Pope began mustering troops from Italy and the Swiss 
cantons to counteract this military threat. However, these soldiers demanded funds that 
the holy father did not have in his treasury at that moment. The need to enlarge the 
papal incomes, most probably to keep borrowing, became an urgent issue. As these 
troops were marching to Rome, Pope Paul IV was already drafting three bulls in early 
May quickly to solve his pecuniary problems.474 Whereas the first papal edict deprived 
Philip II of some of the resources of the Church, the second text summoned the cardinals 
to meet immediately. The third bull revealed the goal of that extraordinary meeting, 
since it was the draft of a new tax at 1% on the value of real estate. Bernardo Navegero, 
the Venetian ambassador to Rome, was able to report on these three documents 
because a ‘leading cardinal’ told him about them. 
The diplomat did not identify his source, but he may have been either the dean 
(Jean du Bellay), the vice-dean (Rodolfo Pio da Carpi) or the cardinals’ chamberlain 
(Pedro Pacheco y Guevara). These three men had a leading role in the College of 
 
473 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, vol. 4, pp. 640–642. 
474 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 879’, Letter, (5 August 1557). 
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Cardinals and were well aware of Paul IV’s pecuniary needs to fund his Swiss 
mercenaries in the upcoming campaign.475 Since Carpi and Pacheco had not agreed to 
the new tax some weeks later, it is likely that the French dean cardinal Jean du Bellay or 
the cardinal Carlo Carafa put the idea in the pope’s mind. Just as the duke of Savoy was 
interested in collecting pecuniary contributions rather than enacting new taxes in the 
Habsburg Low Countries to continue the war against France and recover his duchy, 
cardinal Bellay fought against losing the favour of Paul IV and Carafa was interested in 
benefitting from the war.476  
On the specific case of cardinal Bellay, he was one of the richest clerics in France 
during the reign of Francis I, although he had been displaced from Henry II’s inner circle 
because of the manoeuvres of cardinal Lorraine. 477  This enmity resulted from the 
struggle among court factions, specifically the Guise-Lorraine (e.g. the duke of Guise and 
cardinal Lorraine) and Montmorency (e.g. the constable of France) houses. In other 
words, cardinal Bellay and the duke of Savoy pursued service to their masters (Paul IV 
and Philip II respectively) in order to preserve their favour and achieve their personal 
goals. 
Once again, high-ranking individuals channelled their personal agendas through 
the authority of political leaders with the excuse of helping them. These people enforced 
their private interests by supporting their patrons, which made of them participants in 
the process of state building. The fiscal reforms they proposed and promoted were 
simply a tool these individuals employed to strengthen the power of their sovereigns, 
but this does not mean that this was the only strategy. The term ‘service’ had many 
meanings and forms in the early modern era. Fiscal novelties were just one, while each 
service depended on the subject. The duke of Savoy, for example, also participated 
 
475 After speaking with the French ambassador to Rome, Navagero concluded that “with these lords what 
is true today is untrue tomorrow; there is a great scarcity of money, and to obtain it they have recourse 
to chimerical projects, and I perceive that they do not tell the Pope the true state of affairs" (translation 
from Italian), see Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 880’, Letter, (5 
August 1557). 
476 Cardinal Bellay already noticed this danger to his future in April of that year. See Loris Petris, ‘La Familia 
de Jean Du Bellay à Rome’, in Le Cardinal Jean Du Bellay : Diplomatie et Culture Dans l’Europe de La 
Renaissance, ed. Cédric Michon, Renaissance (Tours: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2018), 183–
91. 
477 Cédric Michon, ‘Le Cardinal Jean Du Bellay et Ses Bénéfices En France Sous François Ier et Henri II’, in 
Le Cardinal Jean Du Bellay : Diplomatie et Culture Dans l’Europe de La Renaissance, ed. Loris Petris, 
Renaissance (Tours: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2018), 67–88. 
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personally in the battle of Saint Quentin (August 1557). In this sense, the duke 
performed his services from the office and the battlefield, whereas cardinals Bellay and 
Carafa supported Paul IV’s war from the College of Cardinals. 
The consistory of 18th May 1557: a house divided 
The analysis of the implementation of the new tax in the Papal States reveals the 
resistance to this new fiscal policy among high-ranking officers and local elites, which 
reflects similar reactions to that sort of fiscal strategy at the States-General in the 
Habsburg Low Countries examined in the previous section. 478  According to the 
correspondence of the Venetian ambassador Navagero, the session in which Paul IV 
presented the bull about the tax for advice to the College of Cardinals on 18th May 1557 
was a difficult one.479 Before addressing the point of the new tax, Paul IV complained 
about how Philip II and his ministers had pushed him into a war in which the imperial 
party had proposed unbearable peace terms. The pope thus identified the enemy to 
blame for the new imposition and argued for the necessity of this new duty to sustain 
the army. Besides providing a scapegoat, Paul IV also stressed that the new tax was to 
be collected from those who had the means to pay. Poor people would be exempt, 
unlike other traditional duties such as the masena (grinding tax). Paul IV made the same 
arguments that Philip II had employed before the States General: protection from the 
evil enemy demanded new contributions, which should come from the wealthier part of 
society. 
A careful examination of the new tax on real estate that Paul IV proposed to the 
College of Cardinals reveals that it was progressive. Properties valued at more than 500 
crowns were charged 1% of its value; those rated between 500 and 100 crowns paid 
0.5%, and properties valued from 100 to 20 crowns were exempt. Since this was a 
controversial proposal because it burdened especially the wealthiest properties in the 
Papal States, which could lead to the resistance of local elites everywhere, Paul IV 
allowed the cardinals to speak freely. His permission was intended to reveal who 
 
478 Although Setton worked thoroughly with the correspondence of Navagero, the Venetian ambassador 
in Rome, it is surprising not to find a lengthier analysis of the resistance of cardinals and councils, which 
is indeed apparent in Navagero’s letters. See Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, vol. 4, chap. 
16. 
479 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’, Letter, (19 May 1557). 
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opposed the new duty, even though the pope had previously ordered cardinal Vitelli to 
convince his colleagues to approve the fiscal novelty.480 Since the Roman chamber was 
divided about the tax, it seems Vitelli’s role was to test the aims of the cardinals rather 
than convince them. 
There were differences of opinion about the proposal, the differing sides being 
headed by the dean Jean du Bellay and vice-dean Rodolfo Pio of the College of Cardinals. 
Whereas Bellay clapped and supported Paul IV’s words on the need for the new tax, 
Pio’s speech was much less indulgent. Although he first agreed with the urgent need to 
condemn the calumnies Paul IV complained about, the cardinal stressed two problems 
that could arise from the imposition of the tax. 
First, Pio referred to the already heavy fiscal burden on the Papal States through 
extraordinary duties, which had made many subjects demand their exemption. 481 
Cardinal Pio warned that if the new tax was approved, these people might change sides 
and join the enemy. Since the war against the Hispanic Monarchy mostly depended on 
the support of French forces rather than native troops, his point was extremely 
important. Rebels or local elites on the Hispanic side could put an end to the war with 
the worst conditions possible. Second, Pio complained that the duty would be arbitrary 
because there was no time to make the necessary estimates. 482  In this sense, it is 
possible to trace the similarities with the proposal of the duke of Savoy before the States 
General of the Habsburg Low Countries, which required the use of regional records to 
calculate the respective contributions.483 
It was evident that Pio opposed Paul IV’s proposal, but the discussion between 
the pope and the vice-dean cardinal turned into an unexpected argument. The Venetian 
 
480 Vitellozo Vitelli had been cardinal deacon since 15th March 1557, just three months before the meeting 
analysed here Salvador Miranda, ‘Vitelli, Vitellozo’, in The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. 
Biographical Dictionary (Florida International University, 2018), 
http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1557.htm#Vitelli. 
481 Indeed, the war of Paul IV against the Hispanic Monarchy made him enact unpopular taxes on basic 
goods, confiscate properties, and regulate traditions. It is not surprising that the same day Paul IV died, 
Roman citizens rioted in the city attacking anyone linked to the Inquisition, Paul IV’s clients, and some 
jails. See more details in John M. Hunt, The Vacant See in Early Modern Rome: A Social History of the Papal 
Interregnum, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, Volume 200 (Leiden Boston: Brill, 2016), 
184. 
482 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’. 
483 Verhofstad S.J., ‘De Regering Der Nederlanden in de Jaren 1555-1559’, 84. 
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ambassador Navagero reported that the tone of this conflict began to show the anger 
of Paul IV until the dean cardinal Bellay tugged at Pio’s robe to make him sit down.484 
However, Pio did not withdraw until he had made his opposition to the new tax clear. 
Once he had returned to his seat, another cardinal expressed his disagreement with the 
proposal: cardinal Giacomo Puteo. The information about this cardinal is scarce, but it is 
noteworthy that his access to the cardinalate preceded the election of Paul IV, which 
indicates that Puteo was not necessarily a client of the pope but possibly an 
imperialist. 485  His speech supports this point, since he proposed limiting the tax 
collection to 500,000 crowns or slightly more. His alternative suggestion was that the 
duty should not be made permanent, which resembles the counteroffer the States-
General proposed to Philip II in the Habsburg Low Countries. In both assemblies, 
therefore, there were those who preferred an extraordinary contribution rather than a 
permanent tax. 
While Rodolfo Pio and Giacomo Puteo irritated Paul IV with their resistance, the 
other cardinals preferred to be less belligerent. Although some of them did not wish to 
approve the tax, they did not oppose its implementation once they saw that the main 
complaints had been made clear. Apart from recalcitrant cardinals, Paul IV and Jean du 
Bellay received the support of other members of the chamber. Cardinals Fano and 
Mignanelli, for example, agreed that the tax was fair and tolerable, which implied that 
it was morally and legally right to impose it.486  
Nevertheless, the speech of Girolamo Dandino is more revealing as regards the 
potential resistance to this tax from local elites, a central aspect of this chapter. Dandino 
was cardinal of Imola, a member of the French party in the College of Cardinals and 
supporter of Paul IV since his election.487 The cardinal stated that during his trip to Rome, 
as he passed through the Romagna region, he discovered that people already knew 
 
484 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’. 
485 Puteo was the imperialist alternative during the conclave that elected Paul IV. See Pattenden, Pius IV 
and the Fall of The Carafa, 11; Salvador Miranda, ‘Puteo, Giacomo’, in The Cardinals of the Holy Roman 
Church. Biographical Dictionary (Florida International University, 2018), 
http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1551-ii.htm#Puteo; M. Gigliola di Renzo Villata, ‘Dal Pozzo, Giacomo’, in 
Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 1986, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giacomo-dal-
pozzo_(Dizionario-Biografico). 
486 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’. 




about the tax and would contribute happily.488 This comment reveals that the local elites 
were already aware of the fiscal novelty even before it had been drafted for approval at 
the College of Cardinals. The fierce resistance of Bologna, the main city of the region, to 
the tax once it had been enacted is all the more surprising then.489 
A matter of international relevance: the 1% tax on real estate and its final details 
Although the chamber was divided, the tax on real estate was passed and the 
final bull was sent to the cardinals the following day for their signatures. The Venetian 
ambassador Navagero reported on cardinal Rodolfo Pio’s intransigency against signing 
the bull.490 The diplomat’s secretary was present when the papal secretary, Antonio 
Fiordibello, brought the document to Pio. Like the cardinal chamberlain Pacheco, 
cardinal Pio refused to subscribe to that bull and asked Fiordibello to remind Paul IV of 
the reasons he had given him on the previous day at the meeting and to cardinal Vitelli 
on 17th May, when he had tested the aims of the cardinals before the meeting. 
Rodolfo Pio asked Fiordibello to report to Paul IV that the pope could strip him 
of his patrimony and honours if he so wished because of his refusal, but that his decision 
was inspired by his devotion to the Holy See and the pope. This way in which Pio 
expressed his disagreement characterises the loyalty to his master. His service to Paul 
IV might not necessarily match the pope’s agenda, and sometimes these types of high-
ranking state-builders had to deny their collaboration notwithstanding their allegiance. 
This loyalty despite disagreements is important because the sources provide 
contradictory information from that presented at the College of Cardinals. Navagero 
stressed this point when he first reported about the tax to the Venetian senate. For 
example, while cardinal Dandino had spoken about the desire of the people in Romagna 
to adhere to the tax, Navagero expressed the contrary conclusion. 
According to the diplomat, there were serious concerns about the fiscal novelty 
in Romagna, the March of Ancona, Campagna and even in Rome.491 However, it was not 
only the evident resistance to the tax that became clear in the following weeks, but also 
 
488 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’. 
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the methods for collecting the tax and the estimated amount it would raise. After 
consulting the local statistics in Rome, Navagero reported that the tax was of doubtful 
efficacy because as a long-term means of obtaining resources it was unpopular among 
the local elites. Apart from that, it was estimated that it would collect two million 
crowns.492 
This estimate was based on the information Navagero received from cardinal Pio 
through his assistant, which nonetheless was imprecise. Indeed, the ambassador 
pointed out that Pio had told his secretary on 19th May that properties valued under 100 
crowns were exempt. However, when Navagero read the bull himself he discovered no 
mention of this exemption. Instead, those owners had to pay 0.5% of the property’s 
value. 493 This information was reported on 29th May, ten days after the meeting of his 
secretary with cardinal Pio. Since the cardinal had no reason to lie to Navagero’s 
assistant, this clause in the bull must have changed in the interim. In other words, the 
bull about the 1% tax was modified before the cardinals were to sign it. In this sense, 
the tax remained progressive, but it had enlarged the range of taxpayers affected 
substantially. 
The bull for the 1% tax was so important and the origin of so much resistance 
among the cardinals that the Venetian ambassador decided to send a copy of the bull to 
the Venetian senate.494 Indeed, the money raised with the new duty was intended to 
maintain the Papal army, especially the Swiss mercenaries coming to stop the advance 
of the duke of Alva. It was, therefore, an affair of state the results of which were 
important for the international community. Apart from the Venetian senate, other 
actors were following what Paul IV dictated in order to continue the war. 
France was observant and watched its Italian ally against the Hispanic Monarchy 
closely, especially during the summer campaign that the duke of Guise led in Italy. The 
Venetian ambassador at the French court quickly reported that Henry II had received 
news from marshal Pierre Strozzi, who was deployed in Italy, about the tax. The French 
monarch told ambassador Soranzo that Strozzi estimated the 1% tax to yield 800,000 
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crowns in the short term.495 We must bear in mind that this information was what Henry 
II told Soranzo, and not necessarily what Strozzi reported to the French sovereign. 
However, the estimate is less than half what Navagero and his statisticians had initially 
estimated in mid-May. The resistance of the local elites was behind this impressive 
change after two months from the initial estimate. 
Cardinal Carafa’s strategy of negotiation and coercion at the local level: the cases of 
Rome and Bologna 
On 28th May, Roman representatives met Paul IV to complain about the 1% real 
estate tax and propose a grinding tax instead, which could be collected faster than the 
fiscal novelty.496 This offer was an important change since the duty of 1% taxed property 
whereas the grinding tax charged consumers. Notwithstanding this appealing 
alternative, Paul IV simply offered elusive words to the Roman representatives, and 
nothing was agreed. The pope knew there was no time for more discussion. Three days 
after the meeting between the Roman potentates and Paul IV, Navagero reported that 
mercenary troops were expected to disembark in Gaeta or Terracina from Naples and 
join Marc’Antonio Colonna, commander of the Hispanic forces, in Priverno to apparently 
attack Paliano and then Rome. The advance of the Hispanic army so close to Rome 
worried the local elites of the city, especially since the pope had already appointed the 
commissioners in charge of collecting the 1% real estate tax. 497 
In the meantime, while part of the French and Hispanic forces fought each other 
near the estuary of the Tronto river, on the border between the March of Ancona and 
Abruzzo, Marc’Antonio Colonna harassed the Roman countryside.498 Although Colonna 
failed in his attempts to take  towns such as Vicovaro (east of Rome), he was ravaging 
the surroundings and creating a shortage of supplies. The city, reported Navagero, had 
not received fresh supplies for many days and the Swiss mercenaries were still on their 
way by 11th June. 499  This context of scarcity and warfare explains why another 
 
495 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 960’, Letter, (7 August 1557). 
496 They proposed a payment of 2 scudi and 5 giulii per rubbio (2,94 hectolitres). On the currencies and 
weights see Hunt, The Vacant See in Early Modern Rome, XI; on the proposal see Bernardo Navagero to 
Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 907’. 
497 More details about the route of the Hispanic army and the concerns of Roman elites in Bernardo 
Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 910’, Letter, (31 May 1557). 
498 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 921’, Letter, (6 May 1557). 
499 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 930’, Letter, (6 November 1557). 
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counteroffer from the Roman representatives in an effort to avoid the 1% real estate 
tax did not succeed. The new proposal consisted of making a single contribution of 
100,000 crowns instead of paying the new tax.500 Once again, there were similarities 
between the strategies of local elites in the Papal States and the Habsburg Low 
Countries. 501  In this sense, western European local and regional elites shared a 
preference for extraordinary payments rather than accepting permanent taxes, 
especially if these duties were charged directly. 
Just as Philip II refused the offer of the deputies in the States-General of 1556, 
Paul IV also rejected the desperate attempt of the Roman patricians during their 
meeting on 11th June. When ambassador Navagero asked cardinal Carlo Carafa about 
this negotiation, the clergyman simply answered that the reason for the refusal was 
because nobody would eat meat.502 In effect, the Roman council had agreed to raise the 
money by imposing a quattrino per pound of meat until its yield generated 100,000 
crowns.503 Since the quattrino was the least valued currency in the Papal States at that 
time, it was not much for the wealthy elites.504 However, the poorer social strata would 
certainly experience the negative effects of this tax much more than their richer fellow 
citizens, especially when the supplies were scarce, the fields dangerous, and prices 
increased to compensate the lack of provisions. Apart from who paid the contribution, 
it is important to note that this was the second time the Roman elites tried to turn the 
new direct tax of 1% into an indirect duty on consumption. If accepted, this offer could 
have been a quicker way of raising money, while the distribution of the burden could 
have been much easier to accept among local elites. 
Although Paul IV rejected the single contribution, cardinal Giovanni Battista 
Consiglieri told Navagero that the issue could still be arranged. Paul IV had appointed 
Consiglieri cardinal on 15th March 1557, barely three months before the second proposal 
 
500 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 932’. 
501 When the two taxes on real estate (1%) and moveable property (2%) were proposed to the States 
General in March 1556, some deputies hastened to offer one million crowns to avoid the taxes. See 
Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, 433’. 
502 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 932’. 
503 Ibid. 
504 On currencies see once again Hunt, The Vacant See in Early Modern Rome, XI. 
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by the Roman council. 505 Unfortunately, it is not clear why this cardinal in particular 
supported the project for an indirect tax instead of backing the decision of his patron. 
Most probably, the situation resembles even more the negotiation between Philip II and 
the States General in the Habsburg Low Countries. The Hispanic sovereign finally 
accepted a generous donative in exchange for not enacting the taxes. As is explained in 
depth below, Paul IV was employing the same strategy of Philip II: negotiating until a 
certain sum was agreed. 
In the speech Paul IV gave on 18th May in the consistory of the College of 
Cardinals about the enactment of the new tax, he said that the goal was to fund the 
army during the war against the Hispanic Monarchy. Since French forces were trying to 
invade the Kingdom of Naples from the Tronto estuary, steady money was much more 
necessary than long-term incomes unless the pope intended to emulate Philip II by 
earmarking these regular incomes to new loans. However, the military threat at the 
gates of Rome may have meant that Papal debt bonds were discounted, thus losing 
capacity to attract prospective bondholders and their savings.506 In this sense, the pope’s 
feigned rejection of the extraordinary contribution was part of a long-term process of 
financial centralisation that had removed Rome's autonomy by the end of the sixteenth 
century.507 
If the Roman council was uneasy with the new tax, then other cities and regions 
of the Papal States felt the same. According to cardinal Carlo Carafa, the provinces of 
Romagna and the March of Ancona were in despair at the new 1% duty.508 Their reaction 
to the pope’s fiscal policy contrasts with what cardinal Gieronimo Dandino had stated 
during the consistory of 18th May, when the tax was first openly proposed to the College 
of Cardinals.509  Dandino, cardinal of Imola, attended the consistory having travelled 
 
505  Salvador Miranda, ‘Consiglieri, Giovanni Battista’, in The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. 
Biographical Dictionary (Florida International University, 2018), 
http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1557.htm#Consiglieri. 
506 A discount in finances means that a debt bond is being sold under its par price or face value. When 
debt issuers are unable to service the yields of these bonds, their price in the market is lower than its 
normal value. 
507 Fausto Piola Caselli, ‘The Formation of Fiscal States in Italy’, in The Rise of Fiscal States, ed. Bartolome 
Yun-Casalilla, Patrick OBrien, and Comin ,Francisco Comin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
286. 
508 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 932’. 
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through the Romagna, where he supposedly had found great enthusiasm for the 1% tax. 
Less than a month afterwards, it seemed as though that cheerful spirit had vanished, if 
it ever existed. Navagero asked cardinal Carafa if he would go there to pacify the region, 
but the clergyman just gave an evasive answer. The war was thus sapping the spirits 
towards the tax, especially when it had reached its most dangerous point due to 
Marc’Antonio Colonna’s harassment while French forces were trying simply to secure 
their positions rather than fighting the Hispanic forces.510  
Nonetheless, it was not in Romagna or the March of Ancona where the resistance 
was fiercest. It was in mid-June 1557 when the main cities showed their resistance and 
resilience. The Roman council did not give up its goal of making a single contribution 
instead of a permanent tax. After Paul IV rejected the 100,000 crowns, negotiations 
continued and finally a new sum was agreed. Cardinal Consiglieri was right when he 
referred to a possible future agreement with the Roman potentates. The deal raised the 
sum to 130,000 crowns, though church properties were exempted from contributing 
according to the decision of the Roman council.511 The strategies of Paul IV and Philip II 
with their respective regional and local elites were, therefore, identical. Just as had 
happened in the Habsburg Low Countries, collecting the money in Rome was 
complicated. 
The Roman countryside was devastated, and the Roman councillors complained 
to cardinal Carlo Carafa that they could not service the payment in the short term.512 
The clergyman then accused the potentates of this being their fault because they did 
not accept the deal earlier. The quattrino per pound of meat was not being collected as 
quickly as expected. Therefore, the Roman council used a similar strategy to that 
employed in the Habsburg Low Countries: the issuance of municipal debt. In this case, 
the councillors chose to take the money from the Monte del quattrino, a fund that Rome 
 
510 In early June, cardinal Carafa told Navagero that the French demanded the port cities of Civitavecchia 
and Ancona to use them as headquarters. These two cities were strategic ports at both sides of the Italian 
peninsula, especially because the Ottoman fleet could dock in them and disembark troops after Suleiman 
had allied with Henry II of France. The request was rejected, and this worsened relations between Paris 
and Rome considerably. See Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 919’, 
Letter, (6 April 1557). 
511 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 941’, Letter, (19 June 1557). 
512 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 962’, Letter, (7 October 1557). 
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used to help the popes in their wars.513 The mechanism of leverage was simple: people 
invested their savings in this municipality-backed fund to receive a long-term return plus 
interest. These earnings came from the local tax of a quattrino per pound of meat. While 
investors received the interest from their financial operation, the local council could use 
the money raised in whichever way it wanted, such as making a contribution to the 
pope. 
The system was similar to that of the Castilian juros at a local level, but it was 
even more similar to the local renten of the Habsburg Low Countries. The only difference 
between the three investments was the institution which backed the debt. The 
investments in quattrini and renten were earmarked to local incomes, whereas Castilian 
juros were backed by the incomes of the kingdom. In other words, it was a matter of 
which institution issued and supported the debt title. However, the three examples 
shared a weakness: the trust of investors. If savers did not trust the fund, they would 
not put their money in the box. Roman councillors complained of this problem when 
they said that it was impossible to raise any money because everything was wasted. It 
was at that moment that another way of recovering investors’ trust came into play: soft 
coercion. 
Cardinal Carafa’s auditor accompanied some of the Roman patricians on their 
visits to the houses of the wealthier local strata, including prelates, to convince them to 
invest in the Monte del quattrino. 514  It would certainly be very revealing if future 
research sheds some light on the individual stories of these ‘forced investors’ so as to 
compare them with those in the Habsburg Low Countries and Castile, thus creating a 
comparative study between those investors in the municipality and those outside of the 
city.515 However, the soft coercion seems to have failed because the 130,000 crowns had 
not been disbursed by the end of July.516 
 
513 Another example of local debt earmarked to this fund occurred in the 1570s to help in the war against 
the Ottoman Empire. See Carmen Genovese and Daniela Sinisi, Pro Ornatu et Publica Utilitate: L’attività 
Della Congregazione Cardinalizia Super Viis, Pontibus et Fontibus Nella Roma Di Fine ’500 (Gangemi 
Editore spa, 2016), 51–52. 
514 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 962’. 
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period studied, contextualised by war and financial reforms, the intermediary was a Genoese broker in 
the Hispanic Monarchy. For more details, see chapters 6 and 7. 
516 Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 976’, Letter, (28 July 1557). 
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Cardinal Carafa’s anger towards the city was reasonable because the marquis of 
Montebello, Antonio Carafa, had been routed by Marc’Antonio Colonna after a failed 
operation to liberate Paliano on 27th July. 517 Colonna was now free to besiege Rome with 
his army. The war was almost over, but it was still necessary to have a strong position 
during the peace negotiations. Therefore, cardinal Carafa threated the Roman council 
when he warned that if the city did not disburse the 130,000 crowns immediately, 
Bartolomeo Camerario would ensure the 1% tax was charged. This reaction showed a 
higher level of coercion against the potentates of Rome. Camerario was the general 
treasurer for the Papal army, prefect, and administrator of the annual finances of the 
Papal States.518 In other words, when cardinal Carafa mentioned the name Camerario, 
the clergyman was in effect threatening the Roman council with a forceable collection 
of the tax. In this sense, cardinal Carafa wanted those potentates who were reluctant to 
invest in the Monte del quattrino to realise that it was time for forced loans. 
This level of strong coercion that cardinal Carafa inflicted upon the Roman 
council had, nonetheless, another purpose. When he suggested the possibility of 
imposing the tax by force, the message was not only for Rome: it was a warning for every 
city in the Papal States. The case of Bologna is paradigmatic in explaining why Carafa’s 
strategy worked. Apart from Rome, Bologna was the other large city in the Papal States 
that opposed the imposition of the 1% tax. Already in June, a few weeks after the 
cardinals signed and approved the new duty, the local authorities in Bologna attempted 
to circumvent the tax and warned that the city could not bear the fiscal burden.519 The 
council sent two ambassadors to Rome, representing the nobles and commoners 
respectively. Both diplomats recalled the previous contributions that the city had made 
to the Papal cause, which theoretically left the city without anything else to give. 
Nevertheless, although their instructions were to exempt the city from the new duty, 
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the representatives hastened to offer a payment of 70,000 crowns instead of the 1% tax 
when cardinal Caraffa threatened the Roman council on 28th July. 520  Their reaction 
reflects the independence that officials employed in their duties, a common 
characteristic also with the Hispanic Factoría General. 
Remarks to the case study: 
In sum, the case study of the Papal States demonstrates the convergence of fiscal 
means, strategies, and solutions with those of Philip II and the duke of Savoy in the 
Habsburg Low Countries. Regional and local elites resisted as best they could the 
imposition of a new permanent tax that especially burdened the wealthiest social strata. 
These patricians employed similar bargaining tactics, though they finally capitulated and 
offered a contribution. It is revealing that social elites from such distant places used the 
same methods to service the single payment. In effect, the reliance on provincial and 
municipal debt was a common resource to raise funds. 
However, when the trust in the institutions that supported that debt was low, 
superregional authorities such as the Papacy or the royal administration had to 
intervene coercively. The first attempt involved negotiating with local elites. If this 
option failed, an armed response could be relied upon to force the granting of loans. In 
the cases of both the Habsburg Low Countries and the Papal States we can observe that 
when the second option applied, cities were unable to resist alone. Therefore, there was 
a process to weaken the urban capabilities of resistance alongside the fiscal reforms that 
gave form to the early modern state. In other words, the new state was less dependent 
on the cities and relied more on interpersonal relations with select individuals to enforce 
the agenda of the central state. 
In the Hispanic case, the duke of Savoy forced the provinces to provide a donative 
if they did not want the tax. In the case of the Papal States, cardinal Carafa finally 
enforced the payment by Rome and Bologna. These two high-ranking state builders had, 
of course, their own agendas and means with which to realise them through the agency 
of higher authorities. Savoy used his position to enforce violence if necessary, whereas 
Carafa simply threatened with the army when the situation was bleak. In short, the early 
 
520 This time even the clergy would contribute. More details in Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 941’. 
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modern state took form thanks to the collaboration of individuals, high-ranking ones in 
the central administration in this case, whose ambitions motivated them to convince or 
force others to participate in a greater project.  
3.3. Cardinal of Lorraine: a state-builder at the court of Henry II of France 
The necessary context of international conflict: 
Before analysing the specific case study of the cardinal of Lorraine, it is necessary 
to bear in mind the historical context in order to understand his behaviour and 
strategies. As cardinal Carafa was negotiating with the local elites of the Papal States a 
generous contribution in exchange for not enacting the new 1% tax in June 1557, the 
French court was monitoring his progress. The Venetian ambassador Giacomo Soranzo 
reported from the royal court in Compiegne in late June 1557 that Pope Paul IV was 
mustering fresh troops and had enacted a new duty on capital, which was expected to 
yield a large sum of money.521 The French court and Soranzo kept close attention to what 
happened in the Papal States, especially regarding the papal capabilities to fund the 
war.522 It could not be otherwise. England had joined the war against France on 7th June, 
which obliged Henry II of France to redistribute his expenses even more to protect the 
realm from the combined Anglo-Hispanic attacks.523 Meanwhile the duke of Vendôme, 
Antoine of Navarre, reinforced the border with the Habsburg Low Countries in Picardie 
and the French monarch sent troops and emissaries to Scotland with the aim of 
convincing regional nobles to fight against England. Henry II sought to open a front on 
the isle to prevent any English invasion on French soil.524 
The position of France was worrying because the three fronts open in Picardie, 
Scotland and the Papal States were very expensive to maintain. The reports of an 
anonymous informant, a servant of Eleanor of Austria in France, describe what was 
happening in the kingdom when the former queen was already back in Castile.525 Henry 
 
521 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 942’, Letter, (25 June 1557). 
522 The agreement of 15th December 1555 between Paul IV and Henry II stipulated the creation of a 
common fund to finance the war, whereby France deposited 350,000 scuds and the Papal States 150.000. 
The enforcement of both contributions, however, was a common problem between the two sovereigns. 
See Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, chap. 4, p. 642. 
523 A transcription of the declaration of war in ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 306’, Letter, (6 July 1557). 
524 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 936’, Letter, (6 December 1557); 
Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 940’, Letter, (18 June 1557). 
525 Eleanor was the Queen Dowager of France since the death of Francis I. She returned to Castile in 1556 
with her siblings Charles V and Mary. See Robert J. Knecht, ‘Austria, Leonor De’, in Diccionario Biográfico 
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II was raising a huge army to defend the borders of the realm, especially the northern 
front with the Habsburg Low Countries. More than half of that army, which was 
estimated to have 25,000 soldiers, were mercenaries from the Holy Roman Empire and 
the Swiss cantons. Henry II also summoned the garrisons of some municipalities, which 
shows the magnitude of the military operation. Notwithstanding the size of this army, 
its initial aim was to defend the border rather than attack the Habsburg Low Countries. 
Eleanor’s servant also gave details about the means Henry II employed to fund 
the war. Tax officers were making an exhaustive collection, leaving nobody aside, while 
royal representatives, whose names have not been revealed in the sources, arranged 
multiple loans with private financiers in France.526 Besides the deployment of the royal 
administration, Pope Paul IV conceded to Henry II the collection of all church incomes 
for a year. For this contribution, the French sovereign sold the position of treasurer for 
its collection, which yielded 18,000 crowns to the monarch. Indeed, the sale of offices 
was another source of income for Henry II, who created additional positions in order to 
raise more money.527 The monarch even sold royal domain such as forests, an interesting 
alternative for more in-depth future investigation, since Philip II and Paul IV were also 
advised to sell part of their dominions.528 This option was the least accepted among the 
three sovereigns, but the fear of a Hispanic invasion from the Habsburg Low Countries 
convinced Henry II to proceed with it. 
 
Español (Real Academia de la Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/15751/leonor-de-austria; the 
reports were merged into a single catalogue entry after the bundle of documents was returned by France 
in 1940. They therefore, they contain multiple items of diachronic news with the same archive code. See 
‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 317: “Reports from France by a Servant of the Queen Dowager of France”’, Letter, (7 
May 1557). 
526 Regarding the loans, Henry II could borrow 500,000 crowns with 16% interest in two phases (200,000 
and 300,000 crowns respectively) from German lenders who invested in the Grand Parti of Lyons, a city-
backed fund. See Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 965’, Letter, (15 
July 1557); Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 979’, Letter, (8 April 
1557); a more detailed work on the Grand Parti and the specificities of its success and failure in Orlandi, 
Le grand parti. 
527 Even high-ranking positions such as councillor and president in the law councils were sold. In this 
regard, Henry II obtained 500.000 francs (a currency that in the last quarter of the century equalled the 
French livre). See Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 965’; on French 
currencies see Stuart Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the Making of Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), XI. 
528 For example, the treasurer of the Papal army Bartolomeo Camerario recommended to Paul IV that he 
could sell a city to the Republic of Venice since money was scarce. Paul IV rejected the offer because the 
1% tax on capital was still being negotiated with Rome. See Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 964’, Letter, (7 October 1557). 
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There was also concern about what had happened in Italy. News of an important 
defeat of the French forces by the duke of Alva in Italy simply encouraged the French 
information system to keep a closer eye on the Papal finances, to prevent the pope from 
withdrawing from the war. The Venetian ambassador Giacomo Soranzo reported on 8th 
July on how much the 1% tax that Paul IV wanted to impose on the Papal States could 
yield. 529  Henry II had directly related this detail to the diplomat passing on the 
information that Piero Strozzi, cousin of queen Catherine de’Medici and military 
commander, brought from Italy, along with an estimated 800,000 crowns. This news 
contrasts with the estimate that Bernardo Navagero, the Venetian ambassador in Rome, 
sent to Venice. While Strozzi supposedly told Henry II that the tax could raise 800,000 
crowns, Navagero’s statisticians estimated the collection of two million crowns. The 
difference was, therefore, noticeable. It is not clear from the documents, however, 
whether the currency used in both estimates was the same since each state had its own. 
French defeat in Saint Quentin: a victory for the cardinal of Lorraine and his family 
Notwithstanding the progress that Henry II and Paul IV were making to raise 
money in France and Italy respectively, everything crumbled with the French defeat in 
Saint Quentin on 10th August 1557. 530 With the French royal entourage and remaining 
forces in full retreat, panic is the only word to describe the situation. The Cardinal of 
Lorraine replaced Anne de Montmorency, who had been captured during the battle, as 
minister of foreign and domestic affairs, while his brother, the duke of Guise, was 
recalled to France from Italy with full military powers. The cardinal and his family, the 
Guise, were then in control of the main positions in the kingdom.531 
When the news about the military defeat arrived in Paris, Henry II had to decree 
that no wealthy man should depart from the city with his personal belongings.532 This 
interesting order reveals that Henry II wanted to keep close control over the rich people 
of Paris in case he needed to impose another forced loan. In effect, Henry II had already 
 
529 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 960’. 
530 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 985’, Letter, (8 November 1557). 
531 R. J. Knecht, Catherine de’Medici (Routledge, 1998), 48. 
532 After a number of days, exceptions were made. Women and children could leave the city accompanied 
by men who had to return before eight days. Otherwise, their belongings would be confiscated. See 
Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 994’, Letter, (18 August 1557); 
Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 989’, Letter, (13 August 1557). 
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used this mechanism to raise funds in February that year. 533   The monarch had 
demanded a loan from all the merchants and wealthy people of the realm.  Their loans 
were to be adjusted to each individual’s wealth, with their investments ranging from 
between four and twenty crowns. Forced loans charged to wealthy subjects according 
to their wealth had become a normalised way of funding some states.534 
Although coercion was a recurrent tool for raising funds, sovereigns usually 
preferred to negotiate. A meeting with the council of Paris that month brought this to 
the forefront. On 13th August, the Queen of France, Maria de’Medici, accompanied by 
some cardinals and princes attended an extraordinary session of the local assembly.535 
The queen, an ally of the cardinal of Lorraine, delivered an important and touching 
speech to the councillors with the aim of obtaining further help in the ongoing conflict.536 
The queen first addressed the issue of the excessive expenses which Henry II had 
incurred in the past. However, she specified that the monarch had always taken special 
care of the cities of the realm. In other words, she meant the main cities of the kingdom 
and specifically Paris. 
The queen continued her speech arguing that nothing had ever been demanded 
from the cities besides the acknowledgment of the royal superiority and modest 
contributions. Because of this privileged position, the queen reminded the ministers 
that French subjects were already heavily burdened with direct and indirect taxes that 
the crown had enacted, including new ones. Therefore, it was not the right time for the 
royal authority to increase the fiscal burden of those taxpayers even more. In effect, a 
generous contribution from Paris was expected. In this sense, the bargaining procedures 
in the Hispanic Habsburg Low Countries and the Papal States differed from those in 
France in the approach to the lack of funding. Instead of proposing a direct and 
permanent tax on the wealthiest social strata, to then negotiate a single contribution, 
 
533 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 818’, Letter, (18 February 1557). 
534 Leaving aside the example of the Papal States, reviewed in the previous section, there were other cases 
such as England, Castile, and the Duchy of Florence. See Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 
185, 230–31; Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, The Rise of Fiscal States, 274. 
535 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 993’, Letter, (14 August 1557). 
536 Although I have found no evidence regarding the presence of the cardinal of Lorraine at the meeting, 
the queen supported the cardinal and his family in the conflict against the Habsburg dynasty. However, it 
is not entirely certain from the sources consulted that the queen was a puppet of the cardinal of Lorraine, 
but may have been a powerful ally with similar interests instead. See Kathleen Anne Wellman, Queens 
and Mistresses of Renaissance France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 207. 
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the French royal administration skipped the first step and directly negotiated the 
donative. 
The queen demanded a subsidy of 300,000 francs from the city of Paris to pay 
for 25,000 soldiers over two months on behalf of her husband. After announcing her 
request, she left the chamber to let the ministers deliberate freely. Their decision was 
almost immediate as they promised the payment and to provide the king with their best 
means at their disposal. 537  The city of Paris rapidly raised the money through the 
investments made by a hundred bourgeois, who offered an instant payment of 3000 
francs each. 538  This way of funding the contribution to speed up its collection was 
identical to the mechanism of financial leverage established in Rome through the Monte 
del quattrino, examined in the previous section. 
Just like Philip II and Paul IV, Henry II could use the subsidy either to pay for the 
mustering of troops or to arrange new financial deals, and thus keep borrowing. The 
parliamentary season closed with Queen Maria thanking the ministers for their 
collaboration to defend the kingdom and the promise to send the dauphin Francis to 
convince the monarch of the need to preserve the privileges of Paris. In other words, 
the local elites of Paris and the main cities in the provinces of the Habsburg Low 
Countries and the Papal States pursued the preservation of their privileges and 
exemptions with their contributions. 
The Venetian ambassador ended his letter about the Paris subsidy by concluding 
that these 300,000 francs would yield 1.5 million of gold écu (escudos) to the monarch, 
which meant that the remaining cities of the kingdom would contribute accordingly at 
the upcoming Estates-General of January 1558. In other words, the participation of Paris 
represented a fifth of the general subsidy that Henry II expected from the realm. The 
payment of these regional subsidies should proceed as happened in Paris, through the 
financial aid of the wealthier social strata in every place. Every element of this financial 
strategy was necessary since the defeat of Saint Quintin was not just a military setback. 
 
537 David Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188. 
538 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 993’. 
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Henry II needed another army and many of his allies had been captured during the 
battle, which also meant that ransoms had to be paid for them.539 
Notwithstanding the negotiated contribution in Paris and the evident lack of 
funds, Henry II managed to arrange a new loan from the merchants of Lyons.540 On this 
occasion, the money exchange was 600,000 crowns, of which 100,000 had no interest 
applied. The remaining 500,000 crowns were promised at a 16% interest rate. The 
Venetian ambassador was surprised at the ‘liberality’ of these financiers as not even the 
German lending community was ready for a similar deal. Not charging interest on a sixth 
of the principal was quite unusual according to the sources, even for native lenders. 
Perhaps this behaviour can partially be explained based on the threat that Lyons faced 
at that moment. In effect, the lending city of France par excellence was suspected of 
being the target of a Hispanic contingent formed in the Franche-Comté.541 
Although the 300,000 francs that Paris promised were quickly being collected, 
each inhabitant giving between 30 and 120 francs according to their economic status, 
Henry II still sought more sources of revenue.542 The French monarch enforced a new 
tithe on the Church, which made five collections in total per year.543 Notwithstanding 
these proofs of royal strength to drain resources from his subjects, August was not Henry 
II’s month. On 27th August the city of Saint Quintin fell after the Hispanic assault on its 
fortress. Just as in Rome when Marc’Antonio Colonna defeated the marquis of 
Montebello earlier that month, Paris was exposed to the enemy forces and terror filled 
the streets. 
 
539 To give an example about the prices of these operations, three high noblemen (Jacques d’Albon, the 
Rhinegrave, and the Duke of Mantua’s brother) were assigned to Don Ferrante Gonzaga at 40,000 crowns. 
After this, Gonzaga could sell their freedom at whatever price but never less than that sum. See Michiel 
Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 997’, Letter, (22 August 1557). 
540 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 995’, Letter, (21 August 1557). 
541 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 994’; Giacomo Soranzo to Doge 
and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1009’, Letter, (9 January 1557). 
542 Those unable to pay the fee in Paris were exempted, although many paid more money than they should 
have. See Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1001’, Letter, (27 August 
1557). 
543  The contribution of the French church is surprising compared to that of Castile. For example, an 
inventory of anything of value in the French churches was being prepared to convert that treasure into 
coin if necessary. The lack of reluctance at participating on the part of the French dioceses may be because 
of papal support for Henry II, although this is still an open question. See ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 317’. 
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The monarch moved the holy relics to Orléans, to where many citizens of Paris 
were fleeing. Indeed, the entire court was expected to move there too in case the 
Hispanic army continued its advance southwards. During this outbreak of fear in the city 
of Paris, however, there was no protest against the sovereign but only in opposition to 
the Guise family. Placards appeared in every corner of the city blaming Francis and 
Charles de Lorraine, duke of Guise and cardinal of Lorraine respectively. They were 
Henry II’s main advisors at that time and the target of protests because of the 
mismanagement and damage caused by the ongoing war.544 Both brothers, however, 
benefited from the French defeat since the duke was re-called to lead the French army 
as lieutenant-general, while the cardinal replaced the constable of France as prime 
minister for domestic and foreign affairs. 
The Guise: a family of high-ranking state builders 
The accusations against the Guise family because of the disastrous course of the 
war were not unfounded. The origins of the enmity towards them dated back to 23rd 
May 1555, when the constable of France, Anne de Montmorency, and the cardinal of 
Lorraine met imperial representatives to discuss a peace treaty between Henry II and 
Charles V.545  While Montmorency represented the court faction that supported the 
cessation of hostilities, Lorraine expected them to continue. The following month 
Gaspar de Coligny, admiral of France and nephew of constable Montmorency, was 
appointed governor of Picardie. This honour paid to Coligny posed a risk to the interests 
of Lorraine and his family, the Guise. However, Gian Piero Carafa had been elected Pope 
Paul IV in May that year, making him a valuable ally for the Guise. Carafa’s anti-Habsburg 
policy drew the attention of the cardinal of Lorraine and his family, who considered 
helping him to continue the war and thus enlarge their influence at the royal court. 
In October 1555, the cardinal of Lorraine was dispatched to form a league with 
the Pope in which France supported the Papal States in their aim of expelling the 
Hispanic Monarchy from the Kingdom of Naples.546 The treaty was secret and peace 
negotiations between Henry II and Philip II continued, concluding with a five-year truce 
in February 1556. However, Philip II’s preventive attack on the Papal States in September 
 
544 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1005’, Letter, (30 August 1557). 
545 Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers, 75. 
546 See more details about this treaty in the second section of this chapter. 
165 
 
that year was the perfect excuse for the cardinal of Lorraine to insist that war be 
resumed. 547 In effect, the Guise family had perfectly positioned its influential agents to 
convince Henry II to send an army to Italy. In the face of opposition from constable 
Montmorency and his party, the Guise and the Queen of France Catherine de’Medici 
voted for war.548 
When Henry II decided to send an army to help Paul IV on 23rd September 1556, 
the duke of Guise was appointed to command it together with his father-in-law, the 
duke of Ferrara. In other words, the French intervention in Italy was an affaire de famille 
that involved every member.. 549  The prospective outcomes of the enterprise, which 
started with the arrival of French troops in February 1557, were too tempting. If the 
Hispanic Monarchy were expelled from Italy, the duke of Guise would become viceroy 
of Naples. The cardinal of Lorraine, on the other hand, expected to become the next 
pope when Paul IV died, which required the withdrawal of Hispanic influence in Italy. 550 
It was clear that the Guise and their allies had to keep the war alive to pursue their 
personal agendas. Therefore, the armed branch of the family fought in Italy while the 
cardinal of Lorraine remained at court, monitoring the manoeuvres of constable 
Montmorency against the war. In this sense, their strategy, and especially that of the 
cardinal of Lorraine, recalls the case studies of the duke of Savoy in the Hispanic 
Monarchy and cardinal Carafa in the Papal States. All three pursued their personal and 
family agendas by channelling their influence through their sovereigns. Since we have 
already examined the cases of Savoy and Carafa, it is time to identify which strategies 
they had in common with the cardinal of Lorraine. 
Although England declared war on France in June, the Guise family was ready to 
weaken the English and Hispanic positions by creating a diversion in Scotland. Mary of 
Guise, sister of the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine, had been Queen-Regent 
 
547 A brief summary of the war in Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers, 76–78. 
548 The Guise party also included the duchess of Valentinois, Diane de Poitiers, who was an extremely 
influential mistress at the French courts of Francis I and Henry II. Her importance at court allowed her to 
marry her younger daughter Louise to the duke of Aumale Claude of Lorraine, the brother of cardinal 
Charles de Lorraine. See ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 317’; Wellman, Queens and Mistresses of Renaissance 
France, 207. 
549 This expression best defines the historical development from our perspective about state-building 
agents. I borrow the term from Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers, 77. 
550 ‘CSP, Spain, Vol. 13, 317’. 
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of Scotland since 1554. With the help of her brothers, who were in a position of influence 
over Henry II, she organised the invasion of England in September 1557.551 This military 
action could not have been better timed to preserve the honour and influence of the 
Guise family at the French court, especially since the loss of Saint Quintin and the peace 
between Paul IV and Philip II.552 The peace agreement between Rome and Brussels 
underlines how fruitless the fiscal strategy of the Pope to fund an army able to take on 
the Hispanic troops was. The Papal withdrawal from the war had weakened the agenda 
of the Guise. Once the family realised that Naples was lost, their main goal was to keep 
pressing for a continuation of the conflict to preserve their influence. 
The duke of Guise, who had quickly left to help Henry II after the disaster of Saint 
Quentin, fell sick in Marseille before departing for Lyons.553 This city was the financial 
heart of France and a cornerstone in the Guise agenda to keep fuelling the war against 
the Hispanic Monarchy. 554 However, German troops coming from the Franche-Comté 
plagued the region.555 It was unclear whether the goal of those troops was to take the 
city or simply loot as much as they could to then join the forces of Philip II along the 
northern border. Henry II thought the German mercenaries would attack Metz, the 
diocese of the cardinal of Lorraine, with the aim of weakening him.556 What was clear, 
however, was the importance of Lyons for the Guise strategy. The duke of Aumale, 
another brother of the cardinal of Lorraine, was dispatched to defend the city 
 
551 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1026’, Letter, (9 July 1557). 
552 The peace was signed on 12th September in Cave, just three days before the Tiber river flooded the 
city of Rome. See Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1032’, Letter, (9 
December 1557); Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1036’, Letter, 
(15 September 1557). 
553 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1046’, Letter, (26 September 
1557). 
554 The Venetian diplomat Giovanni Michiel reported in November from Lyons that the ministers of Henry 
II had suspended the payment of interest on due to royal financiers. The sum owed amounted to 16% on 
the capital and was estimated at 200,000 gold crowns. After negotiating with the affected lending houses, 
an arrangement was made. Further details on the operation in Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1078’, Letter, (11 August 1557). 
555 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1035’, Letter, (14 September 
1557); Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1040’, Letter, (21 September 
1557). 
556 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1040’. 
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personally.557 Guise fears of an ongoing Hispanic plot to take Lyons were justified. It was 
not until the end of November, once the plot failed, that it became publicly known.558 
Apart from the services of the Guise in Lyons, the French troops stationed in 
Compiegne almost mutinied because their wages were four months in arrears in 
November. Since the loss of Saint Quintin, Compiegne had become the headquarters of 
the French army in the North and where most of the troops were being brought 
together. Only the intervention of the cardinal of Lorraine saved the place from the 
anger of the troops when he hastened to Paris to collect new funds. The Guise arranged 
a money loan with the wealthiest people of Paris, amounting to 120,000 crowns. The 
cardinal, personally demonstrating the sacrifices of serving, contributed 10,000 crowns 
while every patrician lent at least 4000 crowns.559 Therefore, there was a maximum of 
28 patricians contributing to this financial effort, reflecting how these sorts of 
operations did not need large groups of people and that smaller groups worked better. 
In other words, this form of service reveals the reach and quality of social networks 
among high-ranking state-builders like the cardinal. 
After the crisis in Compiegne, the influence of the Guise was again high at the 
royal court. The duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine advised Henry II not to 
proceed with a risky attack on the Hispanic side of the border yet. 560 The monarch 
followed their recommendation while the duke of Guise fortified some parts of the 
border.561 Henry II, nonetheless, decided to launch an attack on Calais, which was the 
last English settlement on French soil, with the strong support of the Guise brothers. 
This military action accorded with their interests, especially since constable 
Montmorency, their indefatigable enemy, had been captured in Saint Quentin by 
Hispanic troops.562 As long as the war continued and Montmorency remained captive, 
 
557 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1065’, Letter, (18 October 1557). 
558 Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1093’, Letter, (28 November 1557); 
Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1083’, Letter, (14 November 1557). 
559 Whether these lenders used the money of third parties has not emerged from the sources consulted, 
although it would be interesting to know if this was the casue because they were not depicted as lenders 
but patricians. On the service of the cardinal see Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, 
Venice, Vol. 6, 1087’, Letter, (21 November 1557). 
560 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1094’, Letter, (29 November 
1557). 
561 Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1095’, Letter, (12 February 1557). 
562 Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1108’, Letter, (15 December 1557). 
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the Guise influence over Henry II could grow freely without resistance. While the duke 
of Guise prepared the campaign against Calais, the cardinal of Lorraine sought funds and 
clothes to send to his brother’s army. 563 It was, in short, another affaire de familie 
comparable to that of the duke of Savoy and cardinal Carafa. 
The cardinal of Lorraine at the French Estates General of 1558: the epitome of 
negotiation 
While Philip II accepted the conditions that the provinces imposed on him and 
waited for a positive response from the provincial parliaments in December 1557, 
different socio-economic circumstances allowed Henry II to make a more beneficial 
agreement when the Estates General of France met in Paris.564 On 1st January 1558, the 
French monarch travelled to Paris in order to obtain a generous subsidy with which to 
finance his ongoing winter campaign to take Calais.565 While Paris had already offered 
300,000 livres, it was expected that the other main cities of the realm would contribute 
two million livres at least. However, the size of the contributions is not the core subject 
in this chapter, but the agency of key high-ranking actors such as the cardinal of Lorraine 
in the process of state-building. 
While by the end of the first week of January his brother, the duke of Guise, was 
leading the army assault on Calais, the cardinal of Lorraine welcomed the deputies of 
the realm to Paris and arranged the first meetings. The meeting at which Henry II 
addressed his pecuniary petition to the three estates had been prepared beforehand by 
the cardinal to facilitate a quick and positive response. 566  He met with the 
representatives of the clergy on 2nd January, while the nobility and the cities had their 
moment on 3rd January.567 The cardinal’s power as royal representative was comparable 
only to that of his brother the duke in the military field. The cardinal had indeed become 
the master of the royal court since the capture of Montmorency. He decided when and 
how to introduce visitors, something that the new Venetian ambassador Giovanni 
 
563 David Potter, ‘The Duc de Guise and the Fall of Calais, 1557-1558’, The English Historical Review 98, no. 
388 (1983): 497. 
564 More details about the resolution of the States General in the Habsburg Low Countries in Michiel Surian 
to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1114’, Letter, (23 December 1557). 
565 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1121’, Letter, (1 January 1558). 
566 This was exactly the same strategy followed by cardinal Vitelli, as already examined in the previous 
section. See Bernardo Navagero to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 893’. 
567 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1124’, Letter, (1 April 1558). 
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Michiel stressed shortly after his arrival. Realising the scale of the power embodied by 
the Guise family, the diplomat urged the Senate to address the two brothers in their 
missives to the king henceforth.568 
The star of the two brothers was at its highest point. While Calais was taken, the 
meeting that the cardinal had with the clerical representatives began to produce 
outcomes. The cardinal promised to keep delivering the four tenths on behalf of the 
French clergy, which was estimated at 1,200,000 francs, and also promised to double 
that sum to help the monarch.569 The nobility and urban representatives, however, had 
not yet given their answer to the royal petition. Using a similar strategy to that of 
cardinal Carafa in Rome, the cardinal of Lorraine employed soft coercion with the third 
estate, inviting their deputies to his house, where he asked them to contribute three 
million crowns.570 The strategy of the royal minister was to encourage the deputies of 
the cities to create a list of the three thousand wealthiest people in the cities of the 
kingdom, only those who could offer a thousand crowns at least.  
The urban deputies were reluctant to comply with this suggestion, most probably 
because it meant naming those people who preferred to remain incognito when the 
monarch demanded extraordinary pecuniary subsidies or forced loans. They decided 
instead to provide a loan and distribute the burden of the three million crowns among 
the cities, raising the sum from urban-backed investment funds that promised an 
interest rate of 8.3% through local taxes. 571 In this sense, the strategy of Rome, Paris and 
the provinces of the Habsburg Low Countries regarding the use of municipal debt to 
service royal pecuniary demands was identical. The meeting closed with a solemn mass 
at the chapel of the royal palace on 10th January, after which the sovereign departed for 
Calais to take possession of his new territorial acquisition. The strategy of the cardinal 
of Lorraine was successful, both in servicing his master Henry II and in accomplishing his 
family goals. The recommendation made by the Venetian ambassador Michiel to the 
Senate specifically to congratulate the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Guise, 
 
568 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1137’, Letter, (1 November 1558). 
569 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1138’, Letter, (1 December 1558); 
Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des français. XVIII. 1556-1568, vol. 18 (Paris, 1821), 
69. 
570 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1138’. 
571 Potter, ‘The Duc de Guise and the Fall of Calais, 1557-1558’, 500. 
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especially since the administration of France ‘non sia più per uscire da loro’ (will not 
escape from them), was therefore not surprising.572 
The French victory in Calais brought honours to the Guise family and its allies. 
The duke of Aumale and the marquis of Elbeuf, both brothers of the cardinal of Lorraine, 
were appointed to more prestigious positions. Aumale, for example, became the new 
military governor of Piedmont.573 Piero Strozzi, the military commander who took the 
city and was client of the cardinal of Lorraine, obtained several privileges.574 It was a 
great success, though no victory is everlasting. The overwhelming influence of the Guise 
on Henry II’s decisions found its challengers among their traditional foes, the 
Montmorency. The house of Lorraine interceded on behalf of Anne de Montmorency to 
reach an agreement with the Guise to rescue the constable and hold preliminary peace 
negotiations.575 In other words, the Montmorency-Lorraine were regrouping to reclaim 
their influence at the royal court. 
Meanwhile, the peace negotiations followed their uncertain course and the 
Guise dynasty had accomplished one of the main goals on its long-term agenda: linking 
itself to royal families. Mary of Guise, sister of the cardinal of Lorraine, had married by 
proxy James V Stuart, king of Scotland, in 1538.576 When the monarch died a few days 
after the birth of his daughter Mary Stuart in December 1542, Mary of Guise retained 
the dynastic rights of her daughter as regent. France’s support for the queen regent in 
the following years was based on the influence of the house of Guise with Henry II, 
especially the services of the cardinal of Lorraine and his brother the duke of Guise. The 
improvement in their positions after the French defeat in Saint Quentin and the victory 
 
572 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1137’. 
573 Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1164’, Letter, (2 December 1558). 
574 Strozzi joined the Privy Council and received land concessions. He was especially promoted by Queen 
Catherine, a great supporter of the Guise cause. See Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, 
Venice, Vol. 6, 1159’, Letter, (2 April 1558); on patronage relations between the cardinal of Lorraine and 
Piero Strozzi see Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1216’, Letter, (25 April 
1558). 
575 Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1195’, Letter, (14 March 1558); 
Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1202’, Letter, (22 March 1558); on the 
meeting see Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1206’, Letter, (26 March 
1558); Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1216’. 
576 Mary of Guise was not the first option for James, who had first married the eldest daughter of King 
Francis I. However, when James sailed to France in 1536, Francis had initially promised him the daughter 
of the duke of Bourbon. See Retha M. Warnicke, Mary Queen of Scots, Routledge Historical Biographies 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 20. 
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in Calais granted them a long-awaited reward. Mary Stuart married the dauphin of 
France on 19th April 1558. The cardinal of Lorraine conducted the ceremony in person, 
symbolising a great victory for him and his family.577 
The following month, the duke of Guise besieged Thionville.578 Although the city 
wa taken by the end of June, the family suffered a misfortune as Piero Strozzi, a high-
ranking client of the cardinal of Lorraine, died during the siege.579 The French defeat at 
Gravelines the next month, however, put an end to the war and the agenda of the Guise 
temporarily. Notwithstanding the final military setback, the cardinal of Lorraine 
managed to retain his position at the court for some time.580  However, the alliance 
between the cardinal of Lorraine and the duchess of Valentinois, mistress of Henry II and 
political ally of the Guise family, soon came to an end as the Montmorency faction 
convinced the duchess to influence the king to seek peace instead of more war.581 
Nonetheless, another twist of fate gave renewed hope to the cardinal of Lorraine 
that the war would continue. The death of the Queen Mary of England in November 
opened new possibilities for the private agenda of the Guise family.582 Mary Stuart, the 
niece of the cardinal of Lorraine, gained renewed political relevance because she could 
claim the English throne over Elizabeth, thus putting the peace negotiations at risk. The 
ambitions of Mary Stuart could have triggered a new marriage between Philip II and 
another English queen, thus reviving the Anglo-Hispanic alliance. However, France and 
the Hispanic Monarchy were financially exhausted and real peace negotiations lasted 
for months. The signing of the peace of Cateu-Cambrésis in early April 1559 closed the 
agenda of the cardinal of Lorraine and his family regarding the Habsburg-Valois conflict. 
  
 
577 Ibid., 49. 
578 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1221’, Letter, (5 June 1558); 
Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1224’, Letter, (15 May 1558). 
579 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1242’, Letter, (22 June 1558). 
580 The cardinal participated actively in the negotiations. See for example Giovanni Michiel to Doge and 
Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1271’, Letter, (21 October 1558); Giovanni Michiel to Doge and 
Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1276’, Letter, (11 March 1558). 
581 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1281’, Letter, (15 November 1558). 
582 Giovanni Michiel to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1288’, Letter, (28 November 1558). 
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Remarks to the case study: 
The case study of the cardinal of Lorraine closes this chapter and reinforces the 
thesis of common strategies and goals among high-ranking state-builders. Lorraine was 
a person who sought to enlarge the prestige of his family by channelling its agenda 
through the authority of Henry II of France. The diplomatic services of the cardinal to 
the French monarch in the negotiations for a league with Pope Paul IV and the peace of 
Cateau-Cambrésis, for example, were coupled with actions that helped Henry II to 
finance his war against the Hispanic Monarchy and its allies. The military role of the 
cardinal’s brother, the duke of Guise, as another high-ranking state-builder is also 
undeniable. The cooperation between the two brothers resulted in magnificent 
outcomes for their family, such as the wedding of their niece Mary Stuart. 
On the specific aspect of the strategies that the cardinal of Lorraine employed to 
accomplish his personal goals, it is essential to remember that he was not alone. The 
duke of Savoy, cardinal Carafa and the cardinal of Lorraine found allies at the royal court 
such as the queen and the royal mistress. The personal agendas of these two women 
blended with that of the cardinal, and they were brought together through service to 
the monarch. The French defeat at Saint Quentin triggered a series of events that put 
into effect those alliances. For instance, the promotion of the cardinal and his brother 
and the role of addressing the pecuniary petition to the assembly of Paris in August 1557 
to defend the kingdom were actions that contributed to the political consolidation of 
the state through the reinforcement of the monarchy. 
Conclusions: 
These three case studies are set against the backdrop of financial crisis in three 
different polities. Each case reflects the particularities of its social and economic context 
and allegiances. However, they all share some common characteristics. The three 
examples analyse high-ranking officers inside the royal or papal administrations. They 
were very close to their respective sovereigns, the result of actions taken by their 
relatives to place these three men in the right spot to develop their family agendas. In 
this sense, it is noteworthy to stress that they belonged to noble families with territorial 
claims. The sections on the duke of Savoy and cardinal Carafa are more evident in this 
regard. However, the cardinal of Lorraine and his family had an even greater demand: 
173 
 
Scotland. In effect, their influence in the island kingdom could only be ensured with the 
collaboration and protection of France. 
The strategies that these state-builders employed were also surprisingly similar, 
especially when they compelled the urban oligarchies to make contributions to fund 
their respective wars. In their quest to raise funds for their masters’ conflicts and to 
assert their private goals, the three high-ranking statesmen used soft and hard coercive 
means. While the former measure involved active negotiation, the second option 
involved the arrest of regional and local leaders, the threat of physical violence, or the 
compulsory and detailed registration of the wealthier social strata of each polity. In this 
regard, each section depicts a different level of coercion and outcomes. 
The duke of Savoy, for example, employed hard coercive means such as physical 
violence and arrest to subdue the powerholders of Brabant. The results of his approach, 
nonetheless, were counterproductive to his interests and the resistance endured. 
Cardinal Carafa, on the other hand, represents a model in which negotiation fails and 
the verbal threat of harder coercive measures is necessary. The oligarchs collaborated 
more peacefully in this case because they realised that resistance could be extremely 
damaging. The cardinal of Lorraine, finally, simply negotiated and convinced the urban 
elites of the necessity to cooperate. Lorraine did not find as much resistance as in the 
cases of the Papal States of the Habsburg Low Countries, probably due to the strength 
of inter-urban bonds. 
The undeniable outcome of this process of negotiation and coercion was a 
contribution from the cities of the territory. Leaving aside their different levels of 
resistance, it is surprising that all used municipality-backed debt to service the donative 
to the central government. The certainty of local taxes was what made this alternative 
way of funding the central state possible. In other words, investors in local debt trusted 
the councils. However, that trust could hardly exist in an environment of warfare where 
allied and enemy armies were close by and municipal debt levels were high. The case of 
Rome is paradigmatic in this respect because it demonstrates that high-ranking state-
builders were involved in the process of creating trust, though only because they had a 
personal interest in this. 
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The individuals in these three case studies saw in conflict and coercion a way to 
channel their personal ambitions through their sovereigns. Although their private 
agendas often found resistance among other court factions and cities, these three men 
used any means at their disposal to overcome them. They are therefore perfect 
examples of high-ranking state-builders, though their primary goal was not the creation 
of a central state but their agendas. Their participation in the state-building process from 
within the central administration, at least under the circumstances and in the brief 
periods studied herein, was incidental. However, their private agenda was the necessary 
incentive to trigger their actions under the umbrella of their masters’ authority. In other 
words, the three state-builders were part of formal institutions with respect to their 
sovereigns, but they followed patterns of informal institutions emanated from their 
family agendas when developing their strategies. Similarly to the case of the Factoría 
General, formal and informal institutions intermingled through their members’ 
behaviour. 
This first part of the dissertation concludes here by stressing that the process of 
early modern state-building was not the result of a unique social group such as the one 
these high-ranking officers represented. Instead, the following chapters highlight the 
participation of two other types of state-builders, who emerged directly from Genoese 
relational capital: independent entrepreneurs and local elites. The convergence of the 
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Chapter 4. Costantin Gentil and the recovery of the old debts 
The previous chapters have analysed the origins of financial and administrative 
reform that Philip II initiated in 1556, when he inherited the Iberian kingdoms, to stress 
the role of medium- and high-ranking royal officials in the process of state construction. 
This second part of the dissertation aims to focus instead on independent actors outside 
of the royal administration, to elucidate their agency in the same social, political, and 
economic structure. Since the perspective of the Genoese lending community offers an 
insight into this process, the analysis of the trajectories of two Genoese lenders 
illustrates this part of the research: Costantin Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo. The 
former is the subject of this chapter, an independent financier who was also a broker of 
the mighty Centurione family. His case study provides clues that help to explain the 
recovery of trust among private capitalists and the consequent stabilisation of the credit 
market. 
In order to demonstrate the importance of these independent entrepreneurs 
who operated outside of the central administrations, this chapter reconstructs the path 
to the first asiento with which Philip II agreed to repay his old debts through juros, a 
cornerstone in the process of the financial reform of the Hispanic Monarchy.583 This in-
depth investigation reveals an individualised perspective of the many elements that 
came into play. The continuous correspondence between the three main centres of 
power in the monarchy -Valladolid, Genoa and Brussels- interacts in this chapter with 
the contracts and false promises made, thereby uncovering private agendas and leading 
to the next step in the transformation of the financial structure of the state and its 
consolidation in the turbulent first years of Philip II’s reign. 
4.1. Learning stage and early years at the royal court: 
Costantin Gentil, also known as Costantino Gentile in some sources, was a 
transnational financier who operated in diverse territories of the Hispanic Monarchy 
(chiefly in Flanders and Castile) and the Republic of Genoa. He was born in Genoa as the 
second son of the marriage of Stefano and Maddalena Di Negro, in around the late 
 
583 The asiento that López del Campo arranged with Daniel Spinola in July 1557 to provide funds to Italy, 
discussed in the previous chapter, also included old debts as part of the reimbursement. However, this 
was a decision that the general factor took alone. Costantin Gentile was the first to have royal consent. 
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1490s.584 Costantin Gentil learnt his profession through trading and arranging small-
scale financial deals, as did many other prominent Genoese financiers. This period of his 
life took place in Seville during the late 1510s and early 1520s, where he naturally 
became part of the Genoese merchant community. The commercial routes that Gentil 
managed transported olive oil to the Habsburg Low Countries and sugar to Rhodes and 
Istanbul.585 
He was also involved in the business of naval insurance for ships and cargoes, 
quite often in partnership with Fredrigo Spinola, another Genoese merchant with whom 
Gentil had a long-term business partnership.586 This sort of service to native carriers was 
not a monopoly of the Genoese community but it also involved many other businessmen 
from Castile in their early stages, predominantly from Burgos, Málaga, Valladolid, 
Portugalete and the Basque Provinces. This diversity demonstrates that native 
entrepreneurs enjoyed the same education and worked in the same spaces as their 
competitors from Genoa. Nonetheless, differences in organisational strategies arose 
when the entrepreneurs gained enough experience and participated in larger deals. 
Gentil began to interweave his social network with members of Genoese families, such 
as the Centurione, Sauli, di Negro, and Doria. These friendship ties helped him to 
participate in international banking operations, such as the circulation of bills of 
exchange to Lyon in the 1520s.587  
While Costantin Gentil was still in this learning stage, the dynastic conflict 
between the Habsburg and Valois devastated his homeland. 588  In 1528, however, 
emperor Charles V and the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria signed a contract in which 
the Republic of Genoa sided with the imperial forces against France. 589  This deal 
improved the economic conditions of the Genoese diaspora in the Hispanic Monarchy 
 
584  Maria Carla Italia, ‘Gentile, Costantino’, in Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 2000, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/costantino-gentile_(Dizionario-Biografico). 
585 Enrique Otte, Sevilla, Siglo XVI: Materiales Para Su Historia Económica (Sevilla: Junta de Andalucia, 
Consejería de la Presidencia, 2008), 143, 169. 
586 Ibid., 234–35. 
587 Alfonso Otazu, ed., Dinero y Crédito (Siglos XVI al XIX): Actas Del Primer Coloquio Internacional de 
Historia Económica (Madrid: Moneda y Crédito, 1978), 103–8. 
588 Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, chap. 6. 
589  More details about this condotta contract and an exhaustive historiographical review in Herrero 
Sánchez, ‘Sección Monográfica. La República de Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (Siglos XVI-XVII)’; 
Puncuh, Storia Di Genova, 347–50. 
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considerably and seems also to have accelerated the convergence of family alliances in 
Genoa. When Costantin Gentil married into the Centurione family, he became part of 
this process. 590  The Centurione was a Genoese group of dynasties (albergo) which 
included minor families of bankers, shipbuilders and merchants that belonged to the 
enterprising aristocracy of the Republic. In this sense, Gentil joined an economic, social, 
and politically influential network of people. For example, his wife’s uncle was Adam 
Centurione, one of the three men that dominated the public life of the Republic together 
with admiral Andrea Doria and the Hispanic ambassador Gómez Suárez de Figueroa after 
the abovementioned alliance of 1528.591  
Unfortunately, the information about Costantin Gentil and his role in the 
business of the Centurione family in the Hispanic Monarchy until the mid-sixteenth 
century is scarce. Most of the evidence comes from the works of Enrique Otte, who 
identified joint operations between Gentil and Benedetto Centurione at the fairs of Lyon 
and Besançon in 1548 and 1550. 592 In this sense, we can observe that Gentil was already 
part of the Centurione consortium in the turn from the 1540s to the 1550s, when his 
uncle-in-law and patron Adam Centurione seems to have started to retire from the 
frontline of the firm after a long military and diplomatic service to Charles V and the 
Republic of Genoa. 593  This was the moment when Gentil began to represent the 
 
590 Gentil married Maria Centurione, niece of the patriarch of the Centurione family. See Gómez Suárez 
de Figueroa to Felipe II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 7-8: Carta de Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, Embajador de 
España En Génova, a Felipe II, Rey de España’, Letter, (13 August 1557), 7–8; also referred to in Ildefonso 
Pulido Bueno, Génova En La Trayectoria Histórica de España: Del Auxilio Militar a La Preminencia 
Económica, SS. XI-XVIII: Grimaldi, Spínola y Centurión En La Empresa de La Reconquista, La Expanción 
Ultramarina y El Sostenimiento Del Imperio Español (Huelva: Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, 2013), 324. 
591 The three men used to collaborate to pursue their personal agendas. For example, Centurione had 
supported the appointment of Doria’s son Girolamo to the see of Tarragona in 1532. Their professional 
relationship, however, became a personal one when Centurione married his daughter to Doria’s heir. See 
Adam Centurione to Francisco de los Cobos, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1365, 229’, Letter, (21 November 1532); 
Salvador Miranda, ‘Doria, Girolamo’, in The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church. Biographical Dictionary 
(Florida International University, 2018), http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1529.htm#Doria; another example of 
the political and personal support of Centurione to Doria took place during the Fieschi revolt in the 1540s. 
See Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro, 46, 58–59. 
592 Gentil also operated by proxy at these fairs in 1554, 1556, and 1557. See Otte, ‘Sevilla y Las Ferias 
Genovesas Lyon y Besançon, 1503-1560’, 265; Otte, ‘Il Ruolo Dei Genovesi Nella Spagna Del XV e XVI 
Secolo’, 37; Elena María García Guerra, ‘Los Bancos Públicos En Madrid Durante El Reinado de Felipe II. 
Caracteristicas, Actividades y Relaciones Con Las Finanzas Municipales’, in Banca, Crédito y Capital. La 
Monarquia Hispanica y Los Antiguos Paises Bajos (1505-1700) (Fundación Carlos Amberes, 2006), 324–
25, endnote 34. 
593 Among his military services to Charles V there are well-known incidents such as the expeditions to La 
Goulette (1535) or Algiers (1541). He was also appointed as a diplomatic representative of the Republic 
and Charles V in the 1530s to Castile and France respectively. See more details in Rodrigo Rodríguez-Ponga 
180 
 
Centurione consortium in the Hispanic Monarchy together with other relatives of Adam, 
especially in financial services to the Hispanic sovereigns. 
In 1553, for example, Gentil offered a joint financial service to the prince-regent 
Philip to pay his lenders and arrears. 594 In the contract, signed in Valladolid on 7th August 
1553, Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola agreed to participate in an asiento that 
stipulated the payment of 500,000 ducats to other royal financiers. In other words, 
Gentil and Spinola forwarded money to the imperial cause while emperor Charles V 
repaid his other creditors on time. The prince-regent accepted this service to decrease 
the accumulation of interest for past debts, even though he also incurred new ones. This 
type of service was unusual because the sovereigns were linking their financial 
credibility to the ability of the lenders to fulfil their duties. Nonetheless, these 
operations had to be discreet and secret to avoid alerting the other financiers about the 
lack of solvency in the royal treasury.  
The introduction of Costantin Gentil to the frontline of the financial deals with 
the Hispanic Monarchy was simultaneous to the progressive withdrawal of the main 
royal lending houses in the German area: the Fugger and Welser. 595 While these lenders 
avoided injecting more liquidity into the imperial projects due to the difficulties in 
receiving their reimbursements, Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola prospered by 
issuing new loans to Charles V. The motivation for this activity between the two 
businessmen and the emperor, instead of accelerating a foreseeable bankruptcy as a 
 
y Salamanca, ‘Centurione-Oltramarino, Adamo’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real Academia de la 
Historia, 2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/71571/adamo-centurione-oltramarino; Giovanni Nuti, 
‘Centurione, Adamo’, in Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 1979, 
_http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/adamo-centurione_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/. 
594 Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 1987, 3: Los caminos del oro y de la plata:406, 482. 
595 The decline of the Fugger’s financial business with Philip II is historiographically linked to the bad 
relations that Anton, successor of his uncle Jacob Fugger as head of the firm, had with the royal secretary 
Francisco de Eraso and the generational shift of powerholders in Europe, which negatively affected to the 
Fuggers and other southern German firms. In this thesis, the following chapters highlight how Eraso and 
his political faction at the royal court sought support from the Genoese lending community rather than in 
the German lending houses. More details about this historiographical debate on political factionalism and 
generational history in Hermann Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en España y Portugal hasta 1560, Estudios de 
historia (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2000), 639–40; Mark 
Häberlein, The Fuggers of Augsburg: Pursuing Wealth and Honor in Renaissance Germany (University of 
Virginia Press, 2012), chap. 4. In her biographical entry on Anton Fugger, Sanz Ayán provides the 
introductory literature to the topic and stresses the discrepancies between Eraso and Anton. See Carmen 




result increasing unrepayable debts, seems to be part of a larger agenda to displace 
other lending houses. 
When the two financiers provided credit to Charles V, even though they knew 
that he could hardly service his liabilities, their intention was to gain the trust and favour 
of the sovereign for future deals. Their strategy was a success because the Genoese 
lending families managed to become almost the only financiers of Charles V in 1554, a 
trend that continued in the following years notwithstanding some sporadic financial 
deals with the Fugger in 1555 and 1556. Figure 3 illustrates this pattern based on the 
registry that the economic historian Carande made on the operations of private credit 
granted to the monarchy for the period 1552-1556. Although the field ‘Italian’ groups 
Genoese and Milanese lenders together, the presence of the latter was anecdotal. 
Despite the German resurgence in the later years, Genoese primacy in this sort of deal 
was already a fact. The credit operations of Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola in 1553 
and 1554, therefore, reinforced the position of their lending community before its rivals. 
 
Figure 3. Ducats lent to the royal treasury by the lending community between January 1552 and August 1556. Source: 
Carande, Carlos V y sus banqueros. Los caminos del oro y de la plata (Deuda exterior y tesoros ultramarinos), 3:478–
92. 
Apart from the credit shortage in 1554 that damaged  Charles V’s relations with 
his German financiers, the actions of Gentil and Spinola seem to have been part of an 
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own. Both Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola were close relatives of Adam Centurione 
and Nicolao de Grimaldo respectively, two of the most influential businessmen of the 
Republic of Genoa. Whereas the pater familiae remained in the metropolis overseeing 
the international network of agents, Gentil and Spinola channelled resources to the 
imperial treasury. In broad terms, Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola helped to displace 
German and Italian lending houses alike and reinforced the position of the Centurione 
and Grimaldi families as the main financiers of the monarchy. The agency of these two 
houses in solving the financial constraints of the sovereign was again necessary in 1558, 
just a year after another financial crisis that jeopardized trust in the king’s solvency. 
Besides the help given to avoid the collapse of the royal finances and protect his 
own investments, Costantin Gentil gained royal favour and a place in the regent’s inner 
circle. Gentil formally joined the regency court in Valladolid on 14th June 1553, obliging 
him to settle permanently in the Castilian city.596 Many of those who grew up with 
Costantin Gentil in Seville started to work in the royal court by the middle years of the 
century too. 597 Although the main studies on the Genoese financial rise emphasise the 
shift from trade to high finances, most of these houses continued their businesses by 
naming trustees and it is hardly possible that Gentil was an exception. 598  Finance 
became, nevertheless, his newest and most profitable affair, the top aspiration for 
someone with the skills and social position of Costantin Gentil. In addition, his admission 
to the royal court not only granted him a great honour but also offered him many 
opportunities for social and economic promotion. In this sense, the case study of 
Costantin Gentil offers the perspective of a private entrepreneur who benefited from 
channelling his family agenda through the royal requests for financial services. 
The official recognition of his service to Prince Philip demonstrated his financial 
capacity as a trustworthy businessman. This new role as courtier increased his 
reputation among other lenders and allowed him to undertake larger enterprises, like 
 
596 Romano, ‘Banchieri Genovesi Alla Corte Di Filippo II’, 14; Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 
1987, 3: Los caminos del oro y de la plata:406; however, Alonso García does not consider that Gentil was 
part of the court yet. Cf. David Alonso García, ‘Genoveses en la Corte. Poder financiero y administración 
en tiempos de Carlos V’, in Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528-1713), vol. 1, 2011, 256. 
597 An example of these colleagues was Andrea Lomelin. See Otte, ‘Il Ruolo Dei Genovesi Nella Spagna Del 
XV e XVI Secolo’, 36–37. 
598 Pike, Enterprise and Adventure; the Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World., 49. 
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those of 1558 mentioned above. Furthermore, Gentil gained access to one of the three 
main hubs of information in the Hispanic Monarchy (Valladolid, Genoa and Brussels). 
Being at the regent’s court in Valladolid meant having access to meetings with the 
Council of Finances and, therefore, better sources of information about the political and 
economic context. 599  The informal and circumstantial role of Gentil helped the 
administration provide him with news about the royal estate in Castile and allowed him 
to plan his financial strategies better.600 Therefore, he would know when it was more 
advisable to ask for debt liquidations and which royal incomes were the most reliable 
for allocating his repayments. 
His privileged position explains why Costantin Gentil held 14.88% of short-term 
royal debt, which amounted to 1.12 million ducats and had not yet been allocated by 
mid-1556. 601 Gentil was so confident in the solvency of the sovereign that he even 
suggested the consolidation of the debt that he held in juros in October 1556. 602 
Although his request was dismissed, his strategy was noteworthy and astute. He 
intended to obtain juros with a higher interest rate (10%-7.14%) than those the Council 
of Finances in Castile and López del Campo were considering for the upcoming debt 
consolidation (5%). If the royal officials accepted the consolidation of the outstanding 
debt that Gentil held, he and the Centurione consortium would have obtained 
trustworthy securities to pay their clients even though the process of securitization took 
longer. 
The strategy that Gentil drafted seems to have aimed at liquidity rather than the 
health of the royal finances. In this sense, his role in the process of state consolidation 
at this stage of his career consisted in helping his family agenda rather than aiding the 
sovereign to solve his financial problems. If the debts of Gentil were converted into 
juros, he would have obtained liquidity after placing them in the secondary debt market. 
Keeping those juros at high interest rates would help him to distribute the debt titles 
 
599 Another case study of a Centurione relative, Ottavio Centurione, has recently been examined, which 
emphasises the importance of being present at the royal court. See Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo 
de Oro, 95–100. 
600 The international correspondence among his peers was another source of information to employ 
during his stay at the court of the regent. See Doria, ‘Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo’. 
601 Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 73–75. 
602 Ibid., 76. 
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more easily. The accumulated debt that Gentil had engaged with the royal estate was 
linked to another debt with his own creditors. If the monarch failed to service his 
liabilities, Gentil and his consortium would find themselves without any liquidity for his 
creditors. In short, the problem was about maintaining the equilibrium between the 
credibility of both the sovereign and the Centurione lending house to avoid the collapse 
of the financial system. 
The consolidation of the royal debt by Gentil and the subsequent issuance of 
juros to be sold in the secondary debt market was a risky operation that depended 
greatly on the agendas of the prospective investors. The liquidity Gentil intended to 
obtain from that sale, however, required a lengthy process that consisted in the 
transference of property rights on the debt title to the new holder through the 
intermediation of the royal administration. In other words, it was not a bilateral deal 
between Gentil and an investor. The physical payment of that new holder, on the other 
hand, could also delay the dispatch of liquidity if its payment was earmarked to a future 
income of the investor. Therefore, Costantin Gentil could transfer the juro, but he might 
find himself without liquidity to service those creditors who had initially invested 
through him in the royal debt and whom Gentil intended to pay with the liquidity 
obtained from the sales. 
A final argument about the difficulties that Gentil would face if he decided to 
distribute his juros among his clients was that the acquisition of a juro did not grant an 
immediate royal income to back it. Indeed, the recurrent royal confiscations of American 
bullion in February 1555 and September 1556, left many businessmen with a large 
amount of juros without allocation compensation.603 In this sense, if Gentil seriously 
opted to consolidate his share of the royal short-term debt into juros, he would have 
had a problem to market them among his prospective new clients. The proposal of the 
Genoese financier was, therefore, risky because his reputation could be damaged if the 
juros he distributed were unreliable. In sum, his options were rather limited at that 
moment. On the one hand, he could wait for the monarch to repay his outstanding debt, 
a decision which would delay the repayment to his clients and thus compromise his 
reputation as broker. Another option was to consolidate his debt and begin to promote 
 
603 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 208–9. 
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juros to either obtain liquidity in the secondary debt market or replace his private 
liabilities with his initial creditors. In the end, Gentil realised that it was better to 
consolidate his debt with the monarch and secure it for the future with royal incomes. 
If the royal treasury accepted the issuance of juros at interest rates of between 
7.14% and 10%, Gentil anticipated that this would make them more attractive and thus 
it would be easier to obtain liquidity. In this way, the investments in royal debt that 
Charles V had initially defaulted on because he was unable to find an allocation to repay 
them when they were due could be transformed into profitable long-term incomes. 
Moreover, this process of debt consolidation would allow the sovereign to postpone the 
reimbursement of the principals in the short-term, which freed some liquidity to address 
more urgent issues related to the ongoing war. However, despite all the privileged 
information Gentil had, the Council of Finances did not take the bait and the financier 
found himself again in a very difficult situation.  
Since we know that Costantin Gentil was owed 1.12 million ducats in October 
1556, such a sum of money due was impressive considering that he had promised the 
monarch circa 2.07 million ducats between 12th March 1552 and 13th January 1556, a 
period of barely three years. Chart 2 illustrates how the royal treasury accumulated a 
gross liability of 2,752,197 ducats, once principal and interests (682,197 ducats) were 
grouped together, through 15 asientos with the Costantin Gentil. The annual interest 
rate of these operations, always based on Carande’s data, was nominal. In other words, 
each financial service agreed to include an interest rate in the contract that 
corresponded to that transaction. However, this data is not entirely trustworthy because 
each asiento was an operation that was subject to later changes, such as the 
transference of liabilities among lenders. In this sense, this chart intends to offer an 
initial approach to a much more complex situation since a more detailed analysis of each 
one of those financial services has no interest for this dissertation. The chart, 
nonetheless, sheds light on the recurrent activity of Gentil and his ability to supply large 




Chart 2. Asientos signed with Costantin Gentil (1552-1556) in ducats (left axis) and their interest rate (right axis). 
Source: Carande, Carlos V y sus banqueros. Los caminos del oro y de la plata (Deuda exterior y tesoros ultramarinos), 
vol. 3, pp. 472–97. 
Nevertheless, emperor Charles V was unable to pay back all his debts to 
Costantin Gentil by the time prince Philip inherited the Kingdom of Castile in January 
1556. If we consider those 1.12 million ducats of accumulated debt until January 1556, 
excluding any compound interests that might have resulted from the previous 
operations, the liabilities date back to June 1554. In the best case, Gentil held the royal 
debts for over two years, something impressive given the characteristic short-term 
period of asientos. As we will see more in detail in the third section of this chapter, 
asientos were arranged to be fully reimbursed, including interest, within a year after 
their signing unless the contract involved unusually large sums of money.604 The delay 
that Costantin Gentil experienced simply confirms how difficult the last years of the 
emperor’s reign were in financial terms. His lack of liquidity, mainly because of the 
French war, did not allow him to pay back either his principal according to the estimated 
schedule or the accumulated interest.605 
 
604 This tendency continued even in the seventeenth century. See Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros y la crisis de 
la Monarquía Hispánica de 1640, 61. 
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There were few options left to Gentil if he wanted to recover his money, 
especially after almost becoming bankrupt in September 1556.606 He left Valladolid in 
October 1556 and moved to Brussels, where king Philip II had established his court 
during the war.607 There were two important reasons behind this decision. First, the 
payments fair at Medina del Campo in October 1556 was delayed without a fixed new 
date. The general factor López del Campo and other royal payers, as described in the 
second chapter, were in no condition to take on the monarch’s debts. The uncertainty 
of the situation might have prompted Gentil to move hastily to Brussels, where he could 
more easily influence Philip II to order the celebration of the fair and resume the 
reimbursements on time. Nonetheless, his strategy failed and the fair was not held until 
2nd January 1557.608 The main reason behind this delay lay in the fact that the king had 
requested a delivery of funds to Flanders in the final months of 1556. His urgency 
diverted any resources available, even the money assigned to pay debts at the Medina 
del Campo fair. The monarch awaited the navy sailing from Laredo but, as the general 
factor López del Campo reminded the sovereign in December 1556, the Northern sailors 
refused to depart before Christmas.609 
The second reason why Gentil moved to Brussels is a direct consequence of the 
first. He wanted to be nearer Philip II so he could recover his debts more effectively. This 
decision highlights the lack of willingness in Castile, or at least the power of decision-
making, to satisfy the businessman’s needs. The new system of royal factors, officially 
established on 22nd September 1556 and intended to reorganise the royal finances to 
ease the flows of credit, came into action too late. Costantin Gentil was already on his 
way to Brussels when López del Campo arrived in Castile. The Genoese financier left the 
Castilian representation of the Centurione family in the hands of Luciano Centurione, 
who surely reported to Gentil the news about the general factor, though no reference 
has been found to this in their correspondence. 
 
606 This rescue was an exceptional case, though necessary to keep alive the financial and political links 
with Genoa. See ibid., 232. 
607 Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 75. 
608 Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y Contabilidad En La Real Hacienda’, 277. 
609 Most probably, the adverse weather conditions were the main cause for this delay, though it is not 
explicitly said in the letter of López del Campo. See Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 
129, 291’, Letter, (20 December 1557), 291. 
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Since the beginning of his appointment, the general factor had been 
subordinated to the funds that the Council of Finances wanted to grant him. In this 
sense, there was an intense competition underway between the regency ministers and 
the king’s man in plain sight of everyone. 610 The lack of funds that López del Campo 
experienced in the last months of 1556 attracted the attention of the many financiers 
who had been summoned to deal with him since his arrival, as observed in the second 
chapter. This precarious situation might have been an important reason for Gentil to 
decide against coming back to Castile. The innovative system of royal factors was useful 
for the monarch and his lenders as long as the economic policies of the regency 
converged with their interests. In other words, Costantin Gentil knew that López del 
Campo was powerless unless the Castilian regency and its institutions desired otherwise. 
As the financier had left precisely for this reason, it was senseless to return to Castile. 
These competences divided between the regent’s board and the general factor 
reflect two active parts in a power struggle. On the one side, Philip II tried to keep his 
lenders calm through the new system of factors. On the other, the Castilian institutions 
resisted the meddling of the new royal agent, although they finally adapted the new 
system to their own interests. As a result of this, Costantin Gentil, one of the most 
important financiers of the monarchy and representative of the powerful Adam 
Centurione, decided to take his petitions directly to the king. Nonetheless, the 
businessman ignored the fact that he had to wait until the monarch and the Castilian 
regency agreed a consolidation of the short-term debt before he could recover the full 
amount of royal debts that he still held. As a result, Gentil was left with no other option 
than to follow the policies of his family-in-law and help the monarch in his worst 
moments. 
4.2. When war knocks at your door: the Centurione consortium before the 
financial transformation 
The previous section gave a glimpse of the finances of Costantin Gentil until 
October 1556, when he moved to Brussels to try to convince Philip II to repay his debts. 
Although no personal records of the broker seem to have survived, Gentil clearly 
understood the political discrepancies between the monarch and the Castilian regency. 
 
610 Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y Contabilidad En La Real Hacienda’, 294–95. 
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These differences were based on the income ceiling of the monarch in Castile, which 
limited expenditures and any possible reimbursement of debts. This meant that Gentil’s 
creditors would not receive any money back unless their broker convinced the sovereign 
to pay. The delay of October 1556 fair in Medina del Campo to January 1557, mentioned 
above, suggests that the Genoese financier failed. 
That postponement of the celebration of the fair was directly related to the 
demands for liquidity in Flanders and Italy. While Philip II had requested 200,000 ducats 
from his sister Joanna in the autumn of 1556, the duke of Alva also demanded 600,000 
ducats for the Italian campaign.611 Obviously, regent Joanna could not service all these 
commitments and simultaneously have liquidity for the fair in October, even though the 
arrival of the American fleet at Seville could provide her with some additional funds. 
While the regent collected as much money as she could, the truce of Vaucelles with 
France signed in February 1556 was about to end according to the warnings of royal 
informants in Europe.612 
Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, the Hispanic ambassador in Genoa, warned regent 
Joanna on 21st January 1557 that the truce with France had been terminated.613 On 6th 
January 1557, French armies had invaded the south of Flanders while, simultaneously, 
French troops had marched into Piedmont and advanced along the Po river. 614  The 
economic strategy of Philip II and his ministers was to keep borrowing, using the unpaid 
debts as bargaining chips to finance the war.615 On 1st January 1557, the monarch had 
already foreseen the end of the truce with France and arranged an important asiento of 
430,000 ducats with the factor of the Fugger family in the Habsburg Low Countries, 
 
611 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 114, 226-232’; Duke of Alva to Juana of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, 
Leg. 144, 234’. 
612 French galleys at the service of the Pope Paul IV intercepted deliveries of supplies to the Hispanic 
troops in Italy in late December 1556 and early January 1557. See Manuel Fernández Álvarez, ed., Corpus 
documental de Carlos V. 4: 1554 - 1558 (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1979), 291–92. 
613 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 119-120’, Letter, (21 January 
1557). 
614 The duke of Guise led a French invasion of Italy to officially help pope Paul IV against the Hispanic 
armies from Naples. See Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, 266–70. 
615 Don Bernardino de Mendoza, member of the Privy Council of Philip II, was appointed to deal with the 
German lending houses of Antwerp, which in November 1556 demanded the reimbursement of 1.4 
million crowns that were due. These lenders only received good words and promises of a future 
repayment with 25% interest rate. It was clear that the situation was becoming more tense in the 
Habsburg Low Countries because of the lack of liquidity. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 703’. 
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Matthaus Örtel.616 This deal gave recognition to something that Costantin Gentil had 
sought for a long time: a trustworthy repayment plan of outstanding debts. In this case, 
the Fugger confirmed the repayment of 600,000 ducats from old debts. The 
reimbursement was scheduled to last eight years and the sovereign committed himself 
discreetly to paying 25,000 ducats in both 1557 and 1558. The remaining debt would be 
repaid in annual sixths, that is, 91,666 ducats per year. 
The debt recognition and its repayment schedule reveal two main points of the 
monarch’s strategy. First, he was not inclined to spending too much liquidity on the 
reimbursement of past debts; partly due to the war and because the payments due were 
an incentive for other financiers to keep lending. The monarch had to pretend to be 
solvent if he wanted to keep his lenders on his side and not against him.617 Secondly, 
Philip II was reluctant to facilitate a financial oligopoly of the royal estate in the hands 
of Genoese financiers, who hitherto had the largest share of royal liabilities. Therefore, 
the Fuggers won this battle to recover their loans, while Gentil was still trying to obtain 
that mercy. Indeed, this royal attitude towards banking coalitions was a common 
pattern during his whole reign as is pointed out in the first chapter. 618 
Doubtlessly, the war consumed the king’s available income and every day news 
arrived with demands for more funds for the defence of the monarchy. 619  On 21st 
January 1557, for example, Suárez de Figueroa wrote to regent Joanna requesting more 
funds (provisiones) to pay royal lenders. 620  In addition, Juan Antonio Palavicino 
Basadone and Negron de Negro, two traditional financiers of emperor Charles V, were 
now rushing the ambassador to pay back what the former sovereign owed them. A few 
 
616 Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en España y Portugal hasta 1560, 151; Council of Finances, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 30, 
3-4’ (Asiento copy, 1557), 30; the archival reference of the copy of the asiento is provided by Carlos 
Morales. See Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 68–69. 
617 This pretention was hard to sustain given that Brabant, the richest region in the Netherlands, did not 
want to give more money to Philip II until he abolished some taxes. As we have seen already, without 
trustworthy taxes it was hard for the monarch to borrow. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 741’. 
618 Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘La estrategia de la real hacienda en la negociación del crédito de los Austrias’, in 
Dinero, moneda y crédito en la monarquía hispánica: actas del Simposio Internacional (Dinero, moneda y 
crédito: de la monarquía hispánica a la integración monetaria europea; Madrid, 4-7 de mayo de 1999, 
Fundación ICO, Ediciones de Historia, 2000), 449–51. 
619 This lack of funds led to major mutinies in the Hispanic army, such as that of Hesdin. See Federico 
Badoer to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol, 6, 773’, Letter, (24 December 1556). 
620 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 119-120’. 
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days later, on 27th January 1557, the diplomat wrote again to regent Joanna to inform 
her about the fall of Valenza, a village approximately 100 km north of Genoa, to a French 
army that met with no resistance. Furthermore, the ambassador feared a possible 
encounter with the Papal army in Rome.621 With France advancing on two fronts and 
little hope for peace, rumours spread that the Pope was trying to turn Venice against 
Spain.622 Consequently, the ambassador, in collaboration with the political and military 
leaders of the Duchy of Milan -the cardinal of Trent and the marquis of Pescara 
respectively - began to prepare the Hispanic offensive, although their funding was quite 
limited.623 
Apparently, the military campaigns did not support the plans of Costantin Gentil. 
Two months after moving to Brussels seeking royal favour, the resumption of the war 
with France facilitated an audience with Philip II, but not to repay his debts. Although 
the monarch had already arranged the asiento with the Fuggers, it was not enough as 
the general situation, economically and militarily, was deteriorating every month. On 
19th February 1557, the ambassador to Genoa wrote to the king’s secretary, Francisco 
de Eraso, reporting that French troops were being spread around the territory close to 
Genoa, and the Republic had started to arm men to garrison the city and Corsica.624 
Moreover, he urged the secretary to order more money for Italy, once he realised regent 
Joanna was reluctant to accept his request without royal authorisation. More 
surprisingly, Suárez de Figueroa also outlined to Eraso that the Republic expected Philip 
II to assume half the cost of the defence. This assumption reinforces the 
historiographical concept that considers Genoa as an aggregated state rather than an 
independent ally of the Hispanic Monarchy.625 
Therefore, it was necessary to send new funds to safeguard the semi-
independence of the Ligurian republic. The threat to Genoa was real and simultaneous 
 
621 Although there was a temporary truce between the Pope and the duke of Alva that lasted forty days 
starting from December 1556, Hispanic high-ranking officers already foresaw a French invasion of the 
Piedmont in the same month. See Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1385, 
85’, Letter, (17 December 1556). 
622 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 119-120’. 
623 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Juan de Mendoza, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 148-149’, Letter, (29 January 
1557). 
624 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 4’. 
625  Herrero Sánchez, ‘“Una República Mercantil En La Órbita de La Monarquía Católica (1528-1684). 
Hegemonía y Decadencia Del Agregado Hispano-Genovés”’. 
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to that to Milan, which had been under siege since February.626 This dangerous situation 
risked two of the main strongholds of Philip II in Italy, who saw how his political 
reputation was at stake. Once the Fuggers had been tackled, the ensuing strategy 
required Genoese financial collaboration. The lack of liquidity had stopped Gentil from 
lending any money since his arrival in Brussels. In March 1557 he was already back in 
Castile, most probably attracted by the popularity of López del Campo, who had started 
to gain the trust of Genoese financiers there. Once back in the Iberian Peninsula, on 8th 
March 1557, Gentil arranged a large asiento in partnership with Adam, Benito, Bautista, 
Luciano and Cristobal Centurione.627 
This contract has passed unnoticed by most of the scholars who work on the 
royal suspension of payments in April-June 1557, perhaps because of the scattered 
information about it. Unlike Pulido Bueno, Ulloa considered the operation as a single 
asiento, a claim that is supported in the correspondence of the royal factor in Genoa 
Silvestre Cattaneo, in which he referred to this deal as an asiento of 800,000 ducats.628 
The controversial agreement promised bills of exchange valued at 160,000 and 640,000 
ducats. In return, the consortium received a license to export all the money, plus to 
recognise the 1.15 million ducats debt that the king still owed Gentil. The royal liabilities 
with Costantin Gentil had increased by 30,000 ducats since October 1556. With no 
contracts signed between October 1556 and March 1557, the increase in the royal debt 
can only mean a progressive accumulation of annual interest at 6.9%. This estimate 
complements the data used in chart 2 in Carande’s study, which reflects sharp peaks 
and falls in the annual interest rates of each new contract with Gentil since 1552. In this 
sense, the recognition of the entire debt with a relatively low interest rate symbolised 
an agreement between the monarchy and the lender. 
 
626 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 159. 
627 Philip II to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 516, 19-22’, Letter, (n.d.). 
628 In 2004, Pulido Bueno interpreted this deal as consisting of two different contracts; see Ildefonso 
Pulido Bueno, La familia genovesa Centurión: (mercaderes diplomáticos y hombres de armas), al servicio 
de España, 1.380-1.680: una contribución a la defensa de la civilización occidental (Huelva, 2004), 153. 
Although he corrected his position in a later work, Bueno still mistook the value of the principal; see Pulido 
Bueno, Génova En La Trayectoria Histórica de España, 332; Modesto Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla 
En El Reinado de Felipe II, 3rd edition (first published in 1963) (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 
Seminario Cisneros, 1986), 140; Silvestre Cattaneo wrote [...li ducati DCCC U -800.000- che V. Mta ha 
ordinato in Spagna a Fernan Lopez del Campo...]; see Silvestre Cattaneo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 
75-77’, Letter, (27 March 1557). 
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Leaving aside the historiographical discrepancies about this asiento, its 
importance for Gentil’s contemporaries was paramount. Silvestre Cattaneo stressed 
several times in his correspondence to Philip II how important this asiento was for the 
correct functioning of the financial system. 629  The royal factor commented that the 
general spirit among the Genoese businessmen was linked to the monarch’s ability to 
pay. The accumulated debts and the episode that took place in 1556, when the duke of 
Alva seized some private funds arriving in Genoa and forwarded them to Naples, had 
diminished the trust of many. 
The royal factor was also alarmed because he did not receive news about the 
departure of the galleys with the 300,000 ducats from Barcelona to Genoa that would 
hopefully smooth the social tensions in the Republic. Indeed, he warned regent Joanna 
and the general captain Juan de Mendoza, who was in charge of the Hispanic galleys in 
the western Mediterranean Sea docked in Genoa, to provide additional escort to that 
navy. France was mustering thirty-five galleys in Marseille, which could pose a threat to 
the journey from Barcelona to Genoa. Mendoza rejected Cattaneo’s plea since the 
galleys docked in Genoa were waiting to transport German mercenaries to Naples 
instead. 
This episode illustrates the divergent priorities and conflicts that existed in the 
royal administration. Service to the king was closely linked to private and individual 
interests that could jeopardise the duties assigned to each person. In this sense, the 
collaboration among royal officials was limited to whatever was strictly necessary. War 
priorities took precedence over financial ones, which eventually might mean the 
collapse of Genoese financial support for the Hispanic Monarchy. The agency of 
Cattaneo, a medium-ranking official of the royal administration, to safeguard Genoese 
interests reflects his close collaboration with independent entrepreneurs outside the 
royal administration. Nonetheless, Cattaneo pursued his own personal agenda, which 
consisted of preserving his position in the royal administration through the protection 
of the Genoese pyramidal system of lending discussed in the first chapter. In other 
words, the private agendas of high- or medium-ranking royal officials and independent 
entrepreneurs from outside the royal administration would overlap when they provided 
 
629 Cattaneo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 75-77’. 
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a joint service to sovereigns. Conflicts such as the war between the Hispanic Monarchy 
and France were catalysts for their activities, which accelerated the accomplishment of 
individual and family goals and contributed to the consolidation of the early modern 
state consolidation.630 
The actions of Cattaneo in Genoa and Gentil at the regent’s court resulted in the 
arrival of the navy of twenty-eight galleys from Barcelona with the 300,000 ducats on 
30th April 1557, after more than four weeks of anxiety among the Genoese creditors.631 
The repayments that Costantin Gentil had arranged with López del Campo finally 
materialised for the ‘contentment and happiness’ of all the Genoese and the other royal 
representatives in Castile. It took between five and six days to unload the gold and silver 
that these ships had brought to Genoa. Afterwards, the troops that had come from the 
Iberian Peninsula departed with Juan de Mendoza for Naples to help the duke of Alva. 
The duke had been organising the defence of the Kingdom of Naples since Papal and 
French forces invaded in March 1557.632 
The money from Gentil’s asiento was assigned to the cardinals of Trento and 
Burgos, who oversaw the defence of Milan and Siena respectively.633 Leaving aside the 
vicissitudes of war, the fact that no other asiento had been signed with Genoese 
financiers in the previous two months stresses the importance of this deal. Indeed, 
Costantin Gentil had achieved the recognition of past debts and could check by himself 
that repayments were taking place accordingly. In fact, the agency of Gentil helped to 
keep the Genoese financial community loyal to the Hispanic Monarchy. In addition, the 
asiento also reflected the effective and collaborative family strategy of the Centurione. 
From this moment until the second debt consolidation in November 1560, the 
subsequent large loan contracts for over 50,000 ducats arranged by Costantin Gentil 
 
630 The Centurione family analysed in this chapter, for example, were military providers besides financiers. 
Their complementary activities resulted in ennoblements and other mercies. Recent works have stressed 
this point, thus highlighting the role of private entrepreneurs from outside the royal administration in the 
activities of the Hispanic Monarchy. See Maréchaux, ‘Instituciones Navales y Finanzas Internacionales’; 
Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro. 
631 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 109-110’, Letter, (16 May 1557). 
632 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 159. 
633 Cattaneo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 75-77’. 
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with royal representatives were always made in collaboration with the Centurione 
family, whereas he managed the small-scale deals on his own. 
The asiento of 8th March 1557 was a success for the agenda of the Centurione 
lending house, which used to help the Hispanic sovereigns in moments of utmost 
necessity. The deal confirms that the monarch always tried to avoid financial oligopolies 
that could interfere with his policies. The hiring of Genoese businessmen rather than 
members of the Fugger lending house was in line with this strategy. Besides this royal 
policy, the Centurione family consortium was desperate to recover liquidity. Their 
situation was generally acknowledged in March 1557, when the king wrote to the 
ambassador and royal factor in Genoa requiring 150,000 escudos from them. 634 This 
additional sum of money was consigned to the cardinal of Burgos, Francisco de Mendoza 
y Bobadilla, who commanded the defence of Siena.635 The monarch’s messenger also 
carried letters for Adam Centurione and Agustin Lomelin, whom Philip II pleaded with 
to help him by providing the sum of money. The answers given by Suárez de Figueroa 
and Silvestre Cattaneo, written on 26th and 27th March 1557 respectively, illustrated the 
difficult situation of the Centurione family.636 
In their letters, the ambassador and the royal factor noted that Adam Centurione 
had long ceased conducting business on his own and that he had a large financial burden 
of unpaid debts in the Iberian kingdoms. It appears that Philip II was aware of this 
situation, probably thanks to Gentil when he was in the Habsburg Low Countries, yet 
still tried to encourage the Centurione to prevail and provide the service. Despite this 
pressure, neither Adam Centurione nor Agustin Lomelin were likely to risk their own 
patrimony, so the ambassador and the royal factor only received offers of a joint sum of 
50,000 escudos.637 Adam Centurione and Agustin Lomelin finally decided to provide 
some funds to pay German mercenaries, although much less than what was solicited. 
 
634 Ibid. 
635 The correspondence of Suárez de Figueroa reveals that the Mendoza family made the defence of the 
axis Barcelona-Genoa-Milan their duty with the sovereign. While the cardinal organised the land forces, 
Bernardino and his son Juan de Mendoza organised the galleys that patrolled the Western Mediterranean 
Sea and carried funds to Genoa from Barcelona. 
636 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Felipe II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 3’, Letter, (26 March 1557); Cattaneo to 
Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 75-77’. 
637 According to the ambassador, Agustin Lomelin was more merchant than financier, so his capability to 
raise money for the King was more limited than that of Adam Centurione. See Gómez Suárez de Figueroa 
to Felipe II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 3’. 
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Nonetheless, Lomelin provided 15,000 escudos and Centurione 2,500, which highlights 
how desperate the situation was. The question whether their proposal was sincere or 
the result of a punitive action that the businessmen wanted to impose on the monarch 
cannot be answered without further research into their private accounts. The delay in 
the arrival of the Hispanic galleys mentioned above doubtlessly became a dividing 
element that tested their collaboration with the royal administration and the coalition 
strategies of the Genoese financial houses. The Genoese lack of a union at this stage of 
negotiations challenges the idea of a lenders’ coalition, which scholars have pointed out 
lately.638 
In a letter to regent Joanna, Suárez de Figueroa let her know about the new 
agreements he was making with other Genoese lenders in Genoa, like Simon Spinola 
and Negron de Negro, which stresses the importance of private agendas in the 
community before the coalition strategies.639 Adam Centurione and Agustin Lomelin 
might not have been too willing to lend much money to the king, yet other financiers 
took their chance to challenge the Centurione pre-eminence. The situation was crystal 
clear, the richest financiers were starting to show signs of weakness and lack of liquidity. 
Those who had cash in Genoa preferred not to invest it in royal enterprises because of 
the distrust of the monarch’s debts at that moment. Furthermore, the reputation of 
Philip II was not only in danger because of his lack of liquidity but also because of false 
news arriving in Genoa.640 
The generalised disinformation and the few channels of communication 
available in wartime began to hamper the sovereign’s ability to keep borrowing. The 
uncertain situation led to loans being rejected, numerous clauses being imposed in loan 
contracts, and a reduction in the credit available. Both rich and medium-ranking 
businessmen were trapped in the same net with the royal administration. If these 
lenders abandoned their deals with the Hispanic Monarchy, the war could become even 
worse. Philip II realised that it was time to reform the system and enhance new flows of 
credit. 
 
638 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 161. 
639 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 104’, Letter, (26 March 1557). 
640 Silvestre Cattaneo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 46-47’, Letter, (4 February 1557). 
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4.3. Restructuring the financial system: Costantin Gentil and the old debts 
On 17th April 1557, Philip II ordered the regency government in Castile to 
consolidate his floating debt into juros al quitar with a 5% interest rate.641 This type of 
juro was not the only one available at the time. Previously, emperor Charles V had 
already issued juros de caución, which were insurances that financiers could enforce if 
repayments were not paid on time. Philip II ordered his Council of Finances to observe 
the use of these juros de caución, while the burden of the debt was turned into long-
term bonds al quitar at a lower interest rate. Although the orders were clear enough, 
the financial circumstances of the royal household in Castile impeded their full 
execution. The incomes for that year were not enough to cover the whole debt, which 
meant that the consolidation was partial, something often overlooked in the literature. 
The 1.15 million ducats of royal liabilities that Costantin Gentil held according to his 
asiento of March were also included in the decree, though the king could only transform 
this into juros with 5% interest, approximately 315,000 ducats. These new royal debt 
titles were not, of course, only intended to pay Gentil back. They were granted to the 
multiple financiers to whom the monarch owed money. The Fuggers, nonetheless, were 
excluded from the decree on 28th April 1557 because of their long-term services to the 
monarchy.642 
The interval between the royal order in April and its final enforcement on 10th 
June does not indicate the existence of a financial operation of Gentil or his wife’s family. 
Neither the regency in Castile nor the Genoese lenders desired to arrange new deals 
once the monarch’s decision was known. The restlessness in the Republic of Genoa was 
evident. While French troops had fortified their positions in Piedmont and plundered 
the territory without resistance, Hispanic and allied soldiers were badly paid for battle. 
The ambassador Suárez de Figueroa foresaw that such a situation could result in the 
outbreak of multiple revolts.643 The authority of Andrea Doria, a close ally of Adam 
Centurione, helped to temporarily calm the agitators. The ambassador was very familiar 
 
641 Philip II to Council of the Estate, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 32, 42’. 
642  Their exclusion was confirmed on 10th June. See Ruiz Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas durante el 
reinado de Felipe II (alternancias de participación que se ofrecieron para Francia)’, 116. 
643 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 109-110’. 
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with the situation when he read a letter from regent Joanna dated 28th June. The 
princess told him to prepare for protests after the consolidation of the royal debt.  
The regency of Castile finally decided to decree an initial suspension of payments 
on the short-term debt, which was followed by the consolidation into juros at 5% 
interest. The transformation of the short-term liabilities into long-term ones with a 
different interest rate spread panic in Genoa in the last days of June 1557. The heads of 
the lending houses received the first letters from their agents and dependant merchants 
in Castile reporting the new measure.644 Everybody in the Ligurian city became worried 
because of the upcoming Genoese fair of August, where it was possible that all the 
investors might want to withdraw their profits or even their principal.645 
The Genoese financiers, famous masters of bills of exchange, found themselves 
ruined due to their lack of liquidity and trustworthy securities. Some of the lenders most 
affected by the decree were Adam Centurione and his brothers, who had worked closely 
with Costantin Gentil since his earliest years as a financier. The Centurione, however, 
quickly set up a two-pronged plan to face this adversity. Adam Centurione pleaded an 
intercession before the monarch to the ambassador López de Figueroa, while also 
sending Costantin Gentil to the Habsburg Low Countries with instructions to convince 
Philip II to exclude them from the edict, as the sovereign had done with the Fuggers.646 
The relationship between Adam Centurione and the ambassador Suárez de 
Figueroa was based on reciprocal aid. The Genoese businessman used the diplomat’s 
institutional role to recall the many services he had provided to the emperor and the 
king in the past.647 For instance, Centurione had refused to receive the interest on a debt 
of 50,000 escudos from the emperor and was said to have lent that money in service to 
His Majesty.648 Evidently, the patriarch of the Centurione firm had pursued a long-term 
agenda. These services to the Hispanic sovereigns had helped his agents to enter the 
 
644 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’. 
645 There were four fairs in Genoa: Apparition Day (1st February), Easter (2nd May), August fair (1st 
August) and the Saints’ fair (2nd November). Each lasted for eight days, with the payments being made 
on the last day. See Pietro Paolo Scali and Ricci, Introduzione alla pratica del commercio (Stamperia di Gio. 
Paolo Fantechi, e compagni, 1751), 151. 
646 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’. 
647 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 81’, Letter, (23 July 1557). 
648 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’. 
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royal service and led to the concession of mercies such as the ennoblement of Adam 
Centurione as marquis in 1543.649 
The additional act of appointing Costantin Gentil as representative of the family 
firm at the royal court in Brussels reflects the fact that Centurione not only entrusted his 
complaints to the Hispanic ambassador, which would be forwarded to the monarch, but 
he also he needed someone able to discuss such matters at the royal court and who was 
personally committed to the family agenda. Costantin Gentil’s experience in the regent’s 
and royal courts in Valladolid and Brussels plus his marriage to a niece of Adam 
Centurione meant he was the best option to defend the family’s interests. 
These two actions, the use of an institutional link with the Hispanic ambassador 
and the appointment of a family agent to represent the firm before the sovereign, reveal 
a double negotiation. Whereas the former passed through the official channels of 
communications, the latter was more personal and private. However, both 
complemented the legation that the republican government sent to Brussels in that 
period. The Dux (political head of the Genoese state) and the council of Genoa (Signoria), 
having heard many complaints from people in Genoa, sent Juan Bautista Lomelin to 
represent the community in the Habsburg Low Countries before Philip II. 650  In this 
regard, it is important to note that the Centurione family sent their personal delegate 
alongside the official delegate of the Republic. This decision reflects the fact that private 
agendas mattered much more than a sense of community. Once again Genoese lenders 
did not necessarily work in a permanent coalition. 
Notwithstanding the private interests of the Centurione family in the legation of 
Costantin Gentil at the royal court, the role of their representative also acquired a public 
dimension in late March. Gentil had departed for the Habsburg Low Countries shortly 
after signing the asiento with the factor general at the regent's court in Valladolid on 8th 
 
649 Pulido Bueno, La familia genovesa Centurión, 116. 
650 Probably Giovanni Battista Lomellini or Giambattista Lomellini in the original Italian. The details about 
the legation in Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 79’, Letter, (18 July 1557). The 
Genoese ambassador was still in Brussels in November that year complaining openly about the king’s 
behaviour. Several times this diplomat called the monarch Nero and tyrant before other lords and 
ambassadors, which shows the dissatisfaction with the king at that time. See Michiel Surian to Doge and 
Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1080’, Letter, (13 November 1557). 
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March.651 Once in Brussels, Gentil joined forces with Giacomo di Negro, a spokesman of 
the Republic who on 18th January had been instructed to defend the interests of Genoa 
at the royal court of Philip II, especially regarding the military situation in Corsica. Once 
the notification of the debt consolidation arrived in Genoa and the Centurione 
appointed Gentil to defend their interests in Brussels, this private entrepreneur was 
back at the royal court on 30th July. While di Negro waited in Brussels for new 
instructions from the Republic to know how to proceed, Gentil followed the sovereign 
to Valenciennes. After returning to Brussels on 7th August, he left the following day for 
Antwerp. Gentil remained in the Habsburg Low Countries until 21st November 1557, 
when he returned to Castile.652 During his stay at the royal court of Philip II, two asientos 
with royal officials had an impact upon the operations of Gentil and his political family. 
On 19th June, barely a week after the decree that consolidated the Hispanic royal 
debt, the factor Silvestre Cattaneo agreed a new asiento with a Centurione-Gentil 
company in Genoa. The date of the contract suggests that none of the lenders had yet 
been informed about the decree enacted in Castile. 653  Since this deal took place in 
Genoa, Leonardo Gentil signed on behalf of his brother Costantin. This episode reflects 
the traditional strategies of financiers regarding the use of proxies, often relatives, to 
arrange business and their convergence with the private agendas of royal officials. 
According to this deal, the Genoese company had to provide funds in two places. 
The first was the fair of Medina del Campo in May, where they were to hand the general 
factor 100,000 ducats, which was also delayed indefinitely.654  The second place was 
Genoa, where they promised to deliver 25,000 escudos to Silvestre Cattaneo in two 
instalments: 15,000 in June and the remaining 10,000 in July. The proposed 
reimbursement of these sums of money sheds light on the long-term agenda of the 
company. Silvestre Cattaneo would reimburse the principal of 100,000 ducats to the 
 
651 Italia, ‘Gentile, Costantino’; Maristella Cavanna Ciappina, ‘Di Negro, Giacomo’, in Dizionario Biografico 
Degli Italiani, 1991, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giacomo-di-negro_(Dizionario-Biografico). 
Gentil's hasty departure to be in Brussels on 19th March is remarkable. The journey took him 11 days, 
which is not surprising if we consider that the journey of prince Philip from Corunna to Southampton in 
1554 took seven days by boat. See Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), 45. 
652 Italia, ‘Gentile, Costantino’. 
653 Silvestre Cattaneo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 34’ (Asiento copy, Genoa, 19 June 1557). 
654 The fair would take place in August of that year, but none of the participants knew this yet. See 
Hernández Esteve, ‘Guerra, Gestión Experta y Contabilidad En La Real Hacienda’, 277. 
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Genoese financiers in Genoa. One third (33,333 ducats) would be delivered twenty days 
after the Castilian fair and no later than the 1st January 1558. The remaining two thirds 
were to be paid either a period of six months after the fair or before 1st July 1558, 
depending on the celebration of the fair. Finally, it was agreed that the 25,000 golden 
escudos to be handed over in Genoa were to be repaid from 1st January and no later 
than July 1558. 
The repayment schedule of this contract specified that all these instalments were 
intended to be in cash and there would be no debt titles, which seems to have been the 
only way to convince financiers to agree with the international operation. In addition, 
this contract was settled without any interest added, at least monetary. These two 
details reveal that the Centurione-Gentil alliance wanted to provide a service to the king 
without revealing its own intentions. They emulated the financial aid without interest 
that Adam Centurione had provided some years earlier to the emperor. This was, of 
course, a continuation of the family strategy during Philip II’s early years as sovereign. 
However, Silvestre Cattaneo would not have consented to any asiento without an 
external order, which could be from either the king or the regency government of 
Castile. The order was intended to provide a last boost of liquidity to the general factor 
and the factor in Genoa. Therefore, while the Centurione and Gentil families tried to 
support the duties of Costantin Gentil and Giacomo di Negro for the recovery of past 
debts, the king prepared his agents for the suspension of payments and the immediate 
consequences of this, such as the lack of cash. In this sense, timing was crucial for the 
agenda of the lenders and the sovereign. 
Legally, the Genoese company was obliged to provide those funds to the factors, 
even though they were notified about the decree of debt consolidation after its 
enactment. The edict, fortunately for the consortium, only affected those contracts 
signed by 31st December 1556. This meant that the contract of 19th June was excluded 
from the financial reform. Since the factor Cattaneo surely knew about the debt 
consolidation before its implementation, the fact that he had agreed to a provision of 
funds before the announcement of the decree results is illuminating. The actions of this 
medium-ranking official in pursuing his private agenda, especially for the preservation 
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of his new position, overlapped with Philip II’s strategy to gather funds despite the 
shortage of credit after the suspension of payments. 
The second asiento that affected Gentil and the Centurione was signed with a 
Genoese lender called Daniel Spinola, a deal already mentioned in the previous chapter, 
a few days after the decree. In a letter to Philip II from late July, the ambassador Figueroa 
stressed that the contract with Spinola had cheered the Genoese lenders because they 
realised that the king had not repudiated his debts but simply consolidated them. 655 In 
effect, Spinola managed to have some of his past debts recognised together with a 
repayment schedule for them. In this sense, this Genoese lender opened the possibility 
of recovering the old debts that Gentil and the Centurione had claimed for so long. 
Nevertheless, the consortium was unable to arrange a similar deal in the following 
months. Their members still had commitments to face at the upcoming fairs of August 
and November. At that moment, their only hope was that their creditors would not ask 
them for full repayments in cash so they could avoid a declaration of bankruptcy. 
Reality became bitter again for Gentil and the Centurione interests, when Aaron 
Grimaldo, former agent of Adam Centurione, declared bankruptcy (rompió) at the fair 
of Milan. 656  This setback exemplifies how solvency and liquidity were two different 
things. For example, the Centurione remained solvent brokers in the sense that they 
could create new sources of income thanks to their good relationship with the royal 
administration, but they did not have the cash to pay their creditors back at that 
moment. It was not until early February 1558 that another representative of the 
Centurione consortium in Castile, Luciano Centurione, signed two asientos with López 
del Campo to send bills of exchange worth 200,000 escudos each to the Habsburg Low 
Countries. 657  This deal brought the consortium’s agenda back into financial play. 
Through this contract, Luciano achieved what Costantin Gentil had been aiming for since 
October 1556: a realistic repayment schedule of past debts in cash.658 Although this new 
 
655 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 82-83’, Letter, (21 July 1557). 
656 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 85’, Letter, (29 July 1557); Aaron or Aron 
was the agent of Adam Centurione in Milan from, at least, the mid-1540s. See Pulido Bueno, La familia 
genovesa Centurión, 115 and 120. 
657 The arrangement of these two asientos on 1st and 2nd February has been linked to the need for funds 
after the loss of Calais and before the French attack in January that year. See Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 55. 
658 The account of the interests due in ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 38’ (Report, n.d.). 
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operation benefited the consortium, other agents were undermining the reputation of 
Gentil before Adam Centurione. Did Gentil make the wrong choice when he decided to 
stand next to the king to facilitate the repayment instead of staying in Castile? This 
question has no single answer, especially because of the events that followed in the first 
days of March 1558. 
4.4. A changing world: Costantin Gentil and the new financial system 
Notwithstanding the actions of Luciano Centurione to recover old debts through 
the last deal made in February 1558, Costantin Gentil managed to obtain a great deal 
for his political family and the Genoese community on 3rd March at the royal court in 
Brussels. The Genoese financier reached a historic agreement with Philip II that radically 
transformed the financial system of the Hispanic Monarchy. Two major achievements 
should be highlighted in this contract. First, the official recognition of 1,300,000 ducats 
of past debts and a plan to repay them at the latest one and a half years later. This 
concession helped the monarch to recover his reputation before the financial 
community. If the repayments were executed according to schedule, liquidity would be 
restored to the fairs of western Europe. Second, Costantin Gentil obtained from the king 
the faculty of selling and transferring any payment (libranza) or allocation (consignación) 
contained in the asiento to other financiers. 659  This clause helped the Centurione 
consortium to minimise risks through the distribution of some of these future payments 
among prospective investors. 
This asiento has been studied mostly from a political point of view, but taking a 
social perspective of the individuals involved paints a different picture.660 Scholars agree 
about the fact that when Philip II accepted the conditions of this contract with Costantin 
Gentil, he was contradicting his own decree of June 1557 and overlapping with another 
asiento signed in Valladolid on 2nd March with Luciano Centurione that had better 
conditions for the monarch. His unilateral decision caused unease among his family and 
servants. The monarch upset the Castilian regency, which began to act on its own to 
 
659 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 56’ (Asiento copy, Brussels, 3 March 1558). 
660 Although this asiento signified a turning point in the financial system of the Hispanic Monarchy, the 
discussions of it in the literature are barely one or two pages long. An in-depth investigation on this asiento 
and its details is therefore still missing. See Romano, ‘Banchieri Genovesi Alla Corte Di Filippo II’, 246–47; 
Martín, ‘Un Expediente Financiero Entre 1560 y 1575’, 19; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado 




negotiate new asientos.661 This repercussion can be analysed from a polycentric point of 
view. The Castilian regency became more independent and initiated bilateral 
communications with the royal servants abroad, notwithstanding the superior authority 
of the monarch. This shows the absence of centralising synergies and the agency of 
multiple royal officials with divergent priorities, each trying to play their own cards in 
the same framework of institutional conflict. 
Apart from the political consequences of this deal, it also caused significant social 
wariness, as López del Campo mentioned in his correspondence to Francisco de Eraso.662 
The news about the asiento in Castile was not warmly received by the international 
lending community. The limited information available about the agreement generated 
fear for the excessive indebtedness of Philip II. According to this view, the king arranged 
two consecutive asientos on the 2nd and 3rd March, each worth 600,000 ducats, plus the 
bills of exchange worth 200,000 escudos agreed in February. The last time that an 
accumulation of capital of this magnitude had occurred was on 8th March 1557 with 
another asiento with Costantin Gentil, just before the suspension of payments. The 
panic that this contract generated was only smoothed by the active correspondence 
between Brussels and Valladolid. In turn, Philip II clarified that only the asiento of the 
3rd of March 1558, which was amended in the following months, would be in effect.663 
The general factor López del Campo explained how the royal institutions resolved 
this confusion in his correspondence of May 1558.664 First, the bills of exchange worth 
200,000 escudos arranged with Luciano Centurione in February arrived in Antwerp. They 
were addressed to Philip II through Lope del Campo, a royal factor in Antwerp and 
brother of López del Campo. Gentil rushed to nullify these bills by triggering a clause in 
his contract with the king according to which no other asiento dealing with the 
 
661 Philip II nullified the asiento of 2nd March and also another one drafted in May with Gentil, who went 
to Castile to reach an agreement with the regency. See Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 
243–44. This conclusion about the outrage of the regency towards Philip II contrasts with the comments 
by López del Campo about the unanimous support for the king's decisions in the Council of Finances. See 
Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 295’, Letter, (5 April 1558). 
662 Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 295’. 
663 There is a historiographical discrepancy about which asiento was finally enforced. Salgado argues that 
only the asiento signed on 3rd March was valid, whereas Morales observed that a new deal replaced the 
previous ones in the end of May. Cf. Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 243; Carlos 
Morales, Felipe II, 57. 
664 Fernán López del Campo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 232’ (Memorandum, May 1558); Fernán López del Campo 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’, Letter, (24 May 1558). 
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consortium’s old debts and signed before that of 3rd March was valid. However, the 
monarch was in urgent need of funds to pay his troops in Flanders and especially those 
in Italy, which were garrisoned in Milan without the possibility of discharge because of 
the disbursement that it would require. Therefore, Philip II avoided the litigation that 
would result from breaching the clause of the asiento with Gentil and instead again 
arranged a new one with the lender on 9th March for 600,000 escudos. 665 
In the new contract, most of the clauses from the deal of 3rd March remained 
untouched. The major concern in the new text was the bills of exchange that Luciano 
Centurione had sent via Genova to Brussels and their reimbursement. Gentil now 
accepted these letters, which became the first two obligations for payment (1st May and 
June) of the asiento of 3rd March. The remaining 400,000 escudos was to be paid on the 
first days of July, August, September, and October. In order to pay these bills of exchange 
back, Philip II decided that the 200,000 ducats already handed to Luciano in Castile in 
exchange for his bills would be used for part of the payment of the new asiento.666 In 
sum, the monarch combined the deals of 1st February and 3rd March 1558 into a new 
deal that granted him even more liquidity in the short-term. 
Notwithstanding these details about obligations and repayments, the core of the 
deals lay in the recovery of the old debts owed to the consortium. With the new deal of 
9th March, the 66,666 ducats of old debts agreed in the asiento with Luciano Centurione 
on 1st February were also modified. If in the meantime Luciano divided a share of his 
66,666 ducats among third parties, then López del Campo had orders to pay them up to 
25,000 ducats. The Centurione consortium was excluded from this as they obtained the 
full recognition of their old debts, which amounted to 1.3 million ducats.  
This combined asiento was the result of sixteen months of lengthy negotiations 
between the sovereign and Gentil since the Genoese broker left Castile in October 1556. 
During this time, the financier obtained a first recognition of old debts on 8th March 
 
665 A copy of the asiento with Luciano Centurion for the exchange of 200,000 escudos in Flanders in ‘AGS, 
CJH, Leg. 34, 63’ (Asiento copy, 2 February 1558). The copy of the asientos signed on 3rd and 9th March 
with Costantin Gentil in Brussels in Philip II, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 55’ (Memorandum, Brussels, March 1558). 
666 In the asiento of 1st February, Luciano secured that every ducat of reimbursement would be worth 405 
maravedis rather than the usual 375. With the new contract enforcing a value per ducat of 375 maravedis, 
the profit that Luciano gained on the price of the money dissipated. 
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1557.667 Unfortunately for him and his consortium, this was ultimately cancelled due to 
the suspension of payments.668 The terms of the new asiento were indeed similar to 
those of the fruitless contract of March 1557, the proposal of December 1557, and even 
the asiento signed in Castile on 2nd March 1558 with Luciano Centurione. 669  The 
structure of the deal reveals a hierarchy of priorities. 
The old debts, as could not be otherwise, occupied the first part of the contract. 
The total sum had increased to 1.3 million ducats since October 1556, which was a 
considerable amount given that the war was not yet over, and Philip II repeatedly 
insisted on his lack of liquidity and allocations to keep borrowing. If the previous asientos 
mentioned in this work are compared with the deal of 3rd March 1558, how could Philip 
II afford to pay back such a huge sum of cash? The shortest answer would be either by 
using the money of other lenders or enacting new economic policies. A more elaborate 
analysis establishes a three-step schedule of payments. 
The largest share of the four elements, 42.3% of the debt, was covered with the 
profits from selling the encomienda of Estepa. This administrative demarcation included 
the homonymous town and the surrounding Sevillian villages of Pedrera, La Roda, 
Gilena, and Miragenil (modern Puente Gentil). 670  Since Ferdinand II of Aragon had 
become grand master of the Hispanic military-religious orders in the late fifteenth 
century, the orders had been progressively dispossessed of their economic resources. 
The turning point in this transfer took place in 1523 with the Papal bull Dum Intra, which 
gave emperor Charles V total control of these institutions and their territories.671 
Bearing in mind this long-term process, the sale of the encomienda of Estepa was 
negotiated with the Count of Ureña in March 1558. Its value was estimated at 
approximately 550,000 ducats. Nevertheless, the Council of Finances in Castile kept the 
 
667 See the section ‘When war knocks on your door’ in this chapter. 
668 Philip II, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 55’. 
669 The asiento of 9th March does not repeat all the terms contained in that of 3rd March but just states 
that they remained untouched: [And everything else agreed with the already mentioned Costantin Gentil 
contained in the aforementioned asiento…is neither altered nor innovated…]. See ibid., 34. 
670 Luis de Salazar y Castro, ‘ARAH: Fondo Salazar y Castro. 9/295, Fo 79 v. Genealogical News about the 
House of the Marqueses of Estepa’ 1734. 
671 Hector Linares González, ‘La historiografía económica de encomiendas de las órdenes militares de 
Castilla durante los siglos XVI y XVII. Un balance bibliográfico (1975-2017)’, Historiografías: revista de 
historia y teoría, no. 14 (2017): 109. 
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sale open to possible buyers because its ministers wanted to provide a much more 
accurate appraisal. Gentil even offered 30,000 ducats to speed up the negotiations, 
which emphasises the importance of this clause in the contract. Indeed, it covered 
almost half the old debts owed to the consortium. Hence, investing some money to 
ensure a quicker reimbursement rather than waiting another year for the alternative 
payment that Philip II offered to the consortium was a legitimate tactic. 
Although Gentil and Philip II agreed to wait until July 1558 for a buyer of the 
encomienda, if the sale never came to an end the monarch would make the payment to 
the consortium in three ways: 250,000 ducats in juros at 7.14% interest rate; 100,000 
ducats in juros at 5%; plus 200,000 ducats charged to the general factor at the fairs of 
1558 and 1559. For the last payment, there were four instalments: 60,000 (October 
1558 fair), 30,000 (1559 Villalón fair), 50,000 (May 1559 fair) and 60,000 (October 1559 
fair).672 There was, nonetheless, a penalty if the encomienda was not sold on time.  
Philip II was to incur an annual interest of 9% on the estimated price of 550,000 ducats 
from 1st January 1558, which makes 2,750 ducats per month. 
The initial recognition of 1.3 million ducats of old debts – later increased to 1.4 
million on 1st May 1558 and finally estimated at 1.3 million ducats on 5th October 1560 
– obliged the monarch to seek new extraordinary incomes to reimburse this part of the 
deal, especially when the sale of the encomienda of Estepa failed and the consortium 
reclaimed their juros.673 However, in the second half of 1559, the encomienda was finally 
sold to Adam Centurione. 674  The acquisition of the territory with the status of 
marquisate reinforced the landed properties of the Centurione in the Republic and set 
firm foot on Castilian soil, thus accomplishing another long-term goal of the family.675 In 
this sense, Gentil participated in the state consolidation of the early modern Hispanic 
 
672 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 56’. 
673 For the increase of the old debts, see Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. On 
the final estimate of 1.3 million ducats, see ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’ n.d., secs 29–34. For the decision not 
to take Estepa, see Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’, Letter, (31 July 1558). 
674 A descendant of Adam Centurione registered this event in a memorandum to highlight the long-term 
service of the Centurione to the Hispanic Monarchy. See Juan Baños de Velasco y Acebedo, Memorial de 
la calidad y servicios de don Cecilio Francisco Buenaventura Centurion Cordova Mendoza Carrillo y 
Albornoz, Marques de Estepa y Almuña ... (Universidad de Sevilla, 1679), 
http://archive.org/details/A11214509. 
675  Once acquired, Adam Centurione transferred the rights of the marquisate to his son Marcos 
Centurione, who followed in his father’ footsteps with a military career in the service of the Hispanic 
Monarchy. See Pulido Bueno, La familia genovesa Centurión, 146. 
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Monarchy by forwarding funds and facilitating the convergence of the private agenda of 
his patron Adam Centurione with that of Philip II. 
Back to the reimbursement plan, another 23% of the old debts (300,000 ducats) 
was allocated on the benefits of the Casa de la Contratación of Seville. Part of this sum 
was reduced to a half according to the amendments of 9th March. These funds, 
nonetheless, were what remained from the fleet of the Indies after it had arrived in 
Seville in September 1557. The funds were still waiting in Seville instead of having been 
sent to the Habsburg Low Countries sometime in the previous months because the navy 
docked in Laredo suffered from bad weather and an endless mustering of troops were 
embarking for the northern front.676 This delivery of money to Philip II was already late 
by the time of the asiento of 3rd March 1558 with Gentil, something that complicated 
the work of López del Campo in the performance of his duties. In other words, the factor 
general worried about the scarcity of available funds to service any new requirement 
from the king or the Castilian regency, something that endangered his position in the 
royal household. 
The remaining 35% of old debts (450,000 ducats) was split into juros and cash. 
First, Philip II promised 250,000 ducats in juros with 7.14% interest to be charged from 
1st January 1558. The other 200,000 ducats were to be paid at the fairs of October 1558 
and Villalón, May and October 1559 with an additional 6% annual interest. If the sale of 
the encomienda of Estepa failed, the resulting payments at these fairs would have to 
converge (see table 2).  
  
 
676 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 292’; Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, 




Fair of October 
1558 
Fair of Villalón 
1559 
Fair of May 
1559 
Fair of October 
1559 
If Estepa was 
not sold 
60,000 30,000 50,000 60,000 
200,000 ducats 
agreed in cash 
(from a sum of 
450,000) 
60,000 30,000 50,000 60,000 
TOTAL 120,000 60,000 100,000 120,000 
Table 2: Payments in the Castilian fairs according to the asiento of 3rd March 1558 with Costantin Gentil and 
company. Source: AGS, CJH, 34, 56. 
Once all the repayments of the old debts were agreed, the asiento continued 
with the services that Costantin Gentil and the Centurione family offered to the king. 
The consortium promised to pay 600,000 escudos in Antwerp following a six-month 
instalment plan, 100,000 escudos per month between May and October 1558, which 
changed on 9th March when the bills of exchange of Luciano Centurione were used as 
the first two payments. In fact, this section of the contract does not differ too much from 
other asientos, stressing the timing of payments to make sure that the lenders knew 
when the monarch should have liquidity. However, the contract was full of special 
clauses that reveal how needy the consortium was and how the monarch configured the 
early stages of the new financial system. 
The first clause, for example, forbade the use of bills of exchange to make the 
payments in Antwerp. Instead, the monarch preferred liquidity rather than solvent 
promises of future payments. This assured Philip II a continuous and trustworthy flow 
of money that he could use to secure new deals with other financiers or promise 
payments to his armies. Nonetheless, the sovereign reserved for himself the right to 
request advances of these payments before their due date. In that case, the consortium 
could issue bills of exchange through its delegates. 
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This option enabled the monarch to forward financial instruments to third 
parties by committing not himself but the consortium instead. 677  Even worse, this 
method allowed Philip II to off-load any liability in case of failed payments due to, for 
example, the bankruptcy of the consortium. In that case, whoever accepted the bill of 
exchange that the Genoese company advanced would have to deal with the consortium 
directly, while the king and his reputation remained safe. This clause was, obviously, 
greatly advantageous for Philip II. 
Although the amount of the credit was agreed in escudos, the monarch 
committed to repaying it in maravedis in Castile with the supervision of López del 
Campo. Accountants in Castile used two different currencies in their books, though the 
hard currency most used was neither of those. These accounting currencies were 
maravedis and ducats, while the most common hard currency was the silver real, worth 
34 maravedis each. According to the asiento, the refund of the 600,000 escudos had to 
be done at a ratio of 405 maravedis per each escudo. This ratio was common in currency 
exchanges in early modern times. Following this exchange rate, the general factor had 
to pay Gentil 648,000 ducats. 678 
The Genoese financier obtained – the risks involved in the payments in Antwerp 
aside – good results with this agreement as the monarch had agreed to recognise the 
debt of 1.3 million ducats. Equally important was Philip II’s decision to help the 
consortium even further. He authorised the freeing of two allocations that Gentil had 
frozen in Castile after the decree: 70,000 ducats from the servicio of 1558 and 27,000 
more from the revenues of mines in 1557. Other Genoese financiers, however, were less 
fortunate. 
Such was the case with Luciano Centurione and Ambrosio de Negro, who were 
part of the consortium and obtained harsher conditions for their rejected deal of 2nd 
March 1558 with López del Campo in Castile. The general factor offered to repay the 
deal at a ratio of 375 maravedis per escudo instead of 405 – 7.4% lower than the 
 
677 ‘y si les pidiéremos sus letras para que sobre ellas se pueda anticipar el dicho dinero, las darán para 
que se cumplan a los dichos tiempos y términos según son obligados’ (and if we would ask them for their 
bills of exchange to advance their funds against them, they will issue them to fit with their timing and 
terms according to their obligations’. See ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 56’. 
678  An escudo was 405 maravedis, 600,000 escudos were 243,000,000 maravedis, and 243,000,000 
maravedis were 648,000 ducats.  
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exchange rate that Gentil received in the Habsburg Low Countries. In fact, Centurione 
and de Negro received just 200,000 ducats of old debts, an insignificant sum of money 
if compared to the 1,300,000 ducats that Gentile achieved.679  In other words, while 
Centurione and de Negro had to invest 3 ducats to recover 1 ducat of old debts, Gentil 
needed just 0.50 ducats to recover 1 ducat of old debts (see table 3). These differences 
reveal the separate agendas of the king and the general factor. López del Campo, now 
in close collaboration with the Council of Finances, preferred not to grant high sums of 
old debts to force financiers to keep lending. By contrast, Philip II, desperately in need 
of new funds and aware of the fact that the fleet from Laredo with 800,000 ducats was 
still docked in Castile, had no other choice than to negotiate contracts offering higher 
concessions. 
Lenders Ambrosio de Negro and 
Luciano Centurione 
(2nd March 1558) 
Costantin Gentil and the 
Centurione 
(3rd March 1558) 
Principal 600,000 escudos of 375 
maravedis 
600,000 escudos of 405 
maravedis 
Repayment of principal 
(in ducats) 
600,000 648,000 
Amount of old debts 
recognised (in ducats) 
200,000 1,300,000 
Cost per every ducat of old 
debts (in ducats) 
3 0.50 
Table 3: Differences between contracts. Sources: AGS, CJH, 35, 38 and Morales (2008), 70. 
Considering the differences in the bargaining capacity of the old debts and 
recalling the asiento signed in Brussels on 3rd March 1558 with Gentil, the conditions 
stated two payments for the remission of the principal. The first promised 300,000 
escudos in silver reales by the end of July 1558. This payment could be made in either 
Valladolid, Medina del Campo, Seville or Toledo, whichever pleased the general factor 
more. It is noteworthy that this part of the repayment could be split into instalments 
without a fixed additional interest. The second payment of 300,000 escudos was 
scheduled for the fair of May 1558 and could be divided into pre-approved instalments 
of 150,000 escudos to be paid at the October 1558 fair, 75,000 escudos to be paid at the 
 




Villalón fair in 1559, and 75,000 escudos to be paid at the May 1559 fair. A 12% annual 
interest rate would be charged in that case, starting on 11th July 1558. 
The key element of this reimbursement was that at least 300,000 escudos 
(324,000 ducats) could be paid during the fair of May 1558, unless López del Campo 
decided to split the payment as mentioned before. The fairs had been experiencing 
constant delays for at least two years, Costantin Gentil was aware of the risks and the 
possibility of further delays to the promised payment. Indeed, the fair of May 1558 took 
place in December of that year, although it was planned to begin on 11th June.680 As a 
result of this economic policy, the Centurione consortium had to advance money to the 
king before they could see a silver real. It was a risky operation for the financiers, 
especially bearing in mind their alleged lack of liquidity since the end of 1556, as seen in 
their correspondence with the royal servants. ‘Mysteriously’, they obtained enough 
liquidity to arrange the contract with the monarch. It is still unknown whether the 
consortium was investing future or current liquidity in this deal. They might have had no 
money at the time but the asiento served to attract new creditors and thus obtain the 
necessary liquidity to make the first payments in Antwerp. 
To make the consortium more attractive for investors, Philip II granted a license 
for the export of 624,000 Castilian ducats from the kingdom. Of this amount, 300,000 
ducats came from the Casa de la Contratación in Seville, promised as part of the 
repayment of old debts. The other 324,000 came from the repayment of the principal, 
expected to be paid in cash by the end of July 1558. The destination of these 624,000 
ducats was either Genoa or Flanders, whatever suited the consortium best. In any case, 
the arrival of bullion would reinforce the credibility of Gentil and the Centurione, as had 
happened a year earlier when the galleys from Barcelona arrived in Genoa just in time.681 
The inflow of precious metal was a public and visual symbol that helped the king recover 
his own reputation as a solvent borrower. Nevertheless, López del Campo disagreed 
 
680 Carlos Álvarez Nogal and Christophe Chamley, ‘Philip II against the Cortes and the Credit Freeze of 
1575-1577’, Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 34, 
no. 3 (2016): 381. On the hope that the fair would be celebrated in June see ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’ 
(Valladolid, 5 October 1558). 
681 See chapter 2. 
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with these solutions as he had advised against the exportation of bullion in his 
correspondence to the king since 1st February 1557.682 
Finally, the main beneficiary of the asiento was Philip II. Sooner or later, the 
monarch had to repay his old debts if he wanted to keep borrowing in the future. 
Surprisingly, he began to pay them back at the expense of increasing the costs of 
financing his enterprises. A quick comparison between the asientos that Gentil arranged 
with Philip II on 8th March 1557 and that on 3rd March 1558 show how the conditions 
became better for the lender. Whereas the king promised 1,150,000 ducats of old debts 
for a principal of 800,000 ducats in the first agreement, the old debts that were 
recognised increased to 1,300,000 ducats in exchange for 600,000 ducats of principal in 
the second contract. Hence, there is a ratio of 0.69 ducats of principal per ducat of old 
debts in the former and 0.46 ducats in the latter. 
In other words, Gentil managed to reduce the price of recovering old debts from 
1557 to 1558 by a welcome 33%.683 In this sense, the asiento of March 1558 was a great 
victory for the consortium, which found in the extreme royal necessities and the 
issuance of juros the solution to the credit freeze. The contract with Gentil and the 
consortium was, therefore, so important that the king sent three copies of this 
manuscript to the regent Joanna through different channels to avoid it being intercepted 
by French agents.684 
Nonetheless, the regency government and López del Campo immediately 
panicked when news of this asiento began to arrive in Castile, though Lopez del Campo 
was still waiting for a copy of the asiento signed on 3rd March 1558 on 5th April 1558. 
The general factor feigned that he was solvent with the financiers who knocked on his 
door, to avoid the spread of distrust, which could increase the cost of future funding. 
 
682 Ibidem and Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
683 In the calculation used here, the principal is divided by the old debts to show how much money the 
lenders should channel to obtain a ducat of old debts. Variables of different circumstances and timing 
have been considered, though the two years of negotiations is a single process because the asiento of 
March 1557 was never enforced. 
684 Philip II, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 53’ (Asiento copy, Brussels, 3 March 1558); Philip II, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 55’; 
‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 56’. 
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Meanwhile, he felt that the contract made in Brussels was impossible to fulfil, unless the 
king granted the general factor additional incomes and the right to manage new taxes.685 
On 5th April 1558, regent Joanna wrote to Philip II, having learned about the deal 
that the monarch had unilaterally signed with Costantin Gentil.686 It is noteworthy that 
the missive from the king to the regent arrived through the common mailing service, 
which turned out to be more efficient than that of the king. The representatives of Adam 
Centurione in Castile not only handed the letter from Philip II to princess Joanna but also 
warned her about the deal signed in Brussels. However, this was not the regent’s only 
source of information. Juan López Gallo, the royal factor in the Habsburg Low Countries, 
also wrote to her about the deal. Although Joanna had these channels of communication 
at her disposal and was in correspondence with the sovereign, no copy of the contract 
had arrived in Castile yet. This informal communication sufficed for the regency 
government to elaborate a draft of the main terms of the asiento with Costantin Gentil 
and the subsequent problems that it would generate. 
According to Joanna of Austria, Adam Centurione had agreed to service the two 
asientos signed with Luciano Centurione (2nd March) and Costantin Gentil (3rd March) at 
600,000 escudos each. Their biggest problem was not related to the old debts, as they 
would keep the 1,300,000 ducats arranged with Gentil, but the reimbursement of the 
principal. Princess Joanna warned Philip II that, even if the consortium could fulfil its 
liabilities, there were no allocations or special grants (‘consignaciones o arbitirios’) 
available in the short term to repay the financiers. The regent was honest on this issue 
with Philip II: the deliveries of money should be funded, being legitimate and safe. It was 
evident that the monarch needed the money, but when the time for repayment came 
and the royal income could not service them, the consortium would have the legal right 
to rescind the contracts and stop their payments. In this sense, Philip II could find himself 
without any available funds, either of his own or from private lenders. The resulting 
discrediting of the royal credibility and solvency would be a matter of time, which would 
surely hinder him from borrowing any more money in the future. 
 
685 Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 295’; Fernán López del Campo to 
Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 296’, Letter, (4 May 1558). 
686 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 166’, Letter, (4 May 1558). 
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In addition to this problem, the regent observed that the recognition of 
1,300,000 ducats of the old debts was to the detriment of the monarchy’s interests. She 
stressed that these debts were the bargaining chip that the king should hold to have 
access to new credits and financial services.687 Financiers were eager to recover them at 
any cost; hence these debts became the triggering element of the new financial system. 
Joanna of Austria suggested to Philip II that he use them as a threat to nullify the 
contract with Costantin Gentil, which she considered disadvantageous because of the 
excessive old debts accepted. At the end, notwithstanding the special clause by which 
the asiento with Gentil cancelled any previously arranged asiento, princess Joanna 
pointed out that these deals were actually being signed with Adam Centurione. In her 
opinion, the Centurione consortium was no more than a pyramid scheme that Adam 
Centurione governed. Even if her theory was plausible, it would still make no sense for 
the head of the Centurione to share the repayments with Gentil, as we have observed. 
The reference to Gentil as an independent recipient of the reimbursements of the 
asiento signed in Brussels, identify him as something other rather than a mere 
representative of the consortium. 
Joanna’s suggestions, therefore, were perhaps more related to a desire to delay 
the enforcement of the contracts rather than an attempt to describe the reality 
accurately. The regent would gain more time to find new sources of income and keep 
the old system working, which she considered safer and more advantageous for the 
monarchy. Indeed, she was not alone in her opinion. The Council of Finances and the 
State Council supported her and suggested that instead of handing the 300,000 ducats 
held in Seville to the consortium, it would be preferable to send them directly to the 
king. That decision would force a renegotiation of the asiento with much better 
conditions for the royal interests. This strategy of delaying the final approval of the 
contracts upset Adam Centurione, who directly blamed the royal ministers in Castile of 
discrediting him before the king by claiming that the Genoese financier had been 
deceitful.688 Such conflicts among high-ranking royal officials and private entrepreneurs 
 
687 ‘mainly because it is of key importance for what matters to Adam Centurione and the other Genoese, 
for whom rather than getting their reimbursements in full, it is preferable to entertain them and thus 
keep negotiating because these debts are collateral and security -prenda y seguridad- to hold them always 
pending for future services’. See ibid. 
688 Adam Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-90’, Letter, (6 November 1558). 
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thus complement and contrast with the view of collaboration between the latter and 
the medium-ranking officials examined in this chapter. 
Conclusions: 
This chapter has analysed the role of private entrepreneurs from outside the 
central administration in the process of state consolidation during a context of 
international conflict and financial crisis. Costantin Gentil was the first case study of this 
type of state-builder. His allegiance to the Centurione family, mostly based on his 
marriage with the niece of the family’s patron, Adam Centurione, led to him promoting 
the private interests of this influential Genoese clan at the royal court. In this sense, the 
marriage strategies of the leading families of Genoa, especially after the reform of 1528 
and the alliance with the Hispanic Monarchy, resulted in the convergence of the private 
interests of the Centurione and Gentil alberghi through a personal union of their major 
asset: their offspring. 
The patronage of Adam Centurione in support of Costantin Gentil resulted in the 
latter’s appointment as the main representative of the family firm in the Hispanic 
Monarchy during the 1550s, at the regent’s court in Castile. His actions intermediating 
between the private interests of the family and the royal administration demonstrate 
the importance of medium-ranking royal officials for their success. The Hispanic 
ambassador Suárez de Figueroa in Genoa, for example, repeatedly supported the 
agenda of the Centurione by transmitting their message and requests to high-ranking 
royal officials such as regent Joanna and the sovereign. The factores reales López del 
Campo and Cattaneo also collaborated with the consortium in general, and with 
Costantin Gentil in Castile more specifically. Both groups of state-builders, medium-
ranking officials inside the administration as well as private entrepreneurs, benefited 
from institutional and international military conflicts to develop their private agendas, 
which used to involve their families, as was also the case with the high-ranking officials 
analysed in the third chapter. In this regard, royal officials and financiers did not differ 
excessively since all pursued their own agendas. 
These three groups of state-builders channelled their interests through higher 
authorities in the royal administration. Conflict and negotiation, therefore, were at the 
centre of their careers. When Philip II decreed the consolidation of his short-term debt 
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in April 1557, these two elements became more evident. The recognition of old royal 
debts, for example, was a bargaining tool that high-ranking royal officials like regent 
Joanna encouraged the use of in the negotiations with lending communities. The private 
negotiation of Costantin Gentil or the asiento with Daniel Spinola in the summer of 1557 
illustrate that such negotiations between the royal administration and financiers were 
much more complex than first expected. Both cases reflect a lack of unity in the Genoese 
lending community, which showed itself to be more concerned about private agendas 
than the general wellbeing. However, the role of Gentil in helping Giacomo di Negro to 
defend the interests of the Republic in the Habsburg Low Countries also shows an 
awareness of public life and a sense of community. In this sense, private entrepreneurs 
had their own institutional backing when needed, something already highlighted in the 
first chapter of this thesis. 
Apart from the relations between royal officials and private entrepreneurs, it is 
important to stress the positions of Costantin Gentil and Luciano Centurione inside their 
own organisation to be able to arrange a repayment schedule for the old debts with the 
royal administration. Although both financiers were representatives of the Centurione 
consortium, the specific clause in the asiento signed on 3rd March 1558 concerning the 
primacy of this deal before any other arranged elsewhere reveals the existence of a 
hierarchy in which expertise and experience were better valued than blood links. In 
effect, whereas Luciano was a direct relative of Adam Centurione, Costantin Gentil was 
his nephew-in-law. The primacy of Gentil’s criteria before those of his homologue in 
Castile was not a matter of who made a better deal. Instead, Gentil was given greater 
powers than Luciano Centurione. Otherwise, the restrictive clause in the asiento would 
not have been included in the first place. In this sense, the idea of family business applied 
to the Centurione consortium does not necessarily mean a primacy of direct relatives in 
the hierarchical organisation. In other words, individual characteristics mattered more 
than blood in this group of state-builders. 
Finally, Costantin Gentil played a meaningful role in the ongoing process of 
financial restructuring in the negotiations with the factores reales, searching for 
alternative sources of royal income such as the encomienda of Estepa, and finding a 
solution after the debt consolidation. His agency in arranging the asiento of 3rd March 
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and the final conditions he obtained from the royal administration were another step in 
resolving the financial crisis of the Hispanic Monarchy. Another Genoese financier, 
Nicolao de Grimaldo, is the subject of the following chapter as he signed another historic 
asiento in Castile that transformed the way of financing the monarchy and securing the 
interests of the Genoese lending community. His case study complements that of 
Costantin Gentil, although both financiers must be considered as part of the same group 





Chapter 5. Nicolao de Grimaldo and the stabilisation of the 
reform 
The previous chapter analysed the relationship between Costantin Gentil and the 
Centurione consortium with the royal administration to illustrate how the private 
agendas of non-state entrepreneurs intertwined with state policies and the role they 
played in the state-building process. This chapter complements that analysis through 
the review of another case study, that of the Genoese financier Nicolao de Grimaldo, 
whose importance for the process of state consolidation started in May 1558. Gentil and 
Grimaldo participated in the construction of the early modern Hispanic Monarchy 
through the transformation of the royal administration’s financial system into an 
institutional organisation based on funded debt. 
Negotiation, the enforcement of contracts (asientos) and the protection of 
private property, namely old royal debts owed to the Genoese lending community, are 
the three pillars of this chapter. The two Genoese lenders and their respective business 
partners embodied informal institutions based on the values of reputation and cheat-
the-cheater enforcement, examined in the first section of this dissertation. In this 
regard, this chapter argues that those informal institutions collaborated with formal 
ones, such as the Factoría General and local officials, to ensure the observance of the 
three pillars mentioned above in a large polity like the Hispanic Monarchy. In other 
words, the central state was unable to protect private interests unless it had the help of 
independent entrepreneurs organised in communities. 
This conclusion is presented through four sections in this chapter. The first part 
introduces the reader to the origins of Nicolao de Grimaldo, who thanks to his deals in 
this period became ‘the monarch of the Genoese’ in the 1570s, until his arrival at the 
regent’s court.689 The second section deals with the first asiento arranged by the Factoría 
General with this lender and its immediate consequences. The third section builds on 
the analysis of Grimaldo’s new financial model and its long-term viability. Finally, the 
fourth section reviews Grimaldo’s participation in the last stage of the war with France 
 
689  On the importance of this character for the Genoese lending community see Pacini, ‘Grandes 
Estrategias y Pequeñas Intrigas’, 43. 
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and the following months, to emphasise his role in the financial transformation of the 
monarchy. 
5.1. The second stage of the financial reform: the arrival of Nicolao de 
Grimaldo in Castile 
When Philip II ordered the consolidation of his short-term debt in April 1557, 
royal officials estimated nearly 7.5 million ducats of debts. Nearly 5.2 million were 
earmarked to royal incomes to be collected between 1557 and 1560, whereas 560,000 
ducats were allocated for the period 1561-1566. The remaining 1.7 million ducats had 
no allocation and, therefore, were a risk for the monarch’s credit reputation.  690 The 
previous chapter showed that in March-May 1558 Costantin Gentil and the Centurione 
family agreed a schedule with the monarch whereby he would repay the old debts he 
owed them, which were 1.4 million ducats in arrears, nearly 18.6% of the short-term 
debt Philip II owed.691 Until that point, the royal administration had only paid back old 
debts in cash and, exceptionally, in non-transferable juros for the last deal with Gentil 
and the Centurione. 
The situation changed when military conditions required the assistance of new 
lenders to supply further financial support for the campaigns in Italy and the Habsburg 
Low Countries.692 Instead of cash, the royal administration began to offer transferable 
juros as a means of payment for old debts, a concession that renewed the interest of 
lenders.693 However, some financial groups found the new policy disadvantageous since 
it changed the traditional system of payments, which made their old contracts less 
competitive than the new deals, especially when it came to finding investors. For 
example, Adam Centurione complained to the chief royal secretary, Francisco de Eraso, 
in June 1558 that the new policy was damaging for his family interests.694 Centurione 
 
690 Hernández Esteve collated the estimates of different scholars, whose calculations pointed to circa 7.5 
million ducats of total debts. See Esteban Hernández Esteve, ‘Asientos Con Mercaderes En La Fi 
Nanciación de La Guerra Contra Francia y La Santa Sede (1556-1559). Las Cuentas de La Factoría General 
de Los Reinos de España’, in Empresario y Docente. Homenaje al Dr. Rafael Muñoz Ramírez (AECA, 2010), 
108. 
691 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
692 The loss of Calais in January was an important setback for the war in the North, especially because it 
made the invasion of the Habsburg Low Countries easier for France. See Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-
1559, 273. 
693 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 57. 
694 Adam Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-90’. 
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argued that Nicolao de Grimaldo and his business partners, the first Genoese lenders to 
enjoy the new policy, had obtained better conditions than his consortium for the rate of 
money exchange and the repayment of old debts. In this sense, Centurione encouraged 
Philip II to protect the private interests of his lending group, namely the old debts, as a 
rightful ruler should do. 695  In other words, Centurione used private channels of 
communication rather than institutions of justice to enforce the legal protection of his 
financial assets. 
The use of private communications was already a recurrent strategy for this 
financial consortium. Centurione employed a similar action when he sent Costantin 
Gentil to the royal court in Brussels with instructions to negotiate a private agreement 
of exclusion from the consolidation of royal debt in 1557.696 The repetition of this tactic 
by Centurione illustrates how informal institutions could interact with business partners 
without resorting to formal institutions, such as the Genoese government or the 
Castilian Royal Chancellery. The use of such institutions could be detrimental for the 
interests of both business partners since they could increase the transaction costs 
implied in the recovery of the old debts. 
Traditional literature on transaction costs defines them as all costs related to 
human interactions that involve the economic expenses of bargaining and enforcing 
contracts, decisions, policies, the collection of information and, especially, the expenses 
for the upkeep of a legal framework that allows bargains to extend over time and 
space.697 In this case, the transaction costs that concerned Centurione were related to 
the inequality of conditions among Genoese lenders to recover old debts. The 
arrangement of more advantageous deals for some individuals risked the integrity of the 
Genoese coalition, which was based on the system of cheat-the-cheater enforcement.698 
This organisational model punished those business partners in the coalition who might 
take advantage of their fellows. Avner Greif already found this social strategy in 
 
695 ‘Ho ben fede che per quanto tocca all’interesse mio et delle mei, che Sua Maestà li debba dare quella 
provisione che a un tanto et cosí giusto et Católico Principe si conviene [...]’, see ibid. 
696 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’. 
697 For related definitions of transaction costs see North, ‘Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of 
Merchant Empires’, 24; Dahlman, ‘The Problem of Externality’, 148. 
698 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell, 36. 
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medieval informal institutions, which he linked to a mechanism of reputation based on 
an efficient system of correspondence that applied that coercion.699 
The importance of reputation in the Genoese lending community was evident, 
given how Adam Centurione stressed his twenty-nine years of continued service to the 
Hispanic sovereigns in his letter to Eraso.700 Following Greif’s conclusions, the long-term 
career of Centurione in the service of Charles V and Philip II had made of him a 
trustworthy business partner for other Genoese lenders. If other fellows like Nicolao de 
Grimaldo obtained better conditions in the recovery of the old royal debts, this could be 
detrimental for the reputation of his consortium. In other words, the new royal policy 
regarding the issuance of transferable juros could destabilise the relationships among 
Genoese lenders and make some of them more attractive to work with than others. 
The recovery of the old royal debts was the pivotal piece around which the 
Genoese lending community negotiated with Philip II. The fact that Nicolao de Grimaldo 
was the first beneficiary of a more advantageous repayment schedule and conditions 
outraged Adam Centurione. Notwithstanding the important role of Grimaldo in this 
phase of the financial reform of the royal administration, the Genoese financier is a 
character whose life is surrounded by contradictory information. The large number of 
people with the same name in the Genoese community and the considerable number 
of relatives named after him in his family make this lender a difficult one to trace.701  
His name is quite often used for two different lenders to Emperor Charles V, yet 
he did not join the royal court before 1544. This detail means that Grimaldo began to 
participate, at least as the main lender in the loan and money exchange contracts almost 
forty years after Adam Centurione and ten years after Costantin Gentil.702 As a result of 
 
699 Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade’, 530. 
700 ‘[...] si potrebbono dire molte raggione, ma per non dar a Vostra Signoria Illustrisima tanto travaglio, 
ne dirò solamente alcune, nè tacerò che in 29 anni ch’io posso dir che di continouo ho servito 
all’Imperatore et a Sua Maestà [...]’, see Adam Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-
90’. 
701  Calogero Farinella, ‘Grimaldi, Nicolò’, in Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, 2002, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/nicolo-grimaldi_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/. 
702 Alonso García, ‘Genoveses En La Corte, Poder Financiero y Administracion En Tiempos de Carlos V’, 
256; although Adam Centurione began to serve at the Castilian court in 1505 according to Alonso García, 
the Genoese financier in 1558 claimed he had 29 years of continuous service, meaning that he actually 
entered as regular financier of the monarch in 1529 rather than in the early 1500s. See Adam Centurione 
to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-90’. 
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this progression, a generation of Genoese entrepreneurs who served the emperor 
between the 1530s and 1540s was responsible for enforcing the transition to the 
Hispanic Monarchy’s new financial model in the late 1550s. 
The high mobility of Gentil and Grimaldo between Castile, the Habsburg Low 
Countries, and Genoa demonstrates their experience in financial deals and helps to 
explain the multiple contacts that they had inside and outside their community. The 
importance of the Centurione family is reflected in the family links of these businessmen. 
If Gentil had joined the branch of Adam Centurion Oltramarino by marrying his niece, 
Nicolao de Grimaldo was the son of Bettina Centurione Becchignone, who belonged to 
another branch of the Centurione albergo, and Agustin Grimaldo.703  
A vast experience in business with excellent contacts was required to become 
part of the Genoese elite that facilitated the new financial system. Nicolao de Grimaldo, 
who was born around 1512, dedicated his earliest steps to a commercial career 
alongside his half-brothers Lazaro and Paolo.704  During his youth, Grimaldo learnt the 
basics of finances to finally master the circulation of bills of exchange with London, 
Seville, Genoa, and Madrid.705 His promising career helped him to marry Giuglia Ceva, a 
descendant of another branch of the Centurione.706 His decision to marry a Ceva woman 
allowed him to enlarge his influence in the high society of the Republic of Genoa, a 
common strategy among its elites.707  
 
703 Luis de Salazar y Castro, ‘ARAH: Fondo Salazar y Castro. 9/302, Fo 209: Genealogic Tree of the Grimaldo 
Family’ 1734; Calogero Farinella, Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, vol. 59, 84 vols (Istituto della 
Enciclopedia italiana, 2002). 
704 A letter written by his son-in-law reveals the age of this prominent figure in Genoese history and, 
therefore, his date of birth. See Sinibaldo Doria to Philip II, ‘AGS, CCA, DIV, 48, 13’, October 1582; the 
letter contradicts Farinella’s entry, which suggests the birth of Nicolao de Grimaldo around 1500. See 
Farinella, ‘Grimaldi, Nicolò’. 
705 Farinella, ‘Grimaldi, Nicolò’; Maristella Cavanna Ciappina, ‘Grimaldi, Agostino’, in Dizionario Biografico 
Degli Italiani, 2002, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/agostino-grimaldi_%28Dizionario-
Biografico%29/. 
706 Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro, 46. 
707  Rafael María Girón Pascual, ‘Exogamia, endogamia e ilegitimidad: estrategias familiares de los 
mercaderes genoveses de Granada durante la Edad Moderna (ss. XVI-XVIII)’, Historia y Genealogía, no. 3 
(2013): 83–98. The Cibo or Ceva family was one of the new alberghi included in the political agreement of 
1528. The rise of this family was linked to their control over the archbishopric of Genoa, an important 
source of funding and political influence. For further information of this family, see Sanz Ayán, Un 
banquero en el Siglo de Oro, 45. 
224 
 
His union with the Ceva family attracted other houses to marry their offspring to 
the descendants of Nicolao de Grimaldo, such as the Doria, Spinola, and Lomelin. Once 
these people joined the house of Grimaldo, they began to work for him in a similar way 
to the Gentil-Centurione consortium. Instead of being the member of the alliance who 
headed the contracts (e.g. Costantin Gentil, Luciano Centurione), Nicolao de Grimaldo 
preferred to be the only one represented in the deal, although he later used the services 
of relatives. Some relevant examples of family partners for the period of study were 
Felipe Spinola in Castile and Esteban Lomelin at the fairs of Besançon. Tomasso Ragio, 
an associated agent, represented Nicolao in Antwerp. 708  In addition, Nicolao de 
Grimaldo not only employed his political sons but his half-brothers too. Lazaro and Paolo 
managed the Genoa-Milan axis during the financial transformation.709 
All this social capital allowed Nicolao de Grimaldo to keep close contact with the 
main centres of power in the Hispanic Monarchy and the main financial hubs through 
which capital and information flowed in western Europe. That interconnection kept him 
informed about what affected royal finances, such as the offers the Gentil-Centurione 
consortium was proposing to Philip II for recovering their old debts. Logically, Grimaldo 
also showed his concern about obtaining his reimbursement, especially after the delay 
of the August fair in Besançon until September 1557.710 Nicolao de Grimaldo’s strategy 
was quite different from that of Costantin Gentil. Instead of negotiating with the king in 
Brussels or sending a delegate to Castile, Grimaldo resorted to a medium-ranking royal 
official, the factor in Genoa Silvestre Cattaneo, and demanded to be compensated in a 
different way. In this sense, Grimaldo used the same tactics as his Centurione relatives 
regarding the collaboration between private entrepreneurs and medium-ranking 
officials. 
 
708 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 137, 276-277’, Letter, (10 October 1588); most 
probably, Felipe Spinola did not work for Nicolao de Grimaldo until the first months of 1558 because in 
August 1557, he was part of a company with Tomas Spinola and Hector Doria. See Gómez Suárez de 
Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg 1386, 61-62’, Letter, (8 July 1557). 
709  Silvestre Cattaneo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 147-148’, Letter, (25 September 1557); by 
December of that year, Lazaro de Grimaldo seems to have been in the service of the royal factor Silvestre 
Cattaneo in Antwerp as an informant. See Silvestre Cattaneo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 
24’, Letter, (12 March 1557). 
710 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg 1386, 61-62’. 
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Grimaldo negotiated a contract in the late summer of 1557 in which he promised 
30,000 escudos to don Juan de Figueroa and the treasurer Nicolas Cid, royal purveyors 
in the defence of Milan. 711  The Genoese lender only delivered 25,000, while the 
remaining 5,000 escudos were procured by the monarch as a partial reimbursement of 
old debts still owed to Grimaldo. These debts came from a previous deal that Philip II 
had arranged with Grimaldo and another Genoese financier called Angelo Juan Spinola. 
Through this stratagy, Nicolao de Grimaldo used the debts he was owed to provide a 
new asiento. Suárez de Figueroa, the Hispanic ambassador in Genoa, explained to Philip 
II the legal problem that this situation generated because the officials still had to repay 
the entire sum of 30,000 escudos to Grimaldo.712 Silvestre Cattaneo, who managed the 
operation, was not allowed to decide whether it was licit or not to accept payment in 
old debts owed. The instructions he received from the monarch, once he took his charge, 
did not mention that possibility.713 Nevertheless, the situation was adverse enough to 
enforce the deal. 714  The ambassador lamented that the contract could have been 
avoided if the galleys carrying money from Barcelona to Genoa had arrived on time. 
The repayment of that ‘mixed’ asiento was delayed until November 1557 and it 
was charged to the general factor in Castile, López del Campo, making him an accomplice 
to this technically illegal contract.715 Nicolao de Grimaldo and Silvestre Cattaneo agreed 
that the 30,000 escudos would equal 32,000 Castilian ducats and that the final 
reimbursement, including interests, would total 43,000 ducats.  716  This means that 
11,000 ducats were the interest charged for this operation, which results in a 34.375% 
interest rate on the principal valued at 32,000 ducats. Cattaneo, aware of the 
 
711 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 60’, Letter, (10 February 1557). 
712 ‘[...] the factor would disagree on this because he had no commission from His Majesty to accept old 
debts [...]’, in ibid. 
713 Cattaneo was appointed royal factor in December 1556. See Federico Badoer to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 760’, Letter, (13 December 1556). 
714 The French fortress of Saint Quintin, a geostrategic location within French territory and close to Paris, 
was taken by Hispanic troops on 27th August 1557. Heny II of France mobilised his entire kingdom before 
the threat to Paris. Once the new border was fortified, the French monarch launched a counter-offensive 
on all fronts, including Piedmont, which considerably reduced the funds available in the Hispanic 
Monarchy. More details in chapter 3 and Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 
6, 1004’, Letter, (28 August 1557); Giacomo Soranzo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 
1055’, Letter, (10 April 1557). 
715 Silvestre Cattaneo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 152’, Letter, (13 November 1557). 
716 ‘I ordered in Spain that for the 32,000 ducats, I must receive 43,000 ducats of which Your Majesty 
might issue to me a bill of exchange charged against the factor (general) López del Campo’ in ibid. 
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exceptionality of this operation and with an eye on his own career and agenda, 
explained in his letter to Philip II how deeply indebted he was and the reasons that led 
him to accept this apparently disadvantageous deal. The behaviour of this medium-
ranking official is identical to that of López del Campo observed in the second chapter 
of this dissertation. 
Notwithstanding the profits that the Genoese financier earned from this asiento 
with the Italian royal officials, Nicolao de Grimaldo only obtained 5,333 ducats of old 
debts. If compared to the debts recognised by the monarch through an asiento with 
Costantin Gentil on 3rd March 1557, which were estimated at 1.15 million ducats, the 
sum promised to Grimaldo was irrelevant. Although the deals made by Gentil and 
Grimaldo were eight months apart, the debts owed to Gentil and his consortium were 
still due, notwithstanding the consolidation of short-term debt enforced between April 
and June. In other words, both financiers had the same goal: the recovery of past debts. 
The decree of debt consolidation, however, had distorted the financial market and the 
reimbursement promised to Grimaldo in Castile encountered many difficulties. 
Although Silvestre Cattaneo asked the king to forward the orders of payment for 
the deal with Grimaldo to López del Campo and the Council of Finances in Castile, the 
general factor reported worrying news to Philip II in December 1557. The Castilian factor 
wrote that he only accepted bills of exchange from Silvestre Cattaneo valued at 20,000 
ducats for the fair of October 1557 in Medina del Campo, which was finally celebrated 
in January 1558.717 Hence, it seems unlikely that the Council of Finances accepted all 
these bills of exchange from Silvestre Cattaneo because of the simultaneous requests of 
money from Philip II. The royal ministers were collecting as many funds as they could to 
send them to Philip II through the navy docked in Laredo, which meant a minimisation 
of the payments charged to the Castilian estate.718 As a result of the divergent agendas 
of Cattaneo and López del Campo, when the general factor attended the fair of Medina 
del Campo he did not have enough liquidity to service the debts Silvestre Cattaneo had 
forwarded to him. 
 
717 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 291’. 
718 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 294’. 
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The royal factor in Genoa found himself with no credibility before Nicolao de 
Grimaldo after the failed fair of January 1558 in Castile. Once again, royal 
representatives had had to adapt themselves to the circumstances and worked 
independently from the monarch and his central institutions. This example illustrates a 
lack of collaboration, which was inherent to the financial system of the monarchy. The 
involvement of many agents and institutions hindered any successful outcome, 
especially if their shared operations were international. Therefore, Grimaldo already 
knew about the rejected bill of exchange in Castile by February 1558, which encouraged 
him to change his strategy regarding the recovery of old debts. 
The failure of Silvestre Cattaneo made him useless to any Genoese financier who 
wanted to recover the royal debts consolidated in the decree of June 1557. If Grimaldo 
wanted to recover them more easily, he had to move to another node of the monarchy 
with greater decision-making power. The news about the recognition of 66,666 ducats 
from old debts, which Luciano Centurione arranged in Castile on 1st February 1558, may 
have triggered Nicolao de Grimaldo’s final decision to move to Castile.  719 His choice to 
move to Castile, rather than Brussels, indicates where the Genoese lender thought the 
actual centre of power was. The independent decisions the regent government carried 
out in the asiento of 2nd March 1558, already mentioned in the previous chapter, proved 
to Grimaldo that he was not mistaken. 
The Genoese financier found on his arrival a regency in conflict with Philip II and 
a sceptical community of lenders. The ability of the monarch to repay his debts was in 
doubt, especially after the deals with the Gentil-Centurione consortium and the taking 
of Calais by French forces. 720  Simultaneously, the triangular system of the Factoría 
General gave an impression of dysfunction because of the competition among factores 
reales, which encouraged López del Campo to suggest the centralisation of the 
institution around him. 721  This political, military, and financial instability prompted 
 
719 A last letter written from Genoa to the Duke of Florence confirms this detail. See Nicolao de Grimaldo 
to Cosimo I of Medici, ‘ASF, MP, Filze 477, Doc. 282’, Letter, (20 February 1558). 
720 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 292’, Letter, (2 February 1558). On the loss of 
Calais in January 1558 see Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1129’, Letter, 
(8 January 1558). 
721 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 220’; Fernán López del Campo to Francisco de 
Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 295’. 
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widespread distrust towards the reputation of Philip II, which López del Campo 
acknowledged when he wrote to the monarch on 24th May 1558.722 
The numerous contradictions and modifications regarding the last asiento with 
the Gentil-Centurione consortium of March 1558, which finally recognised 1,400,000 
ducats of old debts, hampered any new deal until 22nd May. On that day, the general 
factor signed a great asiento valued at one million ducats with Nicolao de Grimaldo. This 
contract was a point of no return in the financial transformation of the Hispanic 
Monarchy because of two main characteristics. First, it provided the largest amount of 
money that anyone had mobilised for the king since the suspension of payments in June 
1557. Second, unlike the asiento signed with the Gentil-Centurione consortium, which 
reimbursed old debts both in cash and in non-transferable juros, the deal with Grimaldo 
reimbursed his share of old debts entirely in juros al quitar that could be sold to third 
parties. 
5.2. The recovery of the old debts: a new asiento with Nicolao de Grimaldo 
and the importance of distributing investments 
The asiento has been the object of several studies since the 1940s, when the 
Italian historian Ruggiero Romano mentioned it for the first time to illustrate the 
advantageous conditions that the Genoese businessmen enjoyed for their services.723 
Since then, multiple authors have examined it from different perspectives. In the late 
1960s, Ruiz Martín emphasised the role of the asiento in the transformation of the juros 
at 5% interest, which the princess regent Joanna had decreed in June 1557, into new 
ones with higher rates. 724  Twenty years later, the focus moved to the military and 
political meaning of this contract. 725 From these works we now know that in April 1558, 
royal accountants estimated a deficit of approximately one million ducats in the annual 
balance of royal incomes and expenses. 
 
722 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
723 Romano seems to have mistaken the date of the contract as he claims it was signed on the 12th May, 
while various sources confirm it was agreed ten days later. See a copy of the asiento Fernán López del 
Campo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 233’ 22 May 1558; Romano, ‘Banchieri Genovesi Alla Corte Di Filippo II’, 243. 
724 Ruiz Martín, ‘Las finanzas españolas durante el reinado de Felipe II (alternancias de participación que 
se ofrecieron para Francia)’, 116–17. 
725 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 143–45. 
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The financial shortfall forced royal officials to find a solution to avoid a new 
financial shock that could freeze the military machinery deployed in Europe. The 
excessive expenses and ‘unrestrained borrowing’ of Philip II from his court in the 
Habsburg Low Countries outraged the regency government in Castile, which refused any 
responsibility for the new deals and their consequences.726 The political position of the 
regency was the response to the convergent agenda of the monarch and the Genoese 
financiers. Nevertheless, recent investigations have placed the contract within a larger 
framework in the analysis of the evolution of the dynastic debt during the reign of Philip 
II.727 
Although most of these works only briefly referred to this asiento, its significance 
deserves a more detailed study in which the reading of the contract goes beyond its 
initial terms and economic analyses. To begin with, the copy of the asiento mentions 
only Nicolao de Grimaldo as promising a financial service. 728  However, private 
correspondence from Genoese lenders to the secretary Francisco de Eraso clarifies that 
Grimaldo was just the main lender of the contract with a share of three-quarters. In 
addition to him, Vicencio Imperial and Grimaldo’s political son Felipe Spinola were also 
party to the deal, with one-fifth each.729 
This discovery, unnoticed in the literature, enriches our understanding of how 
asientos worked beyond the official sources issued by the central administration. More 
significantly, the people who warned the royal secretary were Genoese fellows of 
Grimaldo and his business partners. The general factor López del Campo, who signed 
the contract with Grimaldo in Valladolid, only referred to this Genoese lender in his 
letter to Philip II.730 The correspondence thus reveals that the royal administration did 
not know about the participation of Grimaldo’s partners in the asiento until Eraso 
reported this in early June.  
 
726 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 244. 
727 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 57–58; Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 85–86. 
728 Fernán López del Campo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 233’; a modern transcription can be found in Carlos 
Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 14–16. 
729  Nicolo Cataneo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 88’, Letter, (28 May 1558). Adam 
Centurione also referred to this joint contract when he wrote about this asiento and claimed it was ‘[...] 
fatto con Nicolò Grimaldo et altri [...]’. See Adam Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 
89-90’. 
730 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
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Although the participation of other lenders may not have been important for the 
royal administration since the main goal was to provide a financial service, the 
overlooked collaboration of Grimaldo’s associates has a clear effect on the analysis of 
Genoese financial and institutional strategies. Cataneo and Centurione could have been 
applying a penalty of ‘cheat-the-cheater enforcement’ against Grimaldo by referring to 
this joint venture in their letters to Eraso because Grimaldo and his partners had 
obtained better conditions than the rest of the community. Whereas Cataneo provided 
further details about the partnership, Centurione was more eager to complain about the 
deal because it was detrimental to his family activities. The different responses from 
Cataneo and Centurione draw attention to the fact that Centurione could have been 
trying to obtain a similar deal with the royal administration, besides imposing a penalty 
on Grimaldo and his partners. More research, however, is necessary regarding the role 
of Nicolao Cataneo since he could simply be an informant in the service of the secretary 
Eraso rather than an upset Genoese lender. 
According to the contract, Nicolao de Grimaldo promised the delivery of one 
million escudos to Philip II through two shipments, which indicates the existence of a 
currency exchange. Grimaldo had to divide this sum between two destinations. First, the 
Genoese financier had to send 800,000 escudos to Antwerp in six instalments between 
July and December 1558, which provided Philip II’s treasury with a regular inflow of 
133,333 escudos per month. Second, Grimaldo was expected to provide the remaining 
200,000 escudos in Genoa or Milan, to thus supply the duke of Sessa with funds in Milan. 
The funds for Italy were comprised of three instalments of 66,666 escudos each 
month starting at the end of July and finishing on the last day of September 1558. This 
schedule of payments left Grimaldo with less than two months to prepare the first 
disbursements in both places, which included the change of currency. The contract 
established the delivery to Antwerp in ‘escudos de a 72 gruesos’ and to Italy in ‘escudos 
de 11 reales’. This double financial service of delivery and exchange required a 
proportionate fee to be fixed in the contract. 
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In exchange for these services, López del Campo accepted a reimbursement of a 
principal valued at 400 million maravedis, at 400 maravedis per ducat. 731  The 
transformation of one million escudos into Castilian ducats, which were worth 375 
maravedis each in reality, adjusted the real reimbursement of the principal to 1,066,666 
Castilian ducats or 1,000,000 escudos. The contract organised their distribution in the 
following manner. The Genoese financier would receive 100,000 ducats in juros at 10% 
of interest, which could be earmarked to whichever royal income Grimaldo desired. 
These long-term bonds were non-transferable, and he could enjoy the annual interest 
until the king approved the refund of his 100,000 ducats. Therefore, Grimaldo would not 
find a quick source of liquidity to service his commitments with the royal administration 
in this clause of the contract. The following three cash reimbursements of 150,000, 
250,000, and 266,666 ducats did not help him to fulfil his obligations since the asiento 
did not contain any short-term repayments. 
López del Campo had to gather the money for the first payment of 150,000 
ducats from the sale of jurisdictions and the administrative powers to collect taxes. If 
the factor general could not obtain enough funds to cover this payment, the asiento 
entitled Grimaldo to take them from other royal incomes. The agreement divided the 
150,000 ducats into three instalments of 50,000 ducats per month, which should take 
place in the last days of August, October, and November 1558. The intentional delay of 
the reimbursement dates contrasts with the clauses agreed in the asiento with the 
Gentil-Centurione consortium, which started in July. 
The second repayment of 250,000 ducats did not offer Grimaldo a prompter 
source of liquidity. The contract stipulated that López del Campo would pay this part of 
the principal with the silver shipment that was expected from America in October, once 
the royal mint had coined it. Reimbursements on the American fleets were uncertain 
because of timing and the amount that was transported. During the second half of the 
sixteenth century, for example, Genoese financiers rarely accepted them as contingency 
 
731 Therefore, the price of an escudo was set at 400 maravedis. See Fernán López del Campo, ‘AGS, EST, 
Leg. 129, 233’; ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 116’ (Asiento copy, 1558); Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 58; Ulloa, La 
Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 145. Centurione’s letter referred to an exchange rate 
of 400 maravedis per escudo, which was basically the same since López del Campo artificially inflated the 
value of Castilian ducat from 375 to 400 maravedis with the aim of matching the sum. See Adam 
Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-90’. 
232 
 
clauses. The few who did accept them would charge a 4% premium fee on the contract 
to compensate for the uncertainty.732 In the asiento with Grimaldo of May 1558, the 
general factor was entitled to advance the payment if the fleet docked earlier or to seek 
another source of liquidity if the fleet arrived later than October. In other words, 
Grimaldo accepted the risks but he could still not expect to receive the money on time 
to employ it for his commitments. 
If uncertain incomes backed these two first cash payments (sales of privileges 
and the American fleet), the third one, worth 266,666 ducats, was theoretically a safer 
compensation. The servicio of 1559, an agreed contribution with the cities of Castile in 
the cortes, backed this part of the reimbursement and its general interest, which was 
estimated at 29,333 ducats (approx. 2.75%). 733  However, that meeting had not yet 
concluded when Nicolao de Grimaldo and López del Campo signed the contract. The 
regent Joanna had summoned the representatives of the cities to a cortes on 21st 
February 1558 through a royal decree signed by Philip II. The meeting officially started 
on 27th April and concluded on 30th September 1558, including some temporary 
interruptions in order to transmit the petitions of the cities to the royal court in the 
Habsburg Low Countries.734 The general factor and regent Joanna trusted the cortes to 
grant that subsidy without total certainty. Nicolao de Grimaldo should have been aware 
of that fact when he agreed to be involved in the deal. In this sense, both lender and 
borrower risked their mutual obligations for a political concession from a third party, 
which illustrates the complexity of these operations as well as the importance of 
representative institutions that controlled royal expenditure.735 
Castilian cortes were a traditional means to fund royal debt. Emperor Charles V, 
for example, would bargain the concession of servicios through the capitation 
(encabezamiento) of the alcabala, a sales tax simultaneously used to earmark new debt 
 
732 Regina Grafe, ‘Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, 
Taxes and Default in the Age of Philip II’, EH.Net, July 2014. 
733 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 467–68. 
734 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 50’, Letter, (31 July 1558); Real Academia de la 
Historia, Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla. (Madrid, 1903), 715. By the end of July the 
Cortes had been suspended, though the factor general wrote ‘concluyeron’ (concluded). See Fernán López 
del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’, Letter, (31 July 1558). 
735 Stasavage, States of Credit, 147. 
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through juros.736 Philip II and the princess regent Joanna followed the same principle for 
the cortes of 1558. The fifth petition from the cities to Philip II asked for the renewal of 
the general capitation at the same price.737 Urban representatives agreed to concede 
the ordinary and extraordinary servicio to Philip II, notwithstanding that the royal 
postponement of the negotiation did not guarantee the renewal in the same terms.738 
The contribution was worth 454 million maravedis (1,210,666 ducats) and it was to be 
disbursed between 1558 and 1560.739 Every year royal officials collected a third of that 
extraordinary joint subsidy, which was estimated at 403,555 ducats. From the second 
third of the servicio collected in 1559, therefore, Grimaldo would receive 266,666 
ducats. Chart 3 illustrates that the Genoese financier obtained 66% of that second 
instalment of the servicio and 22% of the whole sum. The acceptance of this clause 
involved two elements that can be applied to the strategies adopted by formal 
institutions to finance early modern states. 
 
Chart 3. Servicios conceded for 1558-1560 (left) and its second instalment of 1559 (right) 
with its distribution according to the asiento signed with Nicolao de Grimaldo on 22nd May 
1558. Sources: AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 233 and AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 116. 
 
First, the main goal of formal royal institutions, such as the Factoría General, was 
to service the royal needs as quickly as possible. When there was an urgent necessity, it 
did not matter if there was a foreseeable lack of funds because the subsidy from the 
 
736 Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, 294–98. 
737 Real Academia de la Historia, Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla., 732–33. 
738 Miguel Artola Gallego, La Hacienda Del Antiguo Régimen, Alianza Universidad. Textos 42 (Madrid: 
Alianza: Banco de España, 1982), 62–63. 
739 Real Academia de la Historia, Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla., 775. 





cortes was uncertain. Second, royal representatives would take important decisions 
without the consent of Philip II and even without having all the information in their 
hands. This informal management followed a political agenda, which in this case was 
linked to the military obligations of the Hispanic Monarchy in Europe. In sum, the priority 
of present needs and the informal process of decision-making were a common practice 
in formal royal institutions at this stage of the Hispanic Monarchy. 
Back to the contract, the final reimbursement of the principal was perhaps the 
trickiest one. It amounted to 300,000 ducats, which López del Campo had to give to 
Grimaldo or his agent in cash before the Genoese financier made the first payment. 
Once Grimaldo received these 300,000 ducats from the general factor as an early 
reimbursement, he handed it back to López del Campo on 3rd June 1558 as the first 
payment.740 This money immediately travelled northwards to be loaded onto the royal 
fleet that was docked in Laredo ready to depart for the Habsburg Low Countries, where 
Grimaldo’s representative Tomás Fiesco Raggio waited for the money. The contract 
specified that these 300,000 ducats would pay part of the first instalments of July and 
August in Antwerp. 
Although this operation of releasing the reimbursement before any payment was 
made might seem strange, it was all part of an elaborate plan of the general factor and 
Nicolao de Grimaldo that seems to be new to the literature on this deal. A letter that 
López del Campo wrote to the monarch on 24th May 1558, reporting on the asiento and 
its advantages, clarifies that the 300,000 ducats Grimaldo received as an early 
reimbursement were not part of the deal.741 Instead, the royal official emphasised that 
the real operation consisted of 700,000 ducats rather than a million. 742  The logical 
question here is why the general factor and the Genoese lender agreed to arrange an 
asiento valued at a million ducats and not 700,000. Lopez del Campo also provided an 
answer to this query in his letter. 
If the financier had not obtained this mercy, explained López del Campo, he 
might have declined to sign the contract and there would have been no other options 
 
740 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 116’ 9 July 1558. 
741 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
742 ‘and indeed, the provision of money is no more than 700,000 ducats’ in ibid. 
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for helping Philip II in 1558.743 In other words, it seems that Grimaldo had no initial 
financial capacity to fulfil his contractual obligations during the first months, though he 
would be able to collect the rest in the short-term future. Therefore, there were no other 
options available for funding the military campaigns of the monarch in the Habsburg 
Low Countries and France. This strange operation sought to increase the reputations of 
the king and the businessman and, therefore, lower the transaction costs for marketing 
Grimaldo’s operation to prospective lenders and investors. The general factor was very 
clear on this aspect of the borrowing process. Besides the high value of this contract, its 
arrangement with one of the most prominent Genoese businessmen would doubtlessly 
draw the attention of other lenders to deal with more convenient conditions for the 
monarch.744 
As a result of this, Philip II showed himself to be a quick payer as well as a solvent 
borrower still able to seal larger deals than usual. By contrast, Nicolao de Grimaldo 
presented his first operation in Castile as evidence of his financial resourcefulness and 
his position as one of the main lenders to the sovereign. The simulation of royal and 
private solvency undoubtedly sought to attract capital and accelerate the flow of credit 
and its result was a complete success. The news of the asiento signed on 22nd May 
rapidly spread around the main centres of power, as has been mentioned before in the 
letters sent by Cataneo and Centurione. This flow of information seems to have helped 
Nicolao de Grimaldo to collect almost all the money he needed to pay in Flanders in less 
than two months. Between the 6th of June and 20th July, Grimaldo handed nearly 
514,034 escudos out of 800,000 to the general factor in Castile.745 
An international group of German, Castilian, and Genoese brokers were the 
receivers of the remaining 285,965 escudos, which were to be disbursed between 
October and December.746 These beneficiaries were representatives of the Fugger family 
 
743 ‘that if it were not by this means, Your Majesty could not use them for the war of this year. This is the 
reason that explains all the conveniences of paying him his old debts and giving him higher interest than 
that charged in previous asientos’ in ibid. 
744 ‘[...] and it seemed to me so good the fact of obtaining a great reputation for borrowing and negotiating 
because of this large-scale asiento, its timing, and because the person has a great reputation among the 
Genoese community that they will think that from now onwards, they can negotiate much better [...]’ in 
ibid. 
745 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 116’. 




(Wolfgang Poschinguer and Mathias Ortel), a half-brother of Nicolao de Grimaldo 
(Lazaro de Grimaldo), other Genoese financiers, and some Burgos businessmen with 
whom Grimaldo had established contact through their compatriots.747 Bearing in mind 
this coalition of agents, there was no substitution of one ‘national lending group’ for 
another as traditional literature claims. 748 Instead, the outcomes of this research show 
that Genoese capital was part of the reimbursements to German financiers. In this way, 
Genoese and German lending communities were interconnected and dependent on 
each other through their mutual obligations with the monarch. However, the main point 
of this operation is that the joint action of Lopez del Campo and Nicolao de Grimaldo, 
members of a formal and informal institution respectively, had an impact on the interest 
of international savers and lenders. In short, early modern finances needed the agency 
of informal and formal institutions to work. 
The combined manoeuvre to improve the reputations of López del Campo and 
Grimaldo so to ease their access to credit in the short term was a complete success. The 
signing of this contract saved Philip II from his temporary liquidity crisis. Although he 
owed more than he could collect that year, he was able partially to pay his creditors with 
the money that arrived from Castile in the Habsburg Low Countries by the end of the 
summer. That shipment also allowed Philip II to simulate solvency when it was still weak. 
Nevertheless, the king was not the only person who profited from this deal. López del 
Campo, who depended on the Castilian regency and the Council of Finances to negotiate 
the asiento, increased his reputation with other lenders and, especially, before the 
monarch. Without this bargaining process, Philip II could have not fulfilled his necessary 
military operations on the French border and in Italy, though its price was high. Princess 
Joanna and her ministers had finally surrendered their agency to that of Philip II and the 
conditions imposed by a Genoese financier; the remaining clauses of the reimbursement 
emphasised this even more. 
For example, Nicolao de Grimaldo also obtained a license to export the 
reimbursement of the whole principal wherever and whenever he desired. This decision 
contradicted the plan López del Campo drafted in February 1557, which suggested the 
 
747 In chapter 7, the links between Nicolao de Grimaldo and the Burgos merchant elite are shown in 
relation to the new right on wool exports. 
748 Ruiz Martín, Pequeño Capitalismo, Gran Capitalismo, 11. 
237 
 
export of precious metal to thus concentrate as much money as possible in case of 
contingency.749 Therefore, the license was a serious defeat for the regency and, to some 
extent, for the monarch as well. Since the suspension of payments in June 1557, Philip 
II and his delegates were not able to negotiate a single asiento with Genoese financiers 
without the concession of this permission. The problem was the distrust that royal 
officials and lenders had for each other. Whereas the former wanted to prevent the exit 
of unlicensed money, the latter sought to extract as much money as it was possible out 
of the kingdom. In accordance with the financial exhaustion that the French war brought 
upon the Hispanic Monarchy, emperor Charles V allowed individuals to export precious 
metal from Castile in 1552, a license that Philip II extended until 1560 to have better 
access to credit.750 
Both groups had their own means to achieve their goals. Although Grimaldo had 
gained the right to export a limited amount of money in exchange for his financial 
services, he still needed specific royal decrees that authorised the operation. This 
process, however, was progressive and prevented Nicolao from exporting large amounts 
of money at once. On 14th July 1558, for example, the Genoese lender was allowed to 
export 8,000 ducats from Castile through the dry port of Monteagudo (southern 
Navarre), which became his favourite crossing point for successive operations.751 Once 
it had crossed the Aragonese border, the money was carried to Barcelona or Rosas, 
where it was loaded onto Genoese or royal galleys that transported it to its final 
destination: Genoa. However, crossing the Castilian-Aragonese border was not the 
simple task that it is today. Although Castile and Aragon were part of the Hispanic 
Monarchy, they were officially separated by royal officials located in the frontier villages. 
The coercive efforts of border officials were the main problem that any 
businessman faced when exporting money from Castile, even though it was a licensed 
operation. In the decentralised state model of the Hispanic Monarchy, the officials 
 
749 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
750 Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda Pública, Fiscalidad y Arbitrios En La Corona de Castilla En Los Siglos XVI y XVII’, 
347. 
751 Monteagudo was one of the thirty-nine dry ports distributed along the Castilian borders. See Ulloa, La 
Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 237; Hernando Ochoa, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 77’ (Exports 




deployed on the borders had to be sure that they were doing their job properly and 
avoid any frauds that could cost them high penalties. The episode of the 8,000 ducats 
crossing at Monteagudo reflects how formal and informal institutions intermingled with 
the local administration, bringing the three actors together to represent what an early 
modern state was. 
On the one hand, the decision of the regency to appoint Lorenzo Ruiz Matallana 
to escort Grimaldo’s representative -Nicolao Amerigo- to the border with Aragon 
illustrates how a formal institution protected the private property of Grimaldo and, 
therefore, the asiento arranged with him.752 On the other hand, the role of Grimaldo’s 
appointee in transporting the money shows how an informal institution, based on 
business networks that required the capital in Genoa to pay off its members, 
collaborated with the royal administration to fulfil the terms of the contract. The third 
part of this picture, the border officials, played a key role as legitimate local 
powerholders. Whereas Ruiz Matallana had the authority to enforce the license 
protecting the cargo, border officials had the effective power to authorise the crossing 
of the border.753 In other words, three different organisations would bargain at a small 
spot along the Castilian-Aragonese border, emphasising that the early modern state was 
based on continuous inter-institutional collaboration and administrative negotiation. 
Once Amerigo crossed the border, Matallana was expected to return to 
Valladolid and sign before a notary a declaration about the veracity of his testimony and 
how the whole process had been carried out.754 The participation of public notaries is a 
common pattern throughout this study as any royal decision had to pass through their 
hands to be legal. If for any reason royal accountants summoned the border officials to 
check their record books and search for fraud on this issue, the accused could use those 
notarial protocols to defend themselves. In this sense, officials at the local level were 
dependent on public notaries for the royal legitimation of their actions. Therefore, 
 
752 Matallana was to accompany the convoy and, once it arrived in Monteagudo, together they were to 
count the money to check that the sum transported matched what was written in the royal license. See 
Ochoa, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 77’; Nicolao de Grimaldo, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 80’ (Attorney letter, Valladolid, 
1558). 
753 This distribution of power explains why Philip II issued a letter to grant protection to Grimaldo and his 
representatives before the local authorities (corregidores, jueces de residencia, alcaldes de saca...) to 
allow the export of precious metal. See ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 82’ (Valladolid, 1558). 
754 The public notary in charge of his testimony was Alonso de Coria. See ibid. 
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notaries were the guarantors of lawful administrative processes that protected private 
operations such as the abovementioned export of precious metal.755 
Leaving aside the complex institutional apparatus that made possible one of the 
concessions to Nicolao de Grimaldo for his financial services, the contract also included 
a mercy for old debts that allowed the businessman to recover part of the debts 
accumulated by the king until 1557. The asiento stipulated that the general factor 
granted Grimaldo 500,000 ducats of old debts, held by himself or any other Genoese 
financier, plus an additional sum worth 40,000 ducats from the annual interests at 8% 
for the whole of 1557.756 Unlike Costantin Gentil in his asiento of 3rd March, Grimaldo 
was also allowed to market them through the sale of juros al quitar. Therefore, 
Grimaldo’s goal was to locate and convince private investors to purchase these long-
term bonds worth 540,000 ducats. While the financier recovered the money lent to the 
king thanks to the distribution of juros to independent capitalists, Philip II alleviated his 
old debts with the Genoese. Eventually, the monarch recovered those juros by paying 
back the principal invested plus any correspondent additional interest to their holders.  
Not all these bonds shared the same interest rates. One half was issued at 7.14%, 
one quarter at 8.3%, and the remaining quarter at 10%. These three groups of juros were 
counted as a mercy and, unlike the 100,000 ducats in juros as repayment of the principal 
in the asiento, they were transferable through renunciation and sale, even if the 
purchaser was a foreigner. If the holders of these titles were citizens of any other nation, 
they could transmit them to their descendants according to the laws and rights of their 
governments. This was a veiled reference to Genoese citizens, who seemed to be the 
preferred candidates to acquire these juros. In addition, the bonds were effective from 
January 1558 onwards, hence anyone holding them could start receiving their interest 
(rendimientos) almost immediately. Grimaldo also obtained permission to transfer 
(mudar) those juros to other royal incomes under the petition of the debt holder and 
without paying any fee for that service. 757 
 
755 Apart from their legal protection for the actions of formal institutions, notaries were also an important 
part of informal institutions providing intermediation services among private financiers and investors in 
the early modern period. See Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless 
Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
756 Fernán López del Campo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 233’. 
757 A thorough analysis of the distribution of the bonds among investors in chapter 6. 
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The Genoese financier thus secured remarkable conditions to dispose of his old 
debts and obtain liquidity to fulfil his obligations. The payments in the Habsburg Low 
Countries were practically covered for the first three months with the delivery of the 
300,000 ducats supplied by the regency and Grimaldo hurried to distribute his juros to 
obtain cash before the payments for July in Italy. Surprisingly, the Genoese financier was 
more effective than expected. In the last days of July 1558, the ambassador Suárez de 
Figueroa and the royal factor in Genoa reported that bills of exchange valued at 200,000 
escudos had arrived at the Ligurian port.758 Since the bills of exchange were addressed 
to the duke of Sessa, the royal factor, following the orders of the ambassador, forwarded 
them to the Genoese financier Manfredo Centurione to service the money and send it 
to the duke while the diplomat retained a part of it in Genoa.759 Two points deserve a 
special analysis of this process. 
First, the initial instalment that Grimaldo had to hand over was worth 66,666 
ducats rather than 200,000. However, he advanced the whole payment for Italy in July. 
This action apparently did not benefit Grimaldo in any way or grant him any additional 
mercies according to his asiento. The Genoese financier probably considered that 
servicing the full sum before the schedule could help him to obtain new contracts and 
thus recover more old debts. His strategy could not have been more right, since he 
signed another asiento in October 1558.760 
Second, when Cattaneo realised the bills of exchange were addressed to the 
duke of Sesa, he was disappointed with the Council of Finances in Castile. 761  The 
reputation of the royal factor in Genoa was at stake since the royal factor in the 
Habsburg Low Countries, López Gallo, had not serviced a bill of exchange worth 6,000 
escudos that were sent to Antwerp in June 1558. Friends and relatives of Cattaneo were 
turning against him as a penalty for his disservice to the monarch. 762  This episode 
demonstrates that a private financier who was part of an informal institution based on 
 
758 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 22’, Letter, (31 July 1558); ‘AGS, 
EST, Leg. 1387, 122’ (Memorandum, 29 July 1558). 
759 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 22’; Silvestre Cattaneo to Philip 
II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 121’, Letter, (26 July 1558). 
760 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’. 
761 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 122’. 
762 [...] mi ha dato il colpo mortale perche li amici e parenti miei ne’sono venuti in una tanta defidentia 
che ancohra non li ho potuti ritornare in ragione [...], see ibid. 
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a business network, Silvestre Cattaneo, joined a formal institution such as the Factoría 
General while still using the services of those networks. In other words, informal and 
formal institutions were indistinguishable in this case. More specifically, they were 
dependant on each other to work properly and each was affected by the legal 
procedures and traditions of the other. For example, when López Gallo did not issue the 
legal order to pay the bill of exchange that Cattaneo had charged him to service, 
Cattaneo’s reputation for future deals suffered in the eyes of his family and friends. As 
a result of this institutional relationship, public and private property intermingled in the 
hands of royal officials and private entrepreneurs. 
However, the damage to Cattaneo’s reputation, which consequently involved 
the credibility of the Factoría General, could be beneficial to another of its members. 
The general factor in Castile had been discrediting his institutional colleagues to 
monopolise decisions in the Factoría General.763 In this sense, the private entrepreneurs 
who were directing a formal institution competed with each other for its control. The 
abovementioned letters by Cattaneo and López del Campo demonstrate that their 
mutual accusations mostly regarded transaction costs for operations linked to bills of 
exchange. The lack of information, the excessive costs of the financial service, or the 
fear of a coordination failure were among their main complaints. The competition 
between these royal officials intertwined with the agendas of private financiers such as 
Nicolao de Grimaldo and the interests of high-ranking royal servants such as the 
members of the Castilian Council of Finances. Notwithstanding the complex relationship 
among all the actors involved, the bills of exchange Grimaldo sent to the duke of Sesa 
financed the recovery of Piedmont and protected Genoa from a French invasion, which 
simultaneously increased the reputation of the monarch.764 
  
 
763 Already in March 1558, López del Campo tried to discredit his colleagues in the Factoria General, Gallo 
and Cattaneo, and encouraged Philip II to concentrate all the powers in him. See Fernán López del Campo 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 220’. 
764 Details about the campaign in Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 
23-24’, Letter, (30 August 1558). 
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5.3. The wheel must keep spinning: the excessive issuance of juros in 
Castile for an all-fronts war 
When Nicolao de Grimaldo signed the asiento of 22nd May 1558, he triggered a 
situation close to a new suspension of payments. The first reimbursement of July, 
discussed in the previous section, was accompanied by bad news for the royal ministers. 
That month, the Gentil-Centurione consortium declined to accept the encomienda of 
Estepa as partial payment of their old debts and sought to enforce the deal of 3rd March 
with Philip II. 765  The financiers now demanded their compensation in juros as was 
planned in case of failure of the sale, perhaps inspired by the juros offered in Grimaldo’s 
asiento and his later success in placing them on the market very quickly. This unexpected 
decision meant the royal administration would have to issue 700,000 ducats in juros at 
7.14% and 400,000 more at 5%, besides 300,000 ducats extra in cash to reach the agreed 
1.4 million ducats of old debts. Therefore, the problem at this stage was not liquidity but 
solvency. The Council of Finances and López del Campo had to find free royal incomes 
for the massive issuance of juros, which proved to Philip II that there were no incomes 
available for that purpose. If the consortium could not find any trustworthy royal 
revenue to back those bonds, they would become useless and unsellable. 
Simultaneously, López del Campo realised that the decision of the consortium 
complicated the task of paying old debts to Nicolao de Grimaldo even more. The 
allocation of both sums of old debts was simply impossible. The reputation of the 
monarch would crumble and access to new credits would be back to the period just 
before the consolidation of the floating debt in June 1557. In addition, the moneys that 
had been shipped with the navy of Laredo left Castile with little liquidity, which forced 
the delay of the fair of May until 20th August.766 Many financiers were eager to see their 
investments back, such as Diego de Bernuy and Rodrigo de Dueñas, who had financed 
the monarch in the months after the suspension of payments. 767 López del Campo, 
 
765 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’. 
766 There is an inconsistency in the departure date of the fleet of Pedro Menendez that was docked in 
Laredo with 400.000 escudos. On the one hand, Suárez de Figueroa reported having received letters by 
Philip II written on the 4th and 6th of June telling him about the arrival of Pedro Melendez. However, the 
general factor López del Campo claimed that the navy departed from Laredo on 18th July. See Gómez 
Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 29’, Letter, (20 June 1558); Fernán López 
del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’; other scholars such as Ulloa, Rodríguez Salgado or Carlos 
Morales do not specify this detail in their works. 
767 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 53. 
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foreseeing how much he had to reimburse, advised a further delay of the fair, until the 
American fleet arrived.768 
Every royal income the general factor could use was already consumed. For 
example, the new right on wool exports, which had been enacted in April 1557, was fully 
committed to backing the juros of Genoese financiers and could only collect about 
80,000 ducats that year. Clearly, the royal administration would have to enact new taxes 
or, at least, increase the traditional ones. Although the cortes had passed the figure of 
454 million maravedis (1.21 million ducats) for the ordinary and extraordinary servicios 
by the end of July, the representative institution was still petitioning for the abolition of 
the nuevo derecho de lana and the renewal of the encabezamiento general.769 These 
petitions ignited the opposition of the Kingdom of Castile to increasing Philip II’s fiscal 
ceiling. 
Nevertheless, not all news was unwelcome. In July, the consortium retracted its 
stated intention and Adam Centurione wrote to the regency of his intention to take the 
encomienda of Estepa for himself and purchase the collection of its alcabalas.770 The 
change of agenda reveals that the consortium was divided between two strategies. 
Whereas Costantin Gentil and Luciano Centurione declared they were interested in the 
encomienda, Adam Centurione’s decision as head of the consortium was decisive. Adam 
Centurione might have known about the financial constraints of the regency, which 
limited any possible resale of juros and risked the finances and reputation of the 
consortium. Information, once again, was an important element in the transaction costs 
of early modern deals. Furthermore, the purchase of the encomienda and its fiscal 
revenues not only gave Centurione lordly jurisdiction over it, granting him important 
income in fees, but also the earnings of one of the most profitable taxes collected in the 
territory. Although the Genoese financier would have to pay for the right to collect the 
 
768 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221'. In the end, it was delayed until October 
of that year. See Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 146. 
769 Real Academia de la Historia, Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla., vol. 5, p. 735. 
770 Both the news about the initial rejection and the final acceptance are in the same letter written by 
López del Campo. See Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’; on 14th September 
1558, the consortium paid 130.690 ducats for the alcabalas of Estepa. See Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de 
Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 167. 
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alcabalas in the encomienda, its incorporation in the sale suggests that it was a mercy 
in exchange for not requesting the payment in juros.  
Adam Centurione’s decision left more room for earmarking the juros of Grimaldo 
and lightening the financial burden of the royal treasury. Nevertheless, military 
constraints demanded additional funds. Thionville, at the border with Flanders, had 
surrendered to the French army.771 At the same time, rumours about the defection of 
Monaco to France and the presence of the Ottoman navy around the Italian shores 
alarmed Genoa.772 The raiding Ottoman ships stormed first into the gulf of Naples and 
plundered Sorrento and Massa, near the vice regal capital. They took three thousand 
captives before the navy headed to the Papal territory, without causing any harm. They 
then turned to Corsica, where they were spotted from Calvi on 26th June.773 Following 
this, the ambassador Suárez de Figueroa, admiral Andrea Doria, and Juan de Mendoza 
discussed the next possible target of the Ottoman navy. The most probable objectives 
were Mallorca, Menorca and Ibiza, so they ordered that galleys be sent with armed men 
to protect these islands if needed.774 
The escalating conflict in the North-western Mediterranean worried the 
principals of Genoa. The council of the city, in an attempt to ease relations with the 
Ottoman Empire, decided to send an ambassador with gifts to hold a dialogue with the 
Ottoman pasha (governor or military deputy). The double French-Ottoman threat on the 
Italian front was considerable for the Republic of Genoa. The general unease triggered 
the independent agency of the Republic, which also sent emissaries to Constantinople. 
The role of Genoa in this issue responded, therefore, to its double agenda. On the one 
hand, the Republic wanted to safeguard their city and protect its private property. On 
the other, Genoa sought to serve Philip II by lowering the military pressure on the Italian 
front and thus reducing the financial needs of the monarch. 
Notwithstanding these diplomatic efforts, the Ottoman navy attacked in 
Menorca the cities of Maon, without success, and Citadela, on the opposite side of the 
 
771 The city fell under the French assault on 22nd June 1558. See Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of 
Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1243’, Letter, (24 June 1558). 
772 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 135’, Letter, (7 September 1558). 
773 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 2’, Letter, (7 November 1558). 
774 Later reports informed about attacks on Menorca during June and July. See Gómez Suárez de Figueroa 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 136’, Letter, (26 July 1558). 
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island.775 The navy sailed to Niza after it left Menorca, although the city was already 
prepared with troops sent from Genoa. Once the Ottoman admiral realised the high cost 
of raiding Niza, he led his ships to Savona, where the navy remained until 26th August. 
The Ottoman fleet departed on that day, travelling along the Italian coastal border to 
the Levant, and it was visible from Genoa, scaring the citizens of the Ligurian republic. 
After some skirmishes with the Hispanic fleet, the Ottoman navy was last seen in Cape 
Santa Maria de Leuca (Puglia), heading eastwards.776 
This episode of the Ottoman navy raiding the western Mediterranean Sea until 
the end of August 1558 was the result of a collaborative strategy with Henry II of 
France.777 The action generated a domino effect in the Hispanic realms, especially after 
setbacks in North Africa in the previous two years. In Catalonia, for example, the rulers 
of Barcelona thought their city was the main target of the Ottoman fleet and asked the 
regency for help. This action intensified the social panic, which was manifested as more 
hate against groups of moriscos, Muslim people who had converted to Christianity, living 
in the monarchy.778 
The viceroy of Catalonia agreed with the Catalan deputies to retain part of the 
servicio that the Cortes of Aragon had granted to the king in their last meeting to protect 
Barcelona.779 In this case, a local representative institution demonstrated its influence 
over the collection and, more importantly, spending of pecuniary contributions agreed 
at regional meetings. Multilevel negotiation was, once again, a pattern throughout the 
Hispanic Monarchy. However, the decision to retain the subsidy reduced Philip II’s 
expected incomes and highlighted the measured political and financial independence of 
the viceroys. Simultaneously, the Castilian representatives in the cortes complained to 
the monarch that the defence of Christendom was at stake, when they demanded 
border reinforcements – a petition that they had already submitted at the cortes of 
1555.780 The military constraints became a social problem that continuously consumed 
funds and manpower. 
 
775 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 22’. 
776 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 5’, Letter, (26 September 1558). 
777 Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559, 264–70; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, 698. 
778 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 286. 
779 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 50’. 
780 Real Academia de la Historia, Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla., vol. 5, pp. 750–51. 
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The pessimism, caused by the naval expedition of the Ottoman navy, contrasted 
with the successful military offensives of the Hispanic Monarchy on other fronts. The 
duke of Sessa retook Piedmont, whilst in July Philip II achieved a major victory in 
Gravelines that forced Henry II to start negotiating a durable peace. 781  The 
understanding of the effects of these events helps to explain the behaviour of the 
regency towards political and financial issues during the period between May and 
October 1558. In August of that year, for example, the princess regent Joanna organised 
a campaign of punishment against Barbary coast, which was one of the last actions 
independent of the king that the regency undertook. Although Philip II initially 
disavowed the decision, his long-term fiscal plundering of ecclesiastical incomes 
encouraged him to finally accept it.782 The actions against Muslim forces in Africa were 
a recurrent requisite at the meetings of the Assembly of the Castilian Clergy.783 Military 
conflict, therefore, could also be the result of institutional development rather than its 
trigger. 
5.4. Towards the peace: Nicolao de Grimaldo and the consolidation of the 
new system 
A summer full of political and military ups and downs ended just as it had started: 
with good and bad news. On the positive side, Joanna of Austria wrote to Philip II on 20th 
September to tell him that the cortes had concluded without his approval the renewal 
of the encabezamiento general. Nonetheless, she recommended to Philip that he 
concede the renewal of general capitation to the cities as they had approved the 
servicios even before the king had committed himself to accepting their main demand.784 
Philip II wanted to leave the issue of the encabezamiento unresolved to increase it and 
exceed the income ceiling that had limited his borrowing capacity in the past. 
This strategy directly affected the royal debt holders. If the monarch enlarged his 
income, it would be more likely that they could obtain trustworthy allocations. 
Nevertheless, Suárez de Figueroa counselled the monarch to be strict on financial 
 
781 Manuel Fernández Álvarez, Felipe II y Su Tiempo, Espasa Fórum (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998), 328–29. 
782 Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 284–85. 
783 Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy, 
chap. 7. 
784 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 54’, Letter, (20 September 1558). 
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issues.785 The diplomat also requested Philip’s favour to force the Council of Finances to 
accept the bills of exchange that Silvestre Cattaneo had sent them. Neither the princess 
regent Joanna nor her ministers, including the general factor, wanted to agree to any 
other payments charged against Castile until they could collect new funds. 
Philip II demanded from Castile two million ducats to prepare for the upcoming 
winter and, at the same time, emperor Charles V died in Yuste on 21st September.786 His 
death eliminated a long-standing barrier to the agenda of the regency. Since he had 
retired to Castile in September 1556, Charles always sought to help his son with any 
means, especially financial, confronting his own daughter if necessary.787 Interestingly, 
the principal nodes of the monarchy received delayed news about the death of the 
retired sovereign. The regent Joanna did not write to her brother about the death of the 
emperor until 11th October, twenty days later.788 Suárez de Figueroa, the ambassador in 
Genoa, knew of the news from the captain of the Sicilian galleys, Don Berenguel de 
Requesens, but not from the regency.789 This silence from Castile could be related to 
Joanna’s recently acquired freedom, which allowed her to negotiate a new asiento with 
Nicolao de Grimaldo in the first days of October. 
On 5th October 1558, Nicolao de Grimaldo opened his purse to serve the king 
with 500,000 escudos.790 Once again, the Genoese financier demanded a premium for 
the exchange of currency. The contract stipulated a ratio of 400 maravedis per escudo, 
which resulted in 533,333 Castilian ducats. These funds barely covered a quarter of the 
two million ducats that Philip II had demanded in September. The problem of royal 
solvency, or more specifically the solvency of the regency, still limited the borrowing 
capability of the monarch. The asiento stipulated payments in bills of exchange instead 
of cash. This decision was a logical clause because the first payment of 150,000 escudos 
 
785 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 5’. 
786 On the request of the monarch, see Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, 248. On the 
death of the Emperor, see John Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, 2. ed (New York: Univ. Pr, 1981), 108. 
787 The most relevant example was the intervention of the Emperor to enforce the confiscation of the 
American fleet in March 1557, which was intented to provide extraordinary funds to Philip II. See 
Fernández Álvarez, Corpus documental de Carlos V. 4, 308–11. 
788 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 158’, Letter, (10 November 1558). 
789 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 18-19’, Letter, (12 June 1558). 
790 Copies of the contract in ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’; ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 8-10’ (Asiento copy, Valladolid, 10 




should take place in November of that year Therefore, there was no physical time to 
collect the money in Castile, ship it to the Habsburg Low Countries, and exchange it for 
escudos. A piece of paper travelled faster than a heavy chest. 
The following payments would continue in December and January, worth 
150,000 escudos each. The last payment was expected in February and was worth 
50,000 escudos. The distribution of the instalments reveals the need for a large 
accumulation of liquidity in the shortest period possible. This operation demanded great 
solvency from Grimaldo in the eyes of his clients, to present himself as a trustworthy 
broker and collect their investments. Indeed, thanks to his ability marketing the juros he 
had received in exchange for old debts from the asiento of 22nd May, he had already 
demonstrated this.791 In addition, Grimaldo could reckon upon 12% annual interest for 
every payment he fulfilled (table 4). Without any doubt, this high rate revealed how 
constrained the credit market was.792 Determining the exact amount of money that 
Grimaldo earned with these interests is not the goal of this study. The multiple delays in 
the celebration of the fairs and the missing information about some Papal bulls that 
backed the payments of November 1558 and January 1559 impedes that research path. 
Nonetheless, it is feasible to estimate the basic interest of this operation through 
the rate of 12%, which generates a minimum profit of 64,000 ducats for his services.793 
The illustration below shows that the burden of the reimbursement of the principal was 
shared with other treasurers and merchants. In fact, the November payment would be 
entirely paid by third parties. This distinction left López del Campo without any initial 
responsibility for it, something that was advantageous for the regency due to the lack of 
liquidity. Finally, Grimaldo obtained a license to export the principal, either in bullion or 
currency, to Flanders, Italy or Besançon. In case Grimaldo and the French monarch had 
deals in common, this license also prevented the former from sending that money to 
France, thereby intruding into Grimaldo’s business network. The emissaries of Philip II 
and Henry II were negotiating the peace during these weeks, so the French should not 
receive any additional funding to continue with the war. 
 
791 Esteban Lomelin, son-in-law of Nicolao de Grimaldo, would forward part of that money from Besançon 
to Antwerp. See Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 145. 
792 Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico, 2016, 86. 
793 The 12% interest rate on the principal of 500,000 escudos at 400 maravedis per escudo (533,000 









Table 4: Distribution of the reimbursement for the principal according to each instalment of 
Nicolao de Grimaldo (in ducats). The final interest would be calculated once the payments were arranged. 
Source: AGS, CJH, leg. 34, 54. 
Apart from the complex reimbursement of the principal, the financier obtained 
old debts once again.794 Grimaldo made a proposal to López del Campo in May to recover 
old debts and this plan prospered.795 On 24th May, the general factor had written to 
Philip II that once the asientos with the Gentil-Centurione consortium (21st May) and 
Grimaldo (22nd May) were fully repaid, the monarch would only owe 600,000 ducats to 
the Genoese financiers.796 These moneys were so widely dispersed among investors that 
most would not receive more than 15,000 ducats each. In the contract of 5th October, 
perhaps convinced by that proposal, the regency granted Grimaldo a mercy of 200,000 
ducats of old debts, which could belong to him or someone else. This deal, hence, left 
400,000 still up in the air. The general factor committed Philip II to paying that sum or 
part of it to whomever Grimaldo chose. A part of those debts had already been paid with 
the juros at 5% in the debt consolidation of June 1557. These bonds provided to their 
holders an annual interest of 5% depending on how much the royal estate owed them 
individually. 
 
794 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’. 
795 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
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Nevertheless, since Grimaldo had signed the contract of 5th October, the juros 
holders would experience a retroactive increment of 3 percentage points on their 
interest for the years 1557 and 1558, which they would start receiving from 1st January 
1559. The contract also arranged an additional increase of 2 percentage points up to 
10% from that moment onwards. These increases would be paid from the sale of juros 
at 10% that Nicolao de Grimaldo promised to market among private investors. 797 
Grimaldo became both an agent for the king, providing him with liquidity to service his 
debts, and a solution for the Genoese to recover the money that the royal officials 
consolidated. Compared to the case of Silvestre Cattaneo and his colleagues in the 
Factoría General, Grimaldo was another private entrepreneur participating 
simultaneously in the actions of formal and informal institutions. 
In an attempt to facilitate the sale of those debt titles, the contract earmarked 
half of them to the new right over exported wool, payable in two halves at the fairs of 
May and October. The second half was allocated in alcabalas and other royal incomes 
held by the royal official Luis de Peralta. This allocation led to abundant correspondence 
from Grimaldo, asking Peralta for the allocation of a certain sum of money for one of his 
clients.798  For the sale of these juros at 10%, neither Grimaldo nor the prospective 
holders had to pay the administrative fees for issuing new titles. Conversely, if the 
holders wanted to sell their juros and the new holder desired the liquidation of the title, 
they would pay the traditional fee to the royal accountants. 
This stipulation aimed to avoid speculation and loss of control over the juros 
through the increase in transaction costs for a secondary broker. If someone brokered 
the purchase of a juro with Grimaldo using the funds of a third party, this broker would 
have to pay for the resale a price charged to the final holder. In the third part of this 
dissertation, some examples will demonstrate the existence of this expensive practice, 
which other Genoese financiers intermediated in a masterful fashion. There were 
exceptions to this rule, but they were rare. An important example was the case of the 
 
797 ‘AGS, EST, 131, 8-10’. 
798 Most of these letters to Peralta are held in AGS, CJH, leg. 35, though some of them are also in AGS, 
CJH, leg. 33. See two examples in Nicolao de Grimaldo to Luís de Peralta, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 43’, Petition 
letter, (14 December 1558); Nicolao de Grimaldo to Luís de Peralta, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 33, 106’, Petition letter, 
(26 December 1558). 
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duchess of Florence, whose juro was intermediated by a businessman from Burgos 
called Francisco de Castro Mújica. The consecutive sales involved the participation of 
more people, a strong flow of information, and the legal protection of the juro in the 
long term. All these elements were transaction costs associated with this secondary debt 
market.799 
Grimaldo became prominent in the Genoese community, aided by his recently 
acquired advantageous position in the market of old debts. He monopolised the 
distribution of old debts through his asiento, which precipitated a wave of investors 
contacting him to deal with the recovery of their old debts. In order to transform the 
juros at 5% into new ones at 10%, Grimaldo needed all the attorney powers from the 
affected lenders, which gradually arrived. Juan Jacobo Cibo Peryano, apostolic notary of 
the Holy Roman Empire arranged most of these notarial protocols in Genoa. Indeed, just 
a day after Grimaldo agreed the asiento of October in Castile, Paulo Spinola, patrician of 
Genoa, signed his notarial protocol.800 
The agency of public servants like Peryano helped to officialise attorney powers 
that his Castilian counterparts recognised, thus becoming an essential part of the flows 
of credit in the Hispanic Monarchy. Those notaries, usually grouped together in guilds, 
were also part of institutions able to give validity to international contracts. The process 
required a certified translation of the original protocol from someone whom the 
Castilian official trusted. Unnoticed, these notaries channelled trust between separate 
polities, which helped financiers like Grimaldo or those in the Gentil-Centurione 
consortium to keep the Hispanic Monarchy functioning, an aspect of this financial 
revolution that has not yet been dealt with in-depth. 
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of this system, it was slow. Investigations 
about how much the monarch owed to his lenders were still in process, which compelled 
Grimaldo and López del Campo to improvise. They agreed to make Grimaldo an informal 
treasurer in charge of the custody of funds obtained from the sale of juros until the 
investigations finished. The Genoese financier became liable for paying the holders of 
 
799 North, ‘Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires’, 24; Dahlman, ‘The Problem 
of Externality’, 148. 
800 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 153, 23’ 1560. 
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royal debt when they reclaimed what the king owed them. This decision was another 
step in a process of the privatisation of royal debt, which henceforth was being partially 
administered by independent agents. In this sense, Grimaldo had to market and service 
the titles that funded the old royal debts. 801 
The Genoese financier still had the juros al quitar at a 10% interest rate that he 
had to sell in the secondary debt market. He had already achieved an identical deal in 
his asiento of May, although then the amount of money attached to them was higher. 
This fact reveals how desperate the regency was to supply liquidity to Philip II. 
Grimaldo’s operation, nonetheless, was overcome by a new bid from Luciano 
Centurione, this time associated with another Genoese financier -possibly the 
abovementioned informant of Eraso in Castile- called Nicolao Cattaneo.802 They signed 
a collaborative asiento on 19th October with López del Campo, barely two weeks after 
that of Grimaldo, promising 100,000 escudos to be placed in Antwerp in exchange for 
33,333 ducats of old debts plus interest, which would also be distributed through juros 
al quitar at a 10% interest rate. 803 If this deal is compared to the asiento just negotiated 
with Grimaldo, then the consortium failed to prevail before a rival who officially worked 
individually. Still, the consortium obtained the largest share of old debts reimbursed in 
a single contract (March-May 1558).  
The last asiento arranged with Grimaldo opened the purses of other financiers, 
all Genoese. From that moment onwards, contracts were negotiated with Vicencio 
Imperial (27th November), Luciano Centurione (29th November), Esteban Spinola (29th 
November), and the company of Felipe Spinola and Jacome Lercaro (30th December). 
These operations closed the year with the forwarding of an extra 616,000 escudos to 
the Habsburg Low Countries.804 The king received 1,216 million escudos (approximately 
1,315,000 ducats), which was a considerable sum but still far from the two million ducats 
 
801 The records of this sale in ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’ (Accounting record, n.d.), sec. 2. Cargo y data 
del factor general Fernán López del Campo (1559). 
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804 Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘Un Expediente Financiero Entre 1560 y 1575’, Moneda y Crédito, no. 92 (1965): 
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demanded. Meanwhile, there was a strong need for liquidity in Castile to pay for basics, 
such as the royal militias (guardas).805 It was again Nicolao de Grimaldo who advanced 
funds to cover this expense. On 22nd January 1559, he promised 100,000 ducats to the 
regency.806 Whether Grimaldo obtained another transformation of old debts for this 
deal or not requires further research, but it is certain that he still had a leading role in 
the management of the royal liabilities. 
The resumption of the credit flow and the initial peace talks between the 
Hispanic Monarchy and France did not restrain Philip II from continuing to borrow. In 
February 1559, the monarch demanded 1.7 million ducats from Castile.807 The regency, 
exhausted by the partial fulfilment of the last request for funds, did its best again. The 
contracts were signed mainly in Castile, while Genoa was displaced to a secondary post 
as soon as the campaigns of the duke of Sessa ceased and the Ottoman navy returned 
to the Levant. The complaints about this isolation of Silvestre Cattaneo against López 
del Campo, who had not written to him since 15th December 1558, confirm this 
perspective.808 Moreover, in the upper political circles a surprising proposal was being 
considered through the correspondence between the ambassador Suárez de Figueroa 
and the royal court in Brussels. Juan Andrea Doria, representative of the admiral Andrea 
Doria, had asked Philip II to seize the city of Genoa and depose the current government. 
The admiral complained about the excessive freedom the Republic enjoyed 
during the war such as, to name a few, the embassies in Constantinople, its participation 
in the rebellion in the marquisate of Finale to overthrow the marquis, or the signs of 
other changes and novelties.809 Doria suggested to the duke of Sessa that he lead the 
capture of the city, which would be easy due to the lack of defences. This plan was not 
new, a similar one had been drafted in 1548. The then prince Philip had been in Genoa 
 
805 Already during the reign of Emperor Charles V, the Castilian government would arrange asientos to pay 
the guardas. This financing turned them from an extraordinary expense into an ordinary and predictable 
one. See David Alonso García, ‘Deuda, crédito y Hacienda Real en tiempos de Carlos V’, in Historia de la 
deuda pública en España: (siglos XVI-XXI), 2015, 23. 
806  Esteban Hernández Esteve, La historia de la contabilidad, vía privilegiada de aproximación a la 
investigación histórica cuentas de los fondos recibidos por la Factoría General de los Reinos de España 
para financiar la guerra de Felipe II contra el Papa Pablo IV y Enrique II de Francia (1556-1559): discurso 
pronunciado por el Dr. D. Esteban Hernández Esteve ... y contestación del académico Dr. D. Leandro 
Cañibano Calvo (Madrid: Real Academia de Doctores de España, 2010), 116. 
807 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 60. 
808 Silvestre Cattaneo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 39’, Letter, (2 August 1559). 
809 Francisco de Eraso to Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 97’, Letter, (13 February 1559). 
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at the time and the emperor had rejected the plan, since it would be very inconvenient. 
Twenty years later the situation was the same when the proposal was again put on the 
table. The risk was too high, and the losses could be huge. Suárez de Figueroa believed 
that the occupation of the city would make the Italian states allies against the Hispanic 
monarch.810 In addition, France could use it as an excuse to resume the war, considering 
the fact that it had always been interested in the Republic. 
The monarchy finally decided to leave the Republic to walk its own path, albeit 
close to the Hispanic one. Apart from the high cost of such a campaign, an attack on 
Genoa would surely have destroyed the new financial system led by Grimaldo and the 
consortium. Bearing in mind that the Genoese financiers had brokered most of the funds 
from the Hispanic Monarchy, dismantling the system by besieging the city seemed too 
counter-productive. Instead of destroying the republic, Philip II tried to reinforce it. The 
monarchy helped in the defence of Corsica against the attack by French galleys.811 The 
king considered the territories of the republic as his own, without them being his. This 
appeal to Genoa simply reflected the existent symbiosis between the two polities, an 
aspect that had evolved faster in the period 1557-1559 than in the interval from 1528 
(the start of the formal alliance with the Hispanic Monarchy) to 1557.812 
The month of March 1559 passed without much news, except for the peace talks 
with France. The ambassador Suárez de Figueroa wrote to Philip II to confirm the 
rumours that had been heard from merchants of Lyon.813 According to these, France and 
the Hispanic Monarchy had signed a peace treaty between 17th and 18th March. The 
Hispanic delegate was not sure whether this information should be taken seriously. The 
secrecy around this issue was dangerous and caused uncertainty among important 
people, especially in Genoa. Both the ambassador and the royal factor felt somewhat 
 
810 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 95’, Letter, (1559). 
811 Philip II to Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 94’, Letter, (13 February 1559); Philip II to 
Juan Andrea Doria, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 110’, Letter, (13 February 1559). 
812 Manuel Herrero Sánchez, ‘Republican Monarchies, Patrimonial Republics: The Catholic Monarchy and 
the Mercantile Republics of Genoa and the United Provinces’, in Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early 
Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Mantain a Global Hegemony? (Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 
181–96. On the climax of the relationship see Thomas Allison Kirk, ‘The Apogee of the Hispano-Genoese 
Bond, 1576-1627’, Hispania: Revista Española de Historia 65, no. 219 (2005): 45–65. For a new view of the 
end of the relationship, see Alejandro García Montón, ‘Trayectorias Individuales Durante La Quiebra Del 
Sistema Hispano-Genoves: Domingo Grillo (1617-1687)’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-
1713), vol. 1 (Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 367–84. 
813 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1388, 31’, Letter, (31 March 1559). 
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marginalised in the Ligurian port city, though they were unaware about whether the 
regency in Castile was in the same situation. All their information came from secondary 
sources, the same ones that Genoese financiers used to manage their businesses. 
Occasionally, this source of information was more important than the official channels, 
as they could influence the prospective holders of juros to keep lending to Philip II. Once 
again, information had an important impact on the transaction costs. 
The peace negotiations with France were delayed until 23rd March, since Philip II 
was waiting for an answer from Elisabeth Tudor, the new queen of England after Mary’s 
death, to his marriage proposal.814 The monarch realised that continuing the war was 
senseless and the peace was agreed on 3rd April at Cateau-Cambresis, at the Franco-
Hispanic frontier in the north of France.815 Leaving aside the political and diplomatic 
development of events, the regency of Castile was still worried about the request for 
additional funds sent in February. On 10th April 1559, the regency agreed a new asiento 
with Nicolao de Grimaldo. 816 On this occasion, Grimaldo promised 600,000 escudos 
through bills of exchange to the Habsburg Low Countries in exchange for 174,000 ducats 
of old debts. Once again, the Genoese financier obtained juros al quitar at 10% interest 
to market them and thus obtain liquidity from their sale to private investors. The system 
was the same and the new right on exported wool again backed more than half the juros. 
This new tax defined the rhythm of the reimbursement of the old debts. 
The bills of exchange sent from Grimaldo to Philip II travelled at the same time 
as the letters from the regent Joanna.817 According to her correspondence, the financier 
would receive as repayment for his principal what was left in the Casa de Contratación 
in Seville from the American fleet that arrived in November 1558. The sum, still in 
bullion, was estimated at approximately 434,666 ducats. Nonetheless, Grimaldo could 
not obtain the whole sum, since López del Campo also needed that income to attend 
 
814 Parker, Imprudent King, 125. 
815 The Venetian ambassador in Brussels followed the entire negotiation from its beginning. See his final 
comments in Paulo Tiepolo to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 7, 55’, Letter, (4 February 
1559). 
816 The date of this contract is an issue still not resolved by the literature. While the sources consulted 
point to the 10th of April as the day of the agreement, Modesto Ulloa proposes the 10th of May and 
Hernández Esteve claims the 20th of April. Cf. ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’; ibid.; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real 
de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 147; Hernández Esteve, La Historia de La Contabilidad. 
817 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 137, 139’, Letter, (22 April 1559). 
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the delayed fair of October. There is no specification in the letters of how the money 
was divided between them. The most important issue, wrote the regent, was to be 
present at the fair (‘[…] hacer rostro en ella […]’). Finally, the fair began on 30th April or 
1st May with a general factor quite limited and highly constrained regarding the 
payments he had to make, which amounted to 643,946 ducats.818 The general factor 
owed practically the same sum of money that Grimaldo had lent the king through the 
bills of exchange. Apparently, both Castile and the monarch were in a similar situation. 
The sale of jurisdictions and alcabalas proved helpful, but they also had social 
consequences. The regent reported to Philip II that these sales had gone too far, and 
that towns and vassals were rising in arms against the decision. The transfer of the 
encomienda of Estepa to Adam Centurione was just one of many examples of this 
political economy, which aimed to increase the income ceiling to sustain borrowing. It 
should be mentioned that Joanna’s letter also reveals another asiento signed with 
Grimaldo in April 1559 for 200,000 escudos, which were sent to the Habsburg Low 
Countries as bills of exchange.819 Surprisingly, there are no further archival references to 
this deal, only the regent’s letter.820 This fact limits the analysis of the last asiento with 
Grimaldo in the immediate weeks after the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. Nevertheless, it 
was clear that the agency of Nicolao de Grimaldo during that last year was invaluable 
for transforming the financial system in which the Hispanic Monarchy rested. 
Conclusions: 
The analysis of the second stage of the financial transformation reflects the 
existence of multiple agencies in the process. The first, and perhaps the most important, 
was embodied in Nicolao de Grimaldo. This Genoese businessman benefited from the 
new policy of the Factoría General regarding the reimbursement of old debts through 
the issuance of transferable juros, rather than cash, at an interest rate above 5%. 
Grimaldo employed a strategy based on offering financial services to the monarch when 
he needed them the most to then pressure royal officials, such as López del Campo, to 
offer conditions better than those offered by the Gentil-Centurione consortium. The 
 
818 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 137, 143’ (Accounting record, 1559). 
819 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 137, 139’. 
820 Cf. Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 147; Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 72. 
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convergence of interests between the private entrepreneur Grimaldo, on the one hand, 
and the royal institution of the Factoría General, on the other hand, resulted in the 
consolidation of a new system to finance the Hispanic Monarchy in the long term, based 
on funded debt. 
Second, the correspondence of the members of the Factoría General 
demonstrates the existence of penalties related to organisations based on their 
reputation. The case study of the royal factor Silvestre Cattaneo illustrates this social 
mechanism. Although he was part of a formal institution dependent on the authority of 
the Hispanic sovereign, he still employed his social capital in the Genoese lending 
community to arrange new deals. When the Factoría General failed to service payments 
in Antwerp that Cattaneo had forwarded there, the reputation of Cattaneo and the 
institution he belonged to was damaged. The former friends and family of the royal 
factor stopped helping him, resulting in a lack of access to credit. In this sense, the 
agency of Cattaneo in managing the Genoese node of the Factoría General illustrates 
how formal and informal institutions, which were practically indistinguishable, 
cooperated and could punish each other. 
The Factoría General, however, was not a stable institution as regards the 
behaviour of its members. Instead, their correspondence with the monarch and 
Francisco de Eraso demonstrates the existence of internal competition for control of the 
institution. The case of López del Campo analysed in this chapter reflects the divergence 
of interests. The individual private agenda of each of the members of the Factoría 
General was at stake if the other royal factors failed to perform their obligations, such 
as servicing bills of exchange linked to asientos. Reputation, therefore, was not an 
exclusive characteristic of informal institutions. Instead, the reputation of the factores 
reales was a double-edged sword. While the case study of Silvestre Cattaneo reflects the 
importance of reputation before exogenous organizations, the letters of the factores to 
Philip II and Eraso exemplify their need to retain a good reputation inside the royal 
administration. Trust among these officials was essential, though not critical, for the 
correct functioning of the financial services arranged in the Factoría General. 
The Factoría General was only one institution among the complex set of royal 
officials in charge of making financial deals possible. Public notaries were also a central 
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piece of the mechanism because they provided long-term legal protection to the 
contracts and also issued reliable documents that created trust among distant 
communities and royal officials. The case study of the first asiento between Nicolao de 
Grimaldo and the Factoría General illustrates the importance of notaries. The mercy to 
export precious metals out of Castile required the collaboration of officials at the service 
of the regency to accompany the delivery, the presence of Grimaldo’s representative, 
and the checking of the money on the border by local officials. The three actors needed 
the legitimation of a notary to proceed with their private business. In other words, 
notaries were a key actor that guaranteed operations with private property among 
formal and informal institutions, thus simultaneously participating in the funding of the 
Hispanic Monarchy. 
Finally, apart from the agency of Nicolao de Grimaldo, the Factoría General, 
private business networks, and public notaries, there was another element that played 
an essential role in the performance of all these actors. War framed the relationship 
among individuals and the development of formal and informal institutions. The several 
requests for funds to support the military efforts resulted in a succession of events, in 
which the centre of decision-making was polycentric, dispersed but interconnected. The 
external threat of France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Papal States triggered the 
creation of the Factoría General, the resort to private financiers like Grimaldo, and the 
resulting participation of business networks and notaries related to the arrangement of 
asientos to fund the war. The role of international military conflict in state consolidation 
is, therefore, undeniable. However, the private interests of each of those individuals was 
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Chapter 6. The creation of trust among bondholders through the 
distribution of juros in wartime: an overview of the investors. 
This chapter illustrates how the royal administration raised money to reimburse old 
debts from the sale of transferable juros al quitar to private investors in a process 
intermediated by the Centurione consortium and Nicolao de Grimaldo together with his 
business partners from May 1558 onwards. The analysis of this process focuses on the 
strategies that the two Genoese lending groups employed to attract other Genoese and 
Castilian brokers, nobility, local officials, and corporations to invest in royal debt. In this sense, 
this chapter argues that financial mechanisms based on reputation, self-enforcement, and the 
diversification of risks were essential in preventing the Hispanic Monarchy from crumbling 
during the ongoing war. These three elements, however, were not exclusive to the Genoese 
lending strategies. Instead, the chapter shows that these mechanisms played a critical role in 
formal institutions, such as the Factoría General, and bondholders. 
In effect, the institutional-based approach applied to the sale of transferable juros 
employed in this chapter sheds light on the influence that the interaction between formal and 
informal institutions exerted on the process of state construction. The main conclusion of this 
analysis is that these two institutional models were indistinguishable from each other and 
were influenced by the same determinants, which challenges the literature to consider this 
joint model as a precursor of economic development in early modern states. The sources that 
support this outcome vary from accounting reports that recorded the sales of juros and their 
allocation on royal incomes to notarial documents that reveal private agendas. 
In terms of structure, the chapter is divided into two main parts plus conclusions. The 
first section analyses the juros given to the Centurione consortium for the asiento of 3rd March 
and its final amendments of 21st May 1558. The focus of this part is the transactions of juros 
at interest rates with between 5% and 7.14% that the consortium distributed among its 
clients. The second section of the chapter deals with an identical mechanism through the sale 
of juros assigned to Nicolao de Grimaldo for his asiento of 22nd May 1558. The analysis of 
bonds issued to reimburse the old debts of Grimaldo, the interest rates of which were 
established at 7.14%, 8.3%, and 10%, is the core part of this section. Finally, the chapter closes 
with brief conclusions that offer general thoughts on the two macro-operations and their 
impact on the process of state building from an institutional perspective. 
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6.1. A dynamic asiento with Costantin Gentile (3rd March – 21st May 1558): the 
recovery of 1.3 million ducats of old debts. 
‘Se ha beneficiado buen golpe de dinero’: Costantin Gentil’s part: 
The asiento the Factoría General signed on 21st May 1558 with Costantin Gentil and 
Lucian Centurione, as representatives of their consortium, was arranged at the court of the 
regent Joanna in Valladolid. 821 The contract stipulated a reimbursement of 800,000 ducats in 
exchange for the same sum of money to be placed in the Habsburg Low Countries at a lower 
interest rate than that initially negotiated in March.822 In this sense, López del Campo was 
right to be proud when he wrote to the monarch about how the last deal had reduced the 
interests to be paid considerably.823 The deal consolidated the orders that Philip II issued at 
his court in Brussels on 1st May, which were intended to enforce the deal of 3rd March and its 
additions of 9th March. In this way, the asiento with Lucian Centurion in Castile was annulled 
while the monarch instructed the regent Joanna to reorganise the order of payment that he 
had sent to Castile on 9th March together with the new clauses.824 
The asiento of early March, later amended, obliged Philip II to issue some payment 
orders for the consortium, charged to the general factor López del Campo in mid-March. The 
official, or more precisely his notary Geronimo Pardo Orense, registered a simplified copy of 
every royal instruction sent to them. There exist seven copies of those orders in the accounts 
of the notary, dated on 27th March, 13th August (triple), 15th November, 18th December, and 
31st December 1558. 825 After the enactment of the first document by the end of March, 
however, the royal accountants Diego Yañez, Hernando de Somonte, and Juan de Galdos 
pursued two investigations over the following months to calculate the final sum of old royal 
debts owed to the consortium up to the end of 1557.826 
 
821 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’. 
822 Juan Vázquez de Molina to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 128, 280’, Letter, (27 May 1558). 
823 ‘and according to what has been agreed, they must service the payments of May and July; from the interests 
there has been a great money boost -buen golpe de dinero- in a way to give a remedy to this business as it was 
necessary for Your Majesty’s service’ Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’, Letter, (24 
May 1558). 
824 The details of this new arrangement in Philip II to Joanna of Austria, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 119’, Letter, (1 May 
1558). 
825 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’ n.d., secs 15, 28–29. The powers given to Pardo Orense that explain his role as 
supervisor and recorder of the factor general in ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 23’ (Instruction, 1556). 
826 References to these enquiries in ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 28–29. 
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Their conclusions favoured the consortium because some old asientos were 
recognised and their unpaid reimbursements were progressively incorporated into the new 
deal of 21st May. As a result of this amendment, for example, the initial payment of 
203,622,847 maravedis contained in the first instruction of 27th March, which was still based 
on the asiento of 9th March, was increased to 217,510,794. In other words, the adjustment in 
the payment due recognised an additional benefit worth approximately 37,000 ducats. 
Costantin Gentil and Lucian Centurione had demanded this inquiry into a small amount still 
owed to the consortium since May at the earliest.827 They estimated it at 60,000 ducats plus 
the 1.3 million already agreed. In this sense, they insisted on the recognition of more old 
debts, which finally reached 1.3 million ducats in 1560 after the consortium rejected the 
encomienda of Estepa in July and changed its mind in September.828  
Besides the money owed to the consortium, its representatives also demanded 
efficiency and quick results.829 Therefore, they urged Philip II to order the accountant Diego 
Yañez to invest more time on their deal, something that the king accepted to maintain good 
terms with the consortium. The complaints from the lending group regarding the slow process 
of calculating /how much the monarch owed its members reflect once again how informal 
institutions dealt with higher authorities. Since Philip II was the only legal authority able to 
enforce the repayment of former debts, an informal institution like the Centurione 
consortium resorted to private correspondence rather than demanding the help of the 
Republic. The previous chapter also reflects this repetitive pattern when referring to the 
correspondence between Adam Centurione and Francisco de Eraso. In short, informal 
solutions were more common and effective than time-consuming appeals to formal 
institutions of justice. 
Apart from these inquiries, it is noteworthy that the asiento of 21st May amended 
many of the clauses agreed on 3rd and 9th March. In July, the general factor wrote to Philip II 
about the consortium’s rejection of the proposal to take Estepa, which obliged the 
rearrangement of a payment by other means instead. Therefore, the payment of their old 
debts should have been as follows: 400,000 and 700,000 ducats in juros at 5% and 7.14% 
 
827 More details about their demands in ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 12’ (Report, 1558). 
828 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’; Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, 
Leg. 130, 73’, Letter, (9 August 1558); ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 29–34. 
829 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 12’. 
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respectively; and the remaining 300,000 ducats in cash, plus the 800,000 ducats for the 
principal.830 The shift from payments in cash to the issuance of long-term debt bonds was a 
clear indicator of the severe scarcity of liquidity in the royal treasury, which had to resort to 
the investments of private savers to obtain cash to pay the debts to the consortium. A sign of 
this lack of liquidity could be seen in July, when the general factor had to reimburse 
230,350,299 maravedis according to the payment order dated 27th March, but he only had 
170,530,378 in hand by the end of that month.831 
The order of Philip II was to pay the principal, which was due by the end of July, with 
the moneys initially scheduled to reimburse old debts.832 In this sense, we can observe the 
flexibility of these sorts of deals and how they adapted to the circumstances. The situation 
was difficult on all fronts of the Hispanic Monarchy, and any funds available were already 
earmarked. The French armies were reinforcing the borders with the Habsburg Low Countries 
while Philip II kept recruiting new troops and fortifying the zone near Calais, with both sides 
waiting for the final clash. In the meantime, the Ottoman fleet threatened the western 
Mediterranean Sea, which obliged Philip II to send help to Malta and to order the 
reinforcement of the coast.833 
The sequestration of the funds assigned to pay old debts was simply necessary at this 
stage of the financial reform. However, it is equally important to know where those moneys 
came from. The distribution of juros at 5% interest, initially assigned to the consortium but 
later sold to private investors as a result of the new conditions after the agreement of 21st 
May, was organised in close collaboration with Lucian Centurione and Costantin Gentil.834 
Once the final agreement of 21st May took place with the new clauses mentioned above, 
these two Genoese financiers sent letters of petition to the royal accountants Luis and Alonso 
de Peralta asking for the allocation of juros to their clients. In this process, the clients of the 
Genoese financiers paid the general factor in exchange for the debt title. Sometimes, the 
 
830 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 221’. 
831 Carlos Morales also reaches this conclusion, though from the general accounts of the factor general. The 
difference with his study lies in the focus on this case-study about the asiento with the consortium to obtain a 
more detailed analysis. See Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Precio Del Dinero Dinástico: Endeudamiento y 
Crisis Financieras En La España de Los Austrias, 1557-1647. Vol. 1 (Banco de España, 2016), 87. 
832 In the instruction of 27th March, Philip II ordered the factor general to take part of the money raised from 
the sale of juros at 5% interest. These debt titles were initially intended to repay old debts, as it is seen in some 
clauses of the asiento of 3rd March. See ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, sec. 28. 
833 Michiel Surian to Doge and Senate of Venice, ‘CSP, Venice, Vol. 6, 1200’, Letter, (20 March 1558). 
834 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 29–34. 
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Genoese lenders specified in their letters which royal income should back these juros, though 
this was not very frequent. In order to fill this gap in the information, it is necessary to check 
the reports of the Council of Finances.835 
The payment and distribution of juros at 5% annual interest: 
Thanks to these documents we can analyse the distribution of the debt bonds at 5% 
and the payment orders that the royal administration issued between August and December 
1558. An accounting report, probably written in 1559, reflects the payments López del Campo 
made to Costantin Gentil with the money the royal factor had raised from the sale of juros at 
5% interest in 1558.836 The report acknowledged five payment orders from Philip II to López 
del Campo, which recorded the payment of 39,192,000 maravedis (104.512 ducats) by the 
end of December 1558. In other words, just a quarter of the 400,000 ducats promised to 
Gentil as part of the compensation in exchange for the failed sale of the encomienda of Estepa 
were delivered to the lender. 
The funds that López del Campo employed to pay Costantin Gentil were raised from 
the sale of juros at 5%, whose trace seems to end in the letters of petition that Gentil and 
Lucian Centurione sent to the royal accountants to earmark a specific part of the earnings on 
royal incomes to a prospective bondholder. Chart 4 demonstrates that eight out of ten 
investors were Genoese, and some of them were part of the consortium (Costantin, Lucian, 
and Benito). The largest share of the entire sale corresponds to Costantin Gentil (26%), which 
means that he had enough liquidity to pay almost 26,790 ducats for his juro in exchange for 
an annual interest of almost 1,340 ducats. The payment by Costantin Gentil together with 
those by the other Genoese comprised 79% of the entire sale, which resulted in an investment 
of 83,178 ducats out of 104,512. This financial effort demonstrates that the Genoese lending 
community had not yet been ruined, as the main lending houses from Genoa foresaw when 





835 An overview of the royal incomes where Costantin Gentil had allocations available and the investors who 
took them can be found in ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 89’ (Report, n.d.). 
836 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 15–16. 













Chart 4. Distribution of juros at 5% interest rate sold by López del Campo on the asiento with the 
Gentil-Centurione consortium of March 1558. Source: AGS, CJH, leg. 35, pp. 76, 82, 85, 96. 
The fact that members of the consortium held 50% of the bonds may be reflected in 
the weak ability to attract investors, which could be related to the interest those bonds 
generated. In the following pages, it will be seen that juros at higher interest rates seem to 
have been more attractive to prospective bondholders. The fourth chapter of this dissertation 
has already analysed the alarming situation in Genoa when the royal short-term debt was 
consolidated into bonds at 5% interest.838 Genoese financiers complained that nobody would 
invest in those bonds, which would bankrupt many of their lending companies. The re-
issuance of juros at 5% interest a year later could have increased the transaction costs for the 
consortium in terms of the net benefit for their fees of intermediation and the search for 
prospective investors willing to take those poorly rated juros.  
It is precisely on these uncertain grounds for both investors and intermediaries where 
reputation becomes a decisive element. The large presence of Genoese bondholders in the 
sale reflects an effective coalition organisation model in which the Genoese investors trusted 
one another. The reputation of the Centurione consortium, based on repeated successful 
operations and a lack of deceitful practices, made the operation viable. The inherent system 
of penalty, based on the use of correspondence and the flow of information, punished 
dishonest members of the community. 839  The example already analysed in the previous 
chapter with Nicolao de Grimaldo and the complaints of Adam Centurione about the asiento 
 
838 Ibid. 





















of 22nd May 1558 prove this point and suggest a model of self-enforcement among individuals 
to avoid cheating one another. If Costantin Gentil or Lucian Centurione, the members of the 
consortium that organised the distribution of the bonds, involved their fellows in an over-
risky operation, those intermediaries and their consortium would probably be banned from 
participating in any new deals that the community arranged in the long run.840 
The presence of members of the Centurione consortium in the operation, 
nonetheless, is a clear sign of the difficulties that the busines group faced to distribute bonds 
at a 5% interest rate in the secondary debt market. Since this operation with low-rated and 
transferable juros was relatively new to the Genoese coalition, the need to create a 
trustworthy asset explains why the consortium held a share of 50% in the operation. 
Therefore, the creation and reinforcement of reputation-based models of business 
organisations in the early modern period were linked to the sharing of risks with equal 
conditions. If Philip II failed to service his debt bonds, it meant that the consortium and the 
other bondholders would lose their investments. 
By contrast to the almost exclusive participation of Genoese financiers, the presence 
of two Castilian noblewomen in the operation offers much insight. They were the daughters 
of Don Diego López Pacheco, duke of Escalona and third marquis of Villena. According to the 
accounts of López del Campo, their father also acquired another pair of juros with a higher 
interest rate for his other daughters, Inés and María.841 The letters of Lucian Centurione to 
the royal accountant in charge of issuing the juros show that Lucian, rather than Costantin 
Gentil, organised the sale of debt titles to this family.842 In other words, Centurione had the 
necessary social links to reach these noblewomen, or at least their father. The participation 
of the Pacheco family with a fifth of the sale of juros at 5% plus another investment in higher-
rated juros suggests a private arrangement between the consortium and the duke, framed by 
the personal agenda of the latter. 
 
840 The system of organisation and punishment was very similar to that of the Maghribi traders studied by Greif. 
See Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, 58–59. 
841 Lucian Centurione to Licenciado Montalban, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 85’, Letter, (1558). 
842 The four daughters began to receive their yields at the fairs of May and October 1559. See ‘AGS, EMR, Leg. 
440’ (Accounting record, n.d.). 
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The payment and distribution of juros at 7.14% annual interest: 
Leaving aside the operations related to the juros at 5% as part of the reimbursement 
for old debts to Costantin Gentil and the consortium, the Factoría General promised 700,000 
ducats in juros at 7.14%. Using the same mechanism that was employed with the juros at 5% 
interest, Philip II sent payment orders to López del Campo between August and December 
1558 to service his debts with the consortium.843 That general operation of 1558 generated 
176,373,660 maravedis (470,329 ducats), which covered more than half of the money 
promised in this way, and a third of the 1.3 million ducats recognised. However, the money 
was not distributed evenly. A note in the margin of one of the documents warns the reader 
that the 176.3 million maravedis were shared between Costantin Gentil on the one hand, and 
Lucian, Bautista, Benito, and Cristobal Centurione on the other (see table 5).  
Payments to Costantin Gentil Payments to the Centurione 
13th August: 
• 72,846,436 maravedis (194,257 ducats), 
• 38,978,200 maravedis (103,941 ducats) 
 
 15th November: 
• 37,500,000 maravedis (100,000 ducats) 
18th December: 
• 19,316,220 maravedis (51,509 ducats) 
 
31st December: 
• 7,732,804 maravedis (20,620 ducats) 
 
Table 5. Payments by López del Campo to the Centurione consortium from the sale of juros at 7.14% to reimburse 
176,374,660 maravedis. Note: the conversion to ducats is rounded. Source: AGS, DGT, I-24, leg. 1458, sec. 29 
The order of 13th August, which instructed the general factor to pay 103,941 ducats to 
Costantin Gentil, shows the importance of checking the small print in these sorts of 
documents. This operation, as had happened with the others, specified which old debt was 
being paid to the lender. In this case, the liquidation of this debt referred to an asiento that 
Costantin Gentil had arranged jointly with Juan Flemingo to service the 100,000 escudos to 
the sovereign. The details included in this entry allow for a better identification of Flemingo, 
who lived in Antwerp and was a representative of Gaspar, Melchor, and Balthasar Schetz. 
 
843 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 29–34. 
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These three brothers were important Brabant financiers, of whom Gaspar became the first 
royal factor in Antwerp by 1556, as mentioned in the second chapter.844 
The powerful Schetz family served emperor Charles V in clear competition with 
Genoese, German, and Castilian lenders during the first half of the sixteenth century. It is 
surprising at first sight that Costantin Gentil, an important member of the consortium, joined 
forces with a direct competitor while the classic historiography dealt with in the first chapter 
claims an aggressive strategy on the part of the Genoese community to take over from the 
rest of the lending houses.845 The asiento arranged between Flemingo and Gentil challenges 
that theory and poses new questions about how Gentil and the Schetz shared a contract, 
besides the details about their share in the operation and if they worked together to obtain 
the subsequent due reimbursement.846 
Apart from the exogeneous operation between Gentil and another lending group 
outside the Genoese coalition, another payment order issued by Philip II on 18th December 
1558 contributes to our understanding of early modern financial strategies.847 The payment 
order referred to another joint asiento of 100,000 ducats, though this time the contract was 
signed between Costantin Gentil and Felipe Spinola. This deal reveals two important elements 
to be considered. First, it took place on 3rd July 1554, whereas the order for its reimbursement 
was not issued until four years later.848 In this sense, the inability of the royal treasury to 
assume its debts until four years after the arrangement of the contract is representative. This 
payment reflects the fact that the Hispanic Monarchy, notwithstanding its late 
reimbursements, paid its debts. In other words, this early modern state was able to protect 
private property in the long term. The issuance of legal documents like the payment order 
 
844 A short reference to the lineage of these three brothers and the importance of the Schetz in the royal finances 
in Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, 99–101. 
845 Felipe Ruiz Martín, Pequeño capitalismo, gran capitalismo: Simón Ruíz y sus negocios en Florencia (Crítica, 
1990), 11. 
846 The asientos recorded by Carande do not contain the joint asiento, though it seems that it could be operations 
448, 458, and 488. These three entries, which correspond to the years 1555 and 1556, refer to a single deal of 
50,000 ducats paid to Prince Philip. Further investigation into this operation could provide details of an 
important long-term alliance between the Schetz and the consortium. No other source consulted contains a 
reference to this joint asiento. See Ramón Carande, Carlos V y sus banqueros. Los caminos del oro y de la plata 
(Deuda exterior y tesoros ultramarinos), vol. 3 (Barcelona: Crítica, 1987), 496. 
847 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, sec. 29. 
848 Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 1987, 3: Los caminos del oro y de la plata:486. 
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and the averiguaciones (accounting enquiries) made by royal accountants such as Diego 
Yáñez, were mechanisms to enforce all the conditions of those contracts. 
The existence of these extremely delayed reimbursements linked to short-term 
operations prior to the consolidation of debt in June 1557, in which Genoese brokers 
channelled the savings of their clients to provide them with short-term returns, reinforces the 
argument about how risky the situation was for financial intermediaries. The clients of 
Genoese brokers were a legal threat if they opted to enforce their contracts at home. 849 
However, the ability of lenders such as Costantin Gentil and Lucian Centurion to ensure new 
deals in which the payment of old debts was effectively dispatched seems to have solved the 
problem of uncertainty. 
Notwithstanding the solution the consortium provided in 1558, it is representative 
that Felipe Spinola desisted from working with Costantin Gentil from 1554. The reputational 
element, already mentioned earlier in this chapter, seems to have encouraged Spinola to shift 
sides to a competitor of the consortium. The fifth chapter of this thesis has already pointed 
to the fact that Felipe Spinola collaborated with Nicolao de Grimaldo and Vicencio Imperial in 
the asiento arranged on 22nd May 1558.850 Felipe Spinola’s change of sides is remarkable, 
especially since he and Gentil had been educated together and collaborated for important 
deals prior to 1554, such as the special arrangement agreed in August 1553 to avoid the royal 
financial collapse analysed in the fourth chapter.851 
The failure of Gentil to obtain an effective reimbursement of those debts in his asiento 
of March 1557, plus the subsequent rescheduling in June later that year, seems to have 
pushed Spinola to shift sides and start working with a direct competitor of the consortium. 
The reaction of the consortium was immediate since Costantin Gentil and Lucian Centurione 
wrote to the Council of Finances with the aim of obtaining the same conditions for the 
reimbursement of old debts that Nicolao de Grimaldo had obtained for his asiento of 22nd 
May 1558.852 The same document demonstrates that the Council of Finances agreed with the 
petition of the consortium. The institutional acceptance restored the equilibrium in the 
 
849 The ambassador to Genoa had warned about this possibility in 1557. See Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Philip 
II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1386, 78’. 
850 Nicolo Cataneo to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 29’. 
851 Carande Thovar, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 1987, 3: Los caminos del oro y de la plata:406 and 482. 
852 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 12’. 
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financial market through the homogenisation of the regulation on competition that Adam 
Centurione had being demanding since June in private correspondence with the monarch.853 
The subsequent distribution of juros at 7.14% illustrates how beneficial the new royal policy 
was for the consortium. 
The new regulation facilitated the sale of juros at a higher interest rate than the 
previous batch at 5%. According to an accounting report on the sale of juros at 7.14%, dated 
5th October 1559, Costantin Gentil and Lucian Centurion did not receive the same amount of 
money because their participation in the contract was uneven. Whereas Gentil’s 
reimbursement amounted to 370,332 ducats, Centurione received 100,000 ducats.854 Chart 5 
illustrates how Costantin Gentil held more than a quarter of the old debts owed to the 
consortium, which reflects the importance of this lender in the Centurione network. 
Therefore, the recovery of old debts was a private goal for Costantin Gentil, whose investment 
is considerable if compared to other members of his political family such as Lucian Centurion 
and his 7% share. 
 
Chart 5. Shares of Costantin Gentil and Luciano Centurione charged to the juros at 7.14% according to the asiento of 
21st May 1558 on a recognised debt of 1.3 million ducats. Source: AGS, DGT, I-24, 1458, sec. 29. 
The distribution of those juros at 7.14% in the secondary debt market was recorded in 
two reports for the years of 1558 and 1559, demonstrating that the consortium was unable 
to distribute all these debt bonds in a single year.855 The fact that there were two asientos 
draining liquidity from the secondary market from May 1558 might explain the scarcity of 
investors and the limited social capital of the Genoese business networks. Nevertheless, 
Nicolao de Grimaldo was more skilful in distributing his juros among private investors than 
 
853 Adam Centurione to Francisco de Eraso, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 1387, 89-90’. 
854 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, sec. 29. 
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the consortium. The better conditions that Grimaldo could offer to his clients may have made 
him more competitive than the consortium, especially until the Council of Finances agreed to 
give them identical concessions.856 
The sale of those debt titles at 7.14% generated approximately 470,332 ducats, which 
were entitled to the consortium in 327,583 ducats (circa 70%) and 142,746 ducats (circa 30%) 
in 1558 and 1559 respectively. The numbers indicate a relative success for the consortium. In 
six months (21st May-31st December 1558), it placed more than two thirds of the debt on the 
market. Simultaneously, the consortium was also trying to distribute the juros at 5%, as 
analysed above. The simultaneous process of selling meant that the debt titles with a 5% 
interest were less attractive and, therefore, were sold after those at 7.14%. The shareholder 
Nicolao Gentil Hodon, for example, did not acquire his juro until the end of November 1558.857 
As in the sale of juros at 5%, most of the investors were also Genoese and a large share of the 
money raised came from members of the consortium. 
Chart 6 identifies thirty bondholders for 1558 and organises their juros in relation to 
the entire account. Twenty-seven investors were Genoese, which reinforces the existing 
literature about the use of strategies based on syndicated lending inside this community.858 
Although Diego de Bernuy, a Castilian businessman, purchased the juro with the largest share 
in a single operation, there is one debt holder who surpassed him through multiple 
operations: Benito Centurione. This member of the consortium obtained 15.77% of the 
operation, in contrast with Bernuy’s 12.82%, through the acquisition of three juros. Once 
again, a member of the consortium led the bidding for the debt titles.  
 
856 ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 131, 12’. 
857 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, sec. 15. 




Chart 6. Juros at 7.14% sold in 1558 on the asiento of 21st May 1558 with the consortium (in maravedis). Source: 
AGS, DGT, I-24, leg. 1458, secs. 29-34. 
The findings of this crossed-data analysis reinforce this chapter’s theoretical proposal 
regarding the consortium’s strategy to take the largest share of an investment so as create 
trust among fellow investors. The almost simultaneous agreement in Valladolid and Brussels 
of the asientos signed on 2nd and 3rd March 1558 had created a situation of financial 
uncertainty, which logically hampered the role of brokers. While the regent Joanna celebrated 
the asiento arranged on 2nd March with the consortium, which had drawn the attention of 
other lenders to propose new deals, López del Campo was commenting on the great damage 
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to the royal reputation.859 Therefore, the role of Benito Centurione seems to have consisted 
of providing trust to investors and reinforcing the reputation of the consortium. 
Apart from the strategy of the consortium in the sale, the presence of members of the 
main Genoese families, such as the Doria and Spinola, is representative of the social links the 
consortium had.860 Felipe Spinola, the old colleague of Costantin Gentil and new business 
partner of Nicolao de Grimaldo, acquired a 3.89% share of the sale. The participation of 
Spinola in the sale of juros at 7.14% and the absence from that sale of juros at 5%, clearly 
shows his ongoing process of shifting alliances. Apart from Spinola, other names deserve 
special mention. Vicencio Imperial, another business partner of Nicolao de Grimaldo, 
acquired 1.4% of the batch. The presence of Spinola and Imperial in the sale, notwithstanding 
their modest investments compared to other lenders, illustrates the Genoese strategy based 
on the diversification of risks. In effect, Spinola and Imperial invested in royal debt in two 
different ways. They participated in the principal for the asiento with Grimaldo, but they also 
invested in juros distributed by the Centurione consortium. In this sense, the internal 
competition within the Genoese coalition becomes blurred when private interests are 
examined. 
Notwithstanding the majority participation of the Genoese lenders, the Ligurian 
community was not the only ‘national’ group present in this sale. There were also two 
Castilians and two investors from Milan: Diego de Bernuy and Doña Teresa de Guevara on the 
one hand, and Juan Bautista and Guido Aisani on the other. Bernuy was an important 
businessman and councilman (regidor) of Burgos, the so-called ‘head of Castile’ because of its 
political and economic importance in the kingdom.861 Doña Teresa de Guevara, wife of the 
knight commander and regidor of Toledo Rodrigo Niño, was one of the two female investors 
of the group, the other being the Genoese Mineta Doria.862 
The presence of women among the investors at this early stage of the new financial 
system in the Hispanic Monarchy was unusual, at least in the sources consulted. Were women 
 
859 Joanna of Austria to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 130, 159’, Letter, (13 March 1558); Fernán López del Campo to 
Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 234’. 
860 An overview of these families in Sanz Ayán, Un banquero en el Siglo de Oro, 42–45. 
861 An interesting study about his importance for the international economy in Selma Huxley, ‘Diego de Bernuy: 
ejemplo de un mercader no lanero’, in Historia de Burgos, vol. 3 (Caja de Burgos, 1992), 193–229. 
862 A copy of Doria’s debt bond in ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 481, 54’ (Juro file, 6 October 1558). Evidence that she started 
receiving the interest at the May 1559 fair in ‘AGS, EMR, Leg. 440’. 
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allowed to invest? The answer depends on the region of study. Recent literature stresses that 
several female investors in long-term debt bonds pursued the safeguard of the family 
patrimony, especially but not exclusively through the creation of dowries. 863  Since the 
Republic of Genoa and the Hispanic Monarchy were two different polities, they had their own 
laws regarding the rights of women to access credit markets. Genoa progressively prevented 
women from participating in credit markets without the agency of a male relative, through 
the enactment of laws between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 864  The Hispanic 
Monarchy, by contrast, was less restrictive in this regard, allowing women to participate in 
the economic life and defend their patrimony in lawsuits.865 In this sense, it is more common 
to find Castilian noble women and nuns investing in royal debt than their Genoese 
counterparts, a fact that speaks to their economic role in their respective communities. 
To return to the different groups of investors, the Aisani belonged to the Milanese 
lending community. Once again, the Centurione consortium collaborated with exogenous 
members of the Genoese coalition, which is not new since they repeated this strategy with 
the Schetz family. The sporadic collaboration with theoretical competitors, therefore, was 
more frequent than has been considered. However, the presence of Milanese financiers in 
these accounts is not strong. Indeed, the sale to the Aisani consisted of a shared juro, which 
indicates that only a joint investment enabled these financiers to participate. The reason for 
this shared investment may not have been a weak financial position but limited social capital. 
In effect, the theory of syndicated lending also suggests that the Genoese community was a 
close-knit group. In other words, it was not permeable and hence difficult for other lenders 
to join them. The case study of the Aisani is simply the exception that confirms the rule. 
The remaining juros at 7.14%, which amounted to 142,746 ducats, are registered in a 
receipt from 1559.866 Chart 7 shows a different type of sale from the previous two. In this case, 
the Genoese presence is weaker, though Lucian Centurion and Costantin Gentil kept the 
 
863 Elise M. Dermineur, ed., Women and Credit in Pre-Industrial Europe, Early European Research 12 (Turnhout, 
Belgium: BREPOLS Publishers, 2018); Amy M. Froide, Silent Partners: Women as Public Investors during Britain’s 
Financial Revolution, 1690-1750, First edition (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
864 Denise Bezzina, ‘Married Women, Law and Wealth in 14th-Century Genoa’, Mélanges de l’École Française de 
Rome - Moyen Âge, no. 130–1 (2018): 121–35. 
865 David Carvajal de la Vega, ‘Crédito privado en Castilla a fines del siglo XV. Una introducción a su estudio’, 
Anuario de estudios medievales 47, no. 1 (2017): 19–21. 
866 I have reconstructed it through the letters of petition that Costantin Gentil and Lucian Centurione sent to the 
Council of Finances. See them in ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35’ n.d. 
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largest share with 14% each. Their investment slightly surpassed that of Domingo Grillo, 
another important Genoese financier already seen in the sale of juros at 5%. Indeed, apart 
from these three people there were other investors from the previous sales, such as Juan 
Antonio Pinelo, Felipe Spinola, Nicolao Doria, and Doña Teresa de Guevara. 
 
Chart 7. Distribution of juros at 7.14% interest from the receipt of 53,529,761 maravedis of 1559 taken from López del 
Campo in relation to the asiento of 21st May 1558 with the consortium (bondholders organised by share of the sale). 
Source: AGS, CJH, leg. 35. 
Among the new names, three bondholders are noteworthy.867 First, Don Rodrigo de 
Mendoza, a member of the thriving Mendoza family, which occupied prominent positions in 
the defence of the Hispanic Monarchy. Interesting examples of his relatives are the temporary 
governor of Siena (Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla), the commander of the galleys in the 
Mediterranean (Bernardino de Mendoza), the ambassador in Portugal (Juan de Mendoza y de 
Rivera), and the president of the Council of Italy (Diego Hurtado de Mendoza y de la Cerda). 
The purpose of Rodrigo’s juro is unknown, though his participation alone represented the 
second largest share in the sale. 
Second, Doña Inés and María Pacheco were sisters of Antonia and Luisa Pacheco, 
whom we included in the sale of juros at 5%. They were all daughters of the duke of Escalona, 
who seems to have been the link between the women and their brokers. Further investigation 
 
867 Donato and Jacome Fanano also deserve a side note as they were Milanese, the second case of investor in 
this sale of juros at 7.14%. Their presence demonstrates the interest of these Lombardian financiers in the new 
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may reveal who actually paid for the acquisition, which in turn will provide a better approach 
to the identity and role of women as investors during the stabilisation phase of the financial 
transformation. 
Third, the female convent of San Pablo in Toledo became an institutional bondholder, 
though only once its abbess died. The presence of religious institutions such as this female 
convent is unusual but important for their economic communities. The seventh chapter of 
this dissertation analyses the role of convents for local credit flows in more detail. In brief, 
they were the guardians of local liquidity and issued microcredits to local people while they 
increased and expanded their assets through the incorporation of new nuns from powerful 
local families.868 
For the Centurione consortium to be successful in its distribution of long-term royal 
debt bonds, at either 5% or 7.14%, the business group had to offer trustworthy royal incomes 
to back those debt titles. The analysis of this economic relationship between debt and taxes 
reveals why bondholders may have been interested in earmarking their juros to specific 
incomes. Map 2 shows that most of the investments were charged on revenues collected in 
Andalusia, especially in the Kingdom of Granada including Malaga. This means that the clients 
registered in the previous sales had an interest in acquiring a regular income coming from 
these cities and towns. 
More specifically, bondholders used to invest in already agreed taxes with 
representative local institutions, such as the general capitation (encabezamiento general) on 
alcabalas and tercias. The fact that the city councils managed the collection of these taxes 
turned those institutions into privileged spaces that could ensure the profitability of 
investments. This seems to be one of the reasons why many bondholders were local 
councillors, especially in the deals with Nicolao Grimaldo discussed in the next section. The 
following examples illustrate some of those cases. 
 
 
868  Kathryn Burns, Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco, Peru (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999), chap. 5; Ángela Atienza López, Tiempos de conventos: una historia social de las 




Map 2. Cities whose contribution to the general capitation supported the earmarking of juros from the asiento signed with 
the Centurione consortium on 21st May 1558. Sources: AGS, CJH, legs.34-35. 
The tercias, a production tax that consisted of two ninths of the tenths that the Church 
collected in the ecclesiastical provinces, was one of the duties most valued by bondholders. 
The collection of this tax was managed by cathedral canonries or territorial lords. 869 The 
absence of royal officials from this process illustrates once again the integration between 
formal and informal institutions, namely the public corporations in charge of the collection 
and the financial networks that distributed royal debt respectively. The Genoese and 
Milanese investors of the sales preferred to use this income to back their debt titles in cities 
such as Granada, Malaga, or Seville, where the Genoese diaspora had already penetrated the 
local councils and their presence was consistent. Some examples, including some Castilian 
cases, were Mineta Doria and Vicencio de Negro (Granada), Doña Luisa Pacheco and the 
Milanese shared juro of Juan Bautista and Guido Aisani (Malaga), and Felipe and Luis Sauli 
(Seville). 
 
869 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 172. 
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The alcabalas, a sales tax, was another duty very much in demand by investors. Most 
of the allocations on this royal income were placed on Jerez de la Frontera, in the modern 
province of Cadiz. Important brokers were also interested in this revenue, such as Bautista de 
Grimaldo (brother of Nicolao de Grimaldo), Simon Lercaro, Lucas Spinola and Antonio 
Palavesin. Some alcabalas from minor towns were also attractive to certain clients, such as 
Agustin and Esteban Imperial (Loja and Alhama), and Doña Antonia Pacheco (Guadix and 
Baza). 
The last important tax in these operations was another sales duty called Almojarifazgo 
Mayor de Sevilla, which was charged on all exports from the kingdom except for those going 
to America.870 This duty was collected in the city of Seville and drew the attention of many 
Genoese financiers, such as Franco Lercaro, Jofre de Marin, and the brothers Lorenzo, 
Raphael, Overto, and Carolo Spinola. It was also the chosen royal rent for Doña Teresa de 
Guevara, who resided in Toledo, which meant that she had the means to collect the earnings 
that the juro generated. 
Through this brief walk around the south of Castile, the area of influence that the 
clients of the consortium and some of its premium members pursued when investing in royal 
debt has been sketched. There was a prominence of Genoese financiers, though there were 
also some exceptions. Women, notwithstanding the laws that hampered their participation 
in credit markets, would invest either alone or as a religious institution, and they had 
mechanisms to collect their interest in other regions of the kingdom. Finally, the Genoese 
community was permeable enough to accept traditional competitors from the Habsburg Low 
Countries (Schetz) and Andalusia (Milanese diaspora). After all these details about how the 
Centurione consortium worked during this period of financial instability, it is time to review 
the operations of the main competitor of this business group: Nicolao de Grimaldo. 
  
 
870 For America there was another tax called Almojarifazgo Mayor de Indias. 
280 
 
6.2. The first individual asiento: the people behind the million escudos for His (absent) 
Majesty 
This contract, signed on 22nd May 1558 with Nicolao de Grimaldo, has a special 
significance because it was the biggest agreement done with a single Genoese financer for an 
extraordinary amount of money after the suspension of payments in 1557. Leaving aside the 
deals with the members of the Centurione consortium, such as the asientos of 1st February 
and 2nd March 1558, another individual asiento had been signed in March 1558 with Tomasso 
Fiesco. However, the financial service was worth 15,000 escudos, a very different figure from 
the million escudos that Grimaldo offered.871 Apart from the size of the principal and the 
conditions of its delivery and reimbursement, which have been examined in the previous 
chapter, this deal was the first that received a mercy to reimburse 500,000 ducats of old debts 
entirely through the issuance of transferable juros rather than cash.872 The change of financial 
policy seems to have been beneficial to the royal administration because no liquidity was 
available.873 
The juros that Grimaldo received thanks to the new royal policy had better interest 
rates than those initially given to the Centurione consortium in their asiento of 21st May, a 
difference already explained earlier in this chapter. From the 500,000 ducats promised to 
Grimaldo in transferable juros, one half was issued at 7.14% interest, one quarter at 8.3% and 
10% respectively. In addition to the 500,000 ducats, the Factoría General granted Grimaldo 
another 40,000 ducats in juros at 5% interest (20,000 al millar) as interests for the unpaid old 
debts. Notwithstanding that the deal avoided the disbursement of cash in the short run, Philip 
II would supposedly redeem (consumirlos) the debt titles in the future to recover the incomes 
earmarked to service those juros. 
The three groups of juros, transferable by renunciation and sale even if the purchaser 
was a foreigner, were payable from January 1558 onward. Therefore, whoever held the bonds 
could start receiving their rendimientos almost immediately. Apart from being able to sell his 
juro in the secondary debt market, Grimaldo could request to transfer (mudar) the juros to 
other royal incomes with the petition of the holder and a concession from the royal 
administration. In other words, Grimaldo was not only an intermediary in the short term 
 
871 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 55 and 72. 
872 Fernán López del Campo, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 129, 233’; ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 116’. 
873 Carlos Morales, Felipe II, 57. 
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through the sale of juros, but also in the long term as a link between investors and the royal 
administration. Thanks to the remarkable conditions he was granted for the distribution of 
his old debts, Grimaldo could rapidly start disbursing part of his obligations to Philip II. The 
following section addresses the sale of the juros linked to old debts. 
Attracting private savings: 
Although the historiography has shown that the Genoese diaspora was a mere 
intermediary between royal institutions and private savers, the identity of the bondholders 
has usually remained unknown.874 As a result, it is impossible to establish whether those 
anonymous investors were sporadic or repeat actors, relatives or friends of the 
moneylenders, or simply strangers who were introduced by someone else, such as notaries.875 
Among all these elements, the continued collaboration between broker and investor over the 
long term helps to discern whether there was a social network or not and what its 
characteristics were. Neither the sale of juros from this asiento nor the sources derived from 
it can offer a complete picture of the investors. However, the sources offer a starting point 
for future research. 
Nicolao de Grimaldo intermediated in the sale of the entire mercy of 540,000 ducats 
through 64 transactions, which were roughly worth 458,000 and 82,000 ducats between 1558 
and 1559.876 In other words, Grimaldo distributed almost 85% of the old debts that the royal 
administration conceded to him in less than seven months. Chart 8 shows the number of sales 
organised by interest rate. From the 64 sales of the juros that Grimaldo intermediated, 44% 
of the total were linked to juros at 10%, 18% to juros at 8.3%, and 38% to bonds at 7.14%. 
These percentages suggest that Grimaldo was interested in attracting a large number of 
investors rather than concentrating the sale in a few hands. The benefit from the transaction 
costs, such as fees for intermediation, might explain the distribution. Unfortunately, the price 
of his financial services has not been found in the sources. However, specific information 
about how those juros were distributed sheds light on the identity and agenda of the 
bondholders who invested in royal debt. 
 
874 An exception in Álvarez Nogal, ‘Oferta y Demanda de Deuda Pública En Castilla’. 
875  For the role of notaries as financial intermediaries, see Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Priceless 
Markets. 




Chart 8: Total number of juros sold between 1558 and 1559 for the asiento of 22nd May 1558 (organised clockwise 
by interest rate). Source: AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, leg. 1458. 
 
The distribution of juros at 7.14% annual interest: 
The group of juros at 7.14% was sold for its ceiling price, which was worth 270,000 ducats, 
through 24 transactions. There were two majority communities in the sale of this group of assets, 
Genoese and Castilian, plus another two communities from Tuscany and Milan. The Genoese invested 
71% of the capital, nearly 192,000 ducats, making them the largest group investing in this batch of 
juros. Castilians, by contrast, held almost 20% of the capital through the investment of roughly 53,500 
ducats. An independent group held the remaining 9% of the capital, thanks to the investment of circa 
23,400 ducats. 
The Genoese group was characterised by the presence of members of families such as the 
Imperial, Spinola, Fiesco, Negron, or Grimaldo. The Spinola were the ones with more operations, four 
in total, and all of them together amounted to 51,270 ducats. In terms of individuals, out of eleven 
Genoese investors, only Vicencio Imperial, Nicolao Fiesco Raggio, Pablo Spinola and Gregorio de Asti 
invested more than 13,000 ducats. Chart 9 shows how Vicencio Imperial, business partner of Nicolao 
de Grimaldo in the asiento, was the largest investor of the Genoese community thanks to his juro, 
which was worth slightly more than 56,000 ducats. 
24 (38% of total)
11 (18% of total)
28 (44% of total)
14.000 al millar (7.14%) 12.000 al millar (8.3%) 10.000 al millar (10%)
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The Castilian group was formed of two corporations and seven individuals (chart 10). 
The former paid 600 ducats while the individual transactions amounted to almost 53,000 
ducats, which highlights a larger concentration of capital in individual hands. The corporate 
part was comprised of the council of Xuances (modern Galicia) and the abbess and nuns of 
San Benito in Cuenca. The juro held by the council of Xuances was addressed to the 
inhabitants of this village in the north-western corner of the Iberian Peninsula and its payment 
was made by someone who was neither Genoese nor from Xuances: Pedro Marino.877 The 
sources on the bond held by the female convent of San Benito offer less information about 
the payer, although they do provide a full list of the nuns living and participating in the 
economic life of the convent.878 This information can be linked to an analysis of the local elites 
of Cuenca and how they promoted their women in that institution. 
The case study of the marriage between Fructuoso Galos and Doña Isabel Ortiz de 
Monteser deserves a special mention, before continuing with the group of individual 
investors. According to Rosario Valdés, the regidor Fructuoso Gallos died a few years after 
acquiring the juro, a common occurrence with other investors too, and was buried next to his 
wife in the chapel of the Holy Spirit in the cathedral of Santiago. His wife, Doña Isabel Ortiz 
de Monteser, was also an important person in the society of the Galician city as she was the 
 
877 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 324, 42’ 1558. 
878 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 16, 25’ (Valladolid, 2 November 1559). 
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Chart 9: Sale of juros at 7.14% acquired by Genoese capitalists (in ducats). Source: AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, leg. 1458. 
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heir of Pedro de Monteser, collector of royal rents in Galicia.879 The couple lived in Santiago 
(Galicia), quite far from the royal court in Valladolid, which suggests the participation of an 
intermediary with social capital in the Kingdom of Galicia. In the example of this couple, the 
juro was paid on their behalf by Nicolao de Grimaldo, thus illustrating the networks of long-
distance trust.880 It has been impossible to discern whether the couple participated in this juro 
jointly or separately, which would enrich our understanding of the financial assets acquired 
during the marriage. 
Chart 10: Sale of juros at 7.14% acquired by Castilian capitalists (in ducats). Source: AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, leg. 1458. 
Don Luís de Guzmán, count of Teva, is a good example of a bondholder since he 
acquired a juro near his residence earmarked for the alcabalas of Malaga and its dependant 
land.881 The Count of Teva did not send someone to pay for his juro in Valladolid. Instead, the 
count dispatched two agents, Andrés de Estramona and Juan de Alneiros, to pay on his behalf 
in the town of Teva. This means that it was not even necessary for a buyer to move his or her 
agents to the royal court, although this was the most common practice among investors. A 
copy of this juro also reveals a detailed list of villages that chose to pay this juro to the count, 
 
879 Rosario Valdés Blanco-Rajoy, ‘La capilla de los Neira de Luaces en la iglesia compostelana de Santa María do 
Camiño (ss. XVI-XIX)’, Cuadernos de Estudios Gallegos 58, no. 124 (2011): 162; Xerardo Dasairas, ‘La Herencia de 
Armada’, Journal, El Faro de Vigo, (12 August 2013), http://www.farodevigo.es/portada-o-
morrazo/2013/12/08/herencia-armada/928670.html. 
880 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 252, 15’ 1558. 
881 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 387, 7:  Juro a Favor Del Conde de Teva Don Luís de Guzmán a XIV Mil El Millar Valorado En 
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covering sixteen municipalities plus the city of Málaga. The villages were required simply to 
pay their alcabala except for Malaga, which instead specified the parts of this tax that would 
go to the count: threads, wax, clothes, linens, fish, inheritances and mercury. This 
organisation of the tax collection at local level was agreed with the cities in charge of that 
duty, and they would redistribute the charges among the dependant towns. 882  This 
distribution of the fiscal burden linked to royal debt demonstrates the independence of local 
authorities to control tax collection and its expenditure.883 
Furthermore, the file suggests why the juro was purchased. In this case, de Guzmán 
transferred his right over this juro to Don Francisco de Guzmán, señor of La Algaba (Seville), 
as part of the dowry of his daughter, Doña Brianda de Guzmán de la Vega, on 12 August 1558, 
less than a month after the concession of the title. This transfer was not formalised through 
the royal accountants with a change in the juro. The count of Teva had used the services of a 
notary of Granada called Diego de Dueñas instead of the services of the royal accountants, a 
fact that reflects once again the importance of public notaries in the integration between 
formal and informal institutions and the subsequent economic development of a family. 
Apart from these extreme cases of the largest and the smallest juros, Don Luís de 
Guzmán and the council of Xuances respectively, there were three more individual investors. 
Fernando Álvarez Ponce de León and Íñigo de Zúñiga were noblemen whose professions 
allowed them to accumulate sufficient capital to acquire the royal debt titles.884 The Licentiate 
Bartolomé de Atienza, however, belonged to the commoners and was an example of a new 
kind of bureaucrat, who had been instructed in the Castilian universities sponsored by the 
Catholic Monarchs since the late fifteenth century to reduce aristocratic influence in the 
institutions of power. This new social group tended to seek forms of ennoblement, or at least 
the imitation of their customs. De Atienza perfectly expressed this behaviour when he 
 
882 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 172. 
883 A similar strategy was followed by local and regional elites in Hispanic America. See Grafe and Irigoin, ‘A 
Stakeholder Empire’. 
884 A brief reference to Íñigo de Zúñiga and his lineage can be found in Juan de la Barreda y Acedo-Rico, Viejas 
familias de Alcalá de Henares (Editorial Complutense, 2003), 59. A copy of his juro and testament in ‘AGS, CME, 
Leg. 324, 32 (1558). 
286 
 
founded a mayorazgo with his juro, which he transmitted to his descendants, even a century 
later, on the alcabalas on the hay and wood of Valladolid.885 
As can be seen, most of the Castilian case studies were noblemen and when this was 
not the case these investors still shared the same characteristics of the aristocracy in the use 
and means of collection of the returns. All sought to place the juros near them and often used 
agents to pay for them on their behalf, which suggests that the earnings of those returns were 
also subleased. This picture allows us a first overview about who and how juros were 
purchased (upstream flow), as well as what these people did with their interest. 
Finally, the independent group consists of the Milanese Geronomio Candiano and 
Giuseppe Malaspina, marquis of Fosdinovo (Tuscany). The former leads to the same 
conclusion as the analysis of the operations of the Centurione consortium: it was possible to 
deal with exogenous competitors. The case study of Malaspina, by contrast, is only 
comparable to the other participants and their investments. This character bought a juro 
worth 4,668 ducats for 4,666 ducats (note the rounding), but it is still unknown which royal 
rent was assigned to pay it. The General Archive of Simancas does not contain any entry for 
his name in the Contaduría de Mercedes collection, which suggests that the copy of his juro 
and the complementary sources are lost. The only way to find his debt title seems to be in the 
various Tuscan archives that hold the records of the Malaspina family of Fosdinovo. 
In the State Archive of Florence, for example, it is possible to find last wills, 
genealogical trees, some notarial records and accounting documents. Nonetheless, they date 
back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and thus do not reveal any further details 
of how the marquis acquired his juro and how he managed it. The answers to this could have 
been in the State Archive of Massa, also in Tuscany, which holds a complete collection on this 
family. An examination of its catalogues has revealed little information on this case, however. 
Therefore, it has been impossible to know if this was another intermediated case, although 
this seems the most probable option as a high-ranking nobleman like the marquis of 
Fosdinovo was unlikely to move out of his territories for such economic matters.  
 
885  Elena Naharro Quirós, ‘Relaciones entre dinero, trabajo y condición nobiliaria (Comentario sobre un 
documento de la Real Academia de la Historia)’, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, 1992, 535. The copy 
of the juro and the founding document of the mayorazgo in ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 201, 20’: 1558. 
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Notwithstanding the limits on the archival research, it is possible to compare the 
results from the Castilian and Genoese groups with the case of Malaspina. An early conclusion 
states that the marquis contributed with a high investment, but not one that was as high as 
the investments of the Genoese. The case of Malaspina proves that landed aristocrats could 
have fewer financial resources and interest to invest in long-term debt those who based their 
wealth on commerce and finance, namely the Genoese nobility. 
The distribution of juros at 8.3% annual interest: 
This group was comprised of eleven juros at 8.3% and which represented 
approximately only 17% of the whole transaction arranged by Nicolao. The distribution of 
these debt titles shows a clear majority of Genoese investors rather than Castilians or any 
other community. The Genoese were once again the largest investors in this group with a 
communal capitalist effort of approximately 105,337 ducats (78%), while the Castilians paid 
29,663 ducats (22%). This imbalance means that the Genoese invested three times more than 
their Castilian fellows, so their capacity to collect funds was again higher. Nevertheless, none 
of these two groups were homogeneous as there were some investors who were very 
different to their fellows in terms of investment. Chart 11 illustrates the distribution of these 
juros to reflect these differences. 
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Chart 11: Sale of juros at 8.3% for the asiento with Nicolao de Grimaldo of 22nd May 1558 (in ducats). 
Source: AGS, CJH, leg. 35. 
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The Castilian group was formed of Alonso Huidobreo, Doña María Huidobreo, and 
Doña Juana Manzolo de Loaisa. The Huidobreo were not a married couple, as she was the 
widow of Diego de Soria.886 Both acquired a juro with its returns allocated to the salt mines of 
Atienza (Guadalajara). Alonso Huidobreo was neighbour and regidor of Ágreda (Soria), while 
his relative lived in Uceda (Guadalajara). None of them could collect the rendimientos of their 
juros near their homes, which suggests that they had someone else in charge of collecting the 
earnings from this downstream flow.887 The way they acquired their debt titles is, however, 
of interest for further analysis. 
They did not purchase their juros directly because this operation was intermediated 
by a Genoese financier called Felipe Spinola, the son-in-law of Nicolao de Grimaldo, and his 
business in the asiento. Spinola was also the intermediary of other of Grimaldo’s investors, 
which reveals a complementary service to prospective bondholders. The funding of Alonso 
Huidobreo to pay Spinola for his financial service was backed by a shared mayorazgo that he 
inherited from his uncle Diego Huidobro, abbot of Berlanga del Duero (Soria).888 How Alonso 
and Maria Huidobro contacted Felipe Spinola to pay on their behalf is a complicated issue, 
because the correspondence of both parties seems to have disappeared. Notarial records 
could help to discover how and under which conditions a power of attorney was granted to 
Spinola, but this investigation needs in-depth research in the provincial historical archive of 
Soria and its notarial protocols that this thesis could not undertake. 
Juana Manzolo de Loaisa, the other Castilian investor, was vecina of Ciudad Real and, 
despite being far from Valladolid, paid for her juro by herself.889 Her earnings were allocated 
on the alcabala of the pastures in the field of Calatrava.890 This tax was often used when 
 
886 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 153, 2’ 1558, 2; ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 420, 50’ 1558. 
887  The Huidobro were a noble family of hidalgos whose most important relatives lived in Ágreda. Further 
information about this family can be found in ‘AHNT, Torrelaguna, Caja 419: Colección de Manuscritos e 
Impresos Genealógicos Pertenecientes a Los Duques Del Parque’ (Family archive, 1771 1584). 
888 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 31, 10’. Alonso and Miguel were preoccupied at that time by a lawsuit with a neighbour about 
the edification of some buildings near their respective houses. On this local conflict, see ‘ARCV, PL CIVILES, 
Fernando Alonso (F), Caja 850, 6: Pleito de Pedro Ruiz de Castejón, de Agreda (Soria), Alonso de Huidobro, de 
Agreda (Soria) y Miguel de Huidobro, de Agreda (Soria)’ (Lawsuit (pleito), 1561 1558). 
889 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 320, 3’ 1558. 
890 The economy of the Order of Calatrava was based on three provinces: Andalusia, the field of Calatrava and 
Zorita. The second was the largest area by far, covering around 11,000 square kilometres and 45 towns. See 
Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, ‘Comentario sobre los señoríos de las Ordenes Militares de Santiago y Calatrava 
en Castilla la Nueva y Extremadura a fines de época medieval’ (Las ordenes militares en el mediterraneo 
occidental (s. XII-XVIII): coloquio celebrado los días 4, 5 y 6 de mayo de 1983, Casa de Velázquez, Instituto de 
Estudios Manchegos, 1989), 172. 
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assigning juros to a royal rent in these years, though the monarch did not have the right over 
the alcabala of pastures.891 Indeed, Ulloa reported that it was the princess regent Joanna who 
had decided to assign this rent to long-term debt, though her brother reminded her that he 
had no papal bull with which to do that.892 Additionally, this alcabala was closely linked to the 
commerce of wool, an economic activity analysed in more detail in the following chapter. 
The pastures of the field of Calatrava fed a large portion of the sheep controlled by 
the Mesta council, which represented the main sheep owners of Castile. This was one of the 
key stops in the transhumance to the north of Castile and, as a consequence, a reliable source 
of income. Juana Manzolo lived in Ciudad Real, one of the cities in charge of this alcabala, 
which made the collection of the rendimiento of her juro easy, unlike in the case of the 
Huidobreo family. In previous periods, between 1559 and 1560, this alcabala was not leased 
but brought to royal supervision through Bernardo de Ávila, neighbour of Almagro, who 
would lease, receive and charge the tax.893 From the downstream flow we are thus reduced 
to discovering if Juana Manzolo asked someone to collect the earnings from Bernardo de Ávila 
or not. 
Finally, Juana Manzolo split the juro in favour of a couple of relatives and the chapel 
of San Pedro in 1570, when she was about to die. In the meantime, Juana enjoyed her annual 
profits for more than ten years, something uncommon among other investors who often 
acquired these long-term investments to provide a certain income for their descendants, as 
the count of Teva did. 
There were eight Genoese investors, and just two of them also purchased juros at 
7.14%: Vicencio Imperial and Esteban Spinola. There is no surviving copy of Spinola’s juro in 
the General Archive of Simancas, whilst there are some for Vicencio Imperial. Imperial had his 
debt title, which was worth 27,108 ducats, earmarked to the tercias of Baeza (Jaén) and its 
dependant territory.894 In this case, he split part of his right in favour of Juan Bautista Lercaro 
and Andrea Imperial, who were Genoese financiers too. The typical diversification of risks 
claimed by Drelichman and Voth does not fit here, as the risk remained in the community.895 
 
891 Ruiz Martín, ‘Un expediente financiero entre 1560 y 1575’, 16. 
892 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 567. 
893 Ibid., 569. 
894 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 459, 6’ 1558. 
895 Drelichman and Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell. 
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It might be that the right was even more fragmented afterwards, but it is not recorded in the 
file of this juro. Neither Jacobo de Grimaldo Bracelo nor Francisco Lomelin or Esteban Spinola 
left a surviving juro file, which suggests that these bonds were filed in other accounts in their 
names.896  
That was not the case for Torello de Asti. This capitalist was not specifically a Genoese 
from the city of Genoa, but from Albenga, which is a town southwest of Genoa in the modern 
province of Savona. He provides evidence for the practice whereby every city that was part 
of the Genoese Republic granted the demonym of Genoese to its inhabitants. This Genoese 
financier lived in Castile, probably accompanying the royal court, which is the reason why he 
paid his juro by himself.897 Nonetheless, he chose to allocate his earnings on the alcabalas of 
the Alpujarra (Granada). 
The Alpujarra covers the region of the southern part of Sierra Nevada between the 
modern provinces of Granada and Almeria. The file of this juro contains a list with the towns 
which should specifically contribute to the right of De Asti: Cañar, Ohanes, Trévelez, Beires, 
Almócita and Padules. The copy of his juro also refers to how he could collect the earnings. 
Instead of going village by village, de Asti, or someone with the power of attorney, was 
entitled to receive the rendimiento in Seville, Medina del Campo or Valladolid. In principle, 
this option did not allow De Asti to remain at the royal court once it had departed for Toledo 
by the end of 1559, which suggests that the Genoese financier had someone else who took 
care of his investment. 
In conclusion, the clients of Nicolao de Grimaldo were mostly Castilian noblemen and 
noblewomen besides other Genoese financiers. This group of juros illustrates the presence of 
Castilian women with different profiles investing on their own. Maria Huidobreo was already 
a widow and the income from her juro was surely geared to providing for a comfortable old 
age, while Juana Manzolo sought to preserve hers beyond a royal depreciation of all the juros 
in 1564 and leave it to her relatives and the chapel where she was buried. By contrast, there 
is a lack of female Genoese investors, an absence also noted in the following batch of juros. 
Nevertheless, the Italian financiers had wives and descendants who took charge of their 
 
896 The case of Francisco Bautista Lomelin results perplexing because there is a copy of a juro in his name for the 
same amount, but it is a juro at 10% instead of 8.3%. See ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 291, 11’ 1559. 
897 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 459, 12: Juro al Quitar a Doce Mil El Millar Con Torello de Aste de 105.468 Maravedíes Por 
1.265.616 Que Por Ellos Pagó’ (Juro file, 1558). 
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business when they died. It seems that financing was a male assignment within the Genoese 
community, while Castilian women were empowered enough to take care of their own 
finances. Finally, the participation of the heads of the asiento in the distribution of juros, a 
pattern also present in the transactions of the Centurione consortium, seems to inspire trust 
in other bondholders, thus complementing the theory about Genoese financial strategies. 
The distribution of juros at 10% annual interest for the old debts and the 
principal: a mixed analysis 
This section covers the sale of 28 juros at 10% from the old debts, which accounted 
for 29% of the total transactions, and the sale of another parcel of juros at 10% that was 
intended to reimburse 100,000 ducats to Grimaldo as part of the principal. 898 This mixed 
analysis intends to reinforce the conclusions already made throughout the previous sections 
and offer some examples of repeated collaboration that could result in the discovery of stable 
business networks in future research. 
The first sale of juros, linked to old debts, shows that the Genoese may have arranged 
fewer operations, but they also better distributed the risks. 899  Chart 12 shows that the 
Genoese group made a total of 9 transactions worth 96,076 ducats out of the 135,000 
conceded by the royal administration, which amounted to 71% of the total sale. Some of 
those Genoese financiers participated in other transactions linked to old debts in the same 
asiento, such as Esteban and Overto Spinola, or Vicencio Imperial. Indeed, Nicolao de 
Grimaldo and Vicencio Imperial once again enabled the investments to create trust. 
The remaining 19 bondholders were Castilians, whose profile is practically identical to 
the others already analysed: noblewomen investing alone (Doña Ana de Velasco, Doña María 
de Silva, Doña Inés de Astudillo) or in a joint investment with their husbands (Doña María de 
Montenegro), and noblemen and regidores surely looking for long-term regular incomes to 
provide a dowry (Ponce de León, Enríquez de Almansa). However, there are some interesting 
points, such as the absence of juros held by corporations like convents or councils. The fact 
that no formal institutions of this sort took part in the most profitable bonds is surprising. 
Most probably, corporations would invest low sums of money, which might have prevented 
them from investing to acquire large bonds in the market. In other words, corporations might 
 
898 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 8–14. 
899 Ibid., secs 8–11. 
292 
 
have been unable to compete with informal institutions, such as the Genoese or Castilian 
business networks. Were these formal institutions unable to compete notwithstanding their 
prominent role in the local economies? There is no definitive answer to this question in the 
literature, but it could be related to the internal norms of those institutions, which may have 
prevented them from risking too much and making large investments to protect the common 
interest.900 
 
900 Álvarez defines the role of civic institutions, such as local councils, as ‘testimonial’ (symbolic) in the royal debt 




Chart 12. Distribution of juros at 10% from the old debts conceded to Nicolao de Grimaldo for his asiento of 22nd May 
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Leaving aside the reimbursement of old debts through the sale of juros at 10%, the 
sale of another batch of juros at 10% to pay Nicolao de Grimaldo 100,000 ducats from the 
principal helps to elucidate some innovations in the analysis of the Genoese financial 
strategies.901 Due to the high number of operations, this section focuses only on the cases in 
which the juro was divided or completely resold to someone else. 
The first example was a member of the mighty Doria family, Nicolao Doria. The lender 
obtained an allocation of his juro on the alcabalas of Murcia (533 ducats) and Cádiz (1,066 
ducats).902 The former covered the tax on meat, fresh fish, young goats, and inheritances, 
while the latter had no itemisation. Both taxes were split into parts that Doria sold on to third 
parties through the intermediation of Nicolao de Grimaldo, demonstrating the long-term 
business relationship of these financiers.  
Charts 13 and 14 show how this new distribution was done. The first shows that 
Nicolao Doria preserved part of his right to the alcabala of Murcia, after Grimaldo sold part 
of that right on behalf of Doria. More specifically, the Genoese broker divided Doria’s juro 
into two uneven parts: 160 ducats for Juan de León and 240 for Doria. As with previous 
transactions, the fees Grimaldo charged for his services remain unknown. The second chart 
provides a list of nine investors who used the services of Nicolao de Grimaldo to become 
bondholders through Doria’s asset. If the original value of the alcabalas of Cádiz was 1,066 
ducats, Grimaldo liquidated this bond through its sale to investors who did not live in Cádiz 
or Valladolid to facilitate the collection of the interest. Diego de Polanco, for example, was 
vecino of Burgos. Individual investigation into private archives or, more likely, notarial records 
is essential to discover how these people collected the returns and contacted Grimaldo. 
Although all these investors should have received a new juro, it has not been possible to check 
them all to see whether someone had intermediated on their behalf. 
The analysis of the agendas of these bondholders can provide an ultimate study of the 
upstream flows. It is not possible to create a profile of those investors of the third level. A 
preliminary inspection, however, indicates that they were not noble, but merchants like Diego 
de Polanco. Nonetheless, the lack of data about the products charged with these shares of 
the alcabala in Cádiz means that the relationship between their businesses and the 
 
901 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 12–14. 
902 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 459, 33’ (Juro file, Valladolid, 1558). 
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merchandise affected by the royal tax is unclear. Finally, Nicolao Doria did not keep any part 
of this share of the juro, either because he had only intermediated for these investors or 
because he needed cash for other transactions. 
 
Chart 13: Distribution of 400 ducats of interest originally acquired by Nicolao Doria on the alcabalas of Murcia after its 







Juan de León Nicolao Doria







Melchor Rodríguez Jiménez Sebastián Moreno
Esteban Cibo Sobranis Hernando Benitez Rendón
Diego de Polanco Diego de Aguiñiga
Elvira Fonte, Luís, Catalina y Leonor Peri Lorenzo Hernández
Rodrigo Pagan
Chart 14: Distribution of shares of the juro acquired by Nicolao Doria (in ducats). Source: AGS, CME, leg. 459, 
33. Note: this chart is intentionally coloured to ease its visual readability. 
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Another example of the resale of juros draws attention to another member of the 
Doria lineage: Pablo Doria. This Genoese, son of Juan Bautista Doria, acquired a juro with a 
rendimiento of 1,000 ducats on the alcabalas of some towns under the control of the Order 
of Alcantara in modern Extremadura (Las Brozas, Tarancón, Moraleja, Torre don Miguel and 
two other towns that are illegible).903 The returns from this debt title would be granted in 
thirds throughout the year in Valladolid or wherever the royal court was. The upstream flow 
of credit is hard to identify here, as it was Nicolao de Grimaldo who paid on behalf of Pablo 
Doria in August 1558. Nevertheless, Pablo Doria quickly renounced his juro in favour of 
Nicolao de Grimaldo in September 1558. Although Pablo Doria obtained rights over the 
pasturage duties of a military order, as in the previous case of Joanna Manzolo with a juro at 
8.3%, he may have resold his privilege because he lived far from the region of collection. 
This is indeed the first debt title that Grimaldo fully recovered for himself from the 
juros. The Genoese lender had interests in the wool export rights, meaning that he also 
benefited from the collection of taxes from herdsmen for the transhumance of their cattle of 
sheep. The downstream flow of this investment was linked to the abilities of Melchor de 
Uceda and Pedro de Miranda, from Toledo and Salamanca respectively, to collect the tax.904 
These two men leased the royal tax from 1556 until 1560. As this was a farmed rent, the 
returns that Grimaldo had to receive depended entirely on the royal treasurer López del 
Campo instead of these tax farmers, which was a safer investment. 
A final example on the resale of juros was also a Genoese, which reinforces the profile 
of this community as financial brokers. Pablo Spinola, who obtained the allocation of his 
privilege in the alcabalas of Aracena and Higuera de la Sierra (both in Huelva), used 
Grimaldo’s services years after the initial sale, which indicates that their relationship endured 
in the long term.905  Grimaldo intermediated for the recovery of 133 ducats by the royal 
administration from that juro between 1562 and 1563, specifically from the part assigned to 
Higuera de la Sierra. and the sale of what was left after the royal operation (about 665 ducats).  
  
 
903 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 459, 24’ 1558. 
904 Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 570. 
905 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 459, 23’ (Juro file, Valladolid, 1558). 
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The new bondholders were Antonio Pérez (vecino of Alcalá de Henares, Madrid), 
Diego de Burgos (chemist of His Majesty) and Francisco de España. None of them were 
Genoese, which means that there was a diversification of risks in play, probably because 
Grimaldo advised Spinola to sell before the new royal order to lower the rendmiento of all 
juros began in 1564. This long-term relationship suggests two conclusions. First, Pablo Spinola 
surely resided in Genoa and this was the reason why he gave Grimaldo power of attorney to 
pay for the juro on his behalf. Second, Grimaldo was not only a provider of rents, but he also 
took care that his clients had trustworthy incomes, which might include the service of 
collecting the earnings in Castile and later forwarding them to Genoa or reinvesting them in 
new financial activities.906 The importance of Grimaldo for his clients and the economic circuit 
between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Republic of Genoa is undeniable. From his position 
in an informal institution like the Genoese lending community, whose principles have already 
been analysed in the first chapter of this thesis, Grimaldo promoted economic progress and 
the protection of contracts in the long term at a local level. In other words, economic 
development in early modern states owed much to informal institutions.907 
The previous examples have illustrated how Genoese lenders diversified their risks in 
two steps. First, the sale of juros liquidated Grimaldo’s old debts. Second, bondholders could 
resell their juros to third parties, sometimes brokered by Grimaldo. This strategy was a 
profitable business thanks to the fees for intermediating the access to those juros. However, 
the financial game was not exclusively a Genoese monopoly. In effect, Castilians also learnt 
to profit from the resale of juros. The following instances demonstrate that there was no 
single profile among the Castilians who employed this financial service. The analysis that 
proves this focuses on three case studies: a merchant, a lady-in-waiting, and a local official.  
The first case is Francisco de Castro Mújica, a financial broker and merchant of Burgos. 
His juro file shows that he paid for this right directly, without the services of an 
intermediary.908 His privilege was earmarked to the Almojarifazgo Mayor de Almonayma y 
 
906 This downstream flow service of has not yet been examined, as it would require more exhaustive and time-
consuming research in the archives. 
907 This conclusion also finds examples in the medieval period. See Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic 
Institutions in Early Trade’. 
908 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 259, 11’ 1558. 
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Berbería of Seville, which had to be charged to the city’s iron and metalwork merchants.909 
Castro Mújica, as an independent broker and experienced financier, sold his privilege to 
Francisco de Salamanca, another Burgos businessman who collaborated with him in the wool 
trade.  
The second example also obtained a privilege on the Almojarifazgo Mayor de 
Almonayma y Berbería of Seville. Her name was Doña Leonor Manuel, a Portuguese 
companion of the princess regent Joanna. The lady-in-waiting purchased her right thanks to 
the intermediation of Felipe Spinola, the business partner and relative of Nicolao de 
Grimaldo.910 This lady belonged to the regent’s inner circle and her behaviour in acquiring a 
juro is surprising considering Joanna’s reticence towards borrowing through the issuing of 
new juros. Leonor’s decision may have been influenced by her marriage in 1558 to Pedro Luís 
Galcerán de Borja, a knight of Calatrava who later became the last Grand Master of 
Montesa.911  
Access to a regular and private source of income gave married women economic 
independence. Since marriage was often an economic contract intended to enlarge the 
wealth and prestige of the couple and their dynasties, the purchase of the juro provided them 
with a long-term asset that could be liquidated in case of necessity. However, the collection 
of the resulting interest lasted for just two years. Doña Leonor Manuel decided to sell her 
privilege to Miguel de Codina in August 1560, after her juro was partially repurchased by the 
royal administration in January. The new holder was a low-ranking Catalonian nobleman and 
the royal treasurer of Philip II, who became a knight by royal privilege in 1562.912 After all, the 
interest remained in noble hands, which shows that the Castilian nobility was interested in 
obtaining regular and trustworthy long-term incomes. 
  
 
909 The Almonayma was a duty for the books in which taxes were recorded, while the ‘renta de Berbería’ taxed 
the trade with the region of Barbary (northern coast of Africa). See José Damián González Arce, ‘El consulado 
genovés de Sevilla (siglos XIII-XV): Aspectos jurisdiccionales, comerciales y fiscales’, Studia Historica. Historia 
Medieval 28, no. 0 (2010): 196. 
910 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 386, 4’ 1558. 
911 Miguel Batllori, La familia de los Borjas (Real Academia de la Historia, 1999), 66. 
912 Francisco José Morales Roca, Ciudadanos y burgueses honrados habilitados como Síndicos del Brazo Real en 
las Cortes del Principado de Cataluña: dinastías de Trastámara y de Austria, siglos XV y XVI, 1410-1599 (Ediciones 
Hidalguia, 1995), 105. 
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The third and last example of this block of juros at 10% is the ‘Bachiller’ Juan Rodríguez 
de Pisa, vecino of Almagro (modern Castilla-La Mancha). Rodríguez de Pisa was another 
bondholder whose investment was earmarked to the pastures of the Calatrava field. 
According to his juro file, he had to collect the earnings in Almagro through the permission of 
Pedro de Miranda, who had the lease of this tax until 1560.913 Specifically, the sources stress 
that Rodríguez de Pisa had to visit the house of Juan de Salvatierra, who would have been the 
representative of Miranda in Almagro. 
This kind of downstream flow contrasts with the one observed in the juro at 8.3% of 
Doña Joanna Manzolo, who had to collect the returns from the royal treasurer. It is clear, 
however, that this form of downstream flow was easier and cheaper for Rodríguez de Pisa. 
Nonetheless, the bondholder had renounced part of his privilege in favour of another vecino 
of Almagro: Bernardo de Orbea. He appears in the accounting records of López del Campo as 
receiving about 24 ducats in February 1559 for himself, a not so small amount bearing in mind 
that the original rendimiento was worth 33 ducats. These small sums of money seem 
particularly insignificant compared to the million escudos issued by Grimaldo to Philip II or 
the thousands of ducats invested by some Genoese financiers. Nevertheless, this financial 
process based on resale among modest investors sheds light on the economic role of people 
who often do not appear in the big narratives. 
A closing statement about the Castilian investors in juros given to Nicolao de Grimaldo 
would be incomplete if the presence of women is not highlighted. Apart from the case of the 
lady-in-waiting, Doña Leonor Manuel, there were four more women who acquired juros 
independently: Doña Inés de Astudillo Montenegro, Doña Ana de Velasco, Maria de Silva, and 
Ana de Béjar.914 Three of these four are clearly noblewomen, and whilst there is no reliable 
confirmation of Inés de Astudillo’s rank, her surname of Astudillo points to a merchant family 
of Burgos. In this sense, women were active actors in the economic life of Castile, even though 
their agency is often eclipsed by the larger Genoese investments. The main difference 
between these two groups of investors, Castilian women and Genoese lenders, lay in the goal 
of their operations. Whereas those women sought to preserve the family reputation and 
 
913 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 335, 25’ 1558. 
914 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’, secs 8–14. 
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patrimony through dowries and regular incomes, Genoese financiers preferred to speculate 
with those debt bonds to profit from their continuous redistribution and resale. 
This section about Nicolao de Grimaldo has shown how the financial flows of early 
modern Castile worked. Map 3 illustrates the multiple points of the Castilian and Genoese 
geographies that participated in the financial circuits in which Grimaldo and the Factoría 
General developed their agendas. Whereas the former represented a well-defined and 
organised collective or informal institution, the Genoese lending community, the latter was a 
formal institution managed by private entrepreneurs. Both institutional representatives had 
their personal agendas: Grimaldo sought to redeem his batch of old royal debts; the factores 
reales aimed to prosper in the royal administration. Their converging interests drew the 
attention of private investors from the territories depicted in the map below. 
Notwithstanding the development of trust strategies to attract prospective bondholders to 
the sale of juros, the sources consulted do not suggest the existence of permanent networks 
of creditors. Nevertheless, informal and formal institutions worked together to make local 
powerholders with financial capability participants in the state-building process. 
 
Map 3. Cities in which the investors of the asiento of 22nd May 1558 with Nicolao de Grimaldo lived. 




The sales of juros have offered a first approach to how the Genoese upstream and 
downstream flows of credit worked through the reimbursement of old royal debts generated 
after the royal suspension of payments in 1557. The analysis of these transactions has 
established a double perspective that consisted of the negotiations between the royal 
administration and the Genoese lenders (macro-level) and the interactions between brokers 
and clients (micro-level). The outcomes of this research show a symbiotic relationship among 
all these actors that are more complex than the mere economic act of arranging a contract. 
Each of the aforementioned actors represented one of the three pillars that sustained the 
early modern Hispanic Monarchy. 
The royal administration was embodied in the Factoría General because this formal 
institution managed the arrangement of new asientos or financial contracts and supervised 
their enforcement. The Genoese lending community was basically an informal institution that 
consisted of multiple business associations based on coercive means of reputation and self-
enforcement. Clients or investors, finally, were local corporations and powerholders whose 
agendas required the agency of a regular long-term income. The interrelation among these 
three social and economic groups prevented the collapse of the Hispanic Monarchy in 1557, 
although their interaction elapsed for years. From the institutional point of view, the relatively 
long process demonstrates that each group needed the other two to perform well 
economically, socially, and politically. 
Nevertheless, the interaction between the three groups was not enough to produce 
economic growth and socio-political integration. The role of representative institutions as 
guarantors of the royal incomes in which juros were allocated was essential to state 
consolidation. Notwithstanding that these representative bodies were formal institutions, 
such as the Castilian cortes that granted subsidies or the councils that distributed the 
encabezamiento general, there was conflict among them. Tension, or competition if 
expressed in economic terms, was also applicable to the other two groups.  
Each one of the three pillars had to negotiate with its institutional fellows besides the 
other groups. For example, the Factoría General had to bargain for its ability to service 
financial contracts on behalf of the monarch with the pre-established institutions of the 
regency or the embassy in Genoa. Similar conflicts took place among Genoese lenders, such 
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as the complaints of Adam Centurione against Nicolao de Grimaldo discussed in this chapter. 
Local corporations and powerholders were also in conflict among themselves, an aspect 
further studied in the following chapter. In this regard, conflict was inter- and intra-
institutional in early modern states. 
The first research question on how trust returned to an international financial market 
after the consolidation of floating debt has multiple answers. First, the use of strategies to 
transmit confidence, such as that of the consortium Gentil-Centurione based on participating 
directly in the sale of juros with the largest share, doubtlessly contributed to calm reticent 
investors. However, it was also a form of syndicated lending because it sought to reduce risks 
through the participation of multiple members of the community. 
Second, the social capital of each broker played a key role in this process. A common 
background in training and previous deals during the reign of emperor Charles V strengthened 
the relations of the Genoese community, which effectively became a sort of close-knit 
diaspora. In this sense, most of the brokers’ clients were friends and relatives, though there 
was also space for outsiders. The closed social group allowed for exceptions that depended 
on the convergence of interests between broker and client. 
Third, the royal need for quick liquidity in the Habsburg Low Countries and Italy 
obliged Philip II to accept a change in his financial policy regarding the concession of 
transferable juros at an interest rate higher than 5% to reimburse old debts in the asientos 
analysed herein. Military constraints and the subsequent need for money to muster and 
dismiss troops on all fronts forced the resumption of new deals that satisfied the Genoese 
brokers. In short, the scarcity of liquidity and the little time to move it around the monarchy 
obliged key formal institutions to negotiate better conditions with the other three socio-
economic pillars of the Hispanic Monarchy. The main outcome of these negotiations was the 
recovery of trust in the financial market, which was central for the resumption of financial 
operations. 
The second research question of this thesis, which enquires about the role of 
intermediaries in these credit flows, has a simpler answer. Brokers existed and were a very 
important part of the financial circuit. Most of them were Genoese such as Nicolao Doria, who 
sold his shares in the alcabalas of Cádiz to third parties, though there were also Castilian 
brokers. The last chapter of this dissertation provides further details about this specific topic. 
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Right now, it is sufficient to say that the profile of these intermediaries was heterogeneous. 
However, it should be stressed that these brokers could be ad hoc, post-operational, or both. 
Ad hoc intermediaries provided a temporary access to debt titles because those 
intermediaries were able to arrange a contract for a financial service with the royal 
administration. Post-operational brokers were people who were not intermediaries when 
they acquired the juro but sold it afterwards according to their private agendas. A 
combination of both models was possible, as the role of Nicolao de Grimaldo as first- and 
second-hand intermediary proves. 
The answers to the third research question of this thesis, which sought to identify the 
political effect that these sales had in local communities in the promotion of state 
construction, is better presented in the following chapter through specific case studies. At 
this point of the thesis, the investment of private capital from local savers in juros was a means 
to obtain a regular and trustworthy income. Examples of the use of the subsequent interest 
are usually linked to dowries and other financial operations such as the division of juros into 
smaller assets to diversify risks and benefit from transaction costs. In terms of the specific 
effect of these bonds on their bondholders in state consolidation, the assets were a clearly 
desirable investment for pursuing personal agendas. Therefore, the sales of juros were a 
centripetal force at local and regional level that amalgamated the private agendas of these 








Chapter 7. Golden threads of wool: financial and commercial interests 
united through the nuevo derecho de lanas 
This part of the thesis employs all the elements analysed in the previous chapters to 
provide a specific view on the people interested in the correct functioning of the new tax on 
wool exports enacted on 30th April 1558. The private agendas of financial brokers, 
bondholders, and merchants are brought together in this threefold chapter to argue that 
informal institutions played a crucial role in interconnecting public and private interests, 
besides promoting economic development at a local level and trust in the international debt 
market. In this sense, the role of formal institutions, such as the Factoría General, in the 
consolidation of the early modern state consisted in the channelling and legitimising of 
private initiatives, which were extremely interested in the survival of the central 
administration. The Hispanic Monarchy was therefore an economic and social framework for 
the development of private and public agendas, which overlapped through strategies for the 
diversification of risks and maintenance of reputation (personal and communitarian). 
The first section of this chapter analyses the sales of juros granted to Nicolao de 
Grimaldo for two asientos he arranged with the Factoría General on 5th October 1558 and 
10th April 1559 and allocated to the new wool exports. The analysis includes the case study of 
the duchess of Florence, Doña Eleonora di Toledo, and the process of brokering that allowed 
her to participate in the secondary debt market in Castile. Her case stresses the existing 
collaboration among informal institutions from different communities to provide financial 
services between different governments in distant geographies. The second section 
emphasises the role the symbiotic relationship between Genoese brokers and Castilian wool 
exporters played in the reliability of the new royal income and the debt bonds allocated to it 
for the survival of the Castilian wool market. Finally, the third section offers an inverted view 
of these flows of capital. Instead of looking at the brokers as the main agents of these financial 
operations, the focus is on local elites and how they sought to participate in the royal debt to 





7.1. A top-down approach: the allocation of juros to the nuevo derecho de lanas 
If the previous chapter showed how the interaction between the Factoría General and 
Genoese lenders resulted in the distribution of regular long-term royal debt bonds among 
local investors and brokers, this section delves into the analysis of specific bondholders whose 
debt titles were allocated to the new wool exports tax (nuevo derecho de lanas) of 1558. Once 
again, the financial operations of Nicolao de Grimaldo with the Factoría General provide 
representative examples of this practice of reimbursing old debts. Instead of using the 
information contained in the asiento signed on 22nd May 1558, this section reviews the 
mercies of two contracts arranged on 5th October 1558 and 10th April 1559. The use of two 
different sales allows us to compare how successful in the distribution of juros Nicolao de 
Grimaldo was, especially since the last asiento was a joint contract with Antonioto Palavesin 
and Lorenzo Spinola. 
The first asiento was signed between Nicolao de Grimaldo and the factor general 
López del Campo in Valladolid on 5th October 1558, just five months after their previous 
contract.915 On this occasion, Grimaldo promised the delivery of 500,000 escudos (533,333 
ducats) to Antwerp. This sum had to be split into four monthly instalments starting with 
160,000 ducats at the end of November until a final payment of 53,333 ducats in February 
1559. In exchange for his financial services, Grimaldo’s principal would be reimbursed in four 
instalments from different parties plus interest of 12%. The importance of the new tax on 
wool exports was already present in this reimbursement since the earnings of this fiscal 
obligation had to service part of the first instalment, which was worth 74,666 ducats, at the 
postponed fair of Medina del Campo initially called for May 1558.916 Nevertheless, the fair of 
May did not take place until December 1558, which reveals that Grimaldo did not receive the 
first instalment of his reimbursement before the first delivery of money to the Habsburg Low 
Countries.917 Indeed, the payment order was issued on 23rd February 1559, which reflects the 
lengthy process of reimbursement when the royal administration ran out of liquidity.918 
 
915 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’. 
916 The remaining 85.333 ducats were to be handed to Grimaldo at the fair of Villalón de Campos in October 
1558, a payment allocated to the earnings of one of the papal bulls in which the name was left blank. See ibid. 
917 Álvarez Nogal and Chamley, ‘Philip II against the Cortes and the Credit Freeze of 1575-1577’, 381. 
918 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’. 
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Apart from the role of the new tax in the reimbursement of the principal, the nuevo 
derecho also backed part of the payment of a mercy of old debts estimated at 200,000 ducats 
plus 32,000 ducats in interest from 1557. The disbursement was assigned to the royal factor 
López del Campo, who was instructed to sell juros at 10% with the interest payable from 
January 1559.919 Grimaldo was entitled to nominate bondholders and allocate half the sum 
conceded (116,000 ducats) to the nuevo derecho in two instalments of 58,000 ducats each 
between the fairs of May and October 1558. The remaining 100,000 ducats were allocated on 
other juros backed by alcabalas and other unspecified rents. Additionally, the juros could be 
resold as many times as their holders wanted. 
Notwithstanding the similarity with the conditions of the asiento signed on 22nd May, 
Grimaldo recognised in the contract that he was unable to find enough investors for those 
juros at that time.920 Accordingly, López del Campo agreed to pay the old debts to Nicolao 
with the money the royal official expected to collect when Grimaldo nominated bondholders, 
which made the reimbursement of the old debts a progressive payment. Since alcabalas were 
a highly reliable source of income because the representative institutions had agreed a fixed 
contribution, the allocation of half the juros on the nuevo derecho could be a deterrent for 
investors. By contrast to alcabalas, the new tax on wool exports depended on the 
effectiveness of the royal administration to collect it and the ability of wool exporters to cheat, 
which made the operation less attractive to prospective bondholders. Although this 
hypothesis is hardly demonstrable without examining the private correspondence of 
Grimaldo, a comparative analysis of accounting sources confirms the premise. 
Gerónimo Pardo Orense, accountant of the general factor López del Campo, 
registered the names and transactions of bondholders who purchased juros at 10% linked to 
the reimbursement of old debts in the asiento of 5th October 1558 in two cargo y datta reports 
between 1558 and 1559.921 The sale of juros amounted to 232,000 ducats, which reflects a 
theoretically perfect distribution of funded debt. However, there was a substantial difference 
between the sum raised to be allocated on the nuevo derecho and the other sum earmarked 
to alcabalas. If initially both batches of juros were worth 116,000 ducats each, an accounting 
 
919 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 34, 54’. 
920 Ibid. 
921 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, 1458’; ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’. 
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report from the Council of Finances pinpoints the names of bondholders who held juros on 
the nuevo derecho, which allows us to cross-reference them with the cargo y datta reports.922 
The result of this comparative analysis shows that bondholders with assets allocated on the 
new wool exports tax invested 25,622 ducats out of 232,000. Therefore, the intermediation 
of Grimaldo in the sale of these juros from October 1558 to April 1559 was not comparable 
to the efficiency shown in his previous contract of 22nd May. In effect, the certainty about the 
fiscal collection of alcabalas seems to have been a determining element in the sale. 
Chart 15 illustrates the distribution of bondholders and their investments from a 
comparative perspective. Whereas most of the investors were Genoese lenders (8 out of 10), 
which can be considered a pattern given the sales of juros analysed in the previous chapter, 
the remaining bondholders were two Castilian women. No Castilian male investor had an 
interest in investing in royal debt backed by the nuevo derecho. The resulting imbalance 
reflects differences beyond the communities. Genoese financiers continued supporting each 
other and participating in the sales of juros as bondholders or unexpected brokers for third 
parties. 
 
Chart 15: Sale of juros at 10% allocated on the nuevo derecho for the asiento of 5th October 1558 with Nicolao de Grimaldo 
(in ducats). Sources: AGS, DGT, I-24, legs. 491 and 1458. 
 
922 The report also contains the investments of other bondholders, though their assets are part of another 
asiento signed on 10th April 1559. The approximate date of the report is therefore after April 1559. See ‘AGS, 
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Some examples of such financial brokerage were Clemente della Robere and Lucas 
Grillo. The first financier held the debt bond for a long time, to later bequeath it to his sons, 
who sold it to other Genoese investors from the Doria family.923 Lucas Grillo, by contrast, 
preferred to sell part of his juro to a Castilian investor, Diego Manuel Bocarro, who may have 
been part of the clientele of Grillo in Seville.924 Further research is still necessary to discover 
if the process of brokerage continued among Castilian investors like Bocarro. In this sense, 
there was no unique profile among the Genoese bondholders registered in the accounting 
records. This conclusion also applies to Nicolao de Grimaldo, who used to participate as a 
main investor in the sales analysed in the previous chapter. His absence in this operation 
seems to have been compensated for by his extraordinary participation in the acquisition of 
juros backed by royal incomes other than the nuevo derecho.925 The fact that representative 
institutions were the guarantors of the debt titles allocated on alcabalas seems to have been 
decisive also for Grimaldo, reflecting how confident he was in the reliability of the other batch 
of juros. 
Apart from the Genoese role in the sale, the participation of Castilian women and the 
absence of their male fellows in the operation is far more revealing. Their female noble titles 
(doña) indicate their social rank, but the information about their debt bonds and lives is 
limited. Apart from being a vecina of Valladolid, there is no trace of Ábalos’ life and economic 
operations in the archives consulted. Her investment, however, was higher than those of 
three Genoese financiers, which suggests a low interest among Genoese lenders in the sale. 
The abbess of Santa Isabel of Valladolid, by contrast, offers more information. As head of a 
religious corporation, her case study is analysed more in-depth in the following pages. 926 
Briefly though, the abbess of Santa Isabel was Doña Catalina de Herrera, a Franciscan nun 
who belonged to a low-ranking noble but wealthy family from the countryside of Valladolid. 
A copy of her bond, held in the Archivo General de Simancas, confirms that the abbess of 
Santa Isabel made two transactions and that the bond was inheritable by the convent.927 In 
exchange for the regular income to the religious institution, the repeated operations in the 
 
923 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 166, 15’ 1558. 
924 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 291, 38’ 1559. 
925 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’. 
926 See in this chapter ‘The Espinosa-Herrera family’. 
927 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 178, 39’ (Valladolid, 28 January 1559). 
310 
 
same sale suggest two intermediations on the part of Grimaldo, which certainly increased the 
transaction costs of the investment. 
The sale of old debts in juros at 10% allocated on the new wool exports tax, 
notwithstanding its initial failure, continued to be part of the mechanism used by the royal 
administration to obtain liquidity with which to reimburse its lenders. Another example of 
this financial tactic was the asiento López del Campo signed with Nicolao de Grimaldo on 10th 
April 1559.928 Chart 16 reflects 14 transactions in which the Castilian and Genoese lending 
communities were much more balanced than in the previous example (7 and 7 respectively). 
The two groups present interesting novelties, such as a predominant male presence among 
the Castilian capitalists and the participation of Nicolao de Grimaldo and his theoretical 
competitor Costantin Gentil with large investments. The operation resulted in the sale of 
151,689 out of the 174,000 ducats that Grimaldo was entitled to market in the contract.929 In 
short, Grimaldo improved his financial performance, but he continued to struggle to 
distribute the juros allocated on the nuevo derecho. 
The increasing share of Grimaldo and his clientele in the new tax on wool exports 
through the sale of juros drew the attention of the royal accountants, who estimated their 
share at 298,072 ducats by 1559.930 The situado (royal liabilities) on the wool exports tax for 
1559, which registered all the financiers participating in the nuevo derecho, was estimated at 
529,570 ducats.931 In this sense, the bonds that Grimaldo and his clientele held amounted to 
56.28% of the situado, which underlines the capacity of a single Genoese financier to sell a 
financial product as a trustworthy investment. 
 
928 The date of this contract has still not been resolved by the literature. While the sources point to the 10th of 
April as the day of the agreement, Modesto Ulloa proposes the 10th of May while Hernández Esteve claims the 
20th of April. See the differences in ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado 
de Felipe II, 147; Hernández Esteve, La historia de la contabilidad, vía privilegiada de aproximación a la 
investigación histórica cuentas de los fondos recibidos por la Factoría General de los Reinos de España para 
financiar la guerra de Felipe II contra el Papa Pablo IV y Enrique II de Francia (1556-1559), 130. 
929 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 491’. 
930 ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 23’. 




Chart 16: Sale of juros at 10% allocated on the nuevo derecho for the asiento of 10 th April 1559 with 
Nicolao de Grimaldo (in ducats). Sources: AGS, DGT, I-24, leg. 491 and AGS, CJH, leg. 35, 23. 
Chart 16 clearly illustrates the differences between the financial capacity of Castilian 
and Genoese investors. Three different cases demonstrate that Castilian capitalism was 
strong enough to eventually participate at the same pace as the Genoese financiers. Doña 
Ángela de Salamanca, Antonio de Olabe, and Juan Jiménez were a medium- to low-ranking 
noblewoman from Burgos and vecinos (possibly merchants) of Vitoria and Valladolid 
respectively. All of them had in common that nobody paid on their behalf, which suggests 
that they were able to raise enough capital by themselves in the short term.932 The case of 
Leonor de Toledo, the highest bidder in the Castilian group and also involved in the sale, is 
dealt with in the next section because of its peculiarities. Nonetheless, it is important to stress 
that she was the duchess of Florence and, therefore, she lived in Tuscany (Italy). Her social 
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position did not allow her to travel to acquire this asset, meaning that someone else paid on 
her behalf.933 
The Castilian group thus shows its strength and independence, while the Genoese 
community activated its cooperative system. The case of Galeote Centurione illustrates this 
behaviour when Felipe Spinola, son-in-law of Nicolao de Grimaldo, paid for the juro on 
Centurione’s behalf.934 This service suggests that Centurione was living outside of Castile, 
probably in Genoa. Spinola would have acted as the agent of Centurione and could also have 
helped him to collect the interest generated until 1567, when the juro was sold to the Castilian 
investor Miguel Bezera. The identification of the people who collected the interest of 10% on 
these debt bonds on behalf of distant Genoese investors highlights the importance of this sort 
of financial service, which logically increased the transaction costs of the long-term 
relationship between broker and bondholder. Thanks to accounting reports held at the 
Archivo General de Simancas, it is possible to locate the brokers who offered those services.935  
The price for those services, however, is data that was kept private and cannot be provided 
by public documents, such as correspondence and accounting books. 
It is clear from this analysis that Nicolao de Grimaldo was entrusted to distribute this 
financial product backed by the new royal tax on wool exports among his clientele. His own 
participation in the acquisition of debt titles was not casual. Quite often, Grimaldo appears in 
the accounting records of the fiscal administrators who supervised the collection of the new 
fiscal duty. The presence of Grimaldo in these lists was linked to his services as guarantor of 
the merchants who should pay the tax.936 Although Grimaldo seems not to have been involved 
in exporting wool himself, his financial strategy covered two aspects regarding the nuevo 
derecho and the juros allocated on it. On the one hand, Grimaldo provided services to make 
the royal tax a trustworthy and regular source of income. On the other hand, his support for 
making the new tax a regular income enabled him to make a better offer to his clients, from 
whom he obtained liquidity by distributing juros. The difference between the sales of 1558 
and 1559 in terms of investments and the quality of investors proves this conclusion. The 
 
933 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 386, 25’: 1559. 
934 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 291, 12’ 1559. 
935 An example in ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, Leg. 269’ n.d. 
936 ‘AGS, EMR, 640’ n.d.; more details about this aspect of the Genoese strategy in ‘Another point of view: the 
business between Genoese financiers and wool exporters’. 
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Genoese financier thus created a perfect business in which he could service the asientos he 
had signed while profiting from brokering the savings of local elites for the royal debt. 
Nevertheless, his project would not have been possible without the participation of other 
brokers who helped Grimaldo to expand his social reach, which is precisely the topic of the 
next section. 
The process of brokering: a duchess and a merchant related 
On 5th June 1559, the royal accountants of princess regent Joanna issued a letter of 
sale to Eleonora di Toledo, consort duchess of Tuscany.937 That letter entitled Eleonora to 
receive 4000 ducats annually through a juro assigned to the nuevo derecho.938 This juro was 
one of those that Nicolao de Grimaldo received from the asiento of 600,000 escudos signed 
on 10th April 1559 to reimburse him for old debts. Although it was common for the purchaser 
of the juro to be present at the transaction, the duchess was not. Her representative, 
Francisco de Castro Mújica, handed over the 40,000 ducats to pay on her behalf. Previous 
examples throughout this thesis have demonstrated that granting powers of attorney to 
someone was a frequent financial strategy among foreign investors, such as the duchess or 
other Genoese financiers living in Genoa. The duchess chose a businessman from Burgos 
(Castile) to represent her at the regent’s court instead of an official ducal emissary, which 
reflects the importance of informal institutions in transactions that could be performed by 
members of formal institutions such as an embassy. Despite his prominent trajectory as a 
financier and merchant, De Castro Mújica is not a character whose traces are easy to find in 
the royal archives. 
He appears mostly in documents such as bills of exchange or is mentioned in some 
commercial affairs. His identification, as happens with other businessmen of medium rank, is 
a complex matter because the private archives of these dealers have not usually survived until 
today.939 It is possible to make up for the lack of sources about such individuals with notarial 
records, although this is also problematic because of the high mobility of such businessmen. 
Their double role as financiers and merchants allowed them to move around the royal court, 
 
937 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 386, 25’. 
938 The allocation on the royal income was done after the letter of sale. See ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 23’. 
939 Exceptional cases exist, such as Simón Ruiz, a businessman from Medina del Campo who also operated as 
financier and merchant, or the Jewish merchant community of Livorno. See Vieira Ribeiro, Early Modern Trading 
Networks in Europe; Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and 
Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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fairs, and stock markets, which means that they used notaries who were located in all these 
spaces. Following the paths of these businessmen becomes almost impossible without a clear 
starting point, which in the case of Francisco de Castro Mújica is to be found in the Archivo 
General de Simancas. The dialogue between royal and notarial sources has resulted in a brief 
reference to this subject. 
Francisco de Castro Mújica (also Móxica and Mugica) was part of the wealthy 
bourgeoisie of Burgos by the mid-sixteenth century. His surnames, Castro and Mújica, reflect 
his heritage as the confluence of two important families of merchants closely linked to the 
exportation of wool to Flanders and Italy. 940  His career and social capital among the 
commercial community of Burgos promoted his appointment in the 1570s and 1580s as 
consul and prior of the Consulado de Burgos, a merchant guild with jurisdiction over the entire 
Castilian kingdom and branches in other regions of Europe like Bruges.941 His professional shift 
from a model of informal institution, such as his business network in the late 1550s, to a 
formal institution like the Consulado de Burgos in the 1570s demonstrates how 
interconnected and permeable these two models of organisation were.942 
Notwithstanding his prominent career, there is no trail of the connection between 
broker and bondholder before the sale of the juro. Unlike many other cases analysed in this 
thesis, the file that contains the debt bond of the duchess does not include the power of 
attorney for the Burgos broker, which could have shed light on the notary who managed the 
transmission of legal powers. 943  Furthermore, there is no surviving master book of his 
businesses, which might have facilitated the analysis of their link. Still, some public archives 
like the Archivo General de Simancas or the Archivo Histórico Provincial of Valladolid and 
Burgos hold some documents on him. 
The intermediation of Nicolao de Grimaldo between the duchess and the Burgos 
businessman was decisive. The Archivio di Stato in Florence holds part of the correspondence 
between Grimaldo and the dukes of Florence from 1554 to 20th February 1558, when the 
 
940 Manuel Basas Fernández, ‘Burgos En El Comercio Lanero Del Siglo XVI’, Moneda y Crédito 77 (1961): 37–68. 
941 Manuel Basas Fernández, ‘Priores y Cónsules de La Universidad de Mercaderes y Consulado de Burgos En El 
Siglo XVI’, Boletín de La Institución Fernán González 161, no. 2o Sem. (1963): 686; Manuel Basas Fernández, El 
Consulado de Burgos en el siglo XVI (Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1963). 
942 José Damián González Arce, ‘La universidad de mercaderes de Burgos y el consulado castellano en Brujas 
durante el siglo XV’, En la España Medieval 33 (2010): 161–202. 
943 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 386, 25’. 
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Genoese lender departed from Genoa for Castile to recover his old debts more effectively.944 
Once the asiento between Nicolao de Grimaldo and the factor general López del Campo was 
signed on 22nd May 1558, the Genoese lender distributed the juros that were assigned to him 
in exchange for his old debts. The correspondence between Grimaldo and the royal 
accountants Luís de Peralta and Licenciado Montalbán records the name of Francisco de 
Castro Mújica, which demonstrates that the Burgos businessman was a client of Grimaldo in 
1558.945  
Once Grimaldo arranged the asiento of 10th April 1559, which included the mercy of 
old debts paid in juros at 10% analysed in the previous section, the Genoese lender signed a 
contract with Francisco de Castro Mújica on 19th May. 946  Castro Mújica promised to pay 
40,000 ducats on the duchess’ behalf for the acquisition of the juro, the official request for 
which was made to the royal accountants the following month. 947 The payment to the factor 
general López del Campo was made on 10th June, almost two months after Grimaldo and 
Castro Mújica signed the contract. In this sense, Grimaldo had continued offering financial 
services to the dukes of Florence, although he had run out of liquidity to service the purchase 
of the juro on this occasion.948  
It seems that the contract with Castro Mújica was not intended to end with the 
acquisition of the juro allocated on the nuevo derecho. Instead, the Burgos businessman 
began to work with the duchess on other business in the 1560s and 1570s, such as the grain 
trade in Málaga in collaboration with Fernando López Gallo, or the administration of a joint 
wool firm in Florence alongside Antonio Salazar and Gabriel de Castro.949 The price for his 
 
944 Grimaldo to of Medici, ‘ASF, MP, Filze 477, Doc. 282’. 
945 Nicolao de Grimaldo to Luís de Peralta, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 39’, Letter, (13 October 1558); Nicolao de Grimaldo 
to Licenciado Montalbán, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 40’, Letter, (13 October 1558). 
946 Tommaso di Iacoppo de ’Medici, ‘ASF, SRP, 4139: Libro Mastro Di Debitori Dei Negozi e Affari Tenuti Di 
Eleonora Da Toledo (1560-1573)’ (Accounting record, n.d.), 259. 
947 Nicolao de Grimaldo to Licenciado Montalbán, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 58’, Letter, (31 May 1559). 
948 Once in Castile, Grimaldo had continued doing business with the dukes. A transaction dated 25th March 1558, 
for example, proves their long-term relationship. See Tommaso di Iacoppo de ’Medici, ‘ASF, SRP, 4138: Libro 
Mastro Di Debitori Dei Negozi e Affari Tenuti Di Eleonora Da Toledo (1558-1560)’ (Accounting record, n.d.), 11. 
949 ‘ASF, MP, Filza 635: Lista Di Debittori e Creditori Di Cosimo I e La Duchesa Eleonora Da Toledo’ (Accounting 
record, 1574); de ’Medici, ‘ASF, SRP, 4139’, 330; Francesco Ammannati and Blanca M. González Talavera, ‘The 
Astudillo Partnership and the Spanish “nation” in the Sixteenth-Century Florence’, in Commercial Networks and 
European Cities, 1400-1800 (Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 125; Blanca M. González Talavera, ‘Presencia y 




services to the duchess in 1563, for example, was set at 767 Florentine lire.950 The absence of 
the Burgos merchant-financier from the master accounting books of the duchess until 1560 
confirms that Grimaldo was the agent who put Elonora di Toledo and Francisco de Castro 
Mújica in contact with each other.951 In this sense, the price for the services of Grimaldo in 
the brokerage of Castro Mújica has not been found in the books of dare e avere (a double-
entry accounting system) of the duchess’ private treasurer, Tommasso de Medici. The 
contract is surely to be found in one of the notarial collections of the Spanish archives, but 
the lack of information as to where the document was signed on 19th March 1559 hampers 
any efficient investigation.  
The collection of the interest generated by the duchess’s juro, by contrast, sheds light 
on the complex network of brokers that the contract between Grimaldo and Castro Mújica 
triggered. The letter books of the Astudillo company, which Castro Mújica co-administered in 
1559, contain the correspondence logs organised in a yearly series that continues until the 
end of the sixteenth century.952 The 21st book has copies of the letters sent to and from Burgos, 
besides other Castilian cities, by Melchor de Astudillo between 1559 and 1560. The names on 
the addressees of these nearly two hundred letters create a list of the people who worked 
with his company. The most repeated addressees were also leading Burgos merchants: Juan 
de Béjar, Miguel de Salamanca, Alonso de Astudillo, and Luís de Polanco. 
Their presence was not a coincidence as they corresponded to long-term business 
relationships with the heads of the company in other affairs. For example, Miguel de 
Salamanca collaborated with Francisco de Castro Mújica in sending bills of exchange to the 
royal factor Juan López Gallo in Flanders by 1558.953 Luís de Polanco, more interesting for the 
topic of this section, collected the incomes the juro of the duchess generated in 1561.954 In 
other` words, the business network of Castro Mújica reflects the importance of social capital 
in informal institutions to work in an ‘international’ dimension.955 However, changes such as 
 
950 Apart from his role in the payment and collection of juros, the reimbursement also included services for the 
grain trade in Granada and ‘seggiole’ (chairs?). See de ’Medici, ‘ASF, SRP, 4139’, 330. 
951 de ’Medici, ‘ASF, SRP, 4138’. 
952 ‘AN, Fondo Naldini. Serie Libri Di Scrittura per Società Mercantili. Sottoserie Ragione Cantante in Melchior de 
Astudillo Di Cui Fu Socio Francesco Naldini’ n.d. 
953 ‘AGS, DGT, Inv. 24, Leg. 815’ 1559. 
954 ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, Leg. 269’. 
955  On the role of social capital in business networks see Aslanian, ‘Social Capital, “Trust” and the Role of 
Networks in Julfan Trade’. 
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the death of Eleonora di Toledo in 1562 and the subsequent transmission of the debt bond to 
her husband Cosimo I could have had an impact on those business networks. In effect, 
Bastiano Matti (also found as Sebastian Mati) began to collect the interest on the juro in 
1564.956 Throughout the years, however, the business network of Castro Mújica recovered its 
role according to the accounting records of López del Campo, which registered collectors such 
as Juan Curiel de la Torre, Luís de Polanco and Alonso de Rueda.957 
This section has demonstrated that informal institutions collaborated with one 
another to provide financial solutions for large polities like the Hispanic Monarchy. Since the 
allocation of juros on the nuevo derecho was considered a less reliable royal income than 
alcabalas because of the agency of representative institutions, the lack of trust to attract 
prospective bondholders like the duchess of Florence made the collaboration between 
Genoese and Burgos business networks necessary. In this sense, the investment of the 
duchess helped to reimburse part of the old royal debts to Grimaldo, which facilitated the 
access of the royal administration to the credit market. Everything was interconnected and 
interdependent, which stresses the importance of the reliability of the nuevo derecho to meet 
the expectations of its bondholders. The following section addresses how the collaboration 
between Genoese and Castilian informal institutions also helped to increase the reliability of 
the new tax, thus reflecting their important role in the consolidation of the early modern state. 
7.2. Symbiosis: the business between Genoese financiers and Castilian wool exporters 
The nuevo derecho on wool exports, published by the princess regent Joanna on 30th 
April 1558, was part of the masterplan that López del Campo proposed in February 1557 to 
Philip II.958 The new tax was implemented on one of the most profitable businesses of the 
Hispanic Monarchy. 959  The exportation of wool involved many transaction costs for 
 
956 ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, Leg. 269’. 
957 Ibid. 
958 On the publication of the new fee see ‘AGS, CCG, Leg. 2977’ n.d.; Tomás González Presbítero, Colección de 
cédulas, cartas-patentes, provisiones, reales órdenes y otros documentos concernientes a las provincias 
vascongadas: copiados de orden de S.M. de los registros, minutas y escrituras existentes en el Real Archivo de 
Simancas, y en los de las secretarías de estado y del despacho y otras oficinas de la Corte (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 
1829), 112; on the suggestion to enact the tax see Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
959 The literature is abundant, but some works deserve a special mention. See Carla Rahn Phillips and William D. 
Phillips Jr., Spain’s Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth 
Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Luis María Bilbao Bilbao and Emiliano Fernández de 
Pinedo y Fernández, ‘Exportación de lanas, trashumancia y ocupación del espacio en castilla durante los siglos 
XVI, XVII y XVIII’, in Contribución a la historia de la trashumancia en España (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, 
Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, 1996), 343–62; Basas Fernández, ‘Burgos En El Comercio Lanero Del Siglo XVI’. 
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production, refinement, and transportation. The wool trade had its headquarters in Castile, 
where flocks of sheep were bred and sheared. Most of the fleeces obtained after shearing 
were exported to the main manufacturing centres of European textiles (the Habsburg Low 
Countries and Italy) rather than being used by the Castilian industry. Exporting wool was an 
expensive and long process that demanded large investments from merchants. Exporters 
would purchase the fleeces from the shepherds about a year beforehand. Afterwards, they 
would wash the wool in specialised places dispersed in Castile, an operation that was 
expensive but generated higher profits in the international market.960 
The new duty imposed a tariff that taxed one ducat per sack of wool travelling from 
Castile to Flanders, and two ducats if the wool was exported to France or Italy if the exporter 
was Castilian. Instead, if the wool exporter or his associates were foreign, the duty doubled. 
Apart from this, every destination had a different way of weighing the wool, which had an 
impact on the value of the final duty. Notwithstanding that the new tax increased transaction 
costs in both destinations, table 6 demonstrates that exporting wool to Flanders incurred a 
lower fee than to other European regions because the merchants paid less than for other 
destinations.  
Arrobas to export Destination Number of sacks Duty 
100 (Castilian) 
Flanders 12 (sacks of 8.5 arrobas) 
12 ducats 
100 (foreigner) 24 ducats 
100 (Castilian) 
France, Italy, others 10 (sacks of 10 arrobas) 
20 ducats 
100 (foreigner) 40 ducats 
Table 6: Comparison of the costs to export 100 arrobas of wool for a Castilian and for a foreigner. 
The factor general had foreseen that the fiscal novelty could create unrest among the 
main groups of merchants from Burgos and Seville.961 In other words, the concerns of López 
del Campo reflect the fact that members of informal institutions could channel their 
 
960 Rafael María Girón Pascual, ‘Los Lavaderos de Lana de Huescar (Granada) y El Comercio Genoves En La Edad 
Moderna’, in Génova y La Monarquía Hispánica (1528-1713), vol. 1, 2 vols (Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011), 
191–202. For example, 17 arrobas of dirty wool were worth 8 of washed wool in the market. See Henri Lapeyre, 
El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, Facultad 
de Filosofía y Letras, 1981), 170. 
961 Fernán López del Campo to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
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complaints and influence through formal institutions such as the Castilian cortes. To 
counteract any resistance, the general factor had suggested that Philip II should negotiate the 
abolition of a decree that obliged wool exporters to bring clothes and lines back to Castile 
from France. 
The Castilian merchant community had a long experience in that monarchy. In the 
fifteenth century, for example, businessmen from Burgos were active in important 
commercial hubs such as Rouen, Nantes, La Rochelle, and Toulouse to import fine clothes, 
wine, naval supplies, or pastel, besides being intermediary points with the northern trade.962 
Notwithstanding the apparent preference for Flanders, Lapeyre discovered that some cargoes 
went to Flanders to then return to Rouen because this longer round trip was cheaper than 
paying the duty exporting from Castile to France directly.963 
The abolition of the law on clothes imports, therefore, could lower the transaction 
costs for those business communities in exchange for their collaboration with the new tax on 
wool exports. In this sense, the aim of the negotiation was that informal commercial 
institutions refrained from channelling their complaints through representative bodies, which 
could enforce a penalty on the monarchy by rejecting the concession of servicios at the 
following meeting. Furthermore, the fiscal and commercial reorganisation was aimed as an 
attack on French industry, to counter the embargo by that monarchy, and provide funds to 
reimburse the old debts of the monarch.964  
The collection of the new tax was organised at three levels: general, regional, and local. 
The first level consisted of a general collector, who received the earnings that the tax 
generated from multiple exporting sea and dry ports in Castile. Since the general collector 
was unable to collect these sums of money by himself alone, he collaborated with regional 
administrators. Map 4 illustrates the geographical points where the duty was collected under 
the close supervision of those regional custom officials. They were four, one per jurisdiction, 
 
962 Hilario Casado Alonso, ‘Circuitos comerciales y flujos financieros en Castilla a fines de la Edad Media e inicios 
de la Modernidad’ (Estados y mercados financieros en el occidente cristiano (siglos XIII- XVI): XLI Semana de 
Estudios Medievales, Estella, 15-18 de julio de 2014, Gobierno de Navarra, 2014), 284. 
963 Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 185. 
964 Carla Rahn Phillips, ‘The Spanish Wool Trade, 1500–1780’, The Journal of Economic History 42, no. 4 (1982): 
781; Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 171; Fernán López del Campo 
to Philip II, ‘AGS, EST, Leg. 121, 62’. 
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covering the exports in the north, east, west, and south of Castile. 965  These regional 
administrators settled in the main ports of their jurisdictions and hired local collectors, people 
who really enforced the new norms at local level in the dry and sea ports of Castile and the 
Basque Provinces. 
 
Map 4. Towns where the new duty was collected in 1558-1559. Sources: AGS, CMC, 2ª Época, 207, AGS, CMC, 1ª Época, 
1559, AGS, EMR, leg. 440. 
When the new tax was finally enacted in April 1558, the royal administration initiated 
a legal process to instruct those officials in their new tasks. This procedure was progressive, 
which shows a surprising timing in completing this process. A remarkable example is the 
administration of the northern region, which included Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and the Cuatro 
Villas de la Mar. Map 5 details which specific ports fell under this jurisdiction, which covered 
the main exporting routes towards the Northern Sea.966 They were assigned to Diego Alonso 
 
965 Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 174–75. 
966 Grafe also includes the port of Deva in her analysis about the evolution of the wool exports in the northern 
area. That seaport has not been included on the map because it does not appear in the records for the initial 
years, especially those referring to local collectors. Therefore, Deva was incorporated in the following years to 
the regional ports. See Regina Grafe, Entre el mundo ibérico y el atlántico: comercio y especialización regional, 
1550-1650 (Bilbao: Diputación Foral de Bizkaia, Departamento de Cultura, 2005), 80. 
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de Maluenda on 29th May 1558, barely a month after the enactment of the new tax.967 The 
remaining instructions of that year, those of the southern and eastern borders, were not 
officially announced until 19th August and 30th September 1558 respectively. In other words, 
there were almost three months between the first and second instructions, something that 
the literature does not seem to have considered. The causes behind this administrative delay 
are still unclear, though it suggests that there were multiple elements involved. 
 
Map 5. Northern ports where the new duty was collected in 1558. Source: AGS, CMC, 2ª Época, 207. 
First, the northern exports were a priority because they were one of the main 
exporting regions in terms of volume of wool sacks. Second, the new fiscal policy was 
intended to promote the commercial flow towards the Northern Sea, which together with the 
upcoming departure of the merchant fleet, ensured the collection of abundant earnings for 
the royal treasury.968 Third, the following pages show that the symbiotic relation between 
Burgos merchants, main wool exporters in the northern seaports, and Genoese financiers 
ensured the viability of the new tax. Fourth, the establishment of the wool tax in the 
 
967 ‘AGS, EMR, 640’; ‘AGS, CCG, Leg. 2977’. 
968 The wool was already in the ships ready for its departure that year. Unloading the ships at that moment was 
not an option, so Philip II instructed the officers of the Consulate of Burgos in Flanders to collect the duty upon 
the arrival of the fleet. See Basas Fernández, ‘Burgos En El Comercio Lanero Del Siglo XVI’, 332; Ulloa, La 
Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 330. 
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Guipuzcoan and Biscayan regions in 1558 was simultaneous to a long-term fiscal and military 
reorganisation to protect the route to the Northern Sea that required the collaboration of 
local elites, especially from Bilbao. From the fiscal perspective, Philip II recovered an old 
Castilian tenth (diezmos de la mar de Castilla) on 10th November 1559, once the king returned 
to Castile, which suggests a long-term policy of fiscal centralisation. 969 On the military side, 
local Bilbao elites initiated a period of continuous negotiation and collaboration with the royal 
administration in the 1560s and 1570s regarding the business of military shipbuilding to 
provide protection to the northern route.970 These four elements contribute to explaining the 
swiftness in issuing instructions for the fiscal collection on the northern coast. 
The second regional jurisdiction was enforced in Andalusia, which took place on 19th 
August 1558.971 The entire summer had already passed when this fiscal district was delineated. 
The administration of this region was assigned to Francisco de Moxica or Mújica, another 
Burgos merchant, who administered this area until 1561.972 Mújica was given a commission 
to administer the fiscal territory on 28th July, though it was not until a month later that he 
received his instructions. His jurisdiction was set between Torrox (Malaga) and the last 
seaport before the Portuguese border, though the salaries of his custom officials for this 
period reveal that Mújica simply enforced the collection in the main ports (map 6). In this 
sense, the regional administrator understood that not all the exports would pass through the 
hands of his officials. However, he had to find the right balance between fiscal coercion and 
administrative sustainability. 
 
969 Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 79. 
970 Jean-Philippe Priotti, Bilbao et ses marchands au XVIe siècle: Genèse d’une croissance, Histoire et civilisations 
(Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2019). 
971 ‘AGS, CCG, Leg. 2977’. 
972 Ulloa omitted the detail about the period 1559-1560, though Lapeyre confirms the dates. See Lapeyre, El 
comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 175; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El 




Map 6. Southern ports where the new duty was collected in 1558. Source: AGS, CMC, 2ª Época, 207. 
The third fiscal district administered the dry and seaports located on the south-eastern 
border between the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Granada. Map 7 shows the multiple 
towns where Julian de Entiena, the first regional administrator, placed local collectors to 
enforce control over his fiscal jurisdiction. The flows of exported wool were mostly directed 
towards Italy, a route that was largely controlled by important Genoese and Milanese 
businessmen from the medieval period, and especially during the fifteenth century.973 
 
973 Girón Pascual, ‘Las Indias de Génova’; Pedro Miralles Martínez, ‘Familias genovesesas afincadas en Murcia 
vinculadas al comercio sedero’, in Los extranjeros en la España moderna: actas del I Coloquio Internacional 
celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002., ed. María Begoña Villar García and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal 
(Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2003), 493; Ángel Luis Molina Molina, ‘Mercaderes genoveses en Murcia 




Map 7. Eastern ports where the new duty was collected in 1558. Source: AGS, CMC, 2ª Época, 207. 
The duty on the Portuguese border was the last to be enacted, and was delayed until 
28th November 1558, probably because it was less common for the wool exports to go in that 
direction. 974 In effect, it was much cheaper to export the wool directly from Castile rather 
than to also pay taxes to exit Portugal, which increased transaction costs. Fernán Ramírez, a 
vecino of Valladolid, was the first regional administrator commissioned to make the collection 
on this border.975 Ramírez owned the encomienda of Herrera (modern Herrera de Alcántara), 
which belonged to the Order of Alcantara and was located on the Portuguese border. In this 
sense, Ramírez was señor of the territory and was used to administering the taxes in that 
region. This nobleman is an example of how local elites participated in a stakeholder model 
of the early modern state because of their private interest in its development.976  
The jurisdiction of Ramírez included the partido (district) of the Alcantara Order, the 
Bishopric of Salamanca, Zamora, and Coria, besides the cities and territories of Ciudad Rodrigo 
and Badajoz. The border with the Kingdom of Galicia, however, seems not to have required a 
 
974 ‘AGS, CCG, Leg. 2977’. 
975 Ibid. 
976 On the concept of stakeholder empire, see Grafe and Irigoin, ‘A Stakeholder Empire’. 
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local collector. Until the instructions given by the next administrator, Luis de Polanco, on 19th 
November 1559, the Galician side of the Portuguese border (the Bishopric of Tuy) was not 
included in the fiscal district, a detail that seems to have been overlooked in the literature 
and requires future research. 
Map 8 shows which custom offices were active in 1559, at the end of Polanco’s first 
year in office. Although Ciudad Rodrigo should be included according to the initial commission, 
the sources consulted do not indicate any employee in that city. Nonetheless, Polanco 
belonged to a powerful merchant family of Burgos and had previously administered the taxes 
in the dry ports with Portugal until he was appointed to his new office. 977 Once again, the 
royal administration employed private entrepreneurs with experience and social capital in the 
‘national’ market. 
 
Map 8. Western dry ports where the new duty was collected in 1559. Source: AGS, EMR, leg. 440. 
Looking at these four jurisdictions together, the regency government minimised the 
coercive costs. Instead of sending officials from the court in Valladolid or the Habsburg Low 
Countries, the royal administration trusted the administration and collection of the new 
 
977 ‘AGS, EMR, Leg. 440’; Ulloa, La Hacienda Real de Castilla En El Reinado de Felipe II, 247. 
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duties to private experts in the subject with influence in the region. In this sense, the four 
jurisdictions were administered by merchants, mostly from Burgos, because of this 
community’s long tradition in such activities. This organisation continued the pattern seen in 
previous chapters on the system of royal factors, who were expert merchant-financiers with 
extensive experience in the field. The state-building process as based on the role of private 
assistance, rather than public (royal) agency, can be observed in this administrative process. 
Notwithstanding the role of regional administrators, we must also bear in mind the 
work of those employees who were under the direct orders of these regional managers. 
People such as Alonso de Maluenda (north), Muxica (south), Entiena (east), and Ramírez (west) 
required the services of people to enforce and collect the new tax in the minor settlements 
along the Castilian borders. The regional officials were thus responsible for paying the services 
of these local collectors, an administrative process that has left its trace in the documentation 
consulted.978 
Thanks to these sources, we know the names and positions of these people and can 
shed some light on their role. Most of the people mentioned in these logs were administrators 
in the towns they were assigned to, though many others were logistics staff. For example, 
notaries again take a predominant role in the fiscal cohesion, and hence in the state 
consolidation, since they would register the fiscal activities of local administrators and 
sometimes collect the duty when there was no one available for whatever reason.979 Death 
and temporary absences due to travel were among the most common cases. Quite often, 
there was also a need to inspect the ships on the shores, especially along the southern border, 
which required a boat to take the administrator and his notary out to check the cargo.980 This 
service was also included in these accounts, adding the profiles of naval suppliers and captains 
to the list. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to realise that local administrators were part of the municipal 
oligarchy. In Cartagena, for example, we find Joan Espin Cobacho administering the duty in 
 
978 Most of the accounts that reveal the names of these subaltern employees in 1558 are in ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, 
Leg. 207’ (Accounting record, n.d.). 
979 An example of this finding was Ginés Sancho de Melgar, notary in Murcia, whose salary amounted to 6.,00 
maravedis per year. See ibid., sec. 5. 
980 ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, Leg. 207’. 
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1558.981 He was a regidor in this seaport, a position that probably helped him to become part 
of the clientele of the regional administrator at that time, Juan de Entiena. In other words, 
the enactment of this new duty activated large networks of clientelism with a pyramid shape 
in which everybody depended upon the regional administrators in the last instance. It was 
they who managed the salaries of these people as well as the money the local officials 
collected. From their headquarters in the main ports of their jurisdictions, regional 
administrators were an all-powerful pole for social and economic promotion and state 
consolidation.982 
Were these four people that influential as the system for organising the local tax 
collection suggests? There were also measures in place to counteract any potential fraud 
resulting from this fiscal and social system. Three levels can be distinguished in these 
antifraud measures. First, there was a superregional stage in which the regional 
administrators had to send their reports to the general administrator. In order to avoid a bond 
of clientelism between these two royal officials, a regional level was established through the 
appointment of notaries to oversee the actions of the regional officials. Instead of sending 
their records to the general collector, these public servants forwarded them directly to the 
royal accountants of the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas. 
This specialised body of the royal administration compared the logs that the royal 
officials sent from throughout the entire monarchy and contrasted them with each other to 
check whether there was corruption in the system. In this sense, these royal accountants 
oversaw the records of the general collector and those of the regional notaries. The third and 
final level was the imposition of a penalty on the regional administrator if his employees were 
deceptive in their accounts. The punishment involved forcing the regional official to pay the 
money that was missing. Once again, the role of regional notaries was crucial for detecting 
cases of fraud at the local level. However, their coercive actions also reinforced the necessity 




982 These ‘headquarters’ were the main exporting ports of each jurisdiction: north (Laredo), south (Seville), east 
(Yecla), and west (unclear: Alburquerque or Badajoz). 
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The actions and converging agendas of all these officials, who became involved in a 
single project after the enactment of the new tax, was a fundamental element in the 
collection of the duty and the reliability of the nuevo derecho to allocate juros on it. The role 
that the royal administration played in framing the fiscal system legally through the 
instructions to the administrators complemented the hiring of private staff at local level. 
However, this public-private collaboration resolved just half of the fiscal problem analysed in 
this section. The other half was entrusted to the Genoese lending community and its financial 
operations to financially support the exporters of Castilian wool. 
Genoese financiers such as Nicolao de Grimaldo and Costantin Gentil, the real 
architects of the new financial structure, helped keep the wool market alive after the 
enactment of the new tax. The decline in Castilian commercial activity because of the royal 
edicts of the 1550s, already examined in the second chapter of this thesis, was exacerbated 
as result of the new duty another cause because of the increase in transaction costs among 
merchants. With the new fiscal measure, the lending services of Genoese high-ranking 
financiers to Castilian wool exporters became more necessary than ever. The literature of the 
nuevo derecho and the wool market has traditionally stressed the interest of royal financiers 
in the leasing of the new tax, especially in the second half of the seventeenth century.983 The 
decline of wool exports in that period, which contrasts with the resurgence of the first half of 
the eighteenth century, suggests that there was always an interest in participating and 
benefiting from this source of income. However, it is also true that there was a progressive 
interest of native capitalists in the financing of this trade, which was clearer in the second half 
of the eighteenth century.984  
This thesis seeks to contribute to this historiography analysing the participation of 
Grimaldo and Gentil in the wool market of the mid-sixteenth century, before the interest of 
financiers shifted to leasing the royal income in a period of uncertainty. Although the Genoese 
 
983 Leaseholders used to offer loans disguised as an advance of money in exchange for the contract, which was 
a fraudulent and illegal practice that was accepted by the royal treasury because of the urgent need of funds. 
See Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘La figura de los arrendadores de rentas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII: la renta de 
las lanas y sus arrendadores’, Hispania: Revista española de historia 47, no. 165 (1987): 203–24; Agustín 
González Enciso, ‘Introducción: la lana, negocio financiero’, ed. Agustín González Enciso (El negocio de la lana en 
España (1650-1830), Ediciones Universidad de Navarra. EUNSA, 2001), 22. 
984 Rafael Torres Sánchez, ‘Lana y banca: los servicios financieros al negocio lanero en el siglo XVIII’, ed. Agustín 




lenders helped to keep the wool market alive, the initial downturn was evident. Figure 4 
shows the evolution of the tax collection until 1598, highlighting a pronounced decline after 
the promulgation of the new fiscal imposition in 1558 until January 1563 and June 1566, when 
the king claimed that tariffs needed to be increased in order to tackle fraud. Whereas informal 
institutions helped to keep the wool market alive by offering financial services to Castilian 
merchants, the royal administration (formal institution) collected less revenue until it applied 
coercive means. 985 
The clash between the interests of businessmen and the central administrative 
apparatus was already evident at the Castilian cortes of 1558, when the urban representatives 
demanded the abolition of the tax because of economic and legal reassons (request 9).986 
First, the magistrates critizised that the new tariff could ruin Castilians, foreigners living in 
Castile, and low ranking nobility (caballeros and hijosdalgo). Since most of the businessmen 
who purchased Castilian wool were foreigners living outside the kingdom, noted the 
representatives, it would be fairer to charge them instead. In this sense, informal institutions 
like the wool exporters managed to channel their complaints through a formal institution to 
 
985 ‘AGS, EMR, 640’. 








Ulloa (edition of 1986, first published in 1963)2 Lapeyre (1981)
Figure 4: Incomes of the new tax on exported wool (1558-1598). Sources: Modesto Ulloa. La Hacienda de Felipe II,  
p. 334 and Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, p. 195. Note: the intervals of 
years reflect the annual average of the tax in that period. Ulloa and Lapeyre differ in some of their findings. For the 
periods 1569-1572 and 1580-1582, Lapeyre only registers the incomes from the northern coast, making comparisons 
with Ulloa’s estimates for those years impossible. 
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prevent an economic disaster. The urban delegates also highlighted the problem of charging 
the caballeros and hijosdalgo, since they were privileged in fiscal terms. If the sovereign 
proceeded to charge them also, he would break laws and pragmáticas. This legal intrusion, 
however, was vaguely satisfied by the sovereing because the answer consisted in a future 
study of the problem. 
The Castilian cortes of 1559 also reflected discomfort with the state of the wool 
market.987 Most of the complaints dealt with the strategies of some merchants to hoard as 
much wool as possible to increase its price to local clothmakers (request 34). The delegates 
also complained of merchants who purchased large quantities of wool to redistribute them 
among exporters (request 35). This re-sale strategy suggests that foreign merchants used 
native businessmen as a front to avoid paying the full tariff. These complaints were also 
accompained of some subtle requests that alert of the economic impact of the nuevo derecho. 
Exactly, there was an scarcity of low-quality clothes (paños bajos) that was linked to the two 
problems of hoarding and export-oriented market (request 32).  
If the meetings of 1558 and 1559 had remarked the unease of part of the urban elites 
who could send representatives to the Castilian cortes, the meeting of 1563 shows that those 
urban elites could not offer a serious resistance. The urban representatives requested that 
the new increase in the wool export tariff, which had been enacted to prevent fraud, be 
abolished and there would instead be a return to the initial fiscal policy of the tax (chapter 
108).988 Although the sovereign rejected their petition, this episode reflects the constant 
bargaining between two economic models: one based on informal institutions that preserved 
economic activity; and another based on regulations imposed by formal institutions that 
sought to maximise revenue at the expense of economic growth. 
The evolution of this trade was not the same in the Atlantic as in the Mediterranean. 
Northern exports were in serious decline because of the rebellion in the Habsburg Low 
Countries and the Anglo-Hispanic maritime conflict, in which the French civil war played an 
important role. Military conflict and mutual embargos were decisive elements that altered 
 
987 Ibid., 824. 
988  Congreso de los Diputados, Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, publicadas por acuerdo del Congreso de los 
Diputados a propuesta de su Comisión de Gobierno Interior (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1861), 373. 
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the normal trends of commerce.989 The French market absorbed part of the Flemish imports 
of Castilian wool, but this was not enough and the importance of Burgos for northern wool 
exports practically vanished by the end of the century.990 
However, this decline linked to military and political events was simply a 
transformation. Burgos and its neighbouring regions, the former core of the northern 
commerce, found new opportunities in trading eastwards to Italy. In effect, the Castilian 
commercial oligarchies partially displaced the Genoese wool exporters in the Mediterranean 
area, at the same time as exports were being concentrated in fewer hands than in the initial 
years of the new tax. According to Lapeyre, ‘Castile’s centre of gravity had moved 
southwards’, a tendency recently confirmed for the last quarter of the century.991 This shift 
means that informal institutions were dynamic, but also that a decision of a formal institution, 
such as the enactment of the tax, could transform the former in unexpected ways. 
Back to the beginning of the timeline, it is common to find Genoese financiers such as 
Nicolao de Grimaldo or Costantin Gentil funding Castilian wool merchants from 1558. The 
analysis of a series of data from 1558 to 1560 sheds light on this issue and allows us to create 
connections among royal lenders and Castilian merchants beyond the individual analyses of 
these figures.992 For example, graph 1 visualises the multiple connections that existed among 
wool merchants and lenders registered in the accounting records of royal officials by 1559. 
Although many businessmen were isolated cases who did not have many ties, it is possible to 
identify up to five main groups that interconnect at least five people. 
Within this ‘big league’, networks A and B show a higher degree of clustering, which 
emphasises the role of key lenders in interweaving multiple actors. Whereas group A is clearly 
marked by its predominant Genoese character, group B illustrates a total absence of non-
Castilian businessmen, either merchants or lenders. The first network, nonetheless, allowed 
for some Burgos merchants to take part in their syndicated operations. This permeable 
 
989 Grafe, Entre el mundo ibérico y el atlántico, 50; Phillips, ‘The Spanish Wool Trade, 1500–1780’, 781. This 
pattern continued in the seventeenth century, see Jonathan I Israel, ‘Spanish Wool Exports and the European 
Economy, 1610-40’, The Economic History Review 33, no. 2 (1980): 208. 
990 Luis María Bilbao Bilbao and Ramón Lanza García, ‘Entre Castilla y Francia: Comercio y Comerciantes En Bilbao 
a Mediados Del Siglo XVI’, Revista de Historia Económica = Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic 
History 27, no. 1 (2009): 103–40. 
991 Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II, 184–91; Girón Pascual, ‘Las Indias 
de Génova’, 119. 
992 ‘AGS, CMC, 2a Época, Leg. 207’; ‘AGS, EMR, Leg. 440’; ‘AGS, EMR, Leg. 443’ (Accounting record, n.d.). 
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commercial strategy reinforces the traditional literature claiming that Genoese lenders 
financed Castilian merchants.993 The novelty of this dissertation to that literature is double. 
First, the Genoese lenders only worked with Burgos merchants because this strategy 
reinforced the oligopolistic tendencies mentioned before. Second, this study reflects on why 
these ties did not collapse during the royal financial crisis of 1557 and the new fiscal 
imposition on exported wool. 
 
Graph 1. Businessmen involved in the duty on exported wool (1559). 
Grouped by colours: blue (merchant), green (lender) and red (merchant-lender). 
Sized by number of connections. Source: AGS, EMR, 440 
If Genoese financiers stopped funding Castilian wool merchants, then the latter would 
probably have been bankrupted by the new tax on exported wool, because the increase in 
transaction costs would have reduced their competitiveness next to foreign businessmen. The 
funding of Genoese financiers became, then, an important tool for wool exporters, who 
accepted a decrease in their earnings because they had secured the necessary financial 
backing. In addition, we can detect that the wool exporting companies were now longer 
lasting than before, and they were based on ties of kinship and reputation. For example, 
Nicolao de Grimaldo funded a Burgos company led by three of the most prominent merchants 
of the city, who had relatives in the local council.994 
 
993 Eufemio Lorenzo Sanz, ed., Historia de Medina del Campo y su tierra, vol. 2 (Valladolid: Ayuntamiento de 
Medina del Campo, Consejería de Educación y Cultura de la Junta de Castilla y Leon, 1986), 25. 





The involvement of Genoese high financiers in the exports of Castilian wool offers 
promising conclusions. Scholars have often focused on the need for the Genoese lending 
community to export the profits from funding royal enterprises.995 The main way to forward 
the benefits back to Genoa was through the licencias de saca, a royal permission to export 
precious metal outside of the Hispanic borders. Castilian legislation from the thirteenth 
century banned the practice, a political position that remained practically intact until the 
reigns of Charles V and Philip II. While the prohibition was active, financiers had to purchase 
commodities and sell them outside the Hispanic Monarchy to thus collect their profits in 
precious metal.996 In other words, the royal legislation prevented the money in circulation 
from exiting the realm and promoted the domestic economic circuits. 
The financial needs of Charles V and Philip II, however, obliged the sovereigns to 
temporarily tolerate the exports of precious metal in exchange for financial services. In the 
years covered by this study, individuals could export precious metals from 1552 until 1560. 
The resumption of legal exports meant that lenders like the Genoese Nicolao de Grimaldo and 
Costantin Gentil had no need to invest in commodities to export the profits of their financial 
services to the monarch. Therefore, the participation of Grimaldo and Gentil in the exports of 
Castilian wool by funding native merchants reflects the need to make that commerce viable. 
The goal of these lenders was to support commercial activities that would make possible the 
collection of the reimbursements of their old debts after the debt consolidation of 1557. 
Over the long term, investing in the wool trade was still a profitable business in the 
1570s. When Philip II declared another suspension of payments and banned any exportation 
of bullion from particulars in 1575, for example, the Genoese financiers reinvested their 
profits in the wool market to resell the product to thus obtain cash in foreign markets.997 
However, the situation was different from that of 1559 because the Genoese lending 
community preferred to purchase wool rather than fund Castilian merchants. In this sense, 
the reaction to the problem of 1575 suggests a need to transport the profits back to Genoa 
rather than make the royal debts sustainable, as in 1559. 
 
995 Ruiz Martín, Pequeño Capitalismo, Gran Capitalismo, 137. 
996 Marcos Martín, ‘Deuda Pública, Fiscalidad y Arbitrios En La Corona de Castilla En Los Siglos XVI y XVII’, 347. 
997 Phillips and Phillips Jr., Spain’s Golden Fleece, 256. 
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Although the causes of this change of strategy were multiple, one in particular stands 
out. The war against the rebels in the Habsburg Low Countries led to an increase in the price 
of insurance and therefore of the price of fleeces in the market, making this product less 
competitive than other alternatives, such as English wool. As the war continued and worsened 
with the fall of key ports in the English Channel to the rebels, the principal flow of the wool 
trade was diverted to Italy, which could not absorb it entirely. The seventeenth century 
witnessed the slow downfall of this very profitable business that had enjoyed its golden era 
in the mid-sixteenth century.998 
This section has emphasised the consequences that the financial rescheduling of 
Spanish royal debt in April-June 1557 had for the European wool market in the short term. 
The links between wool exporters and Genoese financiers have shown that clusters were 
formed whereby the financiers preferred to fund other Genoese businessmen and Burgos 
merchants, who clearly controlled the wool routes to Italy and Flanders respectively. The rest 
of the Castilian merchants had to group together to survive, but they were not competitors 
to the Genoese coalition. The data consulted in this dissertation has demonstrated that 
Genoese financiers were very selective with their clients, either at selling them juros or 
funding their exports of wool. Because of this, only the better positioned merchants could 
count on Genoese support, a prize that reinforced the bonds of kinship and reputation among 
the companies. However, this analysis has been done from a royal perspective, one in which 
the research has been conducted by using ‘state’ sources. The following section turns the 
focus the other way around to discover why prospective bondholders invested in theoretically 
reliable debt bonds backed by a symbiotic system of financiers and taxpayers, without the 
participation of representative institutions. 
7.3. A view from below: holy investments in local agendas 
The third part of this chapter aims to analyse the relationship between high finances 
and the process of state-building in the Hispanic Monarchy from a bottom-up perspective. 
Instead of looking at how Genoese financiers channelled private savings to obtain liquidity 
from the sales of juros, this section examines the private agendas that led investors to 
 
998 Luis María Bilbao Bilbao, ‘Exportación y comercialización de lanas de Castilla durante el siglo XVII (1610-
1720)’, in El pasado histórico de Castilla y León: Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Castilla y León celebrado en 
Valladolid, del 1 al 4 de diciembre de 1982 (I Congreso de Historia de Castilla y León celebrado en Valladolid, del 
1 al 4 de diciembre de 1982, Burgos: Junta de Castilla y León, 1983), 225–43. 
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participating in these financial flows. In other words, the Genoese were not the only social 
group interested in the new way of royal financing, Castilians were also an active part of the 
process. The two case studies in this section are of two Castilian convents: Santa Isabel in 
Valladolid and San Pablo in Toledo. These female religious institutions, which belonged to the 
Franciscan and Hieronymite orders respectively, acquired juros issued during the financial 
transformation of the late 1550s. The communities studied in this section reflect a common 
profile that is repeated in the lists of juros that Costantin Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo 
distributed with their asientos of May 1558. 
These religious communities were mainly characterised for being composed by female 
members of medium-ranking local elites, who joined the religious orders in their youth in line 
with their family’s agenda. The ways by which these nuns became debt holders were varied, 
though they can be organised into three categories: acquisition, inheritance, or donation. This 
section shows how all of them came into play and contributed to the conventual economy, 
which became fundamental for the development of local agendas and, therefore, of state 
formation. 
The Espinosa-Herrera family and the Franciscan Order: the convent of Santa 
Isabel in Valladolid 
On 2nd February 1559, Doña Catalina de Herrera acquired a juro allocated to the new 
tax on exported wool that the princess regent Joanna had enacted the previous year. 999 
Herrera was one of the daughters of Doña Juana de Herrera and the doctor Francisco de 
Espinosa.1000 Whereas the details about her mother are scarce, her father belonged to the 
Espinosa, a low-ranking noble family (hidalga) of Medina de Rioseco. In this small but 
important village, where some of the key commercial and financial fairs of Castile already 
mentioned in this dissertation took place, the Espinosa had a large patrimony and links with 
the ruling noble elite of the place: the Enríquez. 1001 The role of Francisco de Espinosa as 
executor of the last will of Fadrique Enríquez de Velasco, Almirante de Castilla and señor of 
Medina de Rioseco, reveals how strong the Espinosa-Enríquez relation was. Although the 
 
999 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 178, 39’. 
1000 Jesús Urrea Fernández, ‘Revisión y novedades junianas en el V Centenario de su nacimiento’, Boletín del 
Museo Nacional de Escultura, no. 10 (2006): 12. 
1001 «AHN, Sección Nobleza, Osuna, Caja 528, Documento 55: Escritura de compraventa otorgada por Francisco 
de Espinosa a favor de Diego de Espinosa, contador del Almirante de Castilla, de unas casas en la villa de Medina 
de Rioseco (Valladolid).» (Valladolid, 30 July 1550). 
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Enríquez seem to be one of the most important assets in the social capital of the Espinosa 
family, the sources consulted also refer to other noblemen and noblewomen, such as the 
count of Oñate and the countess of Lemos. 1002  Most probably, these friendships helped 
Francisco de Espinosa to be appointed lawyer in the Real Chancillería of Valladolid from 1506. 
From this prominent position in one of the two high courts of appeal in Castile, 
Francisco de Espinosa sought to ensure his lineage both socially and spatially in Valladolid. His 
eldest son, Jerónimo de Espinosa, continued the family career as jurist in the Real Chancillería 
and married a rich estate holder of Valladolid, Isabel de Monteser, in the 1530s. In 1553, 
Francisco de Espinosa founded a private patronage on a chapel in the female Franciscan 
monastery of Santa Isabel in Valladolid, where two of his daughters, Catalina and Juana, 
already lived as nuns.1003 A year later, Francisco de Espinosa died and both sisters renounced 
their family inheritance, which allowed their brother Jerónimo to keep the whole family 
estate undivided in one piece. The chapel was attached to the real estate that Jerónimo 
enjoyed in Robladillo, a small village southwest of Valladolid, by right of primogeniture 
(mayorazgo). This legal contract, similar to the English concept of entailed estate, kept the 
chapel in family hands, avoiding the return of the church of Santa Isabel to the convent. 
Undoubtedly, this type of property had a special place in the family agenda. Jerónimo became 
señor of Robladillo and pursued the enlargement of his political and spatial representation in 
the region. His goal motivated him to have his own chapel built in the Dominican convent of 
San Agustin, very close to Santa Isabel, in 1592 (image 1).1004 
 
1002 Alfonso Guilarte Zapatero, ‘Algunas observaciones acerca del doctor Espinosa y su obra’, Anuario de historia 
del derecho español, no. 16 (1945): 714. 
1003 Urrea Fernández, ‘Revisión y novedades junianas en el V Centenario de su nacimiento’, 12. 
1004 Alonso Pérez, ‘ARCV, Planos y Dibujos, Desglosados, 381: Traza de La Reja de La Capilla de Jerónimo Espinosa 




Although there are no surviving sketches of the Espinosa chapel in Santa Isabel, the 
above drawing of the grille in San Agustin exemplifies the symbolism that a chapel displayed. 
Whereas the grille created a private space within a public one, the fence also let people see 
what was inside. In other words, the common faithful could see through the grille what they 
could not achieve: wealth and social status in the local society. 1005 Sometimes, the foundation 
of chapels required the permission of the conventual patron, who was member of a noble 
family. This market of private spaces in religious institutions frames the case study of the 
Herrera family. In this sense, the construction of chapels by the Espinosa family illustrates an 
ideology of the social order that existed throughout all the territories of the Hispanic 
monarchy.1006 Notwithstanding the differences with higher social groups, who could issue 
patronage on convents and churches, the two Espinosa chapels were a symbol of the family 
wealth and social influence as they were located in very specific spaces. They were 
 
1005 Atienza López, Tiempos de conventos, 205. 
1006 Gerónimo Costilla, a second son of his lineage (segundón), founded a chapel in the monastery of Santa Clara 
(Cuzco) with similar dates to that of the Espinosa. See Kathryn Burns, Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual 
Economy of Cuzco, Peru (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 51. 
Image 1: Draft of the grille that Jerónimo de Espinosa 
ordered to place in San Agustin. 
Source: ARCHV, Planos y dibujos, desglosados, 381 
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constructed in the churches of monasteries that belonged to regular religious orders 
(Franciscan and Dominican) instead of in the local collegiate churches. This distinction shows 
the limits of the Espinosa family to appropriate urban and social spaces for themselves in 
Valladolid. 
Although the patronage of chapels was a means of self-representation and a 
demonstration of power, it was also a long-term investment. Chapels were an aid to promote 
selected nuns who were already part of the religious community to higher positions. A 
notarial protocol dated 1572, for example, lists four Espinosa nuns as members of the chapter 
of Santa Isabel, a number that increased to five a year later.1007 In less than 25 years, the 
Espinosa family had occupied a third of the seats with the right to vote in the ruling council of 
the convent. This assault on the religious institution had initially started with the appointment 
of Doña Catalina de Herrera as abbess from 1553 to the end of July 1575, when the vicar nun 
Doña Ana Enríquez was elected as the head of her community.1008 The progressive Espinosa 
influence in the convent seems to have evolved from the initial patronage established in 1553 
by Francisco de Espinosa. 
That spatial appropriation did not find its echo only in the community that formed the 
monastery, but also in the economic policies that followed the promotion of Doña Catalina 
de Herrera. Although the old conventual archive disappeared after the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939), a master book of accounts (libro becerro) and some fiscal reports that the 
Franciscan Order issued between 1577 and 1582 are still held at the Archivo Histórico 
Nacional of Madrid.1009 Although the book is a succinct description of the real estate and 
financial assets that the convent owned, the latter source is much more precise and offers a 
more meaningful reconstruction of what happened during the Espinosa rule. 
  
 
1007 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 383, 18’ (Accounting record, Valladolid, 1572), 18. 
1008 It is worth noting the presence of Enríquez relatives in the convent, which is precisely the same family with 
which the Espinosa had a close link in Medina de Rioseco. See ‘AHN, Clero, Libros, 17.501: Libro Becerro Del 
Monasterio de Santa Isabel de La Hacienda, Juros y Rentas, Pan y Otras Cosas y Cuentas de Lo Mismo’ 
(Accounting record, Valladolid, 1577). 
1009 The conventual books were destroyed by rain when they were buried in pots in the monastery garden for 
their protection during the Spanish Civil War. 
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These documents show that the financial operations that took place inside the 
convent were distinguished from those made by the institution and the ones undertaken by 
the nuns alone. Quite often, the conventual and private savings of the nuns were employed 
to purchase something that the community needed or was interested in. These operations 
were mainly categorized as censos (leasehold contracts) and juros. The former were loans in 
kind or money to private borrowers and other institutions, whereas the latter were the titles 
of long-term royal debt already analysed in the previous chapters. The reports describe 58 
financial operations between 1513 and 1606, allowing us to establish a timeline with, at least, 
three phases.1010 
The first one can be classified as the pre-Catalina de Herrera (1513-1553) phase, which 
was characterized by small censos and juros backed by taxes that could be directly collected 
in Valladolid or in the nearby village of Medina del Campo. The second phase covered the 
administration of Doña Catalina de Herrera (1553 - end June 1575), who undertook larger 
operations and acquired juros backed by Genoese-managed sources of income. The third 
phase (June 1575-1606) covered the rule of Doña Ana Enríquez, whose administration shows 
a qualitative shift in the type of borrowers to whom the convent lent. Important noble people 
are present in this report, such as the count of Olivares, the count of Benavente, and the 
marquis of Santa Cruz. The censos of this third phase reflected the financial difficulties 
suffered by this social group because of the effects of inflation.1011 
The fact that the Espinosa family made the convent of Santa Isabel a hub for their 
female human resources during the second half of the sixteenth century directly increased 
their influence in the city of Valladolid through the decisions taken at the ruling council of the 
convent. Chart 17 shows the total incomes that the convent was entitled to collect every year 
between 1553 and 1575, when Doña Catalina de Herrera was abbess. The illustration shows 
that from the beginning of her management, the conventual economy especially expanded 
to issue censos. Looking at the people who borrowed from the monastery in those years, most 
of them lived in Valladolid or in nearby villages. 
  
 
1010 The records have annotations in the margins up to 1606. 
1011 Bartolomé Bennassar, Valladolid en el Siglo de Oro: una ciudad de Castilla y su entorno agrario en el siglo XVI 
(Ámbito, 1989), 244. 
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The stream of earnings the juros generated, by contrast, was quite often related to 
Genoese financiers who managed their market, as happened in 1559 with Nicolao de 
Grimaldo. The Genoese collaboration also included paying and collecting money on behalf of 
the institution.1012 Indeed, Francisco Lomelin, a Genoese financier who also acquired a juro in 
1559 from the pack in which Doña Catalina de Herrera participated, had paid for another juro 
on the convent’s behalf in 1553. This coincidence suggests that it was Lomelin who brokered 
the inclusion of Doña Catalina de Herrera among the clients of Grimaldo, who had arrived in 
Valladolid in 1558. In this sense, the convent did not have just a relatively strong connection 
with Genoese brokers but also with their Castilian assistants, thus showing its strategy of 
diversification. 
 
Chart 17: Interest generated by the censos and juros of the convent of Santa Isabel in maravedis between 1553 and 1575. 
Source: AHN, Clero, Libros, 17.501. 
Leaving aside who paid what, Santa Isabel progressively increased its portfolio and 
could offer more financial services to local borrowers than was surely spent on local projects 
in Valladolid. These investments can only be tracked by looking at notarial protocols, which 
show how these contracts were made. First, borrowers and a notary congregated with the 
conventual chapter at a specific space in the monastery called ayuntamiento (council), where 
 
1012 The Genoese representation of the convent was, however, discontinuous. Pedro de Monteser, a relative of 
the sister-in-law of Catalina de Herrera collected the interest on the juro allocated to the new right on exported 












the nuns dealt with their financial operations, either communitarian or private ones. The 
name of that place was not coincidental, but intentional as Santa Isabel organized itself as 
though it were a city. There are different arguments that can help to understand this proposal. 
The convent had created a ruling council at local level that was embodied by the 
abbess and a limited number of selected nuns. The community obeyed a religious rule and 
organized itself according to it. Its top members distributed justice at local level, though their 
decisions could be appealed to the provincial officials of the religious order in dubious cases. 
One such instance occurred in 1572 with Friar Diego de Tamayo, the Franciscan provincial for 
Santa Isabel of Valladolid.1013 The convent of Santa Isabel also had its ‘fiscal system’, which 
consisted of issuing mutual liabilities attached to censos, turning borrowers into actual 
taxpayers for rights such as living in a house that belonged to the convent or for the use of 
land. Furthermore, its economic system distinguished between communal and individual 
goods, entailing a separation of property rights. All this overlapped with the local economy of 
Valladolid, and also with that of the other convents in the Franciscan order spread throughout 
the monarchy. In sum, Santa Isabel, as with many other convents, was a space within larger 
containers that had an organization that went beyond any local scale.1014 
Apart from this conceptualization of Santa Isabel as a micro-urban environment, the 
convent was a solvent and dynamic institution mainly backed by long-term assets. This 
economy allowed the convent to become a guardian of local liquidity.1015 Therefore, its roles 
mainly involved serving as a bank for local citizens, rich noblemen, international brokers, and 
the monarchy. Conventual economies thus created interdependent local and outside 
borrowers. At local level, borrowers could include many types of people: notaries, 
silversmiths, clergy, stewards, locksmiths, tailors, ropemakers, halter-makers, farmers, 
lawyers, deputies in the royal chancellery, and local councillors (regidores).1016 Some of them 
 
1013 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 383, 18’. 
1014 A similar conclusion in Antonio Luís López Martínez, La economía de las ordenes religiosas en el antiguo 
régimen: sus propiedades y rentas en el Reino de Sevilla (Excma. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1992). 
1015 A recent review of conventual economies in Ofelia Rey Castelao, ‘Las economías monásticas femeninas: un 
estado de la cuestión’ (La historia de las mujeres: Perspectivas actuales, Asociación Española de Investigación 
de Historia de las Mujeres (AEIHM), 2009), 197–224; Ángela Atienza López, ‘La Vida Económica de Los Conventos 
Femeninos En España Durante La Edad Moderna. De Una Visión General a Planteamientos Más Novedosos’, 
Ariadna. Revista de Investigación 21 (2010): 217–54. 
1016 For the importance of the conventual accounting books, see the essential historiographical review by Marion 




had an agenda in the convent beyond their loans, such as another Francisco de Espinosa, 
regidor of Valladolid, who sent two of his daughters to join the convent in 1574.1017 
During the administration of Catalina de Herrera, 17 out of 22 operations were censos, 
but they also had their own individual guarantee. Chart 18 illustrates how the securities of 
the same financial products were distributed. Housing was the most common collateral in this 
series of censos. Four out of these seventeen operations also included land, which suggests 
that conventual interests went beyond the city walls. When borrowers took a censo from the 
convent, they had to repay a percentage part of the principal as well as guarantee the full 
reimbursement with their own patrimony. This percentage had been limited by royal order in 
1534 and 1536 to 7.14%, which was precisely what the convent of Santa Isabel annually 
charged its borrowers until they redeemed their debts.1018 Since convents could not compete 
in price with each other, the difference lay in the quality of the assets lent to local 
entrepreneurs. 
In effect, the conventual libro becerro allows us to map where the collaterals that 
borrowers offered to the convent were located, if they failed to repay their loans (map 9). It 
is noteworthy that most of the collaterals were located near key economic points in the city, 
such as around the main square, where the local market was celebrated, or in the streets 
leading to the gates of the city, where tolls for farmers and traders were charged. The careful 
selection of collaterals demonstrates that the convent was interested in acquiring important 
 
1017 ‘AHN, Clero, Libros, 17.501: Libro Becerro’. 
1018 María de los Ángeles Rodríguez Pérez, ‘Censos y tributos: Los conventos de Santa Cruz de La Palma en el 
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Chart 18. Censos issued under Catalina de Herrera (1553-1575). Source: AHN, Clero, Libros, 17.501. 
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spaces in the city that could be rented or sold depending on the needs of the moment, which 
demonstrate they competed. 
As for the juros that the convent of Santa Isabel had acquired by purchase or donation, 
the spaces they were associated with were also carefully selected. Following the strategy of 
other convents, Santa Isabel held juros backed by royal incomes collected in the city of 
Valladolid, namely alcabalas. Chart 19 shows a comparative view with other religious 
communities of the city throughout the century to put the community in perspective. The 
convent of Santa Isabel did not enjoy a relevant share of the alcabalas collected in Valladolid 
compared to other religious institutions, such as San Quirce or San Benito, female and male 
convents respectively. Instead, the convent of Santa Isabel sought to enlarge its financial 
portfolio with other rents elsewhere. 
  
Map 9. Location of collaterals (dashed lines) of the convent of Santa Isabel between 1513-1575 in Valladolid. Close to 
Santa Isabel is the church of San Agustin, where Jerónimo de Espinosa founded his own chapel. Note: there is another 
collateral in the north of the city, but its street disappeared with modernization. Source: AHN, Clero, Libros, 17.501. 
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During the office of Catalina de Herrera, the community acquired juros that jointly 
generated 59,143 maravedis annually (157 ducats) and were backed by royal rents on the 
Castilian cattle (servicio and montazgo, and the nuevo derecho on exported wool).1019 With 
Ana Enríquez, her parallel strategy of searching for new borrowers for larger censos also 
included other juros backed by rents collected outside Valladolid. This shift resulted in the 
acquisition of a juro of 150,000 maravedis of interest on the alcabalas of Seville in 1582, which 
reflects an accumulation of capital during the management of Catalina de Herrera.1020 Clearly, 
the convent of Santa Isabel sought reliable rents for its juros, which increased its solvency and 
assured future liquidity to keep issuing new loans. 
 
Chart 19. Interest of juros backed by the alcabalas of Valladolid (in maravedis). Source: 
Bennassar, Valladolid en el Siglo de Oro, 239. 
To conclude this section, the first point that this case study has demonstrated is that 
conventual spaces such as that of Santa Isabel played a key role as hubs of royal and local 
agendas. Santa Isabel was located within the privileged frame of Valladolid in 1559, when the 
 
1019 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 178, 39’; ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 35, 37’ (Accounting record, Valladolid, 1554); ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 35, 
51’ (Accounting record, Madrid, 1553), 55. 
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Castilian city still hosted the royal court. This temporary situation facilitated the confluence 
of interests and actors, both international and native, in the council of Santa Isabel. Doña 
Catalina de Herrera, the main representative of the Espinosa family in the religious institution, 
served as a link with the royal court through her contacts among the Genoese local 
community. Her inclusion as one of the clients of the Genoese financier Nicolao de Grimaldo 
shows that religious communities were less isolated than might be expected. 
The foundation of the Espinosa chapel in the convent of Santa Isabel triggered the role 
of the abbess as someone who had agency, though it was the space that she occupied and 
administered that makes it possible to talk about the state-building process. The flows of 
liquidity upwards and downwards that the convent managed were connected local and royal 
economies. In other words, the Espinosa family might not have succeeded in governing the 
institution, but the convent would have nevertheless continued providing its services to any 
borrower able to offer suitable collateral. From humble ropemakers to wealthy lawyers and 
secretaries of the Real Chancillería, the convent lent them money to develop their own 
projects through a censal economy. As a result of this policy, the community of nuns gained 
momentum as a source of liquidity for local citizens, neighbouring localities, and the king. The 
collaterals that the convent and nuns obtained in exchange for their censos reveal that its 
long-term investments were backed by real estate close to economic urban poles, such as the 
main square or the gates of the city. Clearly, space mattered both privately and institutionally. 
Second, the self-identification of the convent of Santa Isabel as an urban organization 
suggests a certain degree of independence from the surrounding world, besides the fact that 
the monastery symbolized the borders of the community and the physical limits of its 
jurisdiction. However, Santa Isabel was never a closed space, but a permeable one that 
simultaneously was part of a myriad of other Franciscan convents. This organization is 
identifiable as a hierarchical superstructure that oversaw the dispersed religious communities. 
In other words, convents embodied a kind of state that overlapped with that of the Hispanic 
monarchy. Despite this distinction, both of them fuelled each other, exchanging human and 
material resources very much like the Genoese and Castilian business communities. The 
apparently converging narrative and interests of the royal and conventual superstructures is, 
nonetheless, deceptive. If the monarchy was nourished with the resources of its subjects 
through the collaboration of Genoese financiers and religious institutions claiming to be 
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defending Christendom, the convents funded a monarch at war with the Pope and 
collaborated with Genoese financiers who were symbols of usury. This paradox demonstrates 
that the differences between discourses and practices were more blurred than might appear 
in early modern society. 
Altogether, these elements have facilitated a re-interpretation of the state-building 
process. If the state has been studied mainly from political and fiscal-military perspectives, 
there is also a financial one that complements, rather than substitutes, the other two. This 
financial view has uncovered two different and complementary worlds that occupy specific 
spaces. Conventual economies reveal themselves as visible testimonies of that double reality. 
Although the participation of the convent of Santa Isabel was small in comparison with other 
bondholders in the sale of juros intermediated by Nicolao de Grimaldo, it was the only 
religious institution that trusted that the nuevo derecho on wool exports was a reliable source 
of long-term incomes. The participation of Francisco Lomelin, a Genoese businessman who 
had already collaborated with the convent in 1553, may have influenced Doña Catalina de 
Herrera to trust Nicolao de Grimaldo. In other words, the collaboration of different actors 
created trustworthy circuits of capital through two spaces. 
The additional occupation of new chapels in other religious institutions by the brother 
of Doña Catalina de Herrera suggests that a dynamic strategy of expansion was progressively 
implemented by the Espinosa family through social representation and conventual 
economies. Convents were, in sum, agential spaces for actors and practices where the state-
building process simultaneously developed at macro and local level. Thanks to this type of 
institution, Philip II obtained liquidity to repay his financiers while local borrowers of any 
social status received funding and social spaces to develop their own agendas. No political 
institution, either at royal or local level, could develop a multilevel interconnection of 
interests in the same way that a convent like Santa Isabel could. 
The Niño-Guevara family and the Hieronymite Order: the convent of San Pablo in Toledo 
In this second section on existing relations between bondholders and convents, 
another case study about the convent of San Pablo in Toledo offers a comparative analysis 
with the convent of Santa Isabel in Valladolid. The subject of study is a married couple, 
Rodrigo Niño and Doña Teresa de Guevara. Compared to the Espinosa-Herrera, the Niño-
Guevara shared a similar social status in the medium rank of the Castilian nobility. However, 
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in this case, the focus moves from Valladolid to Toledo, capital of the homonymous 
archdiocese as well as an important economic and political node in the Hispanic Monarchy. 
Doña Teresa de Guevara was the daughter of Don Pedro Vélez de Guevara Dávalos 
and Doña Costanza de Ayala. Her uncle, Hernando Dávalos, was an important comunero 
leader and regidor of Toledo who fled to Portugal and lost several of his properties. Her aunt, 
Aldonza Carrillo, made Doña Teresa de Guevara and her siblings the legitimate heirs of her 
patrimony in her last will.1021 In this sense, Doña Teresa de Guevara belonged to one of the 
wealthiest families of Toledo. Rodrigo Niño was señor of Añover (modern Añover del Tajo) 
and Mazarambroz. He inherited these places from his parents, Juan Niño and Doña Aldonza 
Zapata de Vivero in 1534.1022 Map 10 illustrates how close these places were to Toledo, where 
the family resided. 
 
Map 10. Señoríos of Rodrigo Niño (triangle). Source: AGS, CME, 53, 7. 
The two families were also similar in their pursuit of power at local level. However, the 
relatives of Rodrigo Niño were more successful than the Espinosa in reaching central positions 
 
1021 Luis de Salazar y Castro, Árboles de Costados de Gran Parte de Las Primeras Casas de Estos Reynos, Cuyos 
Dueños Vivían En El Año de 1683 (Madrid: Imprenta de D. Antonio Cruzado, 1795); María del Carmen Vaquero 
Serrano, ‘Dávalos, Hernando (or Fernando)’, in Diccionario Biográfico Español (Real Academia de la Historia, 
2018), http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/127835/hernando-davalos. 
1022 ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 53, 7’ (Juro file, Valladolid, n.d.); Salazar y Castro, Árboles de Costados de Gran Parte de Las 
Primeras Casas de Estos Reynos, Cuyos Dueños Vivían En El Año de 1683, 150. 
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in the local administration. Rodrigo Niño was regidor (local councillor) together with his father 
and his brother, all sharing the name Juan. Another brother of Rodrigo, Hernando, was 
president of the State Council, Bishop of Sigüenza (in the modern Guadalajara province), and 
Patriarch of the Indies.1023 A daughter of Rodrigo Niño, Catalina Niño de Guevara, joined the 
Hieronymite convent of San Pablo, thus continuing the traditional family strategy, which two 
sisters of Rodrigo Niño had also followed. 
The name of his daughter, Catalina Niño de Guevara, changed once she joined the 
convent to become Catalina de San Lorenzo. This practice is full of meaning because all the 
nuns lost their family names to adopt the name of their parishes of origin. In this sense, the 
Niño-Guevara family lived close to the church of San Lorenzo, where they wanted to establish 
a chapel as their property. 1024  Map 11 shows how close these three places were, which 
suggests that the family tried to obtain influence through the religious institutions that 
surrounded it, as well as having a strong presence on the local council. 
 
Map 11. Palace of the Niño-Guevara family and the church of San Lorenzo and the 
convent of San Pablo, which they sought to control, close by the cathedral of Toledo 
(triangle). Source: AHN, Clero, libro 15.968. 
 
1023 Linda Martz, A Network of Converso Families in Early Modern Toledo: Assimilating a Minority (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003), 180–81. 
1024 ‘AHN, Clero, Libro 15.968’ (Notarial protocol, Toledo, 16 February 1558). 
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In their pursuit of influence in the convent of San Pablo, the Niño-Guevara ordered the 
construction of a chapel inside the church of the complex.1025 This behaviour was common 
among the Castilian noble families of the period under study. The case study of the Espinosa-
Herrera analysed above, for example, illustrates that they also established a chapel in the 
church of Santa Isabel. However, there are differences between these two spaces. Whereas 
the chapel in Santa Isabel was closed and separated from the main body of the church by a 
grille, thus turning part of the public space into a private space that demonstrated the family’s 
might, the chapel in San Pablo was open. 
According to the notarial document that Doña Teresa presented before the 
conventual council on 16th February 1558, the couple had already established a chapel under 
the vault that held the choir in the church of San Pablo. The corpse of Rodrigo Niño, who had 
died the previous month, was already resting in the chapel. Although the couple wanted to 
establish the chapel in the church of San Lorenzo, their corresponding parish, they failed in 
their attempt to occupy that space. They then took the chapel in San Pablo as a backup plan, 
which demonstrates the ongoing competition for these spaces. 
The notarial document of February 1558 established that, in case their attempt to be 
buried in San Lorenzo failed, their corpses should be taken to San Pablo and dressed in 
sumptuous capes. Rodrigo Niño would carry his habit of Santiago, while Doña Teresa de 
Guevara would wear the cape of Immaculate Conception. These details are important for this 
study because they were part of a whole ritual that was intended to be public and visible to 
demonstrate the power of the family. The chapel, which is rather a crypt, was sealed with 
white marble in which the nuns had to place the family coat of arms and a text that explained 
who was buried there, besides the dates of their deaths. 
If we look at the inner section of the church today, we can see that the Niño-Guevara 
occupied the most sacred and visible part of the building. The entrance to the church was in 
the side, leaving the choir and the crypt on the right once one entered, with the altar on the 
left. In order to access the pews, the parishioners had to walk alongside the crypt, so that 
everybody attending mass was forced to see the crypt. If that was not enough, the protocol 





legacy of the Niño-Guevara family was to be remembered by the attendees both visually and 
spiritually through the crypt and the mass respectively. 
These masses, of course, were also delivered following the instructions of the Niño-
Guevara family. The descendants of the couple, especially their heir Don Juan Niño de 
Guevara, chose the two priests who preached the masses. These men received a stipend of 
34 maravedis per day each for their services. The funds to make these payments were 
allocated from the interest that the couple obtained from some juros purchased by their 
relative Don Ruy López de Ávalos. These regular incomes came from alcabalas in Toledo on 
meat and fish (8,864 maravedis), firewood (3,333 maravedis and 2 cornados), oil (3,333 
maravedis and 2 cornados), old clothes (2,000 maravedis), and alcahaces or bird cages (3,333 
maravedis), which came to a total annual payment of 20,864 maravedis.1026 In addition to this 
funding, the couple also instructed their descendants to provide 400 maravedis to pay for the 
expenses during the mass (e.g. wax, wine, etc). In short, the Niño-Guevara took control of the 
religious space and the services delivered in it. 
Their strategy was, therefore, almost identical to that of the Espinosa-Herrera family 
in Santa Isabel. However, the similarities between both families did not end there. As has 
been stressed in the previous section, there was a link between these powerful groups and 
the financial transformation taking place in the late 1550s. This point of convergence 
consisted in the acquisition of juros that Genoese financiers, such as Costantin Gentil or 
Nicolao de Grimaldo, distributed among private investors and local elites to collect their 
savings. In the previous chapter, a sale of juros linked to the reimbursement of old debts to 
the Centurione consortium for the asiento of 21st May 1559 pinpoints Doña Teresa de 
Guevara as a client of Lucian Centurione.1027 In that document, the Genoese broker requested 
that the royal accountant Montalban assigned a juro at 7.14% annual interest to Doña Teresa 
de Guevara. The interest amounted to 27 ducats, which means that the noblewoman paid 




1027 Lucian Centurione to Licenciado Montalban, ‘AGS, CJH, Leg. 35, 78’, Letter, (17 March 1559). 
1028 The debt title in ‘AGS, CME, Leg. 499, 2’ (Juro file, n.d.). 
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What is indeed even more interesting about this document is that Lucian Centurione 
made a special petition to the accountant. The juro of Doña Teresa de Guevara should pass, 
once the shareholder died, to her daughter. Instead of providing a name, Luciano only 
referred to her profession: nun. In effect, the debt title was intended to provide a regular 
income to Catalina Niño de Guevara rather than to her mother. The family was already 
seeking trustworthy incomes. The cause of this behaviour seems to be the death of Rodrigo 
Niño, the husband of Doña Teresa de Guevara and father of Catalina, who had died in January 
1558, as mentioned above.1029 
Notwithstanding this domestic financial operation, the letter that Centurione sent to 
Montalban also reveals another intriguing detail. Just after the petition for Guevara and her 
daughter, Centurione also requested a juro for the convent of San Pablo in Toledo, with the 
same conditions. This time, however, the juro generated an interest of 50 ducats, which 
means a payment of something over 700 ducats. In other words, the Genoese broker 
forwarded two debt titles with a high interest rate to the Niño-Guevara family. The previous 
example of Santa Isabel demonstrated that families were interested in obtaining influence 
inside convents, and in order to implement this strategy they provided them with regular 
incomes. Catalina de San Lorenzo, therefore, was a common link between the convent and 
the family, thus granting access to the convent of San Pablo’s market in royal debt. 
The role of Catalina in this institution helped decisively in the accomplishment of this 
financial operation, in a very similar manner to the case of Catalina de Herrera in the previous 
example. According to the records for the year 1559 kept by the convent’s steward, Juan de 
Salazar, Catalina de San Lorenzo was vicar.1030 Her position as second in command of the 
community seems to have been a reward for the large investment that the Niño-Guevara 
family made that year, which includes the building of the crypt. After the prioress Mencia de 
San Pablo, Catalina had a prominent vote and influence to decide whether investing in royal 
debt was beneficial for the conventual economy. When this debt title was allocated, the 
peace with France was still undecided. What motivated the other nuns with decision-making 
power to pass this investment? Apart from the personal influence that Catalina exerted 
 
1029 The year of Rodrigo Niño’s death in Salazar y Castro, Árboles de Costados de Gran Parte de Las Primeras 
Casas de Estos Reynos, Cuyos Dueños Vivían En El Año de 1683, 150; ‘AHN, Clero, Libro 15.968’. 
1030 ‘AHN, Clero, Libro 16.004’ (Accounting record, Toledo, 1559). 
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among her religious fellows, the Genoese broker Lucian Centurione had participated in the 
stabilisation of the new financial order of the monarchy. This operation is excellent evidence 
that trust had returned to the secondary debt market, and the money wheel could now spin 
again. 
Nevertheless, the accounting records of the steward Juan de Salazar and the provincial 
officials of the Hieronymite Order reveal a weaker economy than that of Santa Isabel in 
Valladolid.1031 It is important to highlight the fact that there was a substantial difference 
between the Franciscan Order of the previous example, and the Hieronymite Order in the 
way they registered their accounts. Whereas the officials of the former were very thorough 
in their investigations about how much the convent spent and earned, the latter were 
significantly less inquisitive. The surviving accounts of the Hieronymite officials cover the 
years 1560 and 1563. Whether there were more inspections in the meanwhile has not been 
recorded in the sources consulted. 
However, Juan de Salazar was still the conventual steward in 1563, which suggests a 
long-term relationship with the religious community. Friar Diego Delgadillo was the 
Hieronymite official in charge of keeping the convent’s accounts. He recorded that the 
convent of San Pablo earned 359,063 maravedis and spent 375,486 in the year 1560. This 
means that there was an overdraft in the convent accounts worth 16,423 maravedis. In other 
words, the religious institution was in deficit the following year after the acquisition of the 
juro brokered by Lucian Centurione. Although this situation was bad, it was much better than 
in 1559. Chart 20 illustrates that the convent accounts showed another negative balance of 
50,397 maravedis in 1559, which means an improvement of almost 35,000 maravedis.1032  
 
1031 Ibid.; ‘AHN, Clero, Libro 16.024’ (Accounting record, Toledo, 1563). 
1032 The accounts of the convent steward for 1559 have not been found. However, the consistency in the data 




Chart 20. Steward’s accounts for San Pablo in 1559, 1560, and 1563 (in maravedis). Sources: AHN, 
Clero, Libro 16.004 and AHN, Clero, Libro 16.024. 
Based on the records of the steward Juan de Salazar, the accounts recorded in January 
1564 for the year 1563 illustrate a surprising improvement in the convent’s economy based 
on a reduction in the shortfall to 49,815 maravedis (circa 133 ducats) since 1559. 1033 The 
convent’s earnings increased from one year to the next, especially from the juros that the 
monastery possessed. For example, while Salazar declared having collected 63,000 maravedis 
from them in 1560, three years later he recorded that he had received 81,750. In effect, the 
difference between these two sums makes 18,750 maravedis, the exact amount of interest 
that the convent had acquired in 1559 through Lucian Centurione. Further research is still 
necessary to confirm whether that interest corresponds to the juro of 1559, especially 
regarding the royal income that backed it and the records in the royal accountants about the 
payments of these juros. In this sense, the convent increased its budget thanks to the 
acquisition of royal debt. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these debt titles in the economy of the convent, it 
is noteworthy that this religious institution also received large tributes from the city of Toledo 
(74,813 maravedis) and Villarrobledo (116,407 maravedis) in 1563. In other words, the 
investment in juros was not necessarily the main source of income of the community. The 
strategy of this female religious institution was indeed based on diversifying risks. In this sense, 
we can observe similarities between the behaviours of the Genoese lenders and their Castilian 
clients. The religious community did, in fact, what other financial institutions of their time had 
 
1033 From the accounts of 1559, taken in 1560, to those of 1563, taken in 1564, there is an average reduction of 
12,454 maravedis per year. From 1560 to 1563, however, there was a reduction in the shortfall of 15,841 
maravedis. This means a sharp decrease in the overdraft from 1559 to 1560, which is estimated at 34,556 
maravedis. In other words, the overdraft was reduced more than twice its average value in just one year, which 










been practising for a long time since before the financial transformation of the Hispanic 
Monarchy. The presence of perpetual tributes in these accounts is evidence for the long-term 
existence of this strategy. 
Apart from the steward’s accounts, which recorded all the financial expenses and 
incomes of the community, the convent also had two nuns in charge of the domestic economy. 
These accounts reveal that 1563 was an exceptional year for the institution in financial terms. 
New nuns, together with their correspondent dowries, joined the convent. Indeed, these 
dowries were the largest income that San Pablo ever received under a single item from both 
the accounts of the steward and those of the arqueras.1034  
Chart 21 illustrates how these earnings were distributed. Under the concept of 
‘general incomes’ are the moneys that Juan de Salazar gave to the nuns, using the remaining 
funds to pay the shortfall of 1562, his annual salary of 13,000 maravedis, and other expenses. 
It is interesting, indeed, that it was not Salazar who administered the dowries of the new nuns, 
but the arqueras of the convent. Bearing in mind that the steward administered all the 
financial operations outside of the convent, especially the collection of tributes in other towns, 
the dowries were surprisingly collected in the convent by the convent’s treasurers. 
 
Chart 21. Earnings in 1563 of San Pablo declared by the conventual attorney. Source: AHN, Clero, Libro 16.024 
  
 
1034  Although abbreviated in the documents consulted, the nuns-treasurers of the community were called 












Masses and other religious offices
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This separation of duties between the nuns and their steward, especially regarding the 
dowries, draws attention to the evolution of the conventual economy over the long term. 
Tributes, not juros, were the community’s largest income, paid either in cash or in kind 
(including hens and wheat), which the convent collected from Toledo and its surrounding 
towns. Map 12 closes this section by illustrating how their economy expanded to multiple 
regions of this area in 1569, apart from the additional incomes that other convents and 
churches in Toledo paid to the nuns of San Pablo (e.g. San Lorenzo, San Lucas, San Miguel, 
Santiago del Arrabal, San Juan Bautista, Santo Tomé, San Cebrián or modern San Cipriano). 
 
Map 12. Towns from where the convent of San Pablo had financial assets in 1569. Source: AHN, Clero, libro 16.005 
7.4. Conclusions: 
This last chapter has analysed how royal long-term debt allocated on the nuevo 
derecho de lanas became a financial framework for bondholders, brokers, and non-state 
agents such as merchants. The intermingling of their private agendas resulted in the 
consolidation of a model of funded debt that was reliable in the long run and so could help 
fund local economies through religious institutions, which employed strategies of risk 
diversification such as investing in royal debt to complement their portfolio and enlarge their 
solvency and financial services to local entrepreneurs. In short, this chapter has stressed the 
heterogenous group of people that contributed to the consolidation of the early modern state 
by pursuing private interests. 
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The first section of the chapter has provided an analysis of the social procedures that 
financial brokerage involved. The use of private correspondence and accounting records 
allowed us to establish a connection between Nicolao de Grimaldo, Francisco de Castro 
Mújica, and the duchess Doña Eleonora di Toledo. The sale of juros earmarked to the new tax 
on wool exports in Castile was the starting point for these three actors to become 
interconnected. Each of them pursued the collection of regular incomes: Grimaldo obtained 
the reimbursement of his old debts from the sale of the juro; Castro Mújica became a service 
provider to the duchess of Florence, which increased his prestige among his peers and led to 
his appointment as head of the Consulado de Burgos; and the duchess obtained a regular 
income, the principal of which served to help a political ally at a time of military and financial 
need. Notwithstanding the convergence of their private agendas, these actors needed the tax 
to be reliable. 
The second section deals with this problem through an analysis of the royal income 
and how it was profitable enough to allocate bonds of debt on it. The agency of the Genoese 
lending community was decisive once again. Nicolao de Grimaldo and Costantin Gentil, the 
Genoese financiers who had a direct influence on the transformation of the financial system 
of the monarchy, began to fund Castilian wool exporters to facilitate their trade. Although the 
use of Genoese financial services increased the transaction costs of the merchant community, 
the accounting records of the fiscal collection demonstrate an increase in the burden 
collected throughout the years, despite the sporadic downfalls caused by military conflicts 
and the fraudulent transactions of some merchants that resulted in a change of fiscal policy 
in the 1560s. 
The third section of the chapter is the culmination of all the interconnections that were 
promoted by Genoese and Castilian brokerage. The research into two female convents in 
Valladolid and Toledo shows that their investments in royal long-term debt through the 
intermediation of Genoese financiers was part of an even older strategy of risk diversification. 
The issuance of censos and their competition for assets of better quality in their local 
environment illustrate how these convents were an essential element in advancing economic 
development. The role of women, whose families used them to enlarge their influence in the 
region through their promotion in the conventual hierarchies and the administration of the 
convents is another key point in this section. Rather than passive actors, female convents 
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were dynamic institutions whose contribution to the early modern state at local level is 
undeniable. 
Finally, in general terms this chapter illustrates the capacity of informal institutions, 
such as business networks, including that of the Genoese lending community, to contribute 
to the consolidation of large early modern states through offering their financial services and 
social capital. The agency of formal institutions, such as the Factoría General or the 
administrators of the nuevo derecho, whose instructions involved coercive means, consisted 
in legally framing the actions and operations of the informal institutions that demanded their 
services. In other words, informal institutions interconnected state builders with the central 





This thesis has analysed the process of state consolidation in the early modern period 
from a joint perspective that amalgamates the agencies of state officials, lending communities, 
and local elites in the Hispanic Monarchy during the mid-sixteenth century. Each of these 
groups of actors have been analysed in their own context, which has enabled us to show the 
convergence of individual and family interests present in the process. Their agendas have 
been examined to test how central administrations could mobilise public and private 
resources effectively in a context of war and financial uncertainty. Although the outcomes of 
this research have already been explained through the three parts of this thesis, a final 
analysis that brings the findings retrospectively together is necessary to understand the 
complexity of the state-formation process in the early modern period. 
Early modern central administrations found too costly or simply unmanageable to rule 
over dispersed territories in the long-term. The negotiation with representative institutions 
of each region was not enough to satisfy the needs of central administrations for additional 
funds during the new large-scale military conflicts. The mobilisation of private resources was, 
therefore, imperative. However, the administrative and social structures of early modern 
states differ from our current conception, which is based on a strong, bureaucratic national 
state able to enforce the mobilisation of private resources through public institutions. The 
example of the Hispanic Monarchy in the mid-sixteenth century demonstrates that another 
model is possible. 
The resort to informal institutions, such as financial and merchant communities, 
demonstrates the viability of the early modern alternative for solving the problem of 
bureaucratic inefficiency in the long term. More specifically, the Hispanic Monarchy created 
formal institutions like the Factoría General, which incorporated members of informal 
institutions from the main lending communities operating in the monarchy (German-Flemish: 
Schetz; Italian: Cattaneo; and Castilian: López del Campo and López Gallo). The participation 
of these former members of informal institutions in the Factoría General developed patterns 
of internal competition and mechanisms of reputation more typical of informal institutions 
than state-regulated organisations. In this sense, early modern formal and informal 
institutions were de facto indistinguishable but not de jure. The legal instructions sanctioned 
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by the royal authority regulated the behaviour and powers of the factores and, therefore, also 
their interactions with other social groups. 
The hiring of the services of the Genoese lending community to mobilise public and 
private resources alike among distant regions, administrations, and individuals is an 
illustrative example of this institutional interaction. The efficiency of the financial services 
that private financiers provided to the Hispanic Monarchy was based on a joint organisational 
model that consisted of bonds of kinship and business partnerships. Furthermore, the 
enforcement of the contracts or asientos that these financiers signed, either with the Factoría 
General or local elites, was guaranteed by reputation mechanisms like cheat-the-cheater and 
syndicated lending. As a result of the convergence of these institutional elements, the 
Genoese lending community can be described as a coalition as its social organisation, rather 
than state-issued documents, regulated the behaviour of their members. 
The analysis of the two case studies of Costantin Gentil and Nicolao de Grimaldo in the 
second part of this thesis demonstrates that competition was allowed, although disloyalty to 
the community was actively denounced as part of the cheat-the-cheater mechanism of 
internal protection among the members of the coalition. However, the research shows that 
no penalty was imposed on Grimaldo by his community for the better financial conditions he 
obtained from the Factoría General after the debt consolidation in June 1557. Instead, the 
main heads of the coalition, such as Adam Centurione, requested identical conditions for their 
own organisations. The reaction against the unbalanced regulation of the financial market 
was, therefore, directed at the central administrations rather than at the member of the 
coalition, to avoid undermining the group. 
The consolidation of royal short-term debt analysed in this thesis changed the financial 
conditions in favour of the Genoese lending community. The decision was the result of a 
financial policy drafted by former members of informal institutions in the Factoría General 
and enacted by the highest authority in the monarchy, though the effective power to enforce 
it lay with the regency of Castile. Although the initial plan consisted of issuing juros at 5% 
interest to financiers in exchange for their debts prior to 1557, the military constraints in 
Europe obliged an increase in the interest of those debt bonds to restore the financial services 
of Genoese financiers. The improvement in the quality of the debt titles issued first benefited 
Nicolao de Grimaldo, who was entitled to trade them and obtain liquidity from their sale 
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through the Factoría General. The new strategy, which was also planned by the factor general 
in collaboration with the Genoese lending community through the new asientos of May 1558, 
announced the system that would prevail for over a century. 
The coordinated action of the two institutions to distribute the improved juros allowed 
the mobilisation of private resources at a scale and dynamism never seen before in the 
monarchy. Debt consolidations, therefore, contributed to the economic integration and 
development of the Hispanic Monarchy since the distribution of the debt titles allowed local 
elites to obtain regular incomes that generated long-term interest, which they could re-invest 
in the circuits of local economies. Nevertheless, this financial development, which allowed 
the monarch to enlarge his borrowing capacity while local elites pursued their private agendas, 
was based on a model of informal institutions that was contested by its counterpart. In effect, 
the complaints that formal institutions like the Castilian cortes raised against the enlargement 
of the royal income ceiling, recently studied by Álvarez Nogal and Chamley, simply reflected 
the conflict between a model of economic and financial development based on formal 
institutions and another on informal institutions. In other words, the new financial system 
apparently removed an important bargaining tool from the representative institutions and 
promoted the use of private circuits of credit between broker and investor. 
The third part of this thesis has illustrated the complexity of the process in order to 
succeed. The cooperation between Genoese lenders to distribute juros among their fellows 
and clients reflects their organisational model of coalition. Nevertheless, since a large share 
of the juros sold to private investors was allocated to alcabalas, a royal income backed by 
representative institutions at local level, defining this credit circuit as private is problematic. 
Apart from the ability of the borrower to employ public funds, lenders could also raise them, 
such as the Council of Xuances. The new financial system was a mixture of public and private 
credit circuits because it depended on formal and informal institutions respectively. The 
financial reform, therefore, merged two models for mobilising resources, which enlarged the 
borrowing capacity of the sovereign and offered local economies an alternative way of 
participating in the state-building process, aside from the traditional fiscal burden. Instead of 
being passive members of the system that occasionally intervened in royal policies, local 
economies became active and visible actors in the financial market. 
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The last chapter examines the reality of these local investors from their perspective in 
relation to juros allocated to the nuevo derecho de lanas. The difference between alcabalas 
and the nuevo derecho in terms of their reliability in relation to the type of institutions backing 
them is remarkable. Whereas the former was backed by local councils, the latter depended 
on the ability of the royal administration to collect the new duty. This thesis has shown a 
preference for alcabalas rather than nuevo derecho among the bondholders studied, 
reflecting the fact that investors trusted more in the fiscal capacity of formal institutions at a 
local level than a joint action between formal and informal institutions on a regional scale. 
The agency of the Genoese lending community in support of Castilian wool exporters 
financially was not enough to compete with the ability of councils to transmit trust among 
investors, notwithstanding those financiers who co-organised the new financial system. In 
this sense, this doctoral thesis has demonstrated that informal institutions were the main 
promotors of economic development beyond local markets in the early modern period, 
challenging traditional concepts in the literature and expanding our understanding of the role 
of lending communities in state consolidation. 
After this thorough investigation, it is now possible to provide some answers to the 
questions posed at the introduction of the thesis. The first question, which considered how it 
was possible to restore trust after financial shocks, has no single response. Trust was literally 
reconstructed through the agency of multiple institutions. Some of them were present even 
before the suspension of payments, such as the Factoría General and the Genoese lending 
community. However, the recovery of trust was the result of the convergence of public and 
private agendas at regional and local level triggered by conflict and intermediated by informal 
institutions. 
Regarding the second research question, which sought to define the behaviour of the 
clients of lending communities in the early modern period, it is possible to argue that they 
were the central piece of the process. Without their private agendas, no transaction could be 
possible either upwards to the monarch or downwards to lower levels of risk diversification. 
Their active role as investors or brokers at the local level allowed interregional organisations 
like the Centurione consortium or the business group of Nicolao de Grimaldo to channel the 
private resources of local economies into royal enterprises. 
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Finally, the third research question contemplated the role of these local actors in the 
process of state consolidation in the early modern period. From the local administrators of 
the nuevo derecho to the nuns of Santa Isabel and San Pablo, taking in the merchants of 
Burgos, all of whom participated in the consolidation of the early modern state in the Hispanic 
Monarchy. These non-state state builders had a direct role in the political, social, economic, 
and cultural process. Their private agendas intermingled with the policies of high institutions, 
either formal or informal, and the actions of high and medium-ranking officials in the royal 
administration. Therefore, the state consisted of the people and institutions that converged 
over time and through their interests to pursue a shared goal. With these few words, and 
many acknowledgements, this doctoral thesis will hopefully open new questions about the 
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